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Abstract 
Although Bangladesh is an emerging democratic country, to some extent her 
democracy differs from others. While incumbent governments act as caretaker 
governments in other emerging democracies, in Bangladesh, non-partisan governments 
acted as caretaker governments during all elections held between 1991 and 2008. The 
purpose of this was to ensure that elections were conducted in a way that was free and fair. 
Since independence in 1971 and until 1990, no elections were free and fair because they 
were massively rigged by incumbent parties. As such, in the 1991 election and its following 
three successive elections, Bangladeshi voters enjoyed immense freedom to express their 
political preferences. In each election, the incumbent party failed to be re-elected for its 
poor performance during its tenure. Anecdotal evidences suggest that voters were anti-
incumbent and as such, influenced by bandwagon effects demonstrating irrational electoral 
behaviour. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate whether millions of Bangladeshi voters 
acted rationally when they turned out for voting and when they rewarded incumbents by 
voting in favour of them.   
Using a panel data set consisting of economic, social, political, electoral, spatio-
electoral characteristics of constituencies in Bangladesh, and political capital stock of 
winners in elections held over the 1991-2008 period, this study finds that the electoral 
behaviour of voters in Bangladesh is consistent with propositions of the reward-punishment 
model as well as the economic vote model. This study empirically analyses determinants 
of the voter turnout rate and winners’ vote shares in Bangladesh. It finds that voter turnout 
rates were higher in constituencies where levels of economic activities or human well-being 
were higher. On the other hand, voter turnout rates were lower in constituencies where 
levels of hard core poverty were higher. By re-electing, voters rewarded incumbents who 
made contributions towards improving their constituencies more than the average 
developed constituencies. The level of development is measured by the level of economic 
activities or human well-being and infrastructural development. This study also finds that 
higher vote shares of re-elected winners are positively related with infrastructural 
development. Thus, this study also finds evidence of the positive effect of patronage 
politics in Bangladesh. Political use of scarce public resources is likely to brew inefficiency 
which emerging democracies like Bangladesh can no longer afford.  
xviii 
 
This study makes some significant contribution towards the study of electoral 
behaviour in emerging democracies like Bangladesh. We use night-time satellite imagery 
as a proxy for per capita gross domestic product, a traditional measure of economic 
activities or human welfare prone to measurement errors. We find it significant in 
explaining voter turnout rates and re-elected incumbents’ vote shares and the relationship 
is positive in both cases, which is an expected result. Secondly, we use two measures of 
political competition – the number of effective parties and the winning margin. We find 
that the winning margin can explain variations in the voter turnout and re-elected 
incumbents’ vote shares more than the number of effective parties. This is expected in the 
context of the two-party dominant political system in Bangladesh. Thirdly, to account for 
the lack of required information, we introduce a new measure of patronage politics – power 
match. Incumbents are power-matching when they belong to the immediate past incumbent 
party. We find that it is significant and it has a positive relationship with the voter turnout 
rate and re-elected incumbents’ vote shares. Fourthly, contrary to the economic vote model 
which hypothesizes that economic conditions influence voter turnout and re-elected 
incumbents’ vote shares, we find that economic as well as political conditions influence 
the voter turnout rate and re-elected incumbents’ vote shares in Bangladesh.  
Findings of this study have implications for increasing voter turnout rates in 
emerging democracies with a view to increasing the legitimacy of elected governments. It 
also has implications for increasing the personal political capital stock of incumbents who 
want to be re-elected, and make a positive contribution towards the socioeconomic and 
political development in emerging democracies.         
 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Bangladesh1 experienced periods of rule by a diverse range of ethnic and religious 
groups before finally gaining independence in 1971. For 450 years (750-1200) Bengali 
Buddhist rulers belonging to the Pala dynasty reigned over her independently. The founder 
of this dynasty was a regional chief and was elected king in a consensus with all regional 
chiefs of Bengal. This indigenous regime was overthrown by a non-indigenous Hindu ruler 
hailing from Karnataka, a South Indian state. He founded the Sena dynastic rule in Bengal. 
The rulers of this dynasty ruled Bangladesh independently for 160 years (1070-1230)2. In 
1203 an Afghan commander of the Muslim Emperor of Delhi conquered the western part 
of Bengal and established non-indigenous Muslim rule there. Gradually the eastern part of 
Bengal also came under their control. Though they came to Bengal as representatives of 
the Muslim Emperor of Delhi, they used to declare independence after consolidating their 
political power in Bengal. Bengal was under the control of these independent non-
indigenous Muslim rulers for 138 years (1203-1342). Their descendants became 
indigenized under exigencies and claimed themselves as Bangalee. Bengal had been under 
their political leadership for the following 233 years (1342-1575). The Bengali language 
and culture which all previous rulers cultivated gave birth to Bengali nationalism during 
the rule of independent indigenized Muslim rulers. Under their rule the spirit of Bengali 
nationalism united the Hindus and Muslims of Bengal so much that for a long time they 
unitedly fought against the aggression of Mughal Muslim Emperors of Delhi. Ultimately, 
they gained control over Bengal and their dependent indigenized Muslim representatives 
ruled for 182 years (1575-1757) before the British East India Company overthrew them in 
1757. The Company ruled Bengal for 104 years (1757-1861) followed by the British 
Government’s reign for another 86 years (1861-1947). During the British rule (1757-1947) 
Indian (including Bengal’s) Hindus and Muslims developed conflicting identities on the 
basis of religion. Consequently, the British Government gave independence to British 
Indians in 1947 and partitioned British India into India and Pakistan in religious line.  
Bangladesh became known as East Pakistan under united Pakistan. However, she 
suffered another 24 years under Pakistan’s internal neo-colonial rule. The people of East 
                                                            
1 As a part of Bengal that consisted of present Bangladesh and West Bengal state of India before 1947. 
2 At the same time the Pala rulers, followers of Buddhism, and Sena rulers, followers of Brahmanic 
Hinduism, ruled different parts of Bangladesh. 
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Pakistan carried on movement for full autonomy on the basis of Bengali nationalism for 
over 24 years (1947-1971) and finally obtained independence in 1971 through a nine-
month long bloody Liberation War. As each rule lasted for a lengthy period, each left some 
lasting legacy in the socioeconomic, political, religious, linguistic and cultural landscape 
in Bangladesh.  
The Bengali language and culture as well as Bengal trade and commerce developed 
under the indigenous Buddhist rule (Pala dynasty), non-indigenous Hindu rule (Sena 
dynasty) and indigenized and non-indigenized Muslim rule over the 750-1441 period. 
While some Bengalees embraced Islam during the Buddhist rule coming in contact with 
Muslim traders from Middle East and Gujrat state of India, a large number of lower caste 
Hindus and Buddhists became Muslim under the influence of Muslim saints from central 
Asia during the Hindu rule. This is because, they strictly enforced Hindu caste system under 
which they were groaning. Non-indigenous Muslims captured ruling power in Bengal in 
1203 and patronized propagation of Islam. The onslaught of Hinduism and Islam weakened 
the influence of Buddhism in Bengal over time. Following establishment of Muslim rule 
by a local converted Muslim in 1441 non-indigenized Muslims started to indigenize. They 
began to cultivate a symbiotic relationship with native Hindus on the basis of Bengali 
language and culture keeping aside their religious identities. It gave birth to Bengali 
nationalism over time. The bond between Hindus and indigenized Muslims became so 
strong that they unitedly resisted attack of Delhi-based Mughal Muslim rulers for a long 
time. The Mughal Muslim rulers ultimately brought Bengal under their control by 
following carrot and stick policy. The Mughal Muslim rule in India created some kind of 
caste system among Indian Muslims. The descendants of Muslims who migrated to India 
from Persia, Afghanistan, Turkey and Central Asia and served in the Muslim 
administration and army prospered socioeconomically under the Muslim rule and 
subsequently claimed themselves as upper class Muslims. The socioeconomic conditions 
of descendants of converts from lower caste Hindus declined under Mughal Muslim rule. 
The upper class Muslims treated them as semi-Hindus, because they practiced some 
cultural elements of Hinduism.  
When the British East India Company established its rule in Bengal in 1757 and 
expanded their rule in other parts of India, the socioeconomic conditions of upper class 
Muslims declined. They did not get jobs under the company for their hatred to English, 
whereas the upper class Hindus learned English enthusiastically. So, the Company gave 
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their administrative jobs to upper class Hindus. This created hostility between upper class 
Hindus and Muslims. Under the company’s rule overall condition of the common people 
deteriorated which led to a great mass revolt in 1858. The company suppressed the revolt 
ruthlessly. Following this event the British Government took the ruling power from the 
company in 1861. Being encouraged by the British Government some Indians formed the 
Indian National Congress to voice Indian’s demands.  
The Bengali nationalism which bonded Bengal’s Hindus and Muslims since 1441 
fractured in 1905 when British Government partitioned Bengal to accelerate 
socioeconomic development of East Bengal mostly inhabited by socioeconomically lower 
class Muslims and Hindus. As it rocked the vested interest of Kolkata-based upper and 
middle class Hindus, they launched violent movement against it. So, some upper class 
Muslim leaders formed the All-India Muslim League (AIML) in 1906 to make Indian 
Muslims’ voice heard by British Government. The British Government annulled Bengal 
partition in 1911. This action caused division in Bengali nationalism in religious line – 
Bengal Hindu and Muslim nationalism.  
In the 1937 election Bengali Muslim nationalism motivated many Muslims to turn 
out to vote for the BPML (Bengal Provincial Muslim League) which claimed itself a 
representative of Bengali Muslim nationalism, while many Muslims voted for the INC 
which claimed itself a representative of Indian nationalism. Many Muslims also voted for 
the Krishak Praja Party which stood for rights of poor peasants irrespective of their 
religious affiliation. So did many Hindus. So, religion-based communalism, geographic 
nationalism as well as secularism were drivers of voter turnout and winners’ vote shares in 
the 1937 election in Bengal. However, no identity was predominant in that election.  
Following the 1937 election the INC formed provincial governments in six 
provinces in British India. Both the INC and the AIML performed poorly in Muslim 
constituencies across British India as well as in Bengal. As the INC did not win in majority 
Muslim constituencies in British India, it could not demand that it was the sole 
representative of Indian Muslims. So, it launched some programmes to expand its support 
base among Muslims. The ML criticized them. Moreover, there were allegations of 
oppression by majority Hindus on minority Muslims in the INC-ruled provinces. All these 
increased hostility between Indian Hindus and Muslim including Bengal’s. In this context 
in 1940 the AIML passed the Lahore resolution demanding creation of separate Muslim 
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states in Muslim-dominant regions in British India. The INC criticized it. Following the 
end of the WWII the INC launched the ‘quit India’ movement. By 1946 the Hindu-Muslim 
relationship deteriorated further. It became clear to British Government that British India 
must be given independence as soon as possible. In order to form the constituent assembly 
the government held the 1946 election. The AIML won in most Muslim constituencies 
across British India including Bengal. So, the AIML emerged as the sole representative of 
Indian Muslims and hence neither British Government nor the INC could any longer 
undermine it. Following this victory the AIML modified the Lahore resolution and 
demanded creation of one Muslim state called Pakistan. Some Bengali nationalist leaders 
of the ML protested against it instantly, but this protest went unheard at that time. It planted 
the seed of Bangladesh, which the AIML could not foresee. When the AIML was sure that 
the INC would not let creation of Pakistan, it launched Direct Action Programme which 
provoked violent Hindu-Muslim riots across India including Bengal. So, under duress 
British Government partitioned British India into India and Pakistan in religious line in 
1947.                      
Pakistan consisted of two parts separated by India –East Pakistan (present 
Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (present Pakistan). India separated East and West Pakistan 
and the distance was nearly 2,208 kilometres. The languages and cultures of the people of 
East and West Pakistan were different. They co-shared religious identity only. From the 
very beginning Pakistan Government started to deprive people of East Pakistan from their 
democratic rights. Under their discriminatory rule West Pakistan had been developing at a 
much faster rate than East Pakistan (Sobhan, 2016:263). It triggered the spirit of Bengali 
nationalism that banded Bengali Muslims and Hindus over a half millennium since 1441, 
but forked in 1905 when Bengal was partitioned. As a corollary it also ignited a strong 
sense of regionalism among Bengali-speaking East Pakistani Muslims and Hindus. The 
impacts of the rise of the Bengali nationalism and regionalism were reflected in the 1954 
and the 1970 provincial elections held in East Pakistan under united Pakistan’s internal 
neo-colonial rule. In both elections East Pakistanis turned out to express their grievance 
against Pakistan’s misrule and voted for the Awami League (AL) which spearheaded the 
demand for full-autonomy of East Pakistan. When the AL won landslide victory in the 
1970 election, but West Pakistan-based civil and military bureaucracy and political elites 
did not hand over power to the AL. They rather started to perpetrate genocide in East 
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Pakistan. So, people of East Pakistan launched freedom movement and Bangladesh became 
independent on 16 December 1971.   
In the post-independent period some elections (1973, 1979, 1986 and 1988) were 
held, but those were massively rigged by incumbent parties. So, electoral outcomes did not 
reflect political preferences of the people. Moreover, people lost their trust in the electoral 
system. The two dominant opposition parties (the AL and the BNP) and some other smaller 
parties launched joint movement against the military government in the early 1980s, 
because it captured ruling power unconstitutionally.  When it got re-elected in the 1986 and 
the 1988 election by massive vote rigging, they demanded its unconditional resignation. In 
the face of mass upsurge in the late 1990 it stepped down. In order to transfer power to a 
democratically elected government an election was held in 1991 under a non-partisan 
caretaker government (NCG). As the election was free and fair, it restored trust of the 
people in the electoral system again. It was followed by three more free and fair elections. 
In each election millions of voters turned out for voting. Over time voter turnout rates 
increased and so did winners’ vote shares. It is unexpected according to propositions of 
electoral behaviour models and empirical findings.  
Millions of people participated in the mass movement under the leadership of 
dominant parties to oust the military government which seized power unconstitutionally in 
1982 and got re-elected in the 1986 and the 1988 elections by massive vote rigging. So, 
they demanded resignation of the government unconditionally. When the government 
resigned, the NCG organized an election and took all measures to make the election free 
and fair. This provided the people with an opportunity to express their political preferences. 
The dominant parties that led mass movement participated in the 1991 election and 
campaigned across the country to vote for them. It was expected that the voter turnout rate 
in the 1991 election would be high, but it was only 55.43 percent. The victorious BNP 
polled 30.8 percent vote, whereas the dominant opposition AL polled 30.1 percent vote. 
The average vote share of the BNP’s winners was 44.94 percent, whereas that of the AL’s 
winners was 43.03 percent. The BNP lost in the 1996 election. The key reason may be its 
failure to meet expectation of the people during its tenure, but its vote share increased to 
33.6 percent and the average vote share of its winners increased to 45.37 percent. The 
turnout rate jumped to 75.55 percent. According to the economic vote model (Downs, 
1957), asymmetric grievance vote model (Mueller, 1970) and revised asymmetric 
grievance vote model (Nannestad and Paldam, 1997) voters were likely to turn out more in 
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the 1996 election to express their grievance against the incumbent BNP by voting against 
it.  In some cases they did so and in some cases they did not. Voters punished the party in 
this sense that its vote share is less than the victorious AL in 1996. On the other hand, 
voters rather rewarded the party in this sense that its vote share is more than what it was in 
1991.  Moreover, voters rewarded its winners by voting more for them. The same happened 
in the 2001 election. In the 2008 election the incumbent BNP failed to be re-elected. The 
reason may be that it failed to deliver what it promised earlier. The voter turnout rate 
increased from 76.06 percent in 2001 to 87.05 percent in 2008. The voters were likely to 
turn out to express their grievance against the incumbent party. In some cases they did so. 
The vote share of the incumbent BNP declined from 41.4 percent in 2001 to 33.2 percent 
in 2008. Moreover, its vote share was 33.2 percent against the dominant opposition AL’s 
vote share of 49 percent in 2008. However, voters did not punish winners belonging to the 
incumbent BNP, because their average vote share increased from 54.04 percent in 2001 to 
54.24 percent in 2008.  While voters seemed to have punished the incumbent party as a 
whole in relation to the dominant opposition party for its failure to deliver what it promised 
in election campaigns, they did not punish their winners at all. So, there is a paradox in the 
voting behaviour of the voters in Bangladesh according to aforesaid theoretical electoral 
behaviour models. 
Another paradox is observed in the voting behaviour of the voters in Bangladesh 
when we compare them with findings of some empirical studies. In the East European 
emerging democracies voter turnout rates were high in the early elections following demise 
of the authoritarian communist rule in the early 1990s, but they gradually fell over 
successive elections. It is because, voters were promised peace, stability and prosperity 
when they participated in the movement against authoritarian communist rulers. The 
successive democratic governments failed to deliver what they promised. So, voters were 
increasingly disillusioned and as such they turned out less in subsequent elections. The 
turnout rate declined from 86.28 percent in the first election to 74.88 percent in the second 
election. Again, it declined from 74.88 percent in the second election to 68.43 percent in 
the third election and so on (Kostadinova, 2003). On the other hand, in Bangladesh the 
voter turnout rate increased from 55.45 in 1991 to 75.55 in 1996. Again, it increased from 
75.55 percent in 1996 to 76.06 in 2001 to 87.05 in 2008. As each successive incumbent 
party failed to deliver what it promised, voters were most likely to be disillusioned and as 
such their turnout rates were likely to fall.  
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Some similarities as well as dissimilarities exist between contexts of elections in 
Bangladesh and East European emerging democracies. Both have established democracies 
following collapse of authoritarian rulers and there were mass movements against them for 
a long time. While political elites in East European emerging democracies agreed on the 
mechanism of peaceful transfer of power through free and fair elections, those in 
Bangladesh could not. While each incumbent party tried to be re-elected by unfair means, 
opposition parties tried to plug off all unfair means of re-election through prolonged strikes. 
So, some unexpected events took place before each election for a long time. This may make 
each election critical. This might have contributed to an increase rather than a decrease in 
voter turnout rates.        
Empirical studies are mostly concerned with determinants of voter turnout rates and 
winners’ vote shares in developing countries where elections are held regularly. Though 
elections were held more or less regularly in Bangladesh over the 1991-2008 period with 
some exceptions, in some respects Bangladesh case is unique. There are some paradoxes 
in voter turnout rates as well as winners’ vote shares in Bangladesh from theoretical as well 
as empirical perspectives, but they were not focused in the existing empirical studies. So, 
this study is very interesting.    
While Karim (2007:379-405) analyses voters’ turnout rates in length, another study 
(Ahmed, 2011) explains it very tangentially. Only Baldersheim et al. (2001) exclusively 
analyze determinants of voters’ turnout in the 1996 election in Bangladesh. Using voters’ 
turnout rates in regions of Bangladesh and some socioeconomic and political variables, 
Baldersheim et al. (2001) test the modernization and political development theories of voter 
turnout rates. Secondly, Baldersheim et al. (2001) use the multiple linear regression 
method. They include twenty seven economic, social, political and electoral variables. 
Though their analysis is very comprehensive in many respects, it has some limitations. It 
uses electoral, social, economic and political data of a particular year. So, it does not 
identify factors that could potentially influence voters’ turnout rates across elections. 
Thirdly, in order to capture effects of socioeconomic and political differences among 
regions on voter turnout rates they divide the whole of Bangladesh into two broad regions: 
the northern region and the rest of Bangladesh, and Chittagong Hill Tracts and the rest of 
Bangladesh. It is well known that the northern region and Chittagong Hill Tracts area are 
markedly different from the rest of Bangladesh, but the rest of Bangladesh is also markedly 
heterogeneous in terms of their socioeconomic and political characteristics. As a result, 
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their binary classification of the territory of Bangladesh is unlikely to capture highly 
distinctive characteristics of different regions of Bangladesh. Fourthly, they use twenty 
seven socioeconomic and political variables in their full model. They dichotomize seventy 
percent variables which are continuous. By following this method they attempt to make 
their analysis simple, but take some risks: (i) much information about those variables are 
lost; (ii) it reduces the statistical power to detect a relationship between the variable of 
interest and the turnout rate; (iii) it may give positive association between the variable of 
interest and the turnout rate, but this positive might be false positive; (iv) it most probably 
underestimates the extent of variation in the variable of interest; and (v) it possibly conceals 
the non-linear relationship between the variable of interest and the turnout rate (Altman 
and Royston, 2006). Moreover, their reduced as well as full models are over-specified due 
to inclusion of too many variables of same categories. So, their models are not well-
specified.  
In contrast to Baldersheim et al. (2001), Karim’s (2007: 379-405) approach is 
atheoretical. He uses all electoral variables except one (terrorism proneness) as explanatory 
variables to explain their effects on voter turnout rates. He does not present correlation 
coefficient matrix of the explanatory variables of his models. It is most likely that some 
explanatory variables are highly correlated. As for example, the number of seats won by 
the Awami League and that of the Four-party Alliance in the 1996 election are likely to be 
highly correlated, because the Awami League (AL) was a major partner of the alliance 
(Karim, 2007:403). Secondly, he does not use any social and economic variables. So, his 
analysis suffers from omitted variable bias. Thirdly, he follows the methodology that 
Baldersheim et al. (2001) use as the basis of classification of the territory of Bangladesh. 
For example, he classifies the whole of Bangladesh as urban versus rural constituencies, 
Dhaka (capital city) versus the rest of Bangladesh, terrorism prone constituencies versus 
non-terrorism prone constituencies, constituencies where elections were rigged versus 
constituencies where elections were not rigged and so on. He tries to estimate the 
relationship between turnout rates and various characteristics of constituencies. However, 
like Baldersheim et al. (2001) his broad classification framework was most unlikely to 
capture distinctive characteristics of different regions of Bangladesh.   
A good number of researchers (e.g., Baxter and Rahman, 1991; Kochanek, 1996; 
Khan, 1997; Islam, 2001; Ahmed, 2002; Mannan, 2005; Karim, 2007; Manik, 2008;; 
Alamgir, 2009; Ahmed, 2011) investigate determinants of winning party’s vote shares in 
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Bangladesh over the 1991-2008 period. Only Karim (2007) focus on determinants of 
winning candidates of dominants parties in those elections. The existing studies that deal 
with identification of factors influencing winners’ vote shares in the post-1990 elections 
suffer from some limitations. An important limitation is that their scopes are very narrow. 
They focus more on backgrounds of elections, manifestos of parties and their electioneering 
strategies and less on the socioeconomic development during the tenure of the incumbent 
party. Only a few of them (e.g., Rashiduzzaman, 2002; Manik, 2008) mention about 
economic and social factors that might have affected winners’ vote shares. Secondly, while 
some studies (e.g., Baxter and Rahman, 1991; Ahmed, 2011 and Kochanek, 1996) limit 
their analysis within a particular election, some other studies (e.g., Khan, 1997; Islam, 
2001; Mannan, 2005; Karim, 2007) compare and contrast between two adjacent elections 
or a number of consequent elections. Thirdly, except Karim (2007) all other studies use 
summary statistics of national-level aggregate electoral data as a tool of analysis. So, they 
do not capture the electoral dynamics at the constituency level. Fourthly, most studies base 
their analysis on personal intuitions or anecdotal evidences. None test any hypothesis being 
derived from any electoral behavioural models. Fifthly, only Mannan’s (2005) and Karim’s 
(2007) analyses are more comprehensive than all others. They use electoral data of three 
consecutive elections (1991, 1996 and 2001). Mannan (2005) uses summary statistics of 
national level aggregate data as an analytical tool and hence does not control other variables 
that could potentially influence winners’ vote shares.  
Karim’s (2007) study is the most comprehensive one regarding determinants of 
winners’ vote shares in Bangladesh.  So, it deserves proper evaluation. Karim (2007) uses 
the multiple linear regression method and thus he controls some other variables that could 
potentially affect winners’ vote shares. He uses constituency level electoral data and hence 
he tries to capture electoral dynamics at the constituency level. However, Karim’s (2007) 
analysis suffer from some methodological limitations. His analysis is not based on any 
electoral behavioral models and hence he does not test any hypothesis. Secondly, except 
one variable all other variables being used by Karim (2007) are derived from electoral data, 
which are likely to be highly correlated. He does not present correlation coefficient matrix 
of his explanatory variables. Thirdly, he does not take into consideration the socioeconomic 
and political heterogeneity across constituencies in Bangladesh. As a result, his multiple 
linear regression models are not well specified and hence results are less reliable. Fourthly, 
he does not include any economic and social variables which are likely to influence the 
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electoral outcomes. So, his analysis suffers from omitted variable bias. Last not the least, 
he analyzes electoral data of each election separately and thus his analysis does not identify 
the factors that are likely to influence winners’ vote shares across elections. So, his analysis 
is more contextual.  
The existing empirical studies focus on voter turnout and winners’ vote shares in 
general and re-elected winners’ vote shares in particular in developed countries as well as 
in developing countries where elections are regular and free and fair. There are three regular 
and one irregular free and fair elections in the post-independent period in Bangladesh. All 
other elections were rigged. Moreover, voter turnout and winner’s vote shares in those free 
and fair elections show some paradoxical behaviour from both theoretical as well as 
empirical perspective. So, it is interesting to identify factors that influenced this paradoxical 
electoral behaviour in Bangladesh.      
In this context the main objective of our study is to address some limitations of 
existing studies and hence improve our understanding about determinants of winners’ vote 
shares and voter turnout in Bangladesh. With this end in view our study uses a more 
comprehensive panel data set consisting of economic, social, political and personal 
variables as well as electoral variables that cover all four elections held over the 1991-2008 
period. We include one or two variables from each category so that variables under the 
same category are not highly correlated. Secondly, we use the fixed effect (elections and 
constituencies simultaneously) model to take into consideration the socioeconomic and 
political heterogeneity across constituencies and elections in Bangladesh. Thirdly, we test 
robustness of coefficients of some variables by substituting some competing variables. For 
example, we use inverse of the HHI index and winning margin as measures of electoral 
competition. We test their effects on other variables by alternating them. Therefore, our 
results are likely to be more reliable than those of existing studies. We also test robustness 
of our results by different specifications of models.      
This study has five core chapters. The second chapter summarizes the electoral 
behavioural models in chronological order in terms of their time of development. It 
discusses the main ideas of each model, and its strengths and weaknesses. It also discusses 
the findings of studies that test it empirically.  
As current socioeconomic and political landscape of Bangladesh is the legacy of 
past political systems, the third chapter elaborates the strategies rulers (independent 
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indigenous, independent indigenized and colonial) in Bengal adopted to derive political 
legitimacy of their regimes in absence of present-day democratic elections.  It also 
discusses the strategies the British colonial rulers applied to legitimize and prolong their 
colonial rule in British India. This chapter further describes the strategies the pro-
independent British Indian political elites used to liberate British India from the British 
colonial rule. So, this chapter consists of conflicting as well as collaborating interactions 
between rulers and the ruled. As a corollary, this chapter focuses on Hindu-Muslim 
conflicts as well as cooperation in British India since introduction of democratic elections 
in 1920 and development of religio-communal forces that led to partition of British India 
into Pakistan and India on the basis of religion. Following elaborate discussion on strategic 
interactions between Pakistani neo-colonial rulers who tried to suppress East Pakistanis 
and East Pakistani nationalist political leaders who aimed to overthrow Pakistan’s neo-
colonial rule this chapter ends with discussion on the 1970 election which created 
independent Bangladesh.  
The fourth chapter carries out an in-depth analysis of each election held in 
Bangladesh since independence in 1971. It discusses background of each election, 
manifestos of dominant parties and their electioneering strategies, results of the election 
and consequences of the election. This is because each election was held in a markedly 
different context. In the course of analysis it also tries to identify causes of polling more 
votes by the winning party and less votes by the dominant opposition party.  It also explains 
causes of lower or higher voter turnout rates in each election. Moreover, it compares and 
contrasts between different aspects of two adjacent elections.    
As the very first hurdle voters face in the process of political participation is to 
decide whether they should turn out for voting or not, the fifth chapter attempts to identify 
determinants of voter turnout rates in all parliamentary elections held over the 1991-2008 
period. It describes each explanatory variable, the method of its construction and reasons 
for its inclusion in models. This chapter develops three basic models in the framework of 
the vote-popularity function. In the first model the dependent variable is voter turnout rates 
and independent variables are socioeconomic and political variables at their levels. In the 
second model the dependent variable is voter turnout rates and independent variables are 
those included in the first model and the lagged dependent variable is added as an additional 
explanatory variable. The first and the second model include election and constituency 
fixed effects. In the third model the dependent variable is the first difference of voter 
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turnout rates and independent variables are also first difference of all explanatory variables 
included in the first model. The third model includes only election fixed effects. While the 
first and the second model test the short-term memory and the third model tests the long-
term memory of voters.  
A major finding of the fifth chapter is that voter turnout rates are influenced by both 
the short- and long-term memory of voters. So, our findings subscribe to both Kramer 
(1971) and Stigler (1973) who pioneered in operationalizing Downs’ (1957) economic vote 
model. Some other key findings of this chapter are as follows: (i) a higher level of economic 
activities in constituencies and a higher urbanization rate lead to a higher level of voter 
turnout; (ii) a higher level of hard core poverty leads to a lower level of voter turnout; (iii) 
voter turnout rates are higher in constituencies where incumbent members of the parliament 
belong to the immediate past incumbent party; (iv) a higher cost of turning out leads to a 
lower turnout rate; (v) when winning margins are wider in the current election with respect 
to the previous one, turnout rates in the current election are lower; and (vi) when cost of 
turning out is more in the current election with respect to the previous one, the turnout rate 
in the current election is lower . While these findings are expected, some other findings are 
unexpected, such as (i) as voters become more literate they are expected to turnout more, 
but we find that they turn out less; (ii) as road density per polling station becomes higher 
voters are expected to turnout more. It is because, their cost of voting is likely to be lower. 
In contrast, we find that as road density per polling station becomes higher voter turnout 
rates become lower. We have explained possible reasons of these paradoxical results.  
Having overcome the first hurdle whether voters should or should not turn out for 
voting, the second hurdle voters face is the choice of a party or a candidate. So, the sixth 
chapter investigates determinants of winners’ voter shares in all parliamentary elections 
held in Bangladesh over the 1991-2008 period. It describes each explanatory variable, the 
method of its construction and reasons for its inclusion in models.  We develop four basic 
models in the framework of the vote-popularity function. In the first, second, third and 
fourth model the dependent variable is vote shares of all winners, all re-elected winners, all 
re-elected winners in marginal constituencies and all re-elected winners in non-marginal 
constituencies respectively. The independent variables are socioeconomic and political 
variables at their levels. Each model includes election and constituency fixed effects. The 
estimates of the first model are not meaningful from theoretical perspective, because the 
dependent variable is winners’ vote shares. These winners may be freshmen or re-elected. 
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While voters tend to reward or punish freshmen for their prospective performance, they 
tend to reward or punish incumbents for their future performance being extrapolated from 
their retrospective performance (Downs, 1957). As our data set does not have voters’ 
evaluation about freshmen’s prospective performance, the estimates of the first model are 
inconclusive.  So, we drop freshmen in our second, third and fourth models. As our data 
set consists of values of socioeconomic and political variables in the retrospect, estimates 
of our second, third and fourth models are meaningful from theoretical perspectives. Still 
we estimate our first model as a benchmark model. 
 The estimates of our second model concerning determinants of re-elected winners’ 
vote shares, support some propositions of Key’s (1966) reward-punishment model and 
Downs’ (1957) economic vote model. They are as follows: (i) voters vote for (reward) 
incumbents more when levels of economic activities and literacy are higher; (ii) they 
reward incumbents more when levels of development of their constituencies are higher 
with respect to average developed constituencies. Other key findings are as follows: (iii) 
vote shares of re-elected winners belonging to the immediate past incumbent party are 
higher than those of re-elected winners belonging to opposition parties; (iv) vote shares of 
re-elected winners belonging to political alliances are higher than those of re-elected 
winners who do not belong to any political alliance; (v) vote shares of re-elected winners 
are lower when they encounter tougher competition from runners-up; and (vi) as winning 
margins increase so do vote shares of re-elected winners.       
The estimates of our third model concerning determinants of re-elected winners’ 
vote in marginal constituencies, also support some key propositions of Key’s (1966) 
reward-punishment model and Downs’ (1957) economic vote model. We find that vote 
shares of re-elected winners in moderately developed marginal constituencies are higher 
than those of re-elected winners in lower developed marginal ones. We also find that vote 
shares of re-elected winners in higher developed marginal constituencies are higher than 
those of re-elected winners in lower developed marginal ones. Our other key findings are 
as follows: (i) vote shares of re-elected winners in marginal constituencies are higher when 
they belong to political alliances and lower when they encounter higher levels of electoral 
competition; and (ii) vote shares of re-elected winners in marginal constituencies are higher 
when they belong to the immediate past incumbent party and lower when they belong to 
opposition parties. While these findings are expected, some findings are unexpected. For 
example, when the Hindu population as a percentage of total population is higher in a 
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marginal constituency where incumbents are re-elected, vote shares of re-elected winners 
in marginal constituencies are lower. We attempt to explain possible reasons of this 
paradoxical result. 
The estimates of our fourth model concerning determinants of vote shares of re-
elected winners in non-marginal constituencies, are similar to those of the third model with 
only one exception. While the hard core poverty variable is insignificant in the third model, 
it is significant in the fourth model. The sign is negative, which is expected. It is because, 
poor voters tend to express their grievance against the electoral system by not turning out 
to vote. They may not turn out to vote due to their higher opportunity cost of voting. They 
may be preoccupied with earning livelihood.   
The seventh and final chapter is the conclusion of this study. We summarize historical 
background of elections held in Bangladesh since 1920s. We also summarize our major 
findings in this chapter. We highlight some weaknesses of this study.  
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Models and Empirics of Electoral Behaviour 
2.1 Introduction 
 This chapter aims to review key ideas of some important electoral behavioural 
models, their strengths and weaknesses, and results of their empirical tests. For 
convenience of discussion models are classified into several broad categories.  
Voting is organized when more than one principal or agent takes decisions on single 
or multiple issues. The complexities in making collective choices increase as number of 
decision-makers increases and the range of alternatives expands. Though collective 
decision-makers encounter several problems in making public choices, they reach 
decisions mostly through some form of voting in a democratic system. Making decisions 
on public issues is more problematic in the political arena. This is because, political elites 
who are entrusted to take decisions on behalf of their constituents do not usually bear all 
the related costs. However, they frequently claim credit for any benefit accruing to the 
public from related decisions. They also would like to bank on public benefits 
camouflaging their personal and partisan benefits. Similarly, when voters cast votes in 
favour or against certain parties or candidates, they are likely to pass through certain mental 
processes and take into consideration a good number of factors. Voters usually weigh 
personal and/or social benefits against corresponding costs. In many cases the costs and 
benefits of public choices are inequitably shared by different sections of the population.  
Moreover, both political elites and voters make decisions amid uncertainty about many 
ongoing and upcoming events. Given these conditions, formal voting models attempt to 
trace back the processes through which voters pass while taking voting decisions. 
Moreover, voting models also focus on identifying factors that are most likely to influence 
processes as well as outcomes of electoral behaviour. Following the introduction of 
universal adult franchise in the Western democracies in the late 19th and early 20th century, 
researchers initially started to explore factors underpinning electoral behaviour with a view 
to building up electoral models. Since electoral behaviour is a complex phenomenon 
encompassing a large spectrum of aspects of human behaviour, the development of voting 
models followed a multi-disciplinary approach. With the passage of time deficiencies in 
previous models became evident and they were replaced or modified to explain voting 
behaviour in emerging contexts.    
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The following section explores the trajectory of development of electoral behaviour 
models staring from the recorded earliest to the most recent. It also classifies models into 
multiple categories and discusses the basis of classification. The third section explains all 
models mentioned in the second section. As this section is considerably long, it is divided 
into several sub-sections. Each subsection describes the main idea of one model only, 
results of empirical investigations and strengths and limitations. The models are described 
in chronological order. The final section summarises key features of some mainstream 
models. It also focuses on the specific theoretical models that may possess the potentiality 
to explain electoral behaviour in Bangladesh in the colonial and independent periods.  
2.2 Chronological development and classification of electoral behaviour models  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Chronological development of models of the electoral behaviour 
 
 
Source: Constructed by the author 
Figure 2.1 presents the chronological development of electoral behaviour models. 
As time passes on, new issues appear, and researchers develop models addressing those 
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issues. Researches explored different aspects of electoral behaviour before the 
development of the first model by Hotelling (1929). The development of models was few 
and far between in earlier periods. The pace of development of models accelerated 
following the advent of Downs’ (1957) economic theory of democracy. This is because, 
Downs (1957) suggests that economic conditions affect voters’ political participation and 
choice of party. As economic data became readily and abundantly available, researchers 
used data to test the economic voting model and extended it in various directions. 
Development of models has slowed down in recent decades. This may reflect that existing 
models have covered most aspects of the electoral behaviour of modern voters. 
The economic vote model building exercise commences with Hotelling’s (1929) 
‘linear city model’. Hotelling emphasizes the selection of location by two competing 
business firms1. Hotelling (1929) applies this to the case of politics to develop a spatial 
(ideological) model. His idea is that voters tend to vote for the candidate whose policy 
position is ‘closer’ to them. While this is intuitively appealing, it is hard to measure 
quantitatively the ideological ‘closeness’ or ‘distance’ between two political parties. This 
problem becomes worse if ideological ‘closeness’ is measured along several dimensions. 
A second factor is that Euclidean distance between two parties in terms of ideology makes 
two assumptions about issues: (i) issues are separable and (ii) each issue is equally salient. 
In the case of comparison of ideologies of two parties these assumptions are empirically 
unrealistic and hence this model has some theoretical limitations. The spatial (ideological) 
model is further extended by Downs (1957), Davis and Hinich (1966, 1967, 1968), Davis 
et al. (1970), Coughlin (1992), Enelow and Hinich (1984, 1990), and Hinich and Munger 
(1997). While Cox (1969) shows how voting behaviour of one region spills over to 
neighbouring regions through diffusion of information, Besley and Case (1995) show how 
voters compare retrospective economic performance of incumbents of neighbouring 
regions with their own and punish under-performers and reward high-performers. 
Mueller’s (1970) ‘asymmetric grievance model’, Nannestad and Paldam’s (1997) ‘revised 
asymmetric grievance model’, Key’s (1966) ‘reward-punishment model’ and Fiorina’s 
(1981) ‘retrospective vote model’ can be related with the spatial (ideological) model in the 
sense that voters compare their own ideal position with candidates’ position in the policy 
space. Arrow’s (1951) ‘impossibility theorem’ lays down the foundation of modern social 
                                                            
1 Like Hotelling (1929), Lerner and Singer (1937), and Smithies (1941) also address the problem of 
location. 
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choice theories. It belongs to the family of the spatial (ideological) models, because three 
voters may not agree due to their ideological mis-match.  
 
All models in Figure 2.1 can be divided into two broad groups: (i) spatial 
(ideological/geographical) and (ii) aspatial. Each can again be classified as either 
instrumentalist or expressive. Further can also be categorized as sociological or non-
sociological. Some models, however, do not fit into any of these groups. These can be 
treated as miscellaneous. These classifications are illustrated in Figure 2.2.  
Figure 2.2: Classifications of electoral behaviour models 
 
Source: Constructed by the author 
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Most spatial models are concerned with the instrumental costs and benefits from 
voting. Some aspatial models such as Riker and Ordeshook’s (1968) early ‘expressive vote 
model’, Brennan and Lomasky’s (1993) modern ‘expressive vote model’ and Ferejohn and 
Fiorina’s (1974) ‘minimax regret vote model’ emphasise the expressive aspect of voting. 
A single voter does not have the capability to influence the electoral outcome in a voter’s 
favour and thus she does not derive any direct benefits from voting. These voters cast their 
votes to derive some other kinds of satisfaction. For example, she may vote to express her 
support for some ideology a candidate or a party stands for or to minimise her regret if her 
favoured candidate fails to win for a single vote which she could have provided with. While 
the models assume that the given socioeconomic and political conditions influence voters, 
there are some voting models that argue that what we know as ‘given’ is not given at all. 
Incumbents deliberately try to influence conditions by some policy instruments under their 
disposal to give some kind of ‘false’ impression to voters about their retrospective and 
prospective performance. These models include Buchanan’s (1960) political budget cycle 
model and Nordhaus’ (1975) political business cycle model. There are other models which 
investigate voting from different perspectives. They emphasize partly the instrumental 
aspect and partly expressive aspect. They may fall somewhere between the pure 
instrumentalist models and the pure expressive models. They may be called quasi-
instrumentalist-expressive models. Examples of such models include Lazarsfeld et al. 
(1944)’s Columbia model, Campbell et al.’s (1960) Michigan model, McKelvey and 
Ordeshook’s (1972) strategic vote model, and Goodin and Roberts’ (1975) ethical vote 
model. Each of them stands alone.  
2.3 Instrumentalist vote models 
These models emphasize the direct costs of and benefits from voting. They assume 
that the incumbent herself or another belonging to her party competes in elections. If the 
net benefit from the individual incumbent or her party is greater than zero, voters vote for 
the incumbent otherwise for the challenger. The models which fall under this category are 
Hotelling’s (1929) linear city model, Downs’ (1957) economic vote model/rational choice 
model, Buchanan’s (1960,1967) political budget cycle model, key’s (1966) reward-
punishment model, Mueller’s (1970) asymmetric grievance model, Nordhaus’ (1975) 
political business cycle model, Fiorina’s (1981) retrospective vote model and Nannestad 
and Paldam’s (1997) revised asymmetric vote model. They are explained below.  
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2.3.1 The spatial voting model 
By developing the spatial voting model Hotelling (1929) commenced the process 
of developing voting models. He builds his model based on three important assumptions: 
(i) buyers are evenly distributed along a linear market; (ii) their demand for a good is 
perfectly inelastic, and (iii) their only objective is to maximize profit. His model predicts 
that two firms would settle at the centre of the linear market and very close to each other, 
because firms want to their market share and maximize profits by moving towards the 
centre. When located at the centre, profit is maximized, and a stable market equilibrium is 
attained. No firms will have any tendency to move away from the centre of the market. 
Hotelling (1929) finds that his spatial (geographical location) model of competition 
between two firms selling an identical product and convergence of their business locations 
at the middle of a linear market can also explain close convergence of many policies (in 
terms of ideological stance along a liberal-conservative dimension) of the Democratic Party 
and the Republican Party in the US.   
Strengths and limitations of the spatial voting model 
Though the Hotelling (1929) model has been able to show near-convergence of 
policies of two parties and stable equilibrium in the political structure in the US, some of 
its axioms are questionable and thus it needs reformulation (Stokes, 1963). Its basic axiom 
of single dimension of political conflict is too much simplification of the real situation in 
the US politics, let alone in the multi-party West European political systems (Stroke, 1963). 
Political competition between two or many parties in any political system is most likely to 
be multidimensional ranging from religious, racial or ethnic identifications to special 
socioeconomic, demographic and regional ones. In many cases they are independent rather 
than dependent, conflicting rather than confirmatory, nontransitive rather than transitive. 
So, they are hard to align along the left-right (conservative-liberal) dimension. Secondly, 
Hotelling (1929) equates political space to physical one, but they are not substitutable. It is 
because, the former is variable, while the latter is fixed. The policy space which parties 
employ for gaining electoral support vary over time. The policy that is salient in one 
election may become unimportant in another election. New dimensions are likely to appear 
in the policy space in almost every election. When leaders of a party can capitalize on this, 
they are likely to win. In 1948, for example, the US electorate seemed to have evaluated 
parties by socioeconomic changes brought about by the New Deal era and the incumbent 
party (the Democratic Party) highlighted its outcomes and was re-elected. On the contrary, 
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in 1952 the US electorate seemed to have evaluated parties by their stance on foreign policy 
issues and the incumbent party failed to bank on it and subsequently lost (Fleck, 1999). 
Thirdly, for well-functioning of this model, preferences of political parties and voters must 
be arranged as an ordered set of alternatives and distribution of voters must be unimodal 
so that parties are able to position themselves along ideological dimensions. There must be 
confluence in preferences of parties and voters. Since parties position themselves very close 
to each other along ideological dimensions, it is hard for common voters to distinguish 
between them, and consequently they are likely to make mistakes in choosing right 
candidates. Fourthly, when both parties and voters position themselves ideologically, the 
model is likely to function well. On the contrary, when one group positions itself 
ideologically and another group positions itself opportunistically, the model breaks down. 
Fifthly, in the Hotelling’s (1929) model an equilibrium is attained at the centre of the linear 
market where the two competing firms locate their shops. Analogous to the economic 
market, it suggests that in a two-party political system parties’ competition for garnering 
majority support forces them to formulate policy platforms that are preferred to the median 
voter. So, their policy-platforms do not differ much. Smithies (1941) spots a problem with 
Hotelling’s (1929) model, which assumes that demand for merchandise at each point of the 
linear market is inelastic. Therefore, when a firm starts moving toward the centre from 
either left or right end to encroach into the catchment of the other firm with a view to 
capturing more customers, it does not lose any customer located near left or right end. If 
the assumption is changed in this way that demand for the product is elastic at every 
location of the linear market, as a firm moves towards the centre it does lose customers at 
the end. This may put a brake on their movement toward the centre. Thus, they may locate 
their shops away from the centre too. Analogous to this in the political arena, in some two-
party system policy platforms of two competing parties may be distinct from one another 
due to threat of withdrawal of support from core supporters of the party (Downs, 1957:118-
119).  
2.3.2 The economic/rational voting model 
Long before Downs (1957) many researchers (e.g., Meriiam and Gosnell, 1924; 
Rice, 1928; Gosnell, 1930; Tibbits, 1931; Tingsten, 1937; Bean, 1940; Ogburn and 
Coombs, 1940; Gosnell and Coleman, 1940; Gosnell and Pearson, 1940; and many others) 
explored the effects of economic condition on vote shares of winners and losers and voters’ 
turnout rates. However, these studies were deductive. Downs (1957) advances the 
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economic vote model or economic theory of democracy. He borrows his idea from some 
earlier models, such as Hotelling (1929), Smithies (1941), Schumpeter (1942/1951), Black 
(1948a, b), Arrow (1950, 1951) and Key (1966)2. He blends them in an innovative way. 
He explains electoral behaviour with the help of economic tools. In his model he shows 
how economic conditions influence voters’ behaviours (lower part of the Figure 2.3).  
Downs develops his model based on some key assumptions about voters, candidates 
and the political system. First, voters are rational: they vote instrumentally; they turnout 
for voting when net benefit from voting is positive; they derive utility from retrospective 
performance of the incumbent; they forecast the prospective performance of the incumbent 
on the basis of its retrospective performance and vote for it if it exceeds a threshold level; 
they hold the incumbent responsible for its economic performance; they know the policy 
stance of the incumbent; since information is costly they stop collecting information when 
net benefit from additional information becomes zero; and they do not care about policies 
of parties. Second, candidates and parties are rational: they try to maximize their vote 
shares to get elected/re-elected; their objective is to maximize personal benefits; they know 
preferences of voters; they take ideological stance to avoid uncertainty about voters’ 
behaviour. Third, the political system is the first-past-the-post. On the basis of these 
assumptions Downs (1957) found that voting is irrational. Since many voters vote and so 
many voters cannot be wrong, he discovered the paradox of voting. The paradox is that a 
single voter cannot influence the electoral outcome in her favour, but she incurs cost for 
turning out for voting. So, she suffers from economic loss and hence she should not turnout 
for voting. In contrast, we observe millions of voters are voting in elections. In order to 
solve this paradox, he added another element called ‘civic duty’ as an additional 
determinant of voters’ turnout and choice of party.   
Based on the aforementioned assumptions Downs (1957) derives a total of twenty-
five testable hypotheses. Some important hypotheses are as follows: (i) in a two-party 
system both parties tend to converge to the centre in an one-dimensional ideological 
spectrum, but fear of losing some core voters may hinder a complete convergence of their 
policies; (ii) a democratic government tends to redistribute income from the rich to the 
poor; (iii) voters know which policies affect their income; (iv) more partisan voters turnout 
for voting; (v) voters are influenced by their opinion leaders; (vi) cost of voting is higher 
                                                            
2 Key started to write the book long ago. When he passed away, the book was incomplete. So, Milton C. 
Cummings published it in 1966.   
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for lower socioeconomic status people and as such their turnout rates are low; (vii) when 
the cost of voting is substantially low, the turnout rate is higher; (viii) voters turnout for 
voting more when they are under peer pressure; (ix) parties try their best to stick to their 
ideological stance unless they are overwhelmingly defeated in an election; and (x) voters’ 
turnout rate falls when possibility of forming a coalition government is high. On the basis 
of these hypotheses researchers (e.g., Paldam and Skott, 1995; Kramar, 1971; Stigler, 1973; 
Fiorina, 1981: Popkin et al. (1976) have developed some sub-models: (i) the ‘luxury-goods’ 
model of economic voting versus the ‘Keynesian’ model of economic voting; (ii) the 
pocket-book voting versus the sociotropic voting; and (iii) retrospective voting versus 
prospective voting. The main assumption of the economic vote model is that voters believe 
that the incumbent could steer the economy in the right direction. So, they reward the 
incumbent for better economic performance and punish it for worse one.  
Figure 2.3: Effects of economic conditions on voting behaviour 
 
                Source: Schneider (1984) 
Sub-models of the economic voting model 
 
Luxury-goods model versus Keynesian demand-management model 
The goods and services that governments provide can be classified into several 
categories, such as luxury goods and services (e.g., unemployment benefits and health 
care), necessary goods and services (e.g., basic foods) and inferior goods and services (e.g., 
public transport). The ‘Luxury-Goods’ model of economic voting assumes that the policy 
package of left-leaning parties consists of more luxury goods and service, while that of 
right-leaning parties consists of less luxury goods and services. So, if voters predict that 
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the economy is going to be in the recession and as such the government revenue is going 
to fall, they are more likely to vote for the right-leaning parties. On the other hand, if voters 
predict that the economy is going to recover and as such the government revenue is going 
to increase, they are more likely to vote for the left-leaning parties. The Keynesian model 
of economic voting assumes that the left-leaning parties increase public expenditure, 
whereas the right-leaning parties cut it. The Keynesian economic model suggests that the 
government should spend more to boost up the economic activities and thus reduce 
unemployment when the economy is in the recessionary phase. In contrast, the government 
should spend less and thus reduce inflation when the economy is in the recovery phase. So, 
if voters are Keynesians they tend to vote for left-leaning parties in times of recession and 
for right-leaning parties in times of recovery. It is seen that these two models give 
conflicting suggestions. Stevenson (2002) attempts to reconcile them through the safety-
net approach. When the economy is expected to decline, voters tend to vote for left-leaning 
parties, because they are more concerned with unemployment payment and health care. In 
contrast, when the economy is expected to recover, they tend to vote for right-leaning 
parties, because they need less unemployment payment and health care.  
The sociotropic voting versus the pocket-book voting  
Researchers have developed two contending hypotheses - whether voters take 
voting decisions based on their personal economic condition (pocket-book voting) or their 
perception about the condition of the economy (sociotropic voting). Pocket-book voters do 
not need much information except assessment of their personal economic condition, 
whereas the sociotropic voters need a ‘rough’ assessment of the national economic 
condition and find out the proportion of the national economic progress or decline which 
can be attributed to the incumbents. Secondly, the pocket-book voting is devoid of any 
ideology, whereas the sociotropic voting is based on some sort of ideology. Thirdly, in 
some sense they are competing models, because they approach to the voting decision from 
diametrically opposite perspectives. On the other hand, they are complementary to each 
other. This is because, when a policy affects personal economic conditions of most people 
belonging to a certain socioeconomic class and they eventually factor it into their voting 
decision, pocket-book voting transcends the boundary of selfishness and becomes 
sociotropic. 
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Tests of the sociotropic voting model 
Using electoral data of the US presidential and congressional elections held over 
the 1896-1964 period and relevant economic data Kramer (1971) tests both the sociotropic 
and pocket-book voting models. He observes that the US voters punish incumbents for 
worse economic conditions and vice versa and as such their motive of voting is to further 
social interests. On the other hand, Stigler (1973) argues that rational voters consider the 
long-term economic performance of incumbents’ parties, because fluctuations in the short-
run economic conditions may be influenced by circumstances that are beyond incumbents’ 
control. It is hard for average voters to distinguish economic conditions that are controllable 
and that are uncontrollable by incumbents. Therefore, voters should consider long-term 
economic performance of the incumbent parties instead of individual incumbents. Stigler 
(1973) uses the same US data as Kramer (1971), but specification of his econometric 
models differs. While Stigler (1973) finds that relative changes in real income influence 
relative changes in Republicans’ vote shares, Kramer (1971) observes that the real income 
has positive and statistically significant effects on Republicans’ vote shares. Therefore, 
voters tend to vote with sociotropic motive.  
Tests of the pocket-book voting model 
Popkin et al. (1976) develops the pocketbook voting model based on Downs’ 
(1957:214-216) assertion that information necessary for voting decisions is costly and 
hence voters stop collecting information when the net marginal benefit from the same is 
zero. Therefore, voters are rationally irrational. This is because, they do not collect all 
necessary information. They take voting decisions based on readily and easily available 
information. Popkin et al. (1976) extend this assumption further. They argue that voters are 
too busy to collect information about the personal attributes of candidates, salient issues of 
the time and policy stance of contestants in elections. Voters try to reduce their costs of 
acquiring information by using their economic experiences in their daily lives. Popkin et 
al. (1976) look at the voting decision from an investment perspective. They regard voters 
as investors in public goods and services. If voters perceive that their personal economic 
condition has been better during the election year or over the current electoral cycle, they 
have an incentive to invest their time, energy and money for voting in favour of incumbents, 
otherwise they vote for the challenger. By using survey data collected by the Social 
Research Council (SRC) of Michigan University before the 1972 presidential election they 
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show that in that election voters were more concerned with the economic performance of 
the incumbent candidates that affected their personal economic condition. As Popkin et al. 
(1976) use cross-section data, their analysis has some limitations. By using a panel data set 
(1956-1974) collected by the same SRC Fiorina (1978) finds that voters’ personal 
economic condition affects presidential vote. It affected Congressional votes positively 
until 1960 and negatively thereafter. By using another similar panel data set (1956-1976) 
also collected by the SRC Kinder and Kiewiet (1979, 1981) find that general economic 
conditions affect Congressional electoral results. So, support for the pocket-book voting is 
relatively strong at least from these early studies in the case of presidential vote and 
relatively weak in the case of Congressional vote.  
Synthesis of both models 
Fiorina (1978) and Kinder and Kiewiet (1979, 1981) use data collected by the SRC 
election studies. Sear and Lau (1983) find some limitations in the design of the 
questionnaires used by the SRC to collect relevant information from respondents. 
However, after addressing those limitations Lewis-Beck (1985) shows that Fiorina’s 
(1978) and Kinder and Kiewiet’s (1979, 1981) results are similar. Markus (1988) follows 
a different methodology to test the pocket-book and sociotropic voting models. He uses 
data of the presidential elections held between 1956 and 1984 when incumbent presidents 
competed. On the other hand, Markus (1992) adds the 1988 presidential election when the 
incumbent presidents did not compete. Thus, Markus (1988, 1992) tests both the 
sociotropic and the pocket-book vote models in the presence and in the absence of 
incumbent presidents and finds support for both models. Kramer (1983) holds a moderate 
view that the US voters are neither absolutely pocket-book voters nor absolutely 
sociotropic voters; they are in-between. Gomez and Wilson (2001) divide the respondents 
of the 1992 and the 1996 National Election Surveys into four distinct groups based on their 
level of political sophistication and observe that the respondents with lower levels of 
political sophistication are predominantly sociotropic voters and respondents with higher 
levels of political sophistication are predominantly pocket-book voters.  
Retrospective voting model versus prospective voting model 
Based on time horizon economic voting can be divided into two types –
retrospective and prospective. Key (1966) advances the pure retrospective economic voting 
model. According to Key (1966), voters assess the retrospective economic performance of 
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incumbents. If incumbents contest an election and if their performance is perceived to be 
better than ‘some’ threshold levels, voters vote for them. His model does not take into 
consideration the challenging candidates or parties. However, if voters are not satisfied 
with incumbents running for re-election, by default they vote for challengers. This is a 
simple and straightforward model, because voters have a great deal of information about 
the economic performance of incumbents who run for re-election. However, when 
incumbents do not contest elections, voters do not have any information about candidates’ 
past economic performance. However, they may have information about the past economic 
performance of parties candidates belong to. In this situation voters rely largely on 
proposed future economic policy of non-incumbents. The voting decision under the 
prospective model is more difficult. This is because, incumbents’ economic performance 
may be better in the past, but their economic performance may be worse in the future. 
Similarly, voters may anticipate that incumbents’ economic performance was better in the 
past, but under similar condition challengers would have done better. So, the choice of 
candidates/parties would be completely different under different situations (Lockerbie, 
1992).      
While retrospective and prospective economic voting are separable, Downs 
(1957:41) attempts to integrate them. He argues that as the future is uncertain voters 
extrapolate future economic performance of incumbents running for re-election based on 
their past economic performance. He assumes that incumbents running for re-election are 
most likely to follow their past economic policy under normal conditions. Voters compare 
level of net income utility expected to be obtained from proposed future policy of 
incumbents running for re-election and non-incumbents. If the expected net income utility 
from incumbent candidates outweighs that of non-incumbents, they tend to vote for 
incumbent candidates, otherwise they vote for non-incumbents. However, Downs’ (1957) 
assumption is problematic. If the future economic performance of incumbents is 
extrapolated from their past, results are likely to be similar. So, it makes little sense to 
differentiate between the retrospective and prospective economic performance of 
incumbents (Lockerbie, 1992).       
Tests of the Retrospective voting model versus the prospective voting model 
Both the retrospective and the prospective models can be of two types – pocketbook 
and sociotropic.  Using US data of the 1984 and the 1988 National Election Studies Lanoue 
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(1994) finds evidences of both retrospective and prospective economic voting. The 
retrospective (sociotropic and pocket-book) economic conditions have positive effects in 
both the 1984 and 1988 presidential elections, but the effects are stronger in the 1984 
presidential election than 1988. In the House of Representative elections, the retrospective 
(sociotropic) economic conditions are not significant in the 1984 election, but they are 
significant at a 5 percent level of significance in the 1988. In the Senate elections 
retrospective economic conditions are significant at a 10 percent level of significance in 
the 1984 election, while they are not at all significant in the 1988 election. The prospective 
economic conditions are not at all significant in any types of elections in 1984, but the 
prospective (pocket-book) economic conditions have positive effects only in the 
presidential election and they are statistically significant at 5 percent level of significance 
in the 1988 presidential election. It indicates that effects of various types of economic 
voting vary across types of elections as well as across elections.   
Using data on US presidential approval rates over the 1960-1993 period collected 
by the SRC, Norpoth (1996) tests both retrospective and prospective evaluations of 
business conditions by consumers on presidential approval rates. He finds that retrospective 
evaluations of business conditions by consumers has a positive effect on presidential 
approval rates and this is significant at a 5 percent level of significance. In contrast, 
prospective evaluations of business conditions have no effect on approval rates.   
While Lanoue (1994) and Norpoth (1996) use individuals’ responses, Mackuen et 
al. (1992) use net responses (difference between positive and negative responses) of the 
national electorate. A key advantage of Mackuen et al.’s (1992) methodology is that 
individuals’ evaluations about the retrospective and the prospective personal and national 
economic conditions may have a lot of ‘noises’ and as such results may be less reliable. On 
the other hand, if net responses of the national electorate are taken, they are likely to cancel 
out this ‘noise’ and results are likely to be more reliable. As there is a high correlation 
between the consumer sentiment index and national economic conditions, they use the 
consumer sentiment index as an intermediating variable between the national economic 
condition and the presidential approval rate. Using the consumer sentiment index and 
presidential approval rates over the 1954-1988 they find that the consumer sentiment index 
is significant at a 1 percent level of significance and it has a positive effect on presidential 
approval rates. Secondly, of the four components of the consumer sentiment index only 
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prospective evaluation of business conditions (sociotropic) is significant and it has positive 
effects on presidential approval rates.  
Strengths and limitations of the economic vote model       
The identification of the ‘paradox of voting’ and its apparent solution by addition 
of an expressive element (i.e., civic duty) is a great contribution of the economic vote 
model. This solution led to some extensions of voter behaviour models. Secondly, the 
model gives birth to a good number of testable hypotheses. So, a few studies came forth 
with the advent of this model.  Thirdly, it brings both costs of and benefits from voting into 
the calculus of voting and thus lays down the foundation of the vote-popularity function 
which has been widely used by researchers for different purposes.  
Though the model has made a great contribution in the study of electoral behaviour, 
it has some limitations. It assumes that the prime motive of political elites to get into public 
offices is rent-seeking. This is partly true. However, many political elites get involved with 
politics after amassing a substantial amount of wealth. So, rent-seeking may not be their 
prime motive. It may be altruistic motive or social prestige that may encourage them 
(Bergson, 1958). Secondly, it presumes that voters extrapolate prospective performance of 
incumbents based on their retrospective ones. This implies that voters’ preferences remain 
constant and incumbents do not need to consider them. To win elections incumbents can 
be opportunistic (Backus and Driffill, 1985). In reality, they need to take into consideration 
the rent-seeking behaviour of political elites too, because voters’ preferences change in 
response to changes in socioeconomic and political conditions. Thirdly, it speculates that 
both voters and political elites have well-defined and fixed preferences. In fact, voters’ 
policy preferences and hence choice of the party frequently change mostly due to their 
exposure to election campaigns (Hillygus and Jackman, 2003). Similarly, political parties 
change their policies in response to emerging socioeconomic and political conditions. 
Fourthly, the model postulates that while in office incumbents enjoy unlimited authority. 
In reality, their authority is limited by opposition parties and civil societies. Fifthly, the 
model theorizes that voters’ preferences are single-peaked and hence parties’ policy 
preferences converge to median voters. In fact, the distribution of voters’ preferences can 
be bi-modal leading to a non-convergence in parties’ policies. They may also be multi-
modal giving birth to extreme right and left parties (Evans, 2004:80-81). Sixthly, the model 
hypothesizes that voters vote to prevent democracy from collapsing. As a democratic 
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system is a public good, an individual voter’s vote cannot save it. The model further 
assumes that voters vote to perform their civic duty and they obtain utility from this. Blais 
(2000:3) argues that the psychological dimension can only partially explain political 
participation. Seventhly, the model speculates that to make ‘right’ decisions, voters keep 
collecting relevant information as long as the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost. 
This argument is logically flawed, because if they make ‘misjudgements’, they personally 
bear little costs (Blais, 2000:140). So, they have no incentive to make ‘right’ judgements 
and hence collect ‘right’ amount of information. Eighthly, the model assumes that a voter’s 
ability to influence the electoral outcome is almost zero. In reality, in highly competitive 
elections as well as in small-sized electorates a vote’s vote can be a game-changer.  Last 
but not least, it emphasizes too much on economic costs of and benefits from voting, and 
hence places too little emphasis on other non-economic factors such as habit, civic duty, 
expressiveness and so on. The latter elements can be as strong predictors of electoral 
behaviour as former ones (Barry, 1970:23).      
2.3.3 The political budget cycle model of voting 
Buchanan (1960, 1967) advances this model. The key idea of this model is that 
voters believe that incumbents have an absolute authority over the fiscal policy and the 
competency levels of incumbents can be measured by macroeconomic conditions 
following adoption of the fiscal policy they follow. It is a natural tendency of voters to 
prefer lower levels of taxes to higher ones and high levels of government expenditures to 
lower ones. As a result, they tend to vote for incumbents who can provide them with a 
lower tax rate and higher expenditure. Consequently, incumbents tend to increase 
government expenditures or reduce taxes in an election year with a view to increase the 
probability of their own or their parties’ re-election (shown by the upper loop of the figure 
2.3). Alternatively, they use fiscal policy to attain their selfish objective of increasing the 
probability of their re-election at the cost of destabilizing the economy.  Mourăo (2008) 
classifies political budget cycle models into three classes. Nordhaus (1975) develops the 
first-generation model of the political budget cycle related with voting. His model assumes 
that voters tend to look backward before leaping forward. They form perception about the 
level of future competence of incumbents based on their past economic performance. So, 
incumbents, regardless of their political ideologies, tend to follow an expansionary fiscal 
policy in the late year(s) of their tenure to stimulate the economy.  Rogoff and Sibert (1988) 
and Rogoff (1990) advance the second generation of political business cycle models 
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associated with voting. These models assume that each contesting candidate has a certain 
level of competency. Only the candidates themselves know their levels of competency; 
voters do not. Hence, incumbents with higher levels of competency would try to follow 
expansionary fiscal policy to give a signal to voters that they should vote for them, because 
they possess higher competency levels required to deliver higher levels of public goods and 
services. As a result, election year’s or pre-election years’ budget deficit increases when 
incumbents with higher levels of competency are in the office. The budget deficit increases 
less for incumbents with lower levels of competency. Shi and Svensson (2002) and Persson 
and Tabellini (2000) develop the third-generation political budget cycle models associated 
with voting. The key assumption of this type of model is that incumbents realize that they 
have some competency, but they are not fully aware of their levels. This arises because, in 
the past they did not get opportunity to test their levels of competency. They also do not 
know how well they would be able to handle future problems. Similarly, voters are not 
fully aware of competency levels of incumbent candidates. The voters’ objective is to vote 
for candidates who have higher levels of competency, because this type of incumbents 
would provide higher levels of public goods in post-election years.           
Using US data covering the 1948-1976 period and data related with some other 
Western industrialized countries, Tufte (1978) shows that incumbents of those countries 
try to influence the macroeconomic conditions by manipulating their fiscal policies with a 
view to stimulate the economy and hence increase their likelihood of re-election. His study 
is followed by a good number of studies. For example, using a large panel data set 
consisting of data from both developed and developing countries Shi and Svensson (2002) 
find clear evidence of the prevalence of political budget cycles in both developed and 
developing countries. They show that before elections, government revenue falls and 
government spending increases. As a result, budget deficits increase in election years. 
However, this increase in the budget deficit is more pronounced in developing countries 
than in developed ones.  While Shi and Svensson do not explore the sources of the budget 
deficit, Persson and Tabellini (2003) do so. Using a data set consisting of 60 democratic 
countries covering the 1960-1998 period they observe that the budget deficit arises from a 
fall in the government revenue while government expenditure remains same. While 
Persson and Tabellini (2003) explore electoral budget cycles in 60 democratic countries, 
they do not distinguish between mature and emerging democracies. In contrast, using data 
from 68 newly democratised countries over the 1990-2001 period, Brender and Drazen 
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(2005a) deduce that political deficit budget cycles are more prevalent in the early post-
democratic period than the later period. 
Several studies (e.g., Peltzman, 1992 and Khemani, 2004) remark that it is not the 
total government expenditure but the components of the same that change before elections. 
This is because, voters are fiscally conservative.  Given the size of the budget deficit 
incumbents allocate more resources for more-easily-observable public goods and less 
resources for capital investment necessary for long-term growth of the economy. Peltzman 
(1992), Brender (2003) and Drazen and Eslava (2005) study the effect of the fiscal deficit 
on the probability of re-election of incumbents in individual countries and they find that 
voters punish incumbents for it. Using a large sample of 74 democratic countries over the 
1960-2003 period Brender and Drazen (2005b) conclude that expansionary fiscal policy 
decreases the likelihood of re-election of incumbents. Even in developing countries where 
voters are likely to be more tolerant to budget deficits, it has no significant effect on the 
probability of re-election of incumbents. One explanation for this finding is that there may 
be time lag between the implementation of the fiscal policy and its impact on the economy. 
This is beyond the control of incumbents. The real effects may be felt years after 
implementing the fiscal policy in question. As a result, it is immaterial whether the budget 
deficit is created by increasing expenses or decreasing taxes; it has no or negative effects 
on chances of re-election of incumbents. However, the punishment of incumbents for 
increasing budget deficits in election years is more observed in developed than in 
developing countries irrespective of types of their political system. It may be that voters in 
developed countries are more informed than those in developing countries.                  
Strengths and limitations of the political budget cycle model 
The model emphasizes the fiscal policy as an instrument to manipulate economic 
activity during the election or the pre-election year(s). To some extent, the fiscal policy 
affects the economy. However, this model does not include the level of social capital in a 
country. The effectiveness of the model may be dependent on the level of the social capital 
in a country. This social capital may be willingness to trust others, even strangers, without 
immediate reciprocal benefits (Whiteley, 2000). For example, using a large panel data set 
consisting of 63 countries covering the 1960-2001 period and incorporating the social 
capita levels of countries (low/high) Omiros (2013) finds that political budget cycles are 
more prevalent in countries with low levels of social capital and less in countries with high 
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levels of the same. As the level of the social capital keeps increasing, the effect of budget 
deficits on the probability of re-election of incumbents keeps decreasing. 
2.3.4 The reward-punishment model 
Key (1966) develops the reward-punishment model. Key (1966) analyses Gallup 
poll data sets which show voting intention for presidential candidates before US 
Presidential elections held over the 1936-60 period. He finds a high correlation between 
positions of parties on policies and their retrospective performance, and tendency of many 
voters to vote for or against the incumbent party. His findings corroborate the classical 
assumption that voters are well-informed and conscientious, and hence make their choices 
of parties and their candidates responsibly. He concludes that if voters perceive the 
retrospective performance of incumbents to be higher than certain thresholds or average 
expected levels, they would vote for them, otherwise against them. He argues that voters 
are unlikely to compare policies of competing parties, because in a two-party dominant 
political system they would be nearly similar, though not identical. So, it would not be cost-
effective for voters to compare them.  As a result, he can show why voters vote for or 
against incumbents despite near-convergence of policies of contestants.  
Strengths and limitations of the reward-punishment model 
The model is very simple. The voters need to measure only one thing – how well-
off they were under the incumbents. The model requires minimal assumptions about voters’ 
knowledge and information processing capabilities and hence information cost is 
minimum. Secondly, voters do not need to compare alternative policies being advanced by 
contestants, because policies of parties tend to converge at the level being preferred by the 
median voter. The post-War political development in terms of policy convergence of 
parties (e.g., use of Keynesian economic policy instruments and social security) in the 
Western world is consistent with his assumption until 1970s (Clarke et al., 1994).  
Pinard (1967) argues that while Key (1966) emphasizes retrospective performance 
as an important determinant of voting, his data set does not have information about the 
personalities of candidates which are likely to be as important as parties, issues, policies 
and retrospective performance. Though contesting parties are found to have declared their 
policies on contemporary issues before elections, it is hard for voters to extrapolate what 
policies parties would likely to follow in the case of unforeseen situations. In the era of 
personalization of politics and party de-alignment, experience and trustworthiness of 
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leaders would play an important role in the choice of vote (Blais, 2011). Secondly, he finds 
a strong correlation between issues and swing votes. However, it does not mean that issues 
caused swing voting. Thirdly, his main concern is swing voters, but they consist of only 10 
percent to 15 percent of the US voters. So, he focuses on a very tiny fraction of the 
electorate. Fourthly, he identifies issues as a secondary factor in the choice of vote. If his 
argument is accepted, it does not nullify effects of socioeconomic and demographic factors 
as well as political socialization as determinants of vote. Voting based on socioeconomic 
factors can be considered as rational as voting based on burning issues of the time. Fifthly, 
his data set consists of voting intention instead of actual voting. He uses voting intention 
data of the 1936-1960 period and equates actual voting to voting intention. In fact, there is 
always discrepancy between them, because making of voting intention is much cheaper 
than actual turning out for casting vote. By using 1980, 1984 and 1988 American National 
Election Studies Achen and Blais, (2010) find that eighty-five percent of the people who 
intended to vote reported to have voted and of them only seventy-two percent actually 
voted. Thus, voting intentions overestimate the influence of issues on actual voting. 
Sixthly, he assumes that in some two-party political system policies of parties would tend 
to converge to the position of median voters. However, this policy convergence did not 
persist beyond 1970s, because Keynesian economic policy instruments failed to mitigate 
the rising stagflation in the Western countries. As a result, consensus among major parties 
on important economic and social issues such as social security and its source of funding 
broke down. Therefore, the model needs revision theoretically in the face of development 
in the real world (Clarke et al., 1994). 
2.3.5 The asymmetric grievance model 
Downs (1957) and Kramer (1971) hold the view that it is the economic condition 
during the election year or some pre-election years that affects the probability of re-election 
of the incumbent, Mueller (1970) agrees partly asserting that while approving or disproving 
the incumbent president’s handling of his job of managing the economy, respondents are 
likely to compare their economic condition at the time of polling with that of the time when 
the incumbent took the office. If they perceive that economic conditions are better than 
they were at the time of taking office, voters are likely to approve the incumbent, otherwise 
they will not. While Kramer (1971) considers three economic variables (income, cost of 
living index and unemployment) Mueller (1970) considers only one economic variable – 
the unemployment rate. Mueller (1970) compares unemployment rates at the time of 
MODELS OF ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR 
 
35 
 
polling with the rate that prevails when the incumbent takes the office. If the difference is 
negative, it indicates that the economic condition has become worse and if it is positive, it 
implies that it has improved. It is expected that the relationship between differences in 
unemployment rates and differences in perceptions about economic conditions would be 
negatively correlated. Mueller (1970) uses three hundred approval/disapproval rates 
available in the opinion polls that took place over 24 years (1945-1969). He finds that 
incumbent presidents’ popularity (i.e., approval rate) declines by 3 percentage points for 
every percentage point rise in the unemployment over the level when they start their current 
terms. In contrast, their popularity does not increase if unemployment rates decline. 
Moreover, Mueller (1970) finds that the electorate reacts to an economic variable only 
when the variable takes on values above or below a certain threshold. Thus, he advances 
the asymmetric grievance model of voting. 
Tests of the asymmetric grievance model   
Using the data set related to the 1896-1970 period for the US Congressional 
Elections Bloom and Price (1975) find that (i) partisan identification is statistically 
significant; (ii) a fall in real per capita income during the pre-election year has statistically 
significant negative impact on incumbent Republicans’ vote shares, whereas a rise in the 
same has no statistically significant impact on them. It may imply that voters punish 
incumbent Republican Governors for recessionary conditions, but do not reward them 
accordingly for recovery conditions. So, changes in economic conditions have asymmetric 
impacts on vote shares of incumbent Republican Governors. Results of some other studies 
(e.g., Claggart, 1986) are also consistent with their findings. However, in Hibbs’ (1974) 
analysis Mueller’s (1970) ‘economic slump’ (a rise in unemployment above a threshold) 
variable is statistically insignificant when residual autocorrelations are controlled. 
Mackuen (1983) finds that unemployment had effect on popularity between 1963 and 1980, 
but it wore off quickly. Results of some studies (e.g., Cameron, 1984; Norpoth, 1984; and 
Lanoue, 1987) conform to it.  
Strengths and limitations of the asymmetric grievance model 
The important finding of this model is that voters respond only when the values of 
concerned variables exceed certain thresholds. Some studies have confirmed it. However, 
the key problem of this model is the use of an arbitrary threshold level. Mueller (1970) uses 
the rate of unemployment that exists at the time of taking the office by the incumbent 
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president as the threshold value. He does not explain why he does not take the average or 
trend as the threshold value. He justifies his action by arguing that it ensures correct sign 
to the coefficient of the unemployment variable. So, his criterion is arbitrary. 
2.3.6 The monetary opportunistic/political business cycle model of voting 
This model has two versions: the opportunistic model of voting and the partisan 
model of voting.  
The opportunistic model of voting 
This model assumes that the government deliberately uses monetary policy to 
influence economic activity and give an impression that it can manage the economy better. 
So, voters should re-elect it in the next election. To increase economic activity before the 
election, the government follows an expansionary monetary policy. This is likely to 
increase economic activity, but it would also create inflation with some time lag. Nordhaus 
(1975) develops the opportunistic model of voting. His model suggests that if voters take 
the voting decision based on the recent retrospective economic performance of the 
government and if they form their expectation about the future money supply on its the 
basis, an opportunistic government would follow an optimal expansionary monetary policy 
during its tenure. It tunes the monetary policy in such a way that the economy experiences 
a boom just before an election followed by a recession after the election.      
Tests of the opportunistic model of voting 
A number of studies (e.g., Kramer, 1971; Tufte, 1975 and Fair, 1978) draw a 
conclusion that the economic condition prevailing just before an election influences voting 
in the US election, but there is little evidence of political business cycle in economic 
activity predicted by the Nordhaus model in the US or OECD countries (McCallum, 1978; 
Alt and Chrystal, 1983; Alesina et al., 1997; Faust and Irons, 1999; Paldam, 1979 and 
Lewis-Beck, 1988).   
Strengths and limitations of the opportunistic model of voting 
There are little empirical supports in favour of this model. Drazen (2000) identifies 
three conceptual limitations in this model: (i) it assumes that the president controls the 
monetary policy. This is inconsistent with the reality of central bank independence. The 
US Federal Reserve Bank is independent. However, the executive branch may put pressure 
upon the Reserve Bank to tune monetary policy so that interest rates do not fluctuate much 
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during the election year; (ii) it hypothesizes that voters take into consideration the pre-
election economic activity as a guide for taking voting decision. Thus, this model assumes 
that voters are too immature to understand the opportunistic behaviour of the government. 
Any voter who has experienced several electoral cycles know that low inflation and high 
economic activity during the pre-election period are followed by high inflation and low 
economic activity in the immediate post-election period. So, they ae likely to punish the 
government for its opportunistic behaviour; and (iii) this model excludes fiscal policy, but 
it also has effect on the economy.   
The partisan political business cycle model of voting 
Hibbs (1977) develops this model. He assumes that there are two types of parties in 
most Western democratic countries: (i) left-leaning parties and (ii) right-leaning parties. 
Each type of party needs to satisfy its constituencies. Lower socioeconomic status people 
are likely to provide the support base of left-leaning parties. These people prefer lower 
unemployment rates. So, left-leaning parties follow a monetary policy that keeps 
unemployment rates low. However, it may increase inflation rates. In contrast, the higher 
socioeconomic status people are the support base of the right-leaning parties. These people 
prefer lower inflation rates. So, right-leaning parties follow a monetary policy that keeps 
inflation rates low. However, this may increase the unemployment rate. As a result, the 
target of the left-leaning parties is to maintain higher levels of economic activity than the 
level preferred by the right-leaning parties. Secondly, they are more likely to bear the cost 
of deviating from the target economic activity level than the target inflation level. Thirdly, 
they may have a higher inflation target than the right-leaning parties. Therefore, they are 
more likely to follow an aggressive expansionary policy than their right-leaning 
counterparts during their tenure. The more slowly the expected inflation adjusts with the 
actual one, the longer is the partisan effect.  
Tests of the partisan political business cycle model of voting  
Hibbs (1977) tests his model using the post-war data of 12 West European and 
North American nations. He finds evidence in favour of his model. In those countries the 
unemployment rate is low, and the inflation rate is high during the rule of left-leaning 
parties. In contrast, the unemployment rate is high, and the inflation rate is low during the 
rule of right-leaning parties. In the case of the US and the UK the Democratic Party and 
the Labour Party reduce the unemployment rate, while the Republican Party and the 
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Conservative party increase it. Alesina et al. (1997) and Faust and Irons (1999) test Hibbs’ 
(1977) model.  Alesina et al. (1997) find support in favour of the model when they consider 
the whole period of the administration of a party, but they find no support for Hibbs’ (1977) 
model when they sub-divide the period.  Faust and Irons (1999) find support of this model 
during the first half of the total period.     
Strengths and limitations of the partisan political business cycle model of voting  
There is mixed evidence in favour of this model. Drazen (2000) argues that the 
assumption of the model that parties can use the monetary policy to affect their targets of 
unemployment and economic growth is mistaken.   
2.3.7 The Retrospective voting model 
Fiorina (1981) develops this model. He observes that the empirical studies that used 
survey data suffer from some problems: (i) they use individual voters’ perception about 
their personal as well as national economic condition. This is a subjective rather than an 
objective measure and they take party identification as an everlasting phenomenon. In 
reality, voters’ party identification undergoes changes over time depending on the past 
performance of parties with respect to challengers. In this backdrop he develops his model 
by combining two models: (i) the party choice model and (ii) party identification model. 
He develops his model step-by-step: 
(i) At the first stage he assumes that somehow a country has developed a two-party 
system and new voters take the voting decision without any information about the 
past performance of the parties. In this case they will compare expected changes in 
their personal welfare between the current and the next election resulting from 
proposed policies of the parties.  
(ii) At the second stage voters have information about the performance of the 
incumbent party but no information about the performance of the challenger. In this 
situation if they perceive that the incumbent performed better than expected, they 
are likely to develop a bias towards the incumbent. On the other hand, if they 
perceive that the incumbent performed worse than expected, they are likely to 
develop a bias against the incumbent. Thus, in the second election their voting 
decision is influenced by bias towards or against the incumbent. So, some sort of 
asymmetry enters their calculus of party choice. Now they calculate other 
components of the calculus of voting: (i) they compare their welfare gain/loss from 
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the incumbent’s retrospective performance; (ii) they compare their prospective 
welfare gain/loss from the incumbent’s prospective performance and (iii) they 
estimate hypothetical welfare gain/loss had the challenger in the last election been 
elected. Thereafter, due to uncertainty regarding the prospective welfare gain/loss 
resulting from the prospective performance of both the incumbent and the 
challenger they discount them.  They also discount the hypothetical welfare 
gain/loss had the challenger in the last election been elected. These discount factors 
are different for the incumbent and the challenger. When voters participate in 
several consecutive elections and get some idea about the retrospective 
performance of each party, they tend to identify themselves with one of the two 
parties. Thus, partisan identification develops after a few elections and it get into 
their calculus of voting.  
(iii) At the third stage they make choice of the party by evaluating their cumulative 
retrospective performance and prospective performance, which are additive. By this 
time their bias towards a party is more consolidated but it is never permanent. So, 
this bias factor enters their calculus of voting. This bias is a product of their past 
and current political socialisation. The decision rule is that given the partisan 
biasness if the incumbent party’s long term average performance exceeds the 
challenger party’s one, voters vote for the incumbent, otherwise for the challenger. 
Thus, Fiorina (1981) meshes issue voting and party identification, where 
retrospective performance plays a great role.      
Tests of the Retrospective voting model 
Fiorina (1981) tests his model by using the 1974-1976 wave of the 1972-1976 data 
set collected by the Centre for Political Studies (Institute of Social Research, University of 
Michigan). The data contains information such as personal financial condition and business 
condition, which he terms as simple retrospective evaluation of the performance of 
incumbents. It also contains information such as perception about presidential economic 
performance, unemployment and inflation which he terms as mediating retrospective 
evaluation of the performance of incumbents. His findings are as follows: (i) previous party 
identification has a statistically significant effect on the current one, which is again 
influenced by voters’ retrospective evaluation of the government’s performance in relation 
to inflation and unemployment; (ii) the party which was able to manage inflation and 
unemployment rates better in the past is expected to manage them in the future too; (iii) the 
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past economic performance has some effect on current evaluation of the incumbent, but the 
expected performance (economic and non-economic) plays a more important role in party 
choice. Overall, he finds that evaluation of economic condition has short-run as well as 
long-run effects on votes. The evaluation of personal economic condition (actual and/or 
perceived) affects voting indirectly. It affects evaluation of performance of the incumbent, 
which in turn affects future expectation about the incumbent’s performance and modifies 
party identification and ultimately affects party choice.      
Strengths and limitations of the Retrospective voting model 
There are some empirical supports in favour of this model. However, Fiorina (1981) 
claims that though the model is more complicated than the political business cycle model, 
it is more realistic. This is because, voters respond not only to drastic short-term 
fluctuations in the economy but also to long-term factors such as partisanship. Many studies 
have ignored this model. One of its major limitations is that it has completely ignored the 
deliberate manipulation of the public policy by the incumbent for reaping short-term 
electoral dividends.   
2.3.8 The revised asymmetric grievance vote model  
Nannestad and Paldam (1997) develop this model by re-examining Mueller’s 
(1970) asymmetric grievance model. They use the vote-popularity function framework. 
They suggest that (i) voters attach higher weights to bad events (e.g., higher unemployment 
and economic recession) and lower weights to good events (e.g., lower unemployment and 
economic recovery). When values of a variable (e.g., unemployment or inflation) fluctuate 
too much around the trend over time, voters punish incumbents. So, economic stability has 
a high electoral premium; (ii) during the rule of a government values of some economic 
variables move in favourable direction, while those of other variables in unfavourable 
direction. The government loses more votes for variables that move in unfavourable 
direction than those variables that move in favourable direction; (iii) one party manages 
some economic variables better than the other party. As incumbency alters between parties 
over time, changes in all economic variables become symmetric in the long run; and (iv) 
in a two-party system both parties choose policies that are close to the level preferred by 
the median voter. So, voters are divided into two groups being half to the left and half to 
the right of the median voter. Any incumbent who polls lower than 50 percent votes loses 
in elections.  
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Tests of the revised asymmetric grievance vote model   
Using the Danish data covering the 1985-1992 period Nannestad and Paldam 
(1997) themselves test the model. They find evidence of grievance asymmetry at the mass 
level where microeconomic variables affect personal economic conditions and hence the 
voting behaviour. Secondly, the incumbent loses (1.7 percent ± 4.5 percent) of the vote just 
for being an incumbent. Thirdly, economic evaluations at the mass level is myopic as well 
as retrospective.  
Strengths and limitations of the model   
This model is an improvement over Mueller’s (1970) asymmetric grievance 
model.  It has traced back the cost of ruling of a party, but it did not focus on the 
intermediating variable that translate grievance into loss of incumbents’ votes for being 
incumbents.    
2.4 Expressive vote models 
Proponents of expressive vote models totally rule out the influence of the 
instrumentalist factors on the electoral behaviour. They focus absolutely on the 
expressiveness that influence the voting behaviour. When Downs (1957) finds the paradox 
of voting, he tries to overcome it by adding civic duty with instrumentalist variables. As it 
has no relation with instrumentalist motive, civic duty captures the expressive motive. As 
a result, the Downsian model couples the instrumentalist and the expressive elements of 
voting. In contrast, expressive models decouple them.    
2.4.1 The early expressive vote model 
Downs (1957) emphasizes the economic factors as determinants of the voter turnout 
rate and choice of parties in elections. One key assumption of the Downsian model is that 
every vote is pivotal in deciding electoral outcomes. While developing the economic vote 
model he discovers that for a single voter, the net benefit from turning out for voting is 
negative. This is because, a voter cannot influence electoral outcomes to her favour, but 
she faces economic loss for turning out for voting. So, it is irrational for a single voter to 
turnout for voting. In reality, many voters turnout for voting. Thus, he discovers the 
paradox of voting.  He tries to solve it by adding ‘civic duty’ as one of several explanatory 
variables of the voter turnout rate. Later Riker and Ordeshook (1968) attempt to improve 
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the Downsian model by incorporating some socio-psychological elements into it. They 
reformulate the Downsian voting model as under: 
vote if  
(2.1)   pB+D > c; otherwise abstain. 
where p = the probability that the voter is pivotal, 
 B = difference in the voter’s utility if the preferred candidate wins rather than the other,   
c= cost of voting, and  
D = sum of positive contributions to the voter’s utility where magnitude is independent of 
the voter’s contribution to the outcome.   
Strengths and limitations of the early expressive vote model  
Riker and Ordeshook (1968) refer to D as the fixed benefit of voting resulting from 
several sources: (i) a sense of civic duty to the polity and society voters belong to; (ii) 
compliance with the ethic of voting; (iii) demonstrating loyalty to the political system and 
preferred party; (iv) being at the polling station, and so on. Thus, they have extended the 
sources of psychological satisfaction obtainable from different sources. In fact, they 
generalized it and subsumed Downs’ (1957) notion of civic duty aimed to preserve the 
democratic system.  
Fiorina (1976) singles out Riker and Ordeshook’s (1968) genuine theoretical 
contribution to the development of electoral behaviour models. While some previous 
models (e.g., the Michigan model and the Downsian model) recognize that the act of voting 
has two aspects (instrumental and expressive) and they can exist simultaneously, they place 
instrumental factors at the epicentre and expressive ones at the periphery in their models. 
They ignore the fact that voting itself has some intrinsic value (e.g., expressiveness).  
Riker and Ordeshook (1968) try to capture the complex nature of calculus of voting 
and as such they develop a hybrid model. They observe that certain cohorts of voters were 
more likely to vote (not vote) than others in general and in certain elections. For each group 
of voters/non-voters instrumental as well as expressive aspect of voting have different 
weights. There are elements of both aspects that yield either positive or negative utility 
from voting. So, they hypothesize that (i) the probability of participating in elections 
increases as competition in elections increases; and (ii) voters’ propensity of voting would 
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be increasing as the probability of influencing the preferred outcomes would be increasing. 
They test their hypothesis by using the US data: the 1952, the 1956, and the 1960 US 
Presidential elections collected by the SRC of the University of Michigan. They find that 
P (probability of influencing the preferred outcomes), B (benefit from voting), C (cost of 
voting), and D (fixed benefit from voting) of equation (3) are significant and can predict 
participation rates in elections. So, they can capture the complexity of the calculus of voting 
more than previous models.   
Riker and Ordeshook (1968) were quite aware that the probability of a single vote 
in making significant contribution in party differentials is infinitesimally small in an 
electorate of large size irrespective of the number of issues. In this context, if the expressive 
utility from voting outweighs the instrumental one, it might motivate many voters to vote. 
Using data from three hundred sixty-six local liquor referenda in Texas (USA) held over 
the 1976-1996 period involving relatively small-sized electorate (fewer than nine hundred 
eligible voters) and simulated data based on those data, Coate et al. (2006) observe that as 
the size of the electorate increases, the turnout rate as well as the winning margin falls. 
With a view to have deeper insights into drivers of voter turnout in those electorate, they 
test two models: the pivotal voter model (emphasizing instrumental aspects of voting) and 
the intensity model (emphasizing expressive aspects of voting). They find that the pivotal 
model outperforms the intensity model in explaining larger turnout rates and larger winning 
margins in small electorates (fewer than hundred voters) but underperforms in explaining 
the same in larger electorates (more than four hundred voters). On the other hand, the 
intensity model outperforms the pivotal model in the latter case. Thus, it may be asserted 
that voters derive expressive utility from voting irrespective of the scale of the electorate, 
but it is more predominant in large than in small electorates. This finding further reinforces 
Riker and Ordeshook’s (1968) findings.  
Fiorina (1976) claims that by extending the sources of expressive utility, Riker and 
Ordeshook (1968) have degraded the model down to the status of a tautology. However, 
since benefits accruing from the term D are not discounted by the probability that the voter 
is pivotal, a voter’s perceived benefits from D may hugely outweigh perceived costs and 
thus she may find it costly to abstain from voting. To Barry (1970:16) it is hard to fit it 
within the economic model of voting when D is hard to quantify. Barry (1970:16) also 
questions why some people attach larger values to D than others. Riker and Ordeshook 
(1968) show that given the instrumental costs and benefits, the higher the ‘citizen duty’ 
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score (low, medium, high) and the closer the contest in elections, the higher is the 
probability of casting vote. However, Barry (1970) points out that Riker and Ordeshook 
(1968) do not estimate weight of each factor (low, medium, high) ‘in determining the 
probability that a given person will vote’. Barry (1970:17) shows that the ‘citizen duty’ has 
the most important effect and the expected competitiveness in elections has little effect in 
determining the probability of casting vote. By a more rigorous analysis Barry (1970:18) 
finds that Riker and Ordeshook (1968) do not consider the interaction effect between the 
‘citizen duty’ and the expected ‘party differential’ (i.e., how much difference the 
respondent believed which party would win). Examining Riker and Ordeshook’s (1968) 
analysis from this perspective, Barry (1970:18) observes that when the citizen duty score 
is medium or high, party differentials contribute a moderate difference in voting levels (6 
percent to 12 percent), whereas when it is low party differentials contribute a high 
difference of nearly 20 percent in voting levels. The latter finding is untenable. Riker and 
Ordeshook (1968) ware aware of this and argue that voters may ‘irrationally’ attach much 
higher probability that a single vote can make in party differentials. They do not explain 
further why and how they are irrational.  
Riker and Ordeshook (1968) suggest that voters’ participation in elections is 
motivated predominantly by expressive utility and marginally by instrumental utility. It is 
observed by Downs (1957:48) that a rational voter at first decides which party’s policy 
would maximize her instrumental utility and then decides whether it has a chance of 
winning. If her preferred party (i.e., from which he expects to get maximum instrumental 
utility) has a little chance of winning, she is unlikely to waste his vote by voting for it. In a 
multi-party model, she rather ranks her preferences for the second and the third party which 
are more likely to win. If party differential between the second and the third is low and 
many prefer the second to the third, she is most likely to vote for the second to prevent the 
third from winning. According to Riker and Ordeshook (1968), the voter would rather vote 
for the party A and receive the maximum expressive utility, even though her vote is wasted. 
Thus, the Riker and Ordeshook (1968) model cannot explain this strategic voting 
behaviour.  
2.4.2 The modern expressive vote model 
Brennan and Lomasky (1993:21-24) emphasize the expressive aspect of voting. 
They claim that the foundation of those theories that use the consumer theory to explain 
the political behaviour of voters is basically flawed. As an individual voter is not vital in 
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influencing the electoral outcome, she votes for some other reasons. In particular, she votes 
to express her preferences for something. She derives utility by expressing such preferences 
at the ballot box.  This has nothing to do with the electoral outcome. Brennan and Hamlin 
(1998) show that the expressive voting model overcomes some counter-intuitive 
implications associated with the instrumental voting model. For example, when voting is 
costless and voluntary, instrumental voters tend not to vote. The not-to-vote situation is an 
equilibrium. However, this is undesirable as a higher turnout rate increases the political 
legitimacy of the government.  One explanation of higher turnout rates may be “something” 
other than instrumental benefits. This other factor may be expressiveness, or the intrinsic 
value of votes. Secondly, instrumental voting models suggest that in a two-party political 
system both parties will target the policy preferred by the median voter. So, voters whose 
preferences are away from the median voter are unlikely to vote; the preferences of the 
median voter do not represent theirs and thus they become alienated or apathetic politically. 
Only the median voter is likely to vote and as such the turnout is likely to be low. In reality, 
in almost all democratic elections voter turnout rates are reasonably high. Thus, the 
expressive voting model overcomes some counter-intuitive implications of the 
instrumental voting model and thus it is more coherent and more consistent with actual 
observed voting behaviour. 
Hamlin and Jennings (2011) point out some characteristics of the expressiveness 
voting. It is symbolic. The expressive voter derives utility directly from the action of voting. 
Secondly, its manifestation takes different forms based on the context. While the concern 
for expressiveness remains constant, the same voter expresses it differently in different 
contexts. The very act of voting can reveal voters’ social and political identification, moral 
choices and so on.       
Tests of the modern expressive vote model   
Copeland and Laband (2002) identify some problems in testing this model. First 
and foremost, there is a practical difficulty in finding reasonable measures of 
expressiveness. An individual’s propensity to engage in expressive behaviour in general 
cases is likely to be different in political decision-making. Secondly, the broader the 
boundary of the political jurisdiction in which expressiveness is measured, the lower is the 
likelihood of variability in expressiveness. Theoretically, it may be hypothesized that the 
more expressive voters are the more is the likelihood of voting. Copeland and Laband 
CHAPTER 2 
46 
 
(2002) test this model using the National Election Surveys conducted in 1986, 1988, 1990, 
1992, 1994 and 1996 by the University of Michigan’s Centre for Political Studies. The 
questionnaires included two questions which they took as proxies for political 
expressiveness. They find positive and significant correlation between propensity of voting 
and expressiveness. Moreover, the propensity of expressiveness is 40 percent higher in 
presidential elections than non-presidential ones.    
Strengths and limitations of the modern expressive vote model   
Hamlin and Jennings (2011) argue that the underlying logic of the model is ‘both 
clear and attractive’ and as such it has attracted the attention of researchers. However, they 
opine that the ‘specific content of expressive choice is contentious’. Since expressiveness 
can take many forms, it lacks specific predictive and normative power. Secondly, Brennan 
and Lomasky (1993) compare expressive voting with cheering at a sports match and to 
dinner-party conversation.  Hamlin and Jennings (2011) claim that these analogies are 
inappropriate to some extent. Thirdly, expressiveness takes place in the public arena, but 
voting takes place in the private arena. Voters cast vote secretly. Lastly, since 
expressiveness can be expressed in many ways, the observed voting behaviour is a partial 
reflection of the total actual behaviour.  
2.4.3 The minimax regret voting model 
 
Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) investigate electoral behaviour from the decision-
theoretic perspective. This too can be regarded as an expressive model, because voters are 
not concerned with the direct benefits from voting. They argue that an individual voter is 
motivated to minimize the cost of voting with a view to avoid the maximum regret: if her 
preferred candidate is defeated by a single vote; her regret is maximum. This is because, 
she could have provided with it by casting her own vote. Voters conjure levels of regret 
associated with differential outcomes resulting from a variety of decisions and thus they 
make a regret matrix. Having constructed the regret matrix, they choose the action that 
yields the smallest maximum regret. They barely think about the probability of occurring 
such an event.  They claim that their model does not need to estimate probabilities 
associated with various outcomes of the election. As a result, it is a better model to explain 
electoral outcomes under uncertainty than under risks.  
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Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) argue that the minimax regret model would predict 
higher turnout rates than instrumentalist models, because the level of regret would be 
higher if one’s preferred candidate fails to be elected for lack of a single vote and this single 
vote results from her failure to turnout for voting. As a result, a potential voter has an 
incentive to minimize her maximum possible regret. They argue that it is possible to 
associate turnout rates of different socioeconomic and demographic cohorts (for example, 
age, occupation, education and so on) with their voting strategies. The poor participation 
rate of the extremely disadvantaged groups of the society may be an example of their 
maximin voting strategy, while the high participation rate of the educated and rich voters 
may be an example of their minimax voting strategy. Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) do not 
test their hypotheses with any data; instead they offer intuitive support for their model.  
Tests of the minimax regret voting model  
Kenney and Rice (1989) collected required data from two large US cities 
(Burlington and Phoenix). They empirical test the minimax regret model using their 
collected data. They observe that on average 37.75 percent respondents are qualified as 
potential maximum regret voters. Thereafter, they test whether these voters show a higher 
propensity of voting. They find that potential maximum regret voters (89.1 percent) in one 
city (Burlington) who voted in the last election 96 percent of them also intended to vote in 
the upcoming election. This finding shows that potential maximum regret voters behave as 
predicted by the model. However, they may also be motived; these are not mutually 
exclusive. So, Kenney and Rice (1989) make an expected utility index for each respondent. 
According to the utility maximization rule, respondents having lower indices would have 
less incentive to vote than those having higher indices. Cross-tabulating expected utility 
maximizing voters and potential maximum regret voters, they find that the minimax 
decision-making process is independent of the decision-making process based on the 
expected utility maximization and opine that the former may be a much more important 
decision-making process than the latter. Moreover, the minimax regret model is also 
superior to the rational choice model in the sense that the former differentiates between 
potential voters and non-voters, while the latter does not.  
Strengths and limitations of the minimax regret voting model 
Though some empirical studies support the predictions of this model, Blais et al. 
(1995) argue that the theoretical foundation of the minimax regret model is weak, and its 
CHAPTER 2 
48 
 
empirical testings suffer from operationalization of the minimax regret concept. So, they 
undertake a multivariate analysis of the minimax regret model. They collect data from 
students of two universities in Canada before and after the 1993 federal election. They 
observe that the minimax regret measure is not a statistically significant predictor of the 
voter turnout when other factors of the Downsian model (B, P, C, D) are included. Other 
factors are statistically significant predictors of the voter turnout. As to reasons behind this, 
they argue that there is relatively a strong correlation between minimax regret measure and 
the sense of duty. The causality can flow from minimax regret to sense of duty leading to 
endogeneity problem. The minimax regret may give rise to a strong sense of duty to vote, 
when a voter feels terribly bad following defeat of her preferred candidate by a single vote 
and her abstention is the cause of this critical shortage. Thus, their study seems to have 
exposed the weak theoretical foundation of the model and nullifies Ferejohn and Fiorina’s 
(1975) claim that the model has some descriptive merits if not prescriptive one. 
2.5 Quasi-instrumentalist-expressive vote model  
 
2.5.1 The ethical voting model 
Goodin and Roberts (1975) argue that a voter has two types of preferences: (i) one 
set of preferences is related with her concern about her personal utility/benefits from 
voting; (ii) another set of preferences is related with her concern about the utility her voting 
is likely to yield to other members of the society. In this context Geys (2006) expresses a 
voter’s utility function as: 
 (2.2)      i i j
j i
W U Uα
≠
= + ∑  
where, α is the weight attached to the utility that a voter’s vote yields to other members of 
the society and 0<α<1. In this case it is not essential to compare the relative strength of 
each component (egoistic versus ethical/sociotropic) as it was necessary in the case of 
Downs-Riker-Ordeshook-Fiorina models. He argues that generally egoistic preferences 
predominate over sociotropic ones. What is necessary here is that the ethical motive of 
voting must have some weight in the voter’s utility function. The model assumes that a 
voter’s attitude towards risks remains constant. Goodin and Roberts (1975) advance their 
ethical voting model as under: 
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Figure 2.4: Determinants of ethical voting behaviour 
 
Figure 2.4 shows that whether a voter is likely to vote ethically or 
egoistically/selfishly is determined by two factors: (i) the size of stakes in the electoral 
outcome: her cost if the outcome goes against her and the reward if it goes in her favour; 
and (ii) efficacy: her chance of influencing the electoral outcome. She votes ethically (i.e., 
she opts for the fairest social policy) when her stakes are low, and/or her efficacy is low. 
On the contrary, she votes egoistically (i.e., prefers unfair social policy tilting towards her 
personal interest) when her stakes are high, and she has the high probability of influencing 
the electoral outcome. Goodin and Roberts (1975)’s model shows conditions under which 
a voter behaves egoistically or ethically. A voter’s dominant voting strategy is either ethical 
or egoistic voting.  
Tests of the ethical voting model 
Feddersen et al. (2009) carry out a laboratory experiment of this model. They ask 
attendees to choose one of two options: (i) an ethical voting option where payoffs are 
distributed relatively equally; (ii) a selfish option where payoffs are distributed unequally 
favouring voters themselves. They find that in large electorates voters cast votes ethically.  
Strengths and limitations of the ethical voting model  
The model suggests that voters are either ethical or selfish in an election. This is 
supported by some empirical studies. However, over time a voter may follow mixed 
strategy to optimize her utility from voting. It does not focus on voters’ use of mixed 
strategy in voting. Secondly, the ethical voting model does not show costs and benefits of 
each type of voting.   
2.5.2 The strategic voting model  
This model comes under the category of the quasi-instrumentalist-expressive voting 
model in this sense that voters cast their votes to express their preference for the party 
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which is not their first preference. They tend to vote for the party which they prefer less 
with a view to resist their least preferred party from winning.  They may vote for it for its 
efficacy in delivering some tangible benefits, which their most preferred party may not 
deliver. McKelvey and Ordeshook (1972) develop this model. The strategic voting is 
different from sincere voting. Under the sincere voting voters vote for their most preferred 
party whether it has any chance of winning or not. Moreover, voters assume that their most 
preferred party would implement its stated policy in full if elected. Under the strategic 
voting model voters do not vote for their most preferred candidates. They vote for the party 
which has a highest chance to win, but they prefer it less and it is in tough competition with 
their least preferred party. Thus, the objective of voters is to maximize their expected utility 
by securing the best possible outcome. They vote for their less preferred candidates to make 
them winners. Under the first-past-the-post system they usually defect their most preferred 
smaller parties in favour of less preferred major parties. While the sincere voting 
emphasizes preferences, the strategic voting emphasizes outcomes. Downs (1957:47-50) 
marginally focuses on the strategic voting, but he does not develop the model. Mckelvey 
and Ordeshook’s (1972) model is as follows: 
(2.3)    0 1 1 2 2
k
k k k kE E P B P B− = +  
where Ek is the expected utility associated with voting for candidate k and E0 that is 
associated with abstention. Bk1 is the net benefit from candidate 1. It makes a series of 
paired comparison between k and the n-1 remaining candidates based on the utility 
differential and the probability of decisiveness a vote for k makes in winning her.     
Downs (1957) narrates his model of strategic voting based on some basic 
assumptions: (i) voters know one another’s order of preferences; (ii) voters cast votes in 
elections to select the government; (iii) every vote is pivotal; and (iv) a multi-party 
democratic system exists. There are at least three parties – Right, Centre and Left. A certain 
voter may sincerely prefer Right to Centre to Left. A sincere vote may recognize that her 
most preferred Right party has little chance to win and if she votes for it, her vote is wasted. 
On the other hand, she realizes that her less preferred Centre has a chance to win and if she 
votes for it, it is likely to win. Moreover, it would prevent her least preferred Left party 
from winning and her vote would not be wasted. However, Downs (1957) is doubtful about 
casting of strategic votes by average voters, because, it is costly to cast strategic vote. There 
is not much difference between Downs (1957) and McKelvey and Ordeshook (1972) in 
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terms of identification of ‘waste-vote’ position and activation of strategic voting. While 
Downs (1957) does not mention the probability of a vote becoming decisive in determining 
electoral outcomes, McKelvey and Ordeshook (1972) do so.  
Duch and Palmer (2002) identify that the strategic voting as a two-stage process. 
The first stage is the recognition that a strategic voting situation prevails. To recognize it, 
the voter needs to collect a lot of information. Since this incurs costs, she may not do it and 
refrain from identifying the ‘waste-vote’ situation. The second stage is casting vote 
strategically. This also incurs a lot of costs. Duch and Palmer (2002) identify some sources 
of cost of the strategic voting. The benefits from the strategic voting must compensate its 
costs to motivate a voter to vote strategically. The voter may incur costs for being 
dissatisfied with the political system and the performance of the government, her preferred 
party being drifted away from her ideological position, and so on. The instrumental and 
expressive benefits from the strategic voting for the government may come from 
continuation of its policy that is helping it to perform better. These benefits may come from 
strategic voting against the government for a change of policy by the new government.  
Tests of the strategic voting model  
Political scientists became more interested in the study of the strategic voting with 
the increase of the number of contestants in the US presidential primary elections since 
1968 when the nomination processes of the presidential candidates of two major parties 
were reformed. The rise of the third party or third challenger in the US presidential elections 
and UK parliamentary elections since 1970 also contributed in this respect. Using the 
survey data drawn from the 1968 and the 1972 Canadian federal elections Black (1978) 
observes evidence of the strategic voting in Canada in those elections. Using the 1970 UK 
electoral data Cain (1978) concludes that when UK voters perceive that their most preferred 
(first choice) is least likely to win, they are more likely to vote for their second choice. This 
type of voting tendency is stronger when the expected margin difference between their 
second and third choice is below 5 percent. Using 1997 Canadian elections Blais et al. 
(2001) find that only 3 percent voters vote strategically. In marginal seats they play an 
important role in winning some less preferred major parties. The tendency of strategic 
voting is more prevalent in local elections than in national elections. It suggests that the 
tendency of strategic voting is contextual.    
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Strengths and limitations of the strategic voting model  
The model seems theoretically and empirically sound. However, it may be 
considered myopic, because it helps a less preferred candidate/party to win and consolidate 
its position at the expense of disappearance of a voter’s most preferred candidate or party. 
Thus, an ideological vacuum in politics is likely to emerge in the long run. However, Duch 
and Palmer (2002) argue that this type of strategic voting is likely to consolidate and 
subsequently stabilize the political system, because it would lead to a two-party system. 
Secondly, Duch and Palmer (2002) speculate that a voter will have no incentive to vote 
strategically under some situations: if (i) there is little difference between his second and 
third preferred party in terms of the proximity of their policies, (ii) he is a supporter of a 
major party, and (iii) his intensity of ideological identification hugely outweighs his 
intensity for helping his second preferred party to win. Thirdly, if a voter does not know 
preferences of co-voters and if a vote is unlikely to be pivotal, a strategic voting is unlikely 
to take place. Fourthly, the strategic voting tendency is likely to be low in countries where 
voters are ill-informed about the likelihood of winning of different candidates on which the 
utility from the strategic voting depends. Using data drawn from the 1988 Canadian 
elections Blais and Turgeon (2004) find that half of the voters could not identify the third 
ranking party in the election.      
2.5.3 The ethnic voting model: the first extension of the Columbia model 
Under the ethnic voting model both ethnic political elites and their co-ethnic voters 
are interlocked by symbiotic relationships (Chandra, 2004:11-12). It is assumed that both 
are benefit-seekers. These benefits may be instrumental as well as expressive. The ethnic 
voters expect some material benefits from co-ethnic political leaders. Sometimes they 
support co-ethnic leaders not for direct benefits, but for expressive purposes. They feel 
proud when they see their co-ethnic leaders occupying public offices. The political elites 
also expect electoral support from their co-ethnic voters. The larger the size of the ethnic 
group, the higher is the chance of winning of the ethnic political candidates. They trigger 
the sense of the ethnic identity and mobilize co-ethnic voters by promising material benefits 
if elected. Moreover, the political communication with co-ethnic voters is less costly than 
that with voters belonging to other ethnic groups. So, ethnic voting does not consider 
ideologies of the contesting parties. They only consider the ethnic identity of candidates. 
The ethnic voters tend to vote for co-ethnic candidates even if their policy or ideology is 
conflicting with their own. Chandra (2004:11) argues that both ethnic voters and their co-
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ethnic political leaders are instrumentally rational and thus attain the Nash equilibrium, 
because given the strategies followed by other parties they use strategies that maximise 
their own utility. Phandis and Ganguly (2001:11-13) argue that ethnic voting is a barrier to 
nation-building in South Asia. Hillman et al. (2015) assert that it reduces political 
competition and quality of democracy, because the same electoral outcomes take place 
repeatedly.    
  In the context of Indian multi-ethnic society and prevalence of ethnic politics 
Chandra (2004) develops an ethnic voting model illustrated in Figure 2.5.  
Figure 2.5: Ethnic voting model 
 
Source: Chandra (2004:12) 
It is Key (1949) who first develops the ethnic voting model in the context of voting 
tendency of the White and the Black voters in the southern US states, where the Black are 
a major ethnic minority during the American Civil war (1860-65). He analyses the electoral 
behaviour of the Black and the White voters in the 1928 and the 1948 presidential elections. 
White voters fear backlash from Black voters. Usually the Black voters are supporters of 
the Democratic Party, while White voters are supporters of the Republican Party. However, 
Black voters are found to have crossed the party line if the candidates of the Republican 
Party are Black. The same is found true for the White voters. Thus, the ethnicity dominates 
over politically salient issues. As a result, Key (1949) calls it a one-party system with 
factionalism within. Under a ‘good’ two-party dominant liberal political system the 
opposition party identifies some salient issues which are debated in the parliament and 
consequently both the incumbent and the opposition parties compromise with each other 
without resorting to violence. This ensures stability in the political system. In the Southern 
US states local rather than national issues are predominant. So, state politics deviates from 
the national politics. As the Southern States had more concentration of the Black than the 
Northern States during the US Civil War period and beyond, the politics in the Southern 
States centred on the socioeconomic problems of the Black people. Moreover, the Blacks 
are socioeconomically under-privileged than the Whites. So, a politics of ethnicity and a 
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politics of social class use to run hand-in-hand, but the former regularly dominates the later 
(Shafer, 2011).  
Tests of the ethnic voting model 
Studies on ethnic voting are conducted mainly in two contexts: (i) countries with 
multi-ethnic immigrants, such as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand; 
and (ii) countries with multi-ethnic natives, such as India. In the US the first-generation 
immigrants tend to cast votes in ethnic lines. Over generations the proclivity of ethnic 
voting tends to disappear, and descendants of immigrants are more likely to align with 
mainstream politics (Dahl, 1961:59-60). Gabriel (1972) finds a similar result that at early 
stages of immigration people vote for ethnic candidates for instrumental benefits, and the 
descendants of immigrants vote for ethnic candidates for expressive benefits. It is different 
in other cases. According to the 2011 Census of South Africa, the Whites are the largest 
minority (8.4 percent in 2011) in South Africa. However, they are not homogenous.  The 
first language of 60.8 percent of the Whites is Afrikaans and they are descendants of the 
Dutch and the French who settled in the 17th and the 18th century. The first language of 
35.9 percent of the Whites is English and they are descendants of the British colonists and 
later immigrants. In the 1970 parliamentary election in South Africa the White South 
Africans voters voted according to their language-based ethnic identities. The Afrikaans-
speaking Whites voted for the Afrikaans-speakers-dominant African National Congress, 
while the English-speaking Whites voted for the English-speakers-dominant United South 
African National Party (dissolved in 1977). The Indian case is different from the South 
African case. In India Muslims are the largest (13 percent) religious minority. The highest 
concentration of Muslims as a minority group is in Uttar Pradesh state of India. They are 
18 percent of the total population of the state. They are backward in all respects in relation 
to the Hindus who are majority (79.8 percent) in India. So, Muslims evaluate their status 
from communal perspectives. They think that Muslim political elites would foster their 
interests better than non-Muslim ones.  As a result, they are more likely to vote for Muslim 
candidates irrespective of their party affiliation if they have a high likelihood of success 
(Heath et al., 2015).   
Strengths and limitations of the ethnic voting model  
While some studies find evidence in support of the ethnic voting, Dowe (2011) 
discovers an important limitation in the Key’s (1949) analysis. While taking interviews 
MODELS OF ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR 
 
55 
 
with a view to getting the relevant data, Key (1949) interviews only the White Southern 
voters of the US and thus he ignores the political attitudes of the Black voters. So, he might 
miss some vital points. One of the vital points may be the ability of non-ethnic political 
elites to out-perform co-ethnic ones in terms of provision of public goods. Ichino and 
Nathan (2013) find that the ethnic voters are likely to cross the ethnic voting line if non-
ethnic political elites can demonstrate to ethnic voters that they can perform better than 
their co-ethnic candidates. So, the tendency to vote in the ethnic line disappears under 
certain circumstances.     
2.6 Sociological vote models 
These models assume that among other characteristics the location of a voter in the 
hierarchical social structure is a prime determinant of her voting behaviour. Lazarsfeld et 
al. (1944) lays down the foundation of this class of models. The model is later extended by 
Campbell et al (1960), Benson (1961), and Lipset and Rokkan (1967).   
2.6.1 The Columbia Model 
Using electoral (election results) and demographic (census) data available at the 
aggregate level and breaking them down into smaller regions or rural-urban categories 
Gosnell (1930) and Tingsten (1937) carry out some empirical analyses. However, as they 
use aggregate data they suffer from ecological fallacy. In this context Lazarsfeld et al. 
(1944) survey 600 prospective voters in a single community (Erie County, Ohio, USA) as 
many as seven times during the 1940 presidential campaign. Their objective is to explore 
‘why people voted as they did, not how they voted’. As determinants of vote they 
emphasize use of various media by contestants in shaping political preferences of voters. 
They change questionnaires each time taking into consideration field level experiences 
during the preceding rounds of interviews. They use the sociological model of voting and 
find that very few voters swing following vigorous campaigns. They, therefore, conclude 
that partisan loyalty of voters is fixed and predetermined by social status, religion, and 
place of residence. Since interviewees are drawn from a single locality, their findings could 
not be used as a guide to national voting preferences (Evans, 2004:23). So, Berelson et al. 
(1954) of the Columbia University conduct another survey in another community (Elmira, 
New York, USA) in 1948. They also use the sociological model of voting. Their basic 
assumption is that voting is determined by both ‘who one is’ and ‘what one believes’. More 
specifically, sociological variables contribute to create common group interests which in 
turn form partisan loyalty. They focus on the past experience of voters to predict about their 
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current electoral behaviour. Thus, they concentrate on main causes of stability of political 
loyalty over time rather than on short-term forces that caused variation in election results 
from one to another. They feel that results of a particular election are a product of moving 
averages of results of past elections and many social and political events.  This time they 
take into consideration socioeconomic factors that are believed to have influenced the 
formation of voters’ political preferences and consequently their political behaviour. They 
also interview prospective voters from a single locality and thus it cannot provide any 
reliable guide to national voting preferences like its preceding one. The surveyed 
communities are not again representatives of a large nation like the United States which is 
hugely heterogeneous in many ways at various sub-national levels. National surveys are 
expected to deduce national voting preferences. However, the Columbia model has two 
remarkable achievements: (a) it shows the potentiality of a repeated interview technique in 
analysing political behaviour in a specific community (Bone, 1953); and (b) it also 
demonstrates the rich potential of election surveys as data for understanding campaigns 
and elections (Bartels, 2010:242). 
 These two studies (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944 and Berelson et al. 1954) at Columbia 
University synthesize the decision-making processes in voting. Their overall finding is that 
voters, who belong to homogenous socioeconomic groups (in terms age, gender, 
occupation, religion and ethnicity and so on), tend to vote for similar parties and their 
voting preferences remain remarkably stable over time. Berelson et al. (1954:73-5) outline 
the three fundamental processes that are likely to contribute to this  inter-generational 
lasting relationship, such as (a) differentiation: whereby individuals with common 
socioeconomic characteristics are more likely to share common interests in public policy; 
(b) transmission: whereby parents pass their values and attitudes to children giving birth to 
stable political preferences over generations; (c) contact: whereby  members of similar 
social groups interact with one another more frequently than they do with members of 
dissimilar groups. This further reinforces their existing beliefs and attitudes. They may 
come under cross-pressures to modify their values and attitudes when they come in contact 
with members of different groups. However, in most cases they are able to resist 
transformation of their pre-existing attitudes and beliefs due to active presence of 
differentiation and transmission processes. This is shown in Figure 2.6. Berelson et al. 
(1954: 67-9and 125) further find that people can be classified into several meso-groups 
according to some indicators, such as age, gender, education, income, occupation, religion, 
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ethnicity and so on and therefore, their relationship with the choice of vote can be 
determined them. All social indicators are unlikely to play the same role in deciding the 
vote. While age and gender are likely to play a lesser important role in deciding the vote, 
socioeconomic characteristics are likely to play a more important role in this regard. 
Though public policy related to age and gender has age and gender specific differential 
effects on the vote, socioeconomic groups such as trade unions and religious groups are 
likely to play a more important role in influencing the vote. It is because, people would like 
to identify themselves more by socioeconomic criteria than age and gender specific criteria. 
It is economically less costly for political parties to mobilize voters on the basis of their 
socioeconomic identities, because parties can focus on their common characteristics, rather 
than individual ones.  
Figure 2.6: Sociological Model of Voting 
 
Source: Udehn (1996:38) 
  
Tests of the Columbia model 
The Columbia model is concerned with individual decision making on the basis of 
socioeconomic and demographic attributes. Moreover, it tries to identify how the flow of 
information during election campaigns affects individuals in making voting decisions 
(Sheingold, 1973). The hypotheses of the model are tested by some researchers, such as 
Langton (1969), Jennings and Niemi (1968) and Percheron and Jennings (1981). Langton 
(1969) focuses on identifying roles played by social institutions like family, school, and 
school peer groups in forming political orientations and dispositions. Jennings and Niemi 
(1968) narrow down their focus and concentrate on the role of the family only in developing 
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political socialization among pre-adult children. They find that less than 15 percent of the 
pre-adult children disagrees with their parents on broader political and social issues. 
Percheron and Jennings (1981) conduct another cross-country analysis using data related 
to a number of Western democratic countries (Britain, Germany, Netherlands, United 
States, Italy, and France). Their data set is rich in the sense that they consist of information 
about political orientations and dispositions of children, ideological preferences of parents 
as being perceived by children, and those of children as being perceived by parents. This 
information is absent in Langton’s (1969) and Jennings and Niemi’s (1968) studies. As a 
result, they are able to examine effects of parental political preferences on children. Among 
their countries of interest some countries (e.g., the USA and the UK) have two-party 
system, while others have multi-party-political system. In the case of the two-party political 
system they measure inclination of parents towards one of the two parties which have 
opposing ideologies. In the case of multi-party system, they measure ideological inclination 
of parents along the Left-Right continuum which have distinctly conflicting ideologies too.  
Whatever the political system is, they observe that ideological cleavages exist in the society 
as stipulated by the Columbia model.  
Strengths and limitations of the Columbia model 
The Columbia model tries to answer two important questions: (i) Why is 
partisanship of majority voters stable? (ii) Why do a minority of voters swing between 
elections? The study find that partisanship is determined by socioeconomic status of voters 
and persists overtime ‘through within group interaction and cross-generational 
socialization’ (Knoke, 1974). Swing voters are not seriously involved with politics and 
election campaigns (Sheingold, 1973). The empirical studies that lead to formation of the 
model answer many contemporary questions related to the individual electoral behaviour, 
but they do not also answer many other questions. They investigate the flow of political 
information during the campaigns and its effects on electoral outcomes from an individual 
perspective, but they are unable to explore the social structure within which the information 
flows take place (Sheingold, 1973).     
2.6.2 The Michigan model 
Learning from the drawbacks of the Columbia model, the pioneers (Angus 
Campbell and Robert L. Kahn of Michigan University’s Survey Research Centre) of the 
Michigan model attempt to investigate more directly the calculus of the voting behaviour 
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of individual voters. So, they approach the issue of voting from the psychological as well 
as social point of view. They attach less weight to social characteristics of voters 
(components of Columbia model) and more weight to party attachment and voters’ 
orientations toward issues and candidates. This is a hybrid model in the sense that it 
interweaves social and psychological factors as determinants of electoral behaviour. 
Moreover, it is deterministic in the sense that it is built on a basic assumption that a set of 
social and psychological factors determine the voting behaviour. The voter herself has no 
control on them. Those variables are interlinked in a chain form, where preceding variables 
affect succeeding ones. Enelow and Hinich (1984:4-5) outline the chain of causality. It 
commences with a voter’s social characteristics that are remotely related with the actual 
act of voting. The social characteristics of a voter, in turn, influence her party identification, 
which measures her emotional attachment with political parties. Once the party 
identification is ascertained, the voter can easily compare and contrast between issues and 
candidates during campaigns. Finally, her personal position on issues and candidates are 
readjusted by having feedback from her family and friends. Thus, an individual’s voting 
decision is the resultant of all these social and psychological forces. 
The conceptualization of the Michigan model takes place in The American Voter 
(Campbell et al., 1960) where the authors apply most of the concepts conventionally being 
used to analyse electoral behaviour. The determinants of electoral behaviour are (a) 
attitudes toward parties, candidates, and issues; (b) party loyalties; (c) ideology; (d) election 
laws; (e) social group membership; (f) social class; (g) economic outlooks; (h) agricultural 
conditions; (i) geographical mobility; (j) education; (k) occupation; (l) sex; (m) age; (n) 
personality; (o) party performance in managing government; and (p) turnout. They use the 
survey data connected with the 1948, 1952 and 1956 presidential elections. It is designed 
not only to develop and test theories of electoral behaviour, but also to trace back factors 
that influence outcomes of certain elections. So, the study distinguishes between long and 
short-term forces that influence electoral outcomes.  The authors assert that the principal 
motivation behind voting in the US is party identification. The core concept of party 
identification serves a few purposes both as a pivot for explanations of party choice and as 
a grounding for the subsequent development of theories of voting.  
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The funnel of causality 
The Michigan model has become a theory of vote choice, because it has identified 
several factors as determinants of vote choice like its preceding studies. Moreover, it has 
also arranged them in order in terms of their utility in influencing electoral behaviour. It 
has developed a causality model called funnel model (see Figure 2.7). It works like this: 
first, voters do not become an active member of a political party. They develop emotional 
or ‘affective’ attachment to a party during the socialization process in childhood and 
adolescence. During this formative period of life, they learn attitudes and values from their 
parents, families and peers. As they are motivated to pin their faith on one of many 
prevailing religions, they are taught by the surrounding environment to be supporters of a 
political party and to learn what it stands for. So, their party identification triggers the 
“funnel of causality” leading to vote choice.  
Figure 2.7: Funnel of causality of voting behaviour under the Michigan Model 
 
Source: Webels et al. (2014:10). 
It should be noted that having developed party identification, voters take position 
on six attitudinal dimensions (in context of the two-party political system) of the electoral 
decision: (a) the personal attributes of candidates of their preferred party; (b)  the personal 
attributes of candidates of their opposition party; (c) the group interests the partisan 
candidates represent; (d) the issues of domestic policy; (e) the issues of foreign policy; and 
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(g) the performance of parties in managing affairs of the government. These issues 
influence voting decision in the short term. They are found highly correlated, because 
partisan feeling is strongly shaped by the party identification. Campbell et al. (1960) 
estimate that voters’ position on these six issues predict voting decisions with 87 per cent 
accuracy. They claim that it is a better method than those methodologies where voters are 
asked in successive periods before the election about their voting intention, as is done by 
researchers associated with the Columbia model. Thus, they claim that their model (six-
factor model) is superior to the Columbia model.  
The normal curve: a key contribution of the Michigan model 
Campbell et al. (1966) publish results of another study entitles ‘Elections and the 
Political Order’. The level of scholarship of this study is much higher than that of The 
American Voter. Converse (1966b) develops and operationalizes the concept of ‘the normal 
vote”, an analytical tool being widely used by political scientists to explore relationship 
between issues and vote. He develops an explanatory theory of presidential elections, 
viewing electoral results as products of long (party identification) and short-term 
components (issues and partisan attitudes). His method provides an estimate of a party’s 
expected proportion of the vote for any selected subgroups of the electorate in a normal 
election. This estimate is based on three factors: (a) the balance of party identifiers within 
the group, (b) the typical defection rates of identifiers to other parties, and (c) the turnout 
rate. A normal vote (in the context of the two-party political system) is one in which 
defection rates of a party (e.g., the Republican Party) is equal to that of the opposition party 
(e.g., the Democratic Party). If a partisan candidate (e.g., a Democratic candidate) wins in 
a certain election from a constituency where the electorate is equally divided, the probable 
reasons might be greater party loyalty and turnout of the party identifiers of the party in 
question. The utility of the normal vote calculation is that it helps analysts to separate issues 
into long and short-term components (Boyd, 1972).  
The partisan (long-term) component of an issue is the extent of party polarization 
on it. Party polarization again is a function of two factors: (a) one aspect of polarization is 
the degree of association of issue positions with party identification. Party identification is 
both stable over the life cycle of most voters and a major determinant of their electoral 
choices. So, an issue on which mass party members are polarized leads into a stable long-
term split among constituents. Given that party loyalty of voters on certain issues is known, 
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it can be predicted how these people would vote in a normal election. For example, if 65 
percent of the voters believe that their party’s position on a certain issue is right and 35 
percent believe it wrong, then this difference of 30 percent reflects relative polarization of 
party identifiers on the issue; (b) a second aspect of polarization is the proportion of party 
identifiers advocating for each of the position on an issue. Polarization is born out of 
conflict of opinions. When consensus is reached on an issue or a great majority of partisan 
identifiers are on one side of the debate, the issue is no longer a partisan matter.  
The short-term component of an issue is its relationship to defections from the 
normal party vote. The normal party vote is the expected percentage of votes determined 
by the average vote a party receives over several elections in the past. When a party’s vote 
share is significantly higher or lower than its expected vote share, it may be due to its 
position on single or multiple issues in the short or long term. However, it cannot ascertain 
net gain or loss of vote of a party resulting from its position on certain issues. To separate 
short-term from long-term components, it is necessary to categorize the electorate 
according to their positions on those issues. If a party’s vote share is systematically more 
or less than the expected share across all issues, then it is a long-term rather than a short-
term defection. The variation of the actual gains and losses in issue category from the 
overall gains/losses is the issue’s strength of association with short-term defections from 
the normal vote. Thus, even we cannot determine in causal terms of an issues’ contribution 
to the vote, we can compare issues statistically in terms of their association with long term 
party loyalties and short-term defections from the normal party vote. 
The simple calculation of normal vote has captured the essence of the Michigan 
model. It suggests that only the party identification operates as a long-term force across 
elections in influencing vote choices. Party identification encapsulates all factors including 
ideology and issues that go into the funnel of causation. By taking into consideration the 
long-term forces originating in the distant past, it has exposed the inadequacy of the 
explanations of political behaviour. It also includes a good number of short-term forces 
influencing vote choice. The six components of the electoral decision originally designed 
to capture short-term forces also nest some residue of long-term forces. When short-term 
forces are balanced between candidates, party identification produces direct impact on vote 
choice. 
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The Michigan model imposes a tight cause-effect framework on the factors 
involved in the voting decision. The funnel of causality orders these factors by the 
proximity to the vote decision. Equally proximate factors are differentiated further in terms 
of their potential relevance. When all these are put together in a tight framework, they 
produce a model of unidirectional causal flows without reverse causality and simultaneity.  
This type of model can be estimated at the time by “state of art” techniques for recursive 
modelling. Though the architects of Michigan model never present their works as 
parsimoniously and explicitly as a model looks like, the outline of a definite model can be 
deduced from their studies.   
Strengths and limitations of the Michigan model 
The Michigan model dominated the field of electoral behaviour for a long time due 
to singling out party identification as a predominant long-term force among all other long 
and short term forces influencing electoral behaviour. It has also linked short term forces 
with long term ones. Thus, it has provided an improved explanatory framework capable of 
explaining electoral behaviour of both core and swing voters. Through its ground-breaking 
advancement in the field of studying electoral behaviour it re-discovers one important 
finding of the Columbia model that a large proportion of the electorate seems to be 
apathetic about politics. Thus, it maintains continuity as well as incorporates a change in 
explaining electoral behaviour.  
The model shows that some short-term forces become predominant in certain 
elections and cause swing, but it cannot ‘satisfactorily’ explain why and how certain short-
term forces become predominant in certain elections and lose their preponderance in some 
subsequent elections. So, it can be deemed an ‘ad hoc and atheoretical’ model (Prewitt and 
Nie, 1971). The counter-argument is that it is capable of explaining growing number of 
politically apathetic (US) voters by their slow and steady movement over time towards the 
centre of the Left-Right (Democrat-Republican) continuum. The real problem with the 
Michigan model is that no party occupies the centre of the Left-Right political spectrum, 
because there is no ideology that can be placed at the centre (Beck, 1986:255). However, 
Killian (2011:3) argues that it is not ideologically empty position. Voters positioning 
themselves at the centre of the spectrum may claim themselves as people without Left or 
Right ideology, but they possess ideology. They long for change, but they do not get what 
they want from elected representatives. So, they move back and forth voting for candidates 
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from both Left and Right parties. Secondly, it claims that socialization takes place during 
the childhood through parents, other family members and peers. Though they come under 
opposing forces in the later part of their life cycle, the partisanship created during the early 
life does not change much. Thus, partisanship continues over generations and party loyalty 
is frozen for ever. However, this model does not explain what happens if early socialization 
does not take place or is less effective in forming partisan identification and what 
supplements or complements it. To Fiorina (1977, 1981) partisan identification is an ever-
changing outcome resulting from past partisan identification, and retrospective and 
prospective evaluations of performance of the party. Thirdly, it claims that partisan 
identification is not influenced by short-term retrospective evaluations of the party 
performance and hence reverse causality is irrelevant. However, Dobson and St. Angelo 
(1975) argue that partisan identification may be reversed based on short-term retrospective 
evaluations of the party performance. So, it may be modelled as both a cause and an effect 
of short-term retrospective evaluations of party performance, but it is more a cause than an 
effect. Since techniques of non-recursive modelling was unknown at the time when the 
Michigan model was developed, the reverse and simultaneous causality could not be tested. 
When it became known, it opened a new opportunity to develop empirical theory and 
testing of those theories. Using data from the 1964 Election Study of the Survey research 
Centre and non-recursive modelling, Jackson (1975) estimates the feedback of evaluations 
of candidates and parties on party identification. Page and Jones (1979) study the 
relationship among issues, party, candidate evaluations and the vote in 1972 and 1976. 
Their findings challenge and subsequently revise the original findings of the Michigan 
model. Lastly, it claims that the long-term forces affect electoral behaviour. Sometime 
some short-term forces may overturn the pre-existing partisanship, but most of the time 
they behave in traditional and apparently heedless ways.  Silbey et al. (1978:253) argue 
that the model does not tell about the historical origin of determinants of electoral 
behaviour beyond the psychological attachment to parties.     
2.6.3 The ethnocultural voting model: the second extension of the Columbia model 
The Columbia model, which emphasizes the pre-exiting socioeconomic classes of 
voters as a primary determinant of electoral behaviour, does not investigate into historical 
factors contributing to the evolution of socioeconomic classes. Having identified this 
lacking in the Columbia model, some researchers attempt to fill up this lacuna. Benson 
(1961:165) argues that economic factors undoubtedly receive prominence in public debates 
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at the national level in times of national economic crisis, but he emphasizes that life styles 
and values deeply rooted in communities brew difference in economic outlooks and hence 
divergence in electoral behaviour of communities. Thus, following Beard (1945/2005) he 
uses historical data and statistical techniques to explain ethnocultural roots of voters’ 
political behaviour and set in the beginning of study of the ethno-cultural voting model.  
Flow of causality  
According to McCormick (1974) and Sibey et al. (1978), three hypotheses explain 
how cultural differences are translated into political differences. Negative feelings against 
some ethnocultural groups called reference groups are determinants of party support.  
Voters tend to vote against the party which shelters those ethnocultural groups disliked by 
them. On the other hand, they vote for a party which effectively protects their interests 
against aggressive ethnocultural groups. Secondly, dominant ethnocultural groups want to 
impose their own values on minority groups through controlling the state machinery. On 
the contrary, would-be suppressed groups want to resist this cultural imperialism through 
controlling the same. So, cultural conflicts break out between them. They work out political 
programs to attain their respective objectives. They realize that without being economically 
strong they cannot become politically strong too. In this way, cultural conflicts trigger 
political conflicts via economic ones. Thirdly, it is assumed that antagonistic ethnocultural 
groups evolve through natural historical progressions. In the US they are mainly pietists 
and liturgists. Their social, economic, religious and political values are diametrically 
opposite to each other. Political parties target one of them as their potential supporters. So, 
they design their policies as close to the values preferred by their target groups as possible. 
This symbiotic relationship between the party and its supporters gradually leads to an 
acutely polarized society and polity. Hay (1967:158-159) claims that these hypotheses 
explain how cultural differences culminated in political differences through party 
realignment before the American Civil War.     
Tests of the ethnocultural voting model  
Leubke (1969) finds that German immigrants in the US were assimilated politically 
instead of structurally until 1900. Moreover, his findings support Benson’s (1961) 
hypothesis that religion instead of economic factor plays a more important role in 
influencing German immigrants’ voting behaviour. Kleppner (1970), Jensen (1971) and 
McSeveney (1972) studies reveal that during normal economic condition major policies of 
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dominant parties are close to one another and hence ethnocultural factors play important 
role in influencing electoral behaviour. In contrast, during critical periods especially during 
severe economic recessions personal economic condition as well as national economic 
issues predominate over ethnocultural ones. In contrast, Kelley (1978) shows that in the 
US rural townships the electoral behaviour of some sub-groups (e.g., the German Catholic) 
of a large ethnic group (e.g., the German) conforms more to the predictions of the 
ethnocultural model than that some other sub-groups (e.g., German Lutheran) belonging to 
the same large ethnic group. In the US urban townships, the electoral behaviour of the 
Norwegian Lutherans, Swedish Protestants and Irish Catholics always conform to the 
ethnocultural voting model.  
Strengths and limitations of the ethnocultural voting model  
Proponents of the ethnocultural voting model have improved our knowledge by 
incorporating historical facts into the voting model hitherto unexplored. They have 
incorporated local issues along with national ones within a broader analytical framework. 
It explains the US electoral behaviour during the last decades of the 19th century, when 
Republican leaders won elections by highlighting economic malaise and sugar-coating 
cultural cleavages. Though Republicans successfully covered up cultural differences at the 
national level, they were operative at state and local elections during 1890s and beyond 
(McSeveney, 1973).  Dahl (1961), Wolfinger (1965) and Parenti (1967) develop the 
assimilation theory, the mobilization theory and acculturation-assimilation theories 
respectively and empirically tested them. They find that ethnocultural voting has been 
either increasing or decreasing over successive generations of US immigrants. 
One important limitation of studies being conducted by Dahl (1961), Wolfinger 
(1965), and Parenti (1967) is that they do not control ‘other variables’ influencing party 
choice by descendants of immigrants. So, their findings are problematic. Knoke and Felson 
(1974) distil some key explanatory factors being used by them to test their models. They 
are socioeconomic status, religious affiliation, and ethnic backgrounds of voters. They sub-
divide the ethnocultural model into three sub-ethnocultural models: (i) the status politics 
model which predicts that lower status social group is more likely to support the Democrats, 
and higher status one Republicans; (ii) the cultural lag model which predicts that the culture 
is likely to adjust with socioeconomic status with time lag; and (iii) the religious affiliation 
model which is capable to predict religion-based voting behaviour. Their objective is to 
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test whether ethnic origin influences electoral behaviour after lapse of 50 years since mass 
immigration ended in 1924. Results indicate that (i) effects of ethnic status on party 
identification become insignificant when other variables are controlled; (ii) father’s party 
choice reduces effect of ethnic status on party identification substantially over years. It 
implies that father’s party choice is passed on to children. They claim that it tends to justify 
the validity of the ‘cultural lag model’; (iii) when all other variables are controlled, 
contribution of religion and ethnic prestige to party identification declines over time and 
they are statistically insignificant. So, religion and ethnic prestige are perplexing variables. 
It suggests that they need to be treated jointly as ethno-religious ones. However, over time 
religion has produced a slightly larger effect than the ethnicity on party identification when 
ethnic prestige, occupation, education, father’s party choice and religion are controlled.  
2.6.4 The social structural theory of voting model: the third extension of the Columbia 
model 
While Columbia model suggests that electoral behaviour of voters is determined by 
their position in the society, it cannot explain why voters belonging to one socioeconomic 
group are found to vote for candidates who represent interests of rival socioeconomic 
groups and why two elections do not produce similar results given that class compositions 
do not change much within an electoral cycle. Thus, two important limitations of the 
Columbia model are the exclusion of context and point of time. The Columbia model was 
developed in the US context during the 1940s and 1950s, but when it was tested in other 
countries especially in European countries using socioeconomic and electoral data related 
to 1960s and 1970s, its predictions came under challenge.  In the UK between 1884 and 
1918, class composition and party support were highly and positively correlated: the further 
voters went down the socioeconomic scale, the more likely they voted for the party of the 
Left. When Labour Party came into being in 1945, elections became a class battle (Pulzer, 
1972:102). Though age (older people are supporters of the Conservative Party), religion 
(people associated with the Church of England are supporters of the Conservative Party) 
and race (ethnic minorities are supporters of the party of the Left) also influence electoral 
behaviour to some degrees and cut across classes, types of neighbourhood became an 
important determinant of voting. Butler and Stokes (1969:140-1) survey 120,000 people 
over three years (1963-9666) across the UK constituencies and find that party support in 
many neighbourhoods varies substantially over and above those accounted for their class 
composition. However, they do not consider strategic interactions among voters of adjacent 
neighbourhoods which also affects electoral behaviour of a neighbourhood. While British 
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party politics are more in line with class than Canadian, American and Australian party 
politics (Alford, 1964:102-3), religion matters more than class in France, and in 
Switzerland class, language and religion all matter, but class ranks third (Lijphart, 
1980:320) Now the question is: why some social divisions are more salient in certain 
countries, but not in other countries? Lipset and Rokkan (1967) attempts to explain it by 
following a macro-sociological approach.     
Building-blocks of the social structural voting model       
Though Western European societies are socioeconomically crisscrossed, Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967) identify four basic cleavages in the Western society created by the national 
and industrial revolutions. They are: (a) Centre versus Periphery: There are conflicts 
between urban and rural elites. This yields regional nationalism which aims to protect 
themselves from the aggression of nationalism being represented by the centre; (b) State 
versus Church: This cleavage yields conflicts between the state (which tends to dominate 
the public domain), and the church (which tries to preserve its historic corporate rights); 
(c) Owner versus Worker: It creates conflicts between capitalists (capital-owners) and 
proletariats (labour-owner), between employers and employees, between the rich and the 
poor, between the haves and the have-nots, and so on; and (d) landed gentry versus 
Industrialists: This cleavage represents conflicts between landed elites and the growing 
bourgeois class. They assert that these four cleavages are product of critical episodes in 
European history and produced a framework for the party systems of democratic politics. 
Cleavages (a) and (b) are formed because of national revolutions, and cleavages (c) and (d) 
are products of industrial revolutions in Europe. These social divisions become linked with 
party divisions and as such voting behaviour. Of all cleavages class becomes the most 
salient source of conflict and hence voting particularly after the extension of suffrage to all 
adult males. Once the structural cleavages are capitalized by mass parties, the party system 
becomes stable and remains unchanged for a long time. As a result, the West European 
party systems “of the 1960s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage 
structures of the 1920’s” (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967:50).   Lipset and Rokkan (1967)’s 
observations are supported by Rose and Urwin (1970).  
Tests of the social structural theory of voting model 
Rose and Urwin (1970) use percentages of votes polled by major parties in nineteen 
Western nations over twenty-five years (1945-1969) and draw a general conclusion that 
MODELS OF ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR 
 
69 
 
“the electoral strength of most parties in Western nations since the war had changed very 
little from election to election, from decade to decade, or within the lifespan of a 
generation.” However, those countries experienced a sea change in their socioeconomic 
conditions in the 1960s and 1970s and as such party systems were likely to have co-evolved 
concomitantly (Erlingsson, 2009). So, Lipset and Rokkan (1967)’s observations and Rose 
and Urwin (1970)’s subsequent empirical findings puzzled contemporary socio-political 
observers.  
In the context of major socioeconomic and political changes in the countries of 
concern, Rose and Urwin (1970) were expected to find substantial changes in the support 
base of major European political parties and as such partisan loyalties, but they did not. It 
is because, they were unable to capture sufficiently the changing electoral behaviour of 
voters in those countries (Lipset, 1990). Mair and Smith (1990:1) observe that the political 
system in the West European countries was in flux due to sudden rise of new parties and 
emasculation of old established parties, increasing level of volatility in the partisan support 
and rising level of vulnerability of parties in the face of latent restlessness in the economy 
and the society and so on. From these facts they opinionated cautiously that though 
traditional cleavage-vote nexus as propounded by the Columbia model had been weakening 
over time, translation of partisan loyalties following socioeconomic and demographic 
changes in the Western Europe had not exhausted yet. The political system is rather moving 
through an uncharted territory. They suggest that the trajectory of the political system might 
take three forms: (a) the current phase is temporary, and the future course is unknown; (b) 
it is trending towards a permanent realignment of voters who are dissatisfied with existing 
political system and parties embedded in it. As such, permanent realignment of voters is 
yet to be completed; and (c) the ‘reshuffling of the pack’ (i.e., swinging back and forth 
among closely related parties within the Left or the Right) is still active.  
Subsequently, Mair (1997) develops a model where an equilibrium situation is 
likely to be determined by the simultaneous interplay of political elites and voters mediated 
through political parties and the system. He takes a firm position on this space of 
controversies by arguing in favour of the ‘reshuffling of the pack’ hypothesis. According 
to Mair (1997), both political elites and voters interact rationally as well as strategically 
during that period. With changes in socioeconomic conditions voters’ demand for 
socioeconomic goods and services is likely to change, and in turn political elites and parties 
must respond to it accordingly. On the other hand, occasionally a few top-ranking political 
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elites of some parties deliberately influence the courses of political events by diagnosing 
‘crises’ in the system instead of in the parties and political parties headed by them and 
found to have ascended to the ruling power capitalizing on those ‘crises’. As a result, he 
argues that volatility of political support remains confined among parties having 
ideological affinity but located distinctly within the Left or the Right camp. Like the pre-
War period the political system in terms of split of voters between the Left and the Right 
camp maintains stability even in the post-War period.  
While swinging of voters across camps is most unlikely and within a certain camp 
is most likely (Mair, 1997), it is unclear to what extent swing takes place and what factors 
contribute to swing voting within the Right or the Left camp following socioeconomic and 
demographic changes. Using some socioeconomic (unemployment and immigration) and 
electoral data of 19 European countries and their 165 national elections over the 1970-2000 
period Golder (2003) explores extent and causes of variation in success or failure of 
extreme Right (populist and neo-fascist) parties. He finds that vote shares of populist 
parties are conditional on the level of unemployment and immigration, whereas those of 
‘fascist’ parties are unconditional. While a higher level of immigration always increases 
vote shares of populist parties irrespective of unemployment level, vote shares of extreme-
right parties remain low but stable irrespective of strategic interactions between voters and 
political elites as well as socioeconomic conditions. As a result, he concludes that voters 
of populist parties are ideational (i.e., supports of the national security and culture) as well 
as materialistic (i.e., supporters of lower unemployment rates), but those of ‘neo-fascist’ 
parties are expressive.  
By analysing some socioeconomic and electoral data of 23 European countries and 
110 parliamentary elections held in those countries of interest over the 1995-2012 period 
Doležalová (2015) tries to identify factors that contributed to the rise of vote shares of the 
extreme Right and Left parties during the recovery and contraction (i.e., economic crisis) 
periods of the business cycle. He remarks that when GDP growth rates are remarkably 
higher, the electorate rewards the incumbent government through re-election and the 
underlying cause of success is attributed to better economic management (i.e., lower 
unemployment rates). On the contrary, when GDP growth rates are lower than the expected 
level, the electorate punishes the incumbent and attribute the underlying cause of failure to 
its economic policy (i.e., higher unemployment rates). So, unemployment is the likely 
contributor to the rise of vote shares of extreme parties during economic downturn. When 
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lower GDP growth rates associated with higher unemployment rates persist over several 
electoral cycles, vote shares of both extreme parties keep increasing and so do their seats 
in the parliament. When the number of seats increases beyond the threshold level, they 
could influence policies in favour of their election promises. In general, ideologically-
oriented voters are more likely to have voted for extreme parties irrespective of economic 
condition.  
Strengths and limitations of the social structural theory of voting model  
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) extend the Columbia model by identifying various 
sources of social cleavages and resulting electoral behaviour of various social groups, but 
it left unexplained the specific mechanisms through which social cleavages were translated 
into political cleavages and subsequently political parties. Thus, the Lipset-Rokkan model 
cannot capture the socio-political reality and it has poor power in explaining the electoral 
behaviour.  
2.7 Spatial (geographical) models 
Most of the previous studies ignore effects of interpersonal influence on an 
individual voter’s electoral behaviour. They assume that an individual voter has weak ties 
with other members of a social network. If their assumption is wrong, their predictions 
about the electoral behaviour are likely to be wrong too. This assumption is most likely 
wrong. Some researchers (e.g., Tingsten, 1937 and Key, 1949) were aware of it long ago, 
but it is Cox (1969) who first advances the conceptual model of voting decision in a spatial 
(geographical) context.  
The spatial (geographical) model developed by Cox (1969) has several nodes 
connected by a social network as shown in the Figure 2.8. Politically-relevant information 
flows back and forth among nodes through the information highway that connects different 
regions. These nodes may be individuals, households, areas or regions located in spaces. 
Each node sends as well as receives information. When the nodes are individual voters, 
there are some opinion leaders among individuals who have better information than others. 
The nodes not only send and receive information among themselves but also process 
information being received. They also receive politically-relevant information from 
political parties and socioeconomic organizations. The space has a significance in the case 
of voting. The higher individuals identify themselves with the group living in a region, the 
higher is the probability that they will behave and think alike and as such they will vote for 
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the same party. It means that the electoral behaviour of members of a group would be more 
spatially homogeneous the more they identify themselves with the group they belong to. 
The electoral behaviour of groups is more likely to be spatially heterogeneous the more 
they identify themselves with their localities. So, a strong sense of localism tends to cause 
spatially heterogeneous voting behaviour. On the other hand, it is less likely to be spatially 
heterogeneous if they identify themselves with socioeconomic classes they belong to and 
the party they are loyal to.  
The linkage between the social network and the flow of politically-relevant 
information may suffer from four important biases: (i) geographical distance bias: the 
distance and the information of acquaintanceship are inversely correlated. So, there is a 
wide variety of contextual effects, such as the neighbourhood effect. For example, members 
of the group consisting of lower educated people interact less with members of the group 
consisting of higher educated ones. It is because, they have less cross-cultural experience; 
(ii) acquaintance circle bias: When two individuals belong to the same group, there is 
likely to be more flow of information between them. So, if the total social network is 
divisible into relatively more inter-connected sub-networks, the variance in the voting 
pattern is less within a sub-network than across sub-networks; (iii) homo-political 
selectivity: individuals prefer those as more reliable sources of information who hold 
similar political attitudes; (iv) reciprocity bias: the shorter the geographical distance 
between the sender and the receiver, the stronger is the social connection between them 
and as such similar is their voting behaviour.   
Researchers who empirically investigate spatial (geographical) voting model use 
Coleman’s (1958) approach. The interpersonal influence can be identified by four means: 
(i) clique detection: it identifies those sub-groups of a social network within which 
individuals are more connected than they are across sub-groups; (ii) pair analysis: it 
identifies members of pairs who are functionally related in some way that will enable 
passing of information back and forth between them; (iii) boundary of homogeneity of 
groups: It measures the efficacy of the group in spreading the opinion; and (iv) contextual 
analysis: it analyses individual’s behavioural pattern in terms of the social context or milieu 
in which he lives when his contact biases or identifications are held constant.  
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Figure 2.8: Individual voters’ interaction with the social network 
 
 
Source: Drawn by the author based on Cox (1969) 
 
Sub-classes of the spatial (geographical) voting model        
Two types of sub-models have been developed from this broad spatial 
(geographical) voting model: (i) the neighbourhood effect model: It suggests that 
individuals living in an area are influenced by defining characteristics of the 
neighbourhood, such as the social structure and political opinion dominant in that 
neighbourhood. As for example, a voter may belong to the lower socioeconomic class, but 
she lives in a neighbourhood dominated by the upper socioeconomic class. She tends to 
vote for candidates preferred by members of the dominant upper socioeconomic class. 
Thus, she crosses the line of her social class under the pressure from neighbours; and (ii) 
the friends-and-neighbours voting model: when the key socioeconomic and political 
characteristics of two neighbourhoods are similar, individuals in a constituency tend to vote 
for candidates who have more personal relationship with that constituency.  The candidates 
may be ‘home’ boys/girls, because they were born and brought up in that constituency or 
they belong to politically powerful groups of that constituency. Many people not only know 
them personally, but also know their qualities, attitudes and views too.  Friends and 
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neighbours encourage one another to turnout for voting on election days and vote for 
candidates who are ‘home’ boys or girls.  
Tests of the spatial (geographical) voting models  
By controlling socioeconomic characteristics of neighbourhoods, a good number of 
studies (e.g., Johnston, 1973; Harrop and Openshaw, 1991; and Johnston et al., 2005) 
notice evidence of the effects of the neighbourhood on the voting behaviour of individuals. 
By controlling effects of partisanship on voting behaviour some other studies (e.g., 
Johnston, 1972, 1973, and 1974; Forest and Johnston, 1973; Forest et al., 1977; and Parker, 
1982) find evidence of friends-and-neighbourhood effects on voting behaviour.    
Strengths and limitations of the spatial (geographical) voting model 
Though some studies observe evidence of the spatial effect, this model is plagued 
with some limitations. A neighbourhood is mostly inhabited by a group of like-minded 
people. The model suggests that their electoral behaviour is influenced by their 
interpersonal relationship and their relationship with social network they belong to. These 
are endogenous factors. They may be exposed to differential extraneous factors that might 
change their behaviour. Using observational data, it is hard to decompose the total effect 
into spatial (geographical) and aspatial. Secondly, the evidence of spatial (geographical) 
effect is still indirect. It is because, researchers estimate it from opinion surveys conducted 
from psycho-sociological perspective. Direct measurement of spatial (geographical) effect 
on electoral behaviour mediating through interpersonal influence is difficult (Harrop and 
Miller, 1987:211). Thirdly, it suffers from endogeneity problem due to self-selection bias. 
It is because, voters belonging to lower socioeconomic classes are likely to choose not to 
move in to neighbourhoods dominated by people belonging to higher socioeconomic 
classes. They feel uncomfortable when they cross their natural line of voting (Crewe and 
Payne, 1976). 
2.8 Spatio-instrumentalist vote models 
 
2.8.1 The yardstick competition vote model   
 
Besley and Case (1995) develop this model based on some assumptions: (i) an 
information asymmetry exists between voters and incumbents regarding costs of providing 
public goods and services. The incumbents know it better than voters; (ii) incumbents are 
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of two types: good and bad. The good incumbents impose lower tax rates and bad ones 
impose higher tax rates for proving the same amount of goods and services; and (iii) voters’ 
objective is to re-elect good ones and as such they compare tax rates voters of a 
constituency pay in relation to their counterparts in neighbouring constituencies. Given the 
level of goods and services if the tax rate of a certain constituency is lower with respect to 
neighbouring constituencies, the incumbent of that constituency is considered a good 
incumbent and voters are likely to re-elect her. So, the probability of re-election of an 
incumbent depends not only on the performance of the incumbent himself but also the 
performance of incumbents of neighbouring constituencies. This induces incumbents to act 
strategically in spatial context. 
Tests of the yardstick competition vote model     
Using the French municipal data of the 1992-2000 period Elhorst and Fréret (2009) notice 
evidence of political competition among municipalities in terms of welfare expenses. While 
municipalities run by a small majority increases the welfare expenses by 17 percent, 
municipalities run by a large majority increases the same by only 3 percent. Using 1982-
2000 data associated with 308 municipalities in Flemish region of Belgium, Vermeir and 
Heyndels (2006) find that voters of a certain municipality punish incumbents for higher tax 
rates with respect to neighbouring ones. A meta-analysis by Costa-Font et al. (2014) find 
that countries as well as municipalities compete with one another in terms of total amount 
of tax and this tax-based competition is stronger among countries than municipalities. 
However, Costa-Font et al. (2014) do not estimate effects of this tax-based competition 
across countries on the electoral success or defeat of incumbents.  
Strengths and limitations of the yardstick competition vote model   
While the yardstick competition model incorporates the strategic interaction 
between incumbents of neighbouring constituencies, it excludes the expressive aspect of 
voting. Secondly, the empirical results may be less unreliable, because both dependent and 
explanatory variables are likely to be spatially and temporally correlated.  
2.9 Miscellaneous vote models 
 
These models do not fit in any of the aforementioned categories. They are stand-
alone models. 
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2.9.1 The theory of democracy 
Schumpeter (1942/1951) develops the theory of democracy. He calls it ‘Another 
theory of democracy’. Schumpeter (1942/1951) borrows his idea of democracy from 
Enlightened rationalism, utilitarianism and Rousseauian ideas (Miller, 1983:137) which he 
calls as the ‘classical doctrine of democracy’. According to the ‘classical doctrine of 
democracy’, democracy is a decision-making process in which people come to decisions 
on public issues through debates and discussions among themselves to promote the 
‘common good’. These public decisions are called ‘popular will’. Thereafter, they elect a 
body of people who are assigned to carry out that ‘popular will’ for promoting the ‘common 
good’. If those elected people fail to enhance the ‘common good’ decided by the ‘public 
will’, they are replaced by another group of people to do the same. In this way the people 
hold the sovereign power to decide public issues and assign the authority to implement it 
to people they like. In this case, choice of ‘popular will’ by the common people is the 
primary and choice of executives entrusted to implement the ‘popular will’ for promoting 
the ‘common good’ is secondary. However, Schumpeter (1942/1951) is not absolutely 
convinced by the logical progression of the ‘classical doctrine of democracy’. It is because, 
he senses some flaws at each stage of its logical progression process. He finds it far away 
from actual workings of democracy. He argues that in the modern industrial liberal 
democratic societies there are many socioeconomic classes that hold irreconcilable 
interests and thus it is hard for them to reach to unique decisions satisfying every group 
equitably. So, there is hardly any existence of ‘popular will’. In reality, majority groups are 
likely to wield more influence on so-called ‘popular will’ and thus, final decisions 
safeguard interests of majority groups at the expense of those of minority groups. 
Additionally, minority groups are influenced by opinions of majority ones. The ‘popular 
will’ is, therefore, actually a ‘manufactured will’ of majority groups rather than a ‘genuine 
will’ of the society when each member of the society could participate in the decision-
making process without external influences (Elliott, 1994). For the sake of argument, if it 
is assumed that the society has come up with a ‘genuine will’ measured in the truest sense 
of the term, for various reasons outcomes may be different from what the ‘genuine will’ 
would aim for (Miller, 1983:137). Having been dissatisfied with the ‘classical doctrine of 
democracy’, he turns it upside down and advances his own version of democracy what he 
calls ‘another theory of democracy’. According to him, there are three groups of actors in 
the political landscape of a country: (i) political entrepreneurs/elites, (ii) the electorate, and 
(iii) political activists. Political activists shuttle back and forth between political 
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entrepreneurs and the electorate receiving and dispensing various politically relevant 
information. Depending on personal and group ideologies, socioeconomic cleavages, and 
potentiality of implementing those ideologies political entrepreneurs form essentially more 
than one political party. They develop party manifestoes and compete in elections 
emphasizing implementation of those manifestoes. In order to win in elections, they require 
majority vote. So, their policy package is designed in such a way that they could entice 
majority voters. The party which receives majority vote forms the government and receive 
public mandate to implement its manifestoes. If the government fails to implement those 
policies advocated by it during elections, majority voters are likely to vote against it in the 
next election and a new government is formed for the same purpose. In this way 
competition among contending political parties bring their ‘manifestoes’ much closer to 
the ‘majority will’ whether it harms personal interests of political entrepreneurs or not 
(Mackie, 2009). Thus, Schumpeter (1942/51)’s ‘another theory of democracy’ stands out 
on its merits. He shows that it is not the electorate that chooses candidates. The political 
entrepreneurs offer themselves as potential candidates and party stalwarts nominate them. 
The electorate is asked to choose among candidates nominated by political parties. Thus, 
the electorate has limited role in the choice of parties and their candidates (Pateman, 
1970:5). Secondly, since there are a few parties competing in elections, the political market 
is more oligopolistic (Udehn, 1996:18).  
Pateman (1970:4-5) identifies some preconditions for working of Schumpeter’s 
democracy. In addition to civil liberties, tolerance of others’ opinions and a ‘national 
character and a national habit of a certain type’ are required. The operation of the 
democratic method itself cannot produce them. Secondly, the structural principles of the 
existing society must be universally recognized. It does not mean that a universal adult 
franchise is necessary. The necessary condition is that many people must participate in 
elections to keep the electoral machinery working satisfactorily. The basis of electoral 
participation may be property, race and religion and so on. It is not incompatible with the 
democratic principles. Thirdly, it is the political entrepreneurs who must be active, take 
initiatives and take decisions. If the electorate take decision, the whole system would 
collapse. So, leadership must come from political entrepreneurs. Schumpeter’s notion of 
democracy is duly appreciated by many subsequent scholars with some reservations. 
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Strengths and limitations of Schumpeter’s theory of democracy 
Schumpeter emphasizes participation of many people in the election so that the 
democratic system operates efficiently. However, Dahl (1956:63-65) argues that extending 
franchise to lower socioeconomic class may be dangerous, because they are more apathetic 
to politics and authoritarian mentality seems to prevail among them. So, a universal adult 
franchise may cause a decline in the quality of polyarchal democracy. According to Dahl 
(1956:63-65), a tough competition among political entrepreneurs would maximize social 
welfare. What is necessary is that political entrepreneurs must be responsive to the demands 
of the electorate. Secondly, Sartori (1962:54) argues that to be elected political 
entrepreneurs may promise something which may not be achievable. This may bring about 
changes in the government frequently leading to severe instability in the democratic 
political system. So, the ideological differences among political elites must be minimized. 
Schumpeter (1942/1951) does not incorporate this into his model of democracy. Thirdly, 
Requejo (1991) argues that Schumpeter’s (1942/1951) theory of democracy is elitist by 
nature, because it does not allow general masses to participate in public decisions that affect 
them. Fourthly, Schumpeter emphasizes that the only political duty of the citizenry is to 
vote and leave the governmental affairs to the political entrepreneurs. Margolis (1979:174-
175) argues that such a passive citizenry is a barrier to viable democracy. 
2.9.2 The median voter theorem 
Scholars have been concerned with the choice of ‘fair’ kinds and quantities of 
public goods through ‘fair’ kinds of collective decision-making processes since Borda 
(Mueller, 2008). Voting, as a collective decision-making process, is regarded as ‘fair’ when 
it possesses some desirable properties.  For instance, it must be anonymous (treat all voters 
equally), neutral (treat all candidates equally), and monotonous (winners cannot be losers 
and vice versa) (Hodge and Klima, 2005: 3-4). Borda (1781) does not regard the simple 
majority rule as a ‘fair’ mechanism of aggregating preferences of individuals. He rather 
proposes a pair-wise preferential voting model, known as Borda-count rule, for this purpose 
(Mueller, 2008). His rule boils down to simple majority one when the number of 
alternatives under Borda-count rule is reduced to two. So, majority rule is a special case of 
the Borda-count rule.  Whether Borda-count rule or the simple majority rule is used for 
aggregating preferences of at least three individuals over at least three alternatives, there is 
a possibility of majority voting cycles leading to indeterminacy in collective choices. This 
is known as ‘Condorcet paradox’ discovered by Condorcet long ago in 1785. With a view 
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to circumventing the problem of voting cycles under a simple majority rule, he advances 
the ‘Condorcet jury theorem’ where more than two voters can make a ‘fair’ choice out of 
two alternative choices by applying a simple majority rule. However, his simplified 
theorem is also plagued with some unsurmountable problems (Mueller, 2008). As a result, 
subsequent researchers look for a solution of the Condorcet paradox.  
After a long span of time Black (1948) re-discovers it and tries to solve it by 
advancing the ‘median voter theorem’. He argues that under some necessary conditions, a 
simple majority rule determines the preference of majority voters belonging to a committee, 
and thus establishes a stable and unique equilibrium. According to his theorem, the 
preference of majority voters in a committee coincides with that of the median voter 
provided that the number of committee members is odd. Rowley (1984) enumerates some 
necessary conditions for establishing a unique and stable equilibrium in this model. They 
are as follows: (i) elections are periodic; (ii) a single candidate/party is chosen by votes to 
govern; (iii) two candidates/parties contest in election; (iv) the candidate/party which polls 
majority votes wins; (v) the candidates/parties are fully informed about voters’ preferences 
for policy in a unidimensional space; (vi) the size of the electorate is large; (vii) the voters 
are fully informed of candidates’/parties’ policy positions; (viii) voters evaluate 
candidates/parties by their overall policy; (ix) each voter’s policy preference is single-
peaked; (x) the distribution of voters over the policy space is unimodal; and (xi) all voters 
vote. This theorem has two major predictions: (i) voters always vote irrespective of whether 
their preferred candidates have any chance to win or not; (ii) they have an incentive to 
reveal their true preferences. This model predicts that when voters tend to vote for a 
candidate or a party whose policy is closest to their most preferred policy, the candidate or 
the party which has policy closest to the policy preferred by the median voter always wins. 
So, the median voter acts like a dictator.  Congleton (2003) identifies three important 
implications of this model: (i) the public policy in question becomes moderate by 
definition; (ii) since voters differ in many respects, such as age, income, ideology, 
information and so on, non-median voters become at least partly displeased with the policy 
chosen; and (iii) even if the dispersion of the preferences of voters increases, it does not 
affect the median voter. So, the policy undertaken according to the preferences of the 
median voter is more stable than if it is undertaken according to the preferences of average 
voters.  
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Tests of the median voter theorem 
As this model has a wide range of applications in the field of public choice, such as 
distribution of public goods and services, distribution of tax burden and welfare payments, 
it is empirically tested in relation to various public policies. Holcombe (1980), Poole and 
Daniels (1985), Rice (1985), Congleton and Shughart (1990), Congleton and Bennet 
(1995), and Husted and Kenny (1997) test this model in different contexts using different 
types of data and they find it quite robust in explaining public policy. However, Islam et 
al. (2018) find that in the face of rising income inequality it is not median voters rather 
Harms and Zink’s (2003) decisive voters or Brennan and Lomasky’s (1993) expressive 
voters who decide the size of constituents of the tax revenue.       
Strengths and limitations of the median voter theorem 
Black (1948) identifies a serious theoretical problem in the median voter model. He 
argues that a median voter exists in one-dimensional policy space when voters’ policy 
preferences are single-peaked. Moreover, a median voter exists in a two-dimensional policy 
space when voters’ policy preferences are symmetrically distributed. In other cases, 
intransitive cycles take place even if voters’ preferences are single-peaked (Congleton, 
2003). Congleton (2003) identifies some limitations in the normative properties of this 
model. This model suggests that median voters would get what they want, but the public 
policy is unlikely to be efficient in Paretian sense. It is because, by definition minority 
groups would not be able to influence the public policy and hence every public policy taken 
by the majoritarian group is likely to impose negative externality on minority groups. 
Secondly, the number of votes decides the policy to be pursued. However, it does not show 
the intensity for a public policy. It may be that a small minority may intensely want a policy 
and their intensity for that policy may outweigh that of the people who oppose it. So, 
gainers may be willing to compensate losers. As a result, unrealized gains from exchange 
may exist at the median voter’s preferred policy. Thirdly, the median voters may not choose 
the policy package that truly advances their interests, because they may not have complete 
information about the wide range of policy options available to them.  For lack of 
information they may not choose the ‘right’ policy.  Fourthly, as collection of complete 
information is costly and as such the median voters may not have incentives to collect all 
necessary information, they may be exploited by other interest groups.  
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2.9.3 Arrow’s impossibility theorem 
Black (1948) was clearly aware of the potential for cycling, should the condition of 
singled-peaked preferences fail to hold. So, in the following year Black and Newing carry 
out another study where they set necessary conditions for stable equilibrium in a multi-
dimensional space and three-voter case. They do not consider cases which involve many 
voters. However, the publication of their study was unduly delayed for a long time, and by 
this time Arrow’s (1950, 1951) studies on the similar issue was published (Rowley, 2008). 
By advancing the ‘Impossibility Theorem’ Arrow (1950, 1951) attempts to generalize the 
paradox of cyclical majorities invented long ago by Condorcet in 1785 and re-discovered 
by Black in 1948. He develops his theorem on the basis of some assumptions: (i) individual 
preference rankings are themselves transitive and ordinal; (ii) choices over two alternatives 
are not externally imposed; (iii) if individual preferences change so that some alternatives 
are ranked higher than they used to be, then collective ranking should place those 
alternatives no lower than they used to be; and (iv) if some individual preferences change, 
but no individual changes the relative ordering of alternatives, then their collective 
orderings should not change. Having laid down these assumptions, he showed that when 
individual preferences are single-peaked and transitive, the social welfare function that 
satisfies those non-controversial assumptions is bound to be intransitive. So, he opined that 
(i) there is no way of aggregating individual preferences without violating at least one of 
these assumptions; (ii) even when those assumptions are satisfied there is a possibility of 
majority vote cycles; and (iii) consequently, some sort of external intervention is required 
for aggregating individual preferences and deriving social welfare function. His theorem, 
therefore, challenges Black’s (1948) initial theoretical notion that a political market is 
inherently stable. In contrast, he shows that a political market is fundamentally unstable. 
His theorem has some important political, social and economic implications (Grofman, 
2008). So far, for instance, welfare economics assumes ranked ordering of the social 
welfare function and Pareto optimization of social welfare is the best available mechanism, 
but he shows that its underlying mechanism is flawed and so is the measurement of Pareto-
efficiency. This made welfare economists pessimistic. Secondly, a simple majority rule 
being adopted in many democratic elections is thought to reflect ‘will’ of the people and 
thus populist socialistic or democratic economic system was thought to be superior to the 
market capitalism. However, Arrow (1951) shows that they do not, and hence his findings 
erode the validity of majoritarian democratic elections being held across the world. So, his 
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theorem wrecks the very basic foundation of both the welfare economics and the 
democratic theory and establishes the modern form of the social choice theory (Sen, 1999).  
Strengths and limitations of Arrow’s impossibility theorem 
Arrow (1951) shows that no social welfare functions can be derived without 
violating the axioms imposed by him. It is true in some cases, but it is a universal truth. 
This produces pessimism among researchers. So, they try to find out some necessary and 
sufficient conditions that ‘would guarantee consistent majority decision’ (Sen and 
Pattanaik, 1969). Secondly, Sen (1999) argues that social choice problems arise in different 
forms and sizes. For some social problems majority rule may be quite inconsistent. As for 
example, when a certain amount of social benefits is to be distributed among stakeholders 
and each group of stakeholders tries to maximize their own shares without taking into 
consideration size of shares of others, then majority rule will yield inconsistent results. For 
some other cases a complete unanimity can be obtained. As for example, the whole of the 
nation will support a programme unanimously in the case of combating an impending 
famine situation. So, Arrow’s (1951) theorem is not comprehensive. Thirdly, Sen (1999) 
argues that while constructing the social welfare function he has ruled out the interpersonal 
comparison of utility. It is necessary for ensuring fairness in distribution and he did not 
substitute it with ‘something’ else as good as the interpersonal utility. Fourthly, Black 
(1969) shows that a committee which is a reduced version of a large society can take 
decision unanimously without violating any axioms set by Arrow (1951).           
2.9.4 The collective action model  
Olson (1965) challenges two conventional wisdoms being held for a long time by 
economists and political scientists. The first long-held proposition is that individuals 
having identical self-interests and rationality would be unlikely to share costs of providing 
collective goods because of high likelihood of free riding tendency, and as such they would 
not be produced.  In contrast, the puzzling observation is that some people having those 
attributes in common are found to have formed associations and voluntarily contributed to 
their administrative cost. Secondly, many economists assume that any outcome resulting 
from bargaining between contending parties would likely to produce socially desirable or 
efficient outcomes because of intense competition among them. This is based on some 
strong assumptions that all contending parties would be equally powerful, organized and 
active. The puzzling observation is that bargaining is likely to take place between unequally 
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powerful parties and benefits are unequally distributed. The stronger parties are likely to 
take a bigger share of the benefit pie. 
Sandler (1992:8-9) summarizes Olson (1965)’s findings as under: (a) the group-
size paradox: (i) strong version – the level of provision of public goods is inversely related 
to the group size; (ii) weak version – the gap between the optimal and actual level of public 
goods is directly related to the group size; (b) exploitation hypothesis: small groups 
enjoying concentrated benefits possess more power and hence use it to shift the cost of 
producing the public goods to larger groups enjoying diffused benefits; (c ) selective 
incentives: reward or punishment can partially overcome the free-riding problems in larger 
groups. 
Contribution of the collective action model in electoral behaviour studies  
Olson (1965)’s central concern was group behaviour. This has several important 
implications for electoral behaviour models. It contributed to enhance our understanding 
about motivation of some interest groups to make contribution to political campaigns. A 
group of voters (Downsian utility maximizers) forming a small group may have some 
interest in some specific issues. They as a group might be motivated to contribute to 
political campaigns of those candidates whose policy stance on those issues is closer to 
their preferred position and who have a high chance to win. Alternatively, they may 
conditionally contribute to those candidates who have high chance to win, but whose policy 
stance is away from their preferred position. The expected condition may be that those 
candidates would commit to bring their policy stance to the position closer to their preferred 
ones (Mueller, 2003b). The members of the group not only contribute to the campaigns of 
those candidates but also mobilize their fellow community members to cast votes. The 
fellow community members respond positively to the mobilization efforts of the members 
of interest groups, though they are aware of their ulterior motives (Miller, 1997). When 
they collect fund for making contribution to those candidates, members may make mutual 
threat to one another to this effect that one would not contribute to the fund unless others 
make the same. This mutual threat is likely to increase the amount of fund above the level 
otherwise would be (Barry, 1970:25).  Secondly, Olson (1965) shows synergies in terms 
of costs and benefits in group activities. In other words, group participation produces 
benefits as well as incurs costs and each has two components – private and public. Public 
costs and benefits are by-products of private ones. In group activities public costs decline 
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but public benefits increase. So, an individual’s net benefit outweighs net cost. From this 
finding Uhlaner (1989) and Mortin (1991) subsequently find that when a number of voters 
act as a group, their individual costs of voting decline and benefits from voting increase 
leading to more political participation of each member of the group. Thirdly, from the 
perspective of the exploitation hypothesis advanced by Olson (1965), it is clear how unfair 
policies result from bargaining between unequally powerful social groups. Consequently, 
public policies are likely to be biased towards powerful groups (Miller, 1997). Therefore, 
if under-privileged groups are harmed by these policies, but they are themselves electorally 
heavy-weight or can make them so by log-rolling with similar groups, parties representing 
them can increase their likelihood of winning by re-casting their policies (Lees-Marshment, 
2009:122). Fourthly, Like Downs (1957), Olson (1965) also identifies that a ‘sense of duty’ 
seems to work in the case of voting, when governance is regarded as a public good. When 
a voter does not vote and quality of governance declines following his abstention, he is 
likely to suffer from some sort of guilt. In contrast, if he votes, he is unlikely to suffer from 
such guilt (Barry, 1970:31). Thus, ‘a sense of duty’ towards improvement of the quality of 
governance is expected to contribute to increase turnout in elections. Last not the least, 
Olson (1965) lays down the foundation of political theories that attempt to explain why 
political activists are likely to participate in political activities at the expense of their 
personal comfort. Barry (1970:25) explains that according to Olson (1965), in a closely 
knitted group some are activists, and some are sympathisers for some politically salient 
causes. The activists tend to sacrifice their personal well-being for those causes, because 
they expect to receive proportionately greater benefits than sympathisers of those causes. 
Opp (1986) points out that activists were likely to exchange comforts of their personal lives 
for social esteem for themselves. Following Opp (1986), it may be argued that partisan 
activists try to capitalize on grievances of some electorally important groups. They attempt 
to mobilize sympathisers in favour of some issues addressing those grievances. In course 
of doing so, they tend to undertake painful tasks of mobilizing sympathisers in exchange 
of appreciation/rewards for them by sympathisers as well as partisan political elites. This 
yields psychic satisfaction/benefits to them. As a result, their net private benefits are likely 
to outweigh the net private costs.   
Strengths and limitations of the collective action model 
Some of Olson (1965)’s ideas have enormously influenced thoughts in economics 
and political science for more than half a century since its publication (Pecorino, 2015). 
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His idea of group-size paradox does not hold for pure public goods, but it holds for impure 
public goods. When members of a group would face rivalry in the consumption of public 
goods, the stakes per person would tend to be larger in a smaller group than in a larger 
group.  The politics of the US sugar policy (many consumers subsidizes a few large 
producers) strongly supports his group-size paradox. Whether a policy is consistent with 
Olson (1965)’s group-size paradox or not depends on whether it is an electoral issue or a 
special-interest issue. If it is a special-interest issue, it supports the same. Secondly, his 
proposition that provision of public goods comes as a by-product in course of providing 
private goods has given birth to the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) – a 
company’s secondary responsibility towards the broader public (provision of public goods) 
in conjunction with its primary responsibility towards its stakeholders (provision of private 
goods). Thirdly, many large companies have integrated CSR into their business models as 
a means of enhancing their long run sustainability. Olson (1965)’s contributions in this 
regard seem to have provided the foundation for carrying out CSR activities among 
business communities since 1960s. Fourthly, Olson (1965) also laid the theoretical 
foundation of lobbying by dominant firms in an oligopolistic market structure.  When an 
industry is oligopolistic, it is profitable for dominant firms to lobby the government and 
allow free-riding by smaller firms.  
Though some of Olson (1965)’s ideas have enormously influenced thoughts in 
economics and political science for more than half a century since its publication (Pecorino, 
2015), his idea of group-size paradox does not hold for pure public goods. Whether a policy 
is consistent with Olson (1965)’s group-size paradox or not depends on whether it is an 
electoral issue or a special-interest issue. If it is an electoral issue, it does not support group-
size paradox. Secondly, his proposition that provision of public goods comes as a by-
product in course of providing private goods is not true in some cases, because public goods 
can be provided by individuals through imposing some conditions on them. When an 
industry is dominated by many small firms, lobbying the government by all firms is highly 
unlikely and by a few firms is unprofitable. However, when the industry structure is 
oligopolistic, it is profitable for dominant firms to lobby the government and allow free-
riding by smaller firms. The hypothesis derived from it is that dominant firms as a group 
are more likely to lobby the government. Having observed little evidence of influence of 
the industry concentration on lobbying efforts in contexts of the US and some advanced 
industrialized countries, Barber IV et al. (2014) re-examine the same using firm-level data 
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collected under the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. They find no support in favour of the 
hypothesis. So, the Olsonian logic, according to their findings, needs re-assessment in this 
context. Thirdly, Olson (1965) asserts that the net benefit to individual members of a group 
would exhibit decreasing returns to scale. This is true for some impure public goods, but 
not for some public goods (for example, riots, strikes, petitions, demonstrations, 
revolutions, wars and so on) which are of political nature and likely to yield increasing 
returns (net benefits) to scale (Udéhn, 1993). It is because, the returns to scale is directly 
related to the active participation of group members. Fourthly, Olson’s (1965) analysis of 
possibility of providing collective goods by smaller groups is of one-shot Prisoner’s 
dilemma and it is not applicable for larger groups. Under some institutional arrangements 
(for example, selective incentives) N-persons single or repeated games (larger groups) are 
likely to motivate members to voluntarily cooperate for provision of collective goods. 
Thus, he drew economists’ attention to institutional development and lobbying activities 
by certain groups for producing public goods. However, selective incentives, which are 
designed to maintain an order in a group, are again public goods. Oliver (1980) argues that 
it creates a second-order collective action problem: why would anyone like to sanction 
other members out of self-interest? In the initial round the threat of group sanctions might 
motivate individual group members to cooperate for provision of public goods, but it may 
be irrational to support it in the second round. Fifthly, members join to an organisation and 
contribute to its function having been motivated partly by a combination of factors, such 
as expected benefits, peer pressure, self-interest, altruism, rationality and so on. He did not 
incorporate them into his theory. Last not the least, he developed his model based on 
economic cost-benefit analysis. For many organizations they are very difficult to measure 
accurately, especially those which produce intangible products. So, his theory has limited 
applicability.  
2.10 Conclusion  
This chapter reviewed several important electoral behavioural models outlining the 
central ideas of each model, some of the results of empirical tests of the models. It also 
discussed some of their strengths and weaknesses. Each model captures some aspects of 
electoral behaviour of voters. Some of the early models (e.g., Hotelling, 1929 and Downs, 
1957) investigate electoral behaviour largely from the perspective of the demand for public 
goods and services by voters. They use voter-popularity function. Some later models (e.g., 
Buchanan, 1960; Nordhaus, 1975; Hibbs, 1977; Rogoff, 1990) investigate from the 
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perspective of the supply of public goods and services by the government. So, they use 
reaction function. When empirical studies find evidence of both, some empirical studies 
(e.g., Fair, 1975 and Frey and Schneider, 1978a, 1978b) try to integrate these models under 
the politico-economic model and conclude that the voter-popularity function can explain a 
large part of the variance in government popularity. They also observe that governments 
take into consideration their current level of popularity when framing current economic 
policy with a view to be re-elected in subsequent elections. Outside this demand-supply 
domain there are some mainstream apolitical models (e.g., Lazarsfeld et al., 1944; Berelson 
et al., 1954; Campbell et al., 1960). While some demand-based models (e.g., Hotelling, 
1929 and Downs, 1957) can be classified as spatial models from the ideological 
perspective, some models (e.g., Cox, 1969 and Besley and Case, 1995) can be classified as 
spatial models from the perspective of geographical distance. A few models (e.g., Benson, 
1961; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Mueller, 1970; Nannestad and Paldam, 1997) are 
extensions of some preceding models (e.g., Lazarsfeld et al., 1944; Downs, 1957). While 
some models (e.g., Hotelling, 1929; Downs, 1957; Buchanan, 1960; Nordhaus, 1975; 
Hibbs, 1977; Rogoff, 1990) emphasize exclusively the instrumental aspect of voting, a few 
models (e.g., Brennan and Lomasky, 1993; Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1974) emphasize 
exclusively the expressive aspect of voting. However, in a later study (e.g., Brennan and 
Hamlin, 1998) one co-founder (Geoffrey Brennan) of the modern expressive voting model 
recognizes that irrespective of contexts some elements of each aspect of voting are active 
in making the voting decision. Their degrees of influence differ based on the context. All 
other models emphasize different aspects of voting. While the ethical voting model (e.g., 
Goodin and Roberts, 1975) focuses on morality of voters, the strategic voting models (e.g., 
McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1972; Besley and Case, 1995) focus on the immorality (i.e., 
opportunistic and strategic behaviour) of voters and candidates. The economic voting 
model (e.g., Downs, 1957) is built on the assumption of maximization of utility from 
voting, but the minimax regret model of voting (Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1974) is developed 
by turning it upside down, that is, minimization of regret from voting. A few models (e.g., 
Campbell et al., 1960 and Brennan and Lomasky, 1993) are very comprehensive, while 
some (e.g., Downs, 1957; Buchanan, 1960; Mueller, 1970; Nordhaus, 1975; Hibbs, 1977) 
are very parsimonious.          
As different voting models use different instruments to explain the electoral 
behaviour, it is clear from the above review that no single model will be able to explain 
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consistently the electoral behaviour of the people of Bangladesh under different regimes. 
Depending on the context different models are likely to explain electoral behaviour in 
different elections. The Columbia model (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944), ethnic voting model 
(Key, 1949), the economic voting model (Downs, 1957), the Michigan model (Campbell 
et al., 1960), the ethnocultural voting model (Benson, 1961), the social structural theory of 
voting model (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), ethical voting model (Goodin and Roberts, 1975) 
and the expressive voting model (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968 and Brennan and Lomasky, 
1993) may jointly explain a large part of the variation in the voter turnout and winners’ 
vote shares in the elections held under different regimes.  
In the free and fair elections (the 1937 and the 1946) held during the British colonial 
period only around 12 percent of the population were franchised, and they belonged to the 
privileged sections of the population. Still electoral behaviour of the people in East Bengal 
(present Bangladesh) is presumed to be influenced by some factors contained in 
aforementioned models. Under the united Pakistan’s internal neo-colonial rule elections 
were held in 1954 and 1970. The 1954 election was free and fair, but the franchise was 
restricted. The 1970 election was free and fair, and the franchise was universal. The 
electoral behaviour of the people of East Bengal or East Pakistan (present Bangladesh) 
might be predicted by those models too, but very few studies investigated determinants of 
voter turnout and winners’ vote shares in those elections.  
In the post-independent period the 1973, the 1979, the 1986 and the 1988 
parliamentary elections were massively rigged by incumbents. Therefore, very few studies 
were undertaken to investigate determinants of voter turnout and winners’ vote shares in 
those elections. Though some studies investigate them in the free and fair elections held 
over the 1991-2008 period, except one (Baldersheim et al., 2001) no other studies based 
their investigation on any specific model(s). Baldersheim et al. (2001) analyse voter turnout 
in Bangladesh in the 1996 election and test influence of modernity on the voter turnout. 
Except a few percentages of tribal people all people in Bangladesh are linguistically and 
culturally monolithic. So, models that emphasize ethnic voting or ethnocultural voting are 
likely to be irrelevant. Models that emphasize the socioeconomic (e.g., Lazarsfeld et al., 
1944), the instrumental (e.g., Downs, 1957; Mueller, 1970; Buchanan, 1960; Nordhaus, 
1975), the partisanship (e.g., Fiorina, 1981) and the expressive (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968 
and Brennan and Lomasky, 1993) aspects of voting are likely to explain adequately the 
voter turnout and winners’ vote shares in Bangladesh.      
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Socioeconomic and political conditions that existed during the elections held over 
the 1991-2008 period were products of past rule under indigenous independent, non-
indigenous independent, indigenized dependent and colonial regimes during different 
periods. We split this whole period into two sub-periods: pre-independent and post-
independent eras. The following chapter discusses strategies rulers used to derive their 
political legitimacy in absence of the present-day electoral system, which was later installed 
in British India by the colonial British Government at the provincial and the national levels 
in the early 1920s. It also discusses electoral politics in Bengal as well as British India 
under the British colonial rule between 1920 and 1947. Following partition of British India 
in 1947 electoral politics in united Pakistan as well as East Pakistan (present Bangladesh) 
took a sharp U- turn to a dangerous direction. This chapter also discusses outcomes of each 
political turn and twist during united Pakistan’s internal neo-colonial rule over the 1947-
1971 period.         
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Background of Elections in Bangladesh: the Pre-independence Era 
3.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter discussed main ideas of electoral behaviour models and their 
empirical tests in a variety of contexts.  It identified factors that influence voter turnout and 
choice of party in elections. It also highlighted strengths and weaknesses of each model. 
This chapter attempts to trace back the development trajectory of Bengali language and 
culture in ancient times and subsequently, the birth of Bengali nationalism in the medieval 
age following the symbiotic relationship between majority Hindus and minority 
indigenized Muslims in Bengal. It also explores the context that created a sharp chasm 
among Indian Muslims during the Mughal Muslim rule. Furthermore, the chapter 
investigates contexts that caused Bengali nationalism to split into two antagonistic religion-
based identities – Bengali Muslim and Hindu nationalism – during the British colonial rule. 
They re-united in East Pakistan under the neo-colonial rule of united Pakistan and gave 
birth to independent Bangladesh through an armed resistance based on Bengali 
nationalism.           
  The socio-political and economic landscape of present day Bangladesh is a product 
of the legacies left by governing practices of many earlier rulers, and hopes and aspirations 
of dominant socioeconomic classes. Past rulers came from a variety of social, political, 
religious, geographical and ethnic backgrounds. Though the monarchy had been the usual 
form of the government in ancient Bengal, at that time some kind of socio-political 
associations existed that prevented monarchs from being authoritarian. The modus 
operandi of those associations resembled Greek-style democratic republics and the 
parliamentary system of modern democratic states. During early periods of the ancient age 
the social structure was egalitarian, and as such chiefs and kings were elected on the basis 
of personal competence. In course of time the social structure became hierarchical. In latter 
periods of the ancient age, kings and chieftains began to inherit their positions 
(Chiriyankandath, 1992; Muhlberger, 1998:8-12, 47-48, 58-69).  
The well-documented political history of Bengal can be characterized by the 
prioritization of national identities of all people of Bengal or identities of her dominant 
classes. The indigenous Buddhist rulers (750-1200) belonging to the Pala dynasty declared 
Buddhism as the state religion, but they were respectful to followers of Hinduism. They 
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patronised Bengali language and culture, promoted trade and commerce and established 
peace and justice in the society. Their ruling period is termed as the golden age in Bengal.  
The non-indigenous Sena dynasty (1070-1203) built their kingdom on ruins of the 
Pala dynasty. They declared Brahmanic Hinduism as the state religion and as such, 
introduced the caste system in Bengal. They relied on the support of upper caste Hindus in 
Bengal and oppressed both lower caste Hindus and Buddhists. So, many Buddhists and 
lower caste Hindus embraced Islam through coming in contact with Muslim traders from 
Middle East, Gujrat state of India and Muslim saints from Central Asia.  
In 1203, non-indigenous independent Muslim rule was established in Bengal. The 
Muslim rulers hailed from Turkey, Central Asia, Afghanistan and Persia. They were proud 
of their distinctive Arabia-Persian language and culture and as such they were interested to 
maintain their hegemony. As they did not have any social roots in Bengal, they maintained 
their authority over majority Hindus by force as well as by dispensing patronage to socially 
dominant Brahmin class. So, they had a toxic relationship with common Hindus. As non-
indigenous Muslim rulers declared independence from their masters in Delhi, they had an 
unpleasant relationship with Delhi too. Taking advantage of such a disturbing situation, in 
1441 a local Bengali Hindu chief overthrew the Muslim ruler in Bengal and became a king. 
It was a wake-up call for the non-indigenized Muslims to become indigenized in a foreign 
land.  
From 1441 onward, indigenous Hindus and indigenized Muslims started to develop 
a symbiotic relationship which produced a new national identity called Bengali 
nationalism. From 1441 down to 1575 indigenized Muslim rulers in Bengal used to 
patronize Bengali language, literature and culture. They also promoted Bengal’s trade, 
commerce and industry.  Under the indigenized independent Muslim rule the spirit of 
Bengali nationalism increased to such a great extent and Bengal became so much 
resourceful that Hindu and Muslim chiefs of Bengal resisted onslaught of Delhi-based 
Mughal Muslim Emperors for a long time. Ultimately, Bengal came under their rule in 
1575.   
The representative of Mughal Muslim Emperors were from central Asian regions. 
They used to patronize their co-ethnic people and as such appointed them in high 
administrative posts. They also recruited co-ethnic people into the army. The non-
indigenous Muslim administrators and soldiers developed socioeconomically and 
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politically. So, they regarded themselves as upper class Muslims. Though Mughal rulers 
were Muslim, they did not like native Muslims who were descendants of Muslims 
converted into Islam from lower caste Hindus. As a result, local Muslims remained 
socioeconomically underdeveloped even under the Muslim rule. Thus, the Mughal Muslim 
rule in India created a sharp chasm among Indian Muslims including Bengal’s.  
The British East India Company overthrew the Mughal rule in 1758. Under the 
British rule (1758-1947) upper class Muslims, who developed socioeconomically and 
politically under the patronage of Delhi-based alien Muslim rulers, gradually became 
pauper. This is because, they did not get jobs under the Company by deliberately neglecting 
English-based education system introduced in India in 1835. On the other hand, by learning 
English the upper class Hindus quickly occupied those positions. Consequently, enmity 
started to develop between the upper class Hindus and Muslims which gradually trickled 
down to their lower classes.  
Under the oppressive rule of the British East India Company the socioeconomic 
condition of the common people deteriorated to such a great extent that there were many 
sporadic revolts against the Company’s rule in Bengal and other parts of India. A great 
revolt against the Company took place in 1858, but the Company suppressed the revolt 
ruthlessly. Thereafter, in 1861 the British Government took the ruling power from the 
Company and aimed to associate Indians with administration and legislative activities 
through piecemeal legislative reforms.  
As the eastern part of Bengal, known as East Bengal, was socioeconomically less 
developed than the western part, the British Government made East Bengal a new province 
in 1905 with Dhaka as her capital. The aim of this partition was to improve socioeconomic 
conditions of Muslims and lower class Hindus who were dominant in East Bengal. It 
apparently hurt vested interests of the upper and middle class Hindus. So, they launched a 
violent movement against it and the government was forced to annul the partition in 1911. 
The partition of Bengal increased hostility between Hindus and Muslims and as such 
Bengali nationalism that thrived over half a millennium split into two antagonistic religion-
based identities -Hindu and Muslim nationalism. The result of the 1937 election reflected 
this split moderately, but the result of the 1946 election reflected it acutely. Eventually, 
Bengal was divided into East and West in 1947 when British India was divided into India 
and Pakistan. East Bengal became known as East Pakistan and came under Pakistan’s rule.           
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The saliency of Bengali Muslim nationalism that created East Pakistan started to 
decline in East Pakistan when West Pakistani civil and military bureaucrats and political 
elites started to deprive East Pakistanis from their democratic rights. The regime used 
Muslim brotherhood as a tool to justify its oppressive rule in East Pakistan. The more the 
ruling elites of Pakistan politicized Islam for harnessing political benefits, the more the 
Bengalees of East Pakistan were drifting towards Bengali nationalism. So, the incumbent 
Pakistan Muslim League (PML), the descendant of the AIML, was quickly losing its 
political legitimacy in East Pakistan. The landslide victory of the United Front, an Awami 
League-led pre-election alliance of some nationalist parties in East Pakistan, in the 1954 
election showed erosion of the political legitimacy of the Pakistani regime in East Pakistan 
and crystallization of Bengali nationalism. The overwhelming victory of the Awami 
League, the dominant opposition party in East Pakistan, reflected the culmination of 
Bengali nationalism in the 1970 election, which gave birth to Bangladesh in 1971.  
This chapter has a total of ten sections. The second section depicts the changing 
nature of competing identities of the people of Bangladesh from the recorded ancient time 
to present day. The third section discusses socio-political development under the local and 
alien independent rulers before the Muslim rule was established in Bengal in 1203. The 
fourth section elaborates the socioeconomic and political problems the hegemonic alien 
Muslim rulers encountered in Bengal and the strategies they followed to attain political 
legitimacy in emerging conditions. The fifth section explores the condition under which 
the non-indigenized hegemonic Muslims were forced to be indigenized and how symbiotic 
relationship between dominant native Hindus and minority indigenized Muslims gave birth 
to Bengali nationalism. The sixth section enumerates the development of socioeconomic 
chasm among Indian Muslims under the Mughal Muslim rule. The seventh section 
examines the disastrous effects of the East India Company’s colonial rule in Bengal leading 
to a series of peasant revolts culminating in the 1858 Sepoy mutiny, the first anti-imperialist 
movement in India. The eight section addresses the rise of communal electoral politics in 
India as well as Bengal leading to partition of British India as well as Bengal in the religio-
communal line in 1947. The ninth section discusses the ethnocentrism of the ruling classes 
of Pakistan and subsequently rekindling of Bengali nationalism which eventually led to 
birth of Bangladesh through a bloody Liberation War in 1971. Finally, the tenth section 
concludes this chapter.  
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3.2 Evolving national identities of the people of Bangladesh 
Figure 3.1 shows twists and turns in the development of national identity of the 
people of Bangladesh during different phases.  
Figure 3.1: Twists and turns in the development of national identities of the people of Bangladesh 
 
 
Source: Constructed by the author 
3.3 Phase I: The independent non-Muslim rule (590-1203)   
This section discusses the sources of legitimacy of non-Muslim rulers who ruled 
Bengal independently before 1203 and the establishment of minority Muslim rule in 
Bengal. 
Before the invasion of Indo-Aryans, there were inhabitants in Bengal. The Indo-
Aryans migrated to Bengal long before 500 B.C. from the West and the North of India. 
They regarded themselves as ‘clean’ races and the original inhabitants in Bengal as 
‘unclean’ races. Following centuries-long rivalry and wars between these two races,  by 
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500 B.C. a broad ideological consensus developed among the ‘clean’ and ‘unclean’ races 
giving birth to hierarchical society in Bengal. The ‘clean’ races were able to establish their 
supremacy over the ‘unclean’ races. In modern days the descendants of ‘clean’ races are 
classified as higher caste Hindus and those of ‘unclean’ races as lower caste Hindus.  
The ‘clean’ Indo-Aryan races were able to establish their political supremacy over 
the ‘unclean’ natives in Bengal due to possession of higher military and agricultural 
technology and better governing skills. Though the ancient systems of government were 
monarchic, they were humane (Eaton, 1993:6-9). We do not know much about ancient 
Bengal. As far as we know Bengal experienced turbulent periods for over three hundred 
years before Gopal was elected as a king by a consensus among local chiefs in 750 
(Majumdar, 1943b:96-97). Subsequent kings of his dynasty were automatically selected 
from his descendants. 
3.3.1 Advent of Islam in Bengal  
The Pala dynasty established by Gopal ruled Bengal for over 400 years (Map 3.1). 
They were devout Buddhists, but majority of their subjects were Hindus. They adopted 
religious tolerance as a state policy and allocated public land for Hindu temples and 
Brahmins. They appointed Hindu Brahmins in high official posts. However, they were 
interested in Buddhist arts, culture and religion. They established several Buddhist 
monasteries as learning centres of Buddhism. Under their reign Buddhism received 
international prominence spreading to neighbouring countries (Eaton, 1993:12). Bengali 
arts and literature flourished during their reign. So, the Pala dynastic rulers derived their 
political legitimacy from multiple important sources, such as they were descendants of 
previous rulers in Bengal, they patronized all dominant religions and their governance was 
non-discriminatory.   They promoted Bengali language and culture as well as trade and 
commerce. It may be mentioned that during the Pala dynastic rule, Bengalees traded Bengal 
textiles through maritime trade routes and some of them converted to Islam through coming 
in contact with Muslim traders from the Middle East and Gujrat state of India (Eaton, 
1993:36-38; Siddiqi, 2016:31).  
Pala kings employed many foreigners as their officials. It is most probable that 
some Karnataka (a south Indian state) officials were appointed as chiefs by Pala kings in 
the south-western region of Bengal. They gradually acquired sufficient power to set up an 
independent kingdom when the central authority of the Pala rulers became weak (Eaton, 
BACKGROUND OF ELECTIONS: PRE-INDEPENDENCE ERA 
 
96 
 
1993:39. The Pala and the Sena dynastic rulers ruled different regions of Bengal at the 
same time.  
Map 3.1:  Original kingdom (upper map) and empire (lower map) of the Pala dynasty (750-1200) 
 
 
 
Sena rulers established a strong monarchy on the ruins of the Pala Empire (Kapur, 
2010:368). They carried out some important social reforms and revived some orthodox 
Hindu rites. The Sena dynasty made orthodox Brahmanism as the state religion and as such 
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infused elements of Brahmanic Hinduism into society, religion and culture of Bengal to 
such a great extent that in Bengal Hinduism survived the onslaught of Islam even after the 
fall of the Sena dynastic rule. During their reign Sanskrit literature was introduced in 
Bengal. However, Buddhism as a religion could not survive the onslaught of state-
sponsored orthodox Hinduism. The fall of influence of Buddhism facilitated spread of 
Islam in Bengal (Majumdar, 1943c:205-229).  
As Sena rulers enforced the Hindu caste system rigorously in Bengal, lower caste 
Hindus and Buddhists ‘suffered under the crushing burden of oppressive and tyrannical 
high-caste Hindus’ and as such, many eventually converted into Islam to ‘escape the yoke 
of Brahmanic oppression’ and enjoy ‘social equality’ that was literally guaranteed in Islam. 
It was Muslim traders from the Middle East and Gujrat state of India and Muslim saints 
from Northern India, Persia, Central Asia and Middle East who presented Islam to them as 
a ‘religion of social equality’ (Eaton, 1993:10-13; Khan, 1985). It may be noted that many 
Bengali Buddhists migrated to Buddhist-dominant countries such as Myanmar, Thailand, 
Tibbets and Sri Lanka to escape religious persecution in Bengal.  
Around 1192, Muslim rule was established in northern region of India with its 
capital in Delhi. However, by this time there were pockets of Muslims in Bengal and in 
order to propagate Islam some great saints settled in Bengal before Muslims conquered it 
(Talib, 1980:191). As indigenous Muslims were minority, they were oppressed by Hindu 
rulers. In 1203 the Northern and Western regions of Bengal came under the control of 
Muslim rulers in Delhi, when an Afghan General captured those regions from Sena 
dynastic rulers. As a result, the Sena dynastic rule got confined in Eastern and Southern 
Bengal for a while, but their power and prestige fell to local chiefs for loss of territories to 
Muslims. So, they also declared independence from Sena dynastic rule (Majumdar, 
1943c:205-229).  
3.4 Phase II: The independent non-indigenized Muslim rule (1204-1342) 
This section discusses social, political and economic problems of non-indigenized 
Muslim rulers in an alien country like Bengal and various attempts to justify their 
political legitimacy.  
This period is characterized by extreme political instability. The representatives of 
Delhi-based Muslim rulers declared independence after consolidating their power in 
Bengal. Sometimes their appointers sent armies to bring their rebel representatives under 
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control and sometimes they tolerated their rebellious actions. Being foreigners, they 
encountered some problems in Bengal.  
3.4.1 Political Problems 
The non-indigenized independent Muslim rulers in Bengal possessed necessary 
military power to keep the local people under their control and fight against the royal army 
sent by Delhi-based rulers. However, in absence of support of Delhi they felt a necessity to 
derive political legitimacy from other sources. So, they tried to derive their political 
legitimacy by adopting several strategies leading to short-term stable situations. They used 
to become disciples of some reputed Muslim saints who had spiritual commands on many 
people irrespective of their religious affiliations. These saints settled in Bengal migrating 
from northern India, the Central Asia or Arabian countries. They played an important role 
in changing regimes in Bengal. Secondly, they declared their allegiance to the Muslim 
Caliphas of Bagdad. Thus, they proclaimed themselves as pan-Islamic rulers (Eaton, 
1993:39). When Delhi-based Muslim rulers encountered this problem, they followed two 
strategies. On one hand, they tried to control Bengal militarily but sometimes they did not 
succeed much. On the other hand, they managed to receive certification of the Bagdad-
based Caliphas as their representatives in India and thus demanded allegiance of their rebel 
representatives in Bengal. Having faced this conundrum, the dynastic Muslim rulers in 
Bengal shifted their allegiance to universally regarded holy places of Muslims - Mecca and 
Medina. They claimed themselves as servants of Islam and thus donated money for 
establishing religious-based educational institutions and other benevolent projects in 
Mecca and Medina (Eaton, 1993:47). Thus, both rulers in Bengal and in Delhi re-positioned 
themselves with a view to attain short-term stability. 
3.4.2 Social problems 
The dynastic Muslim rulers of the consolidation phase confronted some social 
problems too. They belonged to the Indo-Turk ruling classes having ethnic origin outside 
Bengal. Their life style was different from fellow local Bengali Muslims converted into 
Islam mainly from lower caste Hindus and as such they did not like their Hinduism-biased 
culture. Under the influence of great Muslim saints who were their spiritual leaders, they 
declared Islam as the state religion and built many mosques with public money. It angered 
their Hindu subjects who were overwhelming majority in Bengal. Secondly, they were 
bound to appoint Hindu Brahmans in high administrative posts, because they were familiar 
with the people and culture of the country. They were also forced to do so, because they 
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could not bring their co-ethnic people from their places of origin in Central Asia. Moreover, 
they could not recruit experienced Muslim administrators from Northern India too, because 
they had strained relationship with Muslim rulers in Delhi. The saints did not like their 
patronage of Hindu Brahmins who exercised their political command over Muslims in a 
Muslim-ruled state. To them it seemed to have tarnished the image of Muslims (Eaton, 
1993:50-51). So, saints used to stop supporting them at some point and played an important 
role in installing new people as kings. For all these reasons, Muslim rulers in Bengal, who 
had ethnic origin outside Bengal, could not establish their socio-political roots in Bengal. 
However, during this period Muslim population in Bengal increased for several reasons: 
(i) mass immigration of Muslims into East Bengal from other parts of India where Muslims 
were oppressed and (ii) mass conversion of lower caste Hindus (Siddiq, 2016:30).   
3.4.3 Economic problems 
The representatives of Muslim rulers of Delhi who declared independence had to 
keep a large army for multiple reasons. Since population was predominantly Hindu and 
they might revolt against alien Muslim rulers, they needed to keep large armies to subdue 
them if needed. They also required large armies to fight against imperial armies despatched 
by Delhi to punish them. Secondly, in order to keep a large army they needed a large 
amount of resources. So, they imposed higher rates of taxes on the subjects who were 
mostly Hindus (Vohra, 2013:35). Higher rates of taxes pushed local people into the poverty 
trap. On one hand, it reduced land revenue of Bengal rulers in the long run. On the other 
hand, it made them unpopular to their subjects.  
3.5 Phase III: The independent indigenized Muslim rule (1343-1575)  
 This section discusses the context of development of Bengali nationalism through 
interaction between majority Hindus and Minority Muslims. 
This period is characterized by frequent invasion on Bengal by Muslim rulers in 
Delhi. When they ruled for a while and were able to consolidate power, they sent imperial 
armies against their rebellious representatives. On the other hand, Hindu subjects 
threatened to unseat them. This created turmoil in Bengal.   
3.5.1 Rise of local challengers and birth of Bengali nationalism 
The alien non-indigenized Muslim rulers in Bengal used to recruit many Afghans 
as their soldiers. They migrated from Afghanistan to Bengal and other neighbouring areas 
ruled by Muslims. They also recruited Ethiopian Africans in their military and civil 
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services. When Muslim rulers having alien origin became weak due to internal conflicts 
and external invasions, the Afghans and Africans became powerful and became rulers of 
Bengal for a while. Taking advantage of rootlessness and weaknesses of these alien 
dynastic Muslim rulers, a Bengali Hindu chief (Ganesh) seized ruling power and weakened 
social, religious and political influence of Indo-Turks in Bengal. He declared Hinduism as 
the state religion and patronized Bengali language, literature and culture. By this time 
descendants of alien Muslims also became a powerful political force in Bengal under the 
patronage of Muslim rulers. Muslims threatened Ganesh to unseat him if he did not accept 
Islam. So, a compromise was reached between king Ganesh and Muslims through a Muslim 
saint. According to the agreement, Ganesh stepped down and his son accepted Islam and 
became king of Bengal. Thus, the native Muslim rule was established in Bengal (Eaton, 
1993:52-56). 
In later days the ruling power alternated between native and indigenised Bengalis, 
but the state policy of subsequent rulers had been secular. They separated their personal 
religious belief from the state. Bengali became a universal language in all spheres of life. 
They patronized culture of the mass. Thus, the basis of their political legitimacy was the 
spontaneous support of Bengali-speaking local people. The medium of communication 
became Bengali. The interests of rulers meshed with those of local people and culture to 
such a great extent that that local people called rulers ‘Raja’, an indigenous title of Bengal 
rulers. In this way rulers became ‘sons of the soil’ irrespective of their ethnic and religious 
origins (Eaton, 1993:55-66). A symbiotic patron-client relationship was established 
between rulers and subjects leading to birth of Bengali nationalism. As a result, rulers and 
their subjects imbibed with the same spirit of Bengali nationalism stood up against Mughal 
invasion and were able to protect independence of Bengal from Mughal aggression for a 
long time. However, the power of indigenized independent rulers started to dwindle due to 
frequent attack by Mughal imperial armies since 1574.      
3.6 Phase IV: The dependent indigenized Muslim rule (1575-1757) 
This section discusses the establishment of Mughal rule in Bengal and the creation of a 
chasm within Indian Muslims under state patronage. 
This period is characterized by the subjugation of local Muslim as well as Hindu 
chiefs by Mughal Governors. Under the patronage of indigenized independent Muslim 
rulers some regional chiefs in Bengal became powerful. Initially they tried to resist Mughal 
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attack on Bengal, but ultimately they failed to withstand their assaults. Through persistent 
strategic use of the ‘carrot and stick’ policy over a long period the Mughal ultimately 
established their authority on Bengal (Eaton, 1993: 154).  
3.6.1 Multi-faceted approach of Mughal representatives 
Though representatives of Mughal Emperors in Bengal were foreigners and they 
established the Mughal rule in Bengal by subjugating popular independent chiefs in Bengal, 
they tried to win the political support of the common people. On one hand, they extended 
royal favour to people in times of their needs, such as exemption of taxes in the event of 
natural calamities. They even dismissed their tax collectors if they did excesses to collect 
revenues. On the other hand, they did not hesitate to enslave peasants if they failed to pay 
taxes on time (Eaton, 1993:157). Secondly, in their public life they followed Indian 
customs and traditions practised by Indian Hindu kings and emperors in old days. As an 
overwhelming majority of their subjects were Hindus, they presented themselves before 
the public as Indian Rajas (kings) or Maharajas (Emperors) instead of Persian Shahs or 
Central Asian Sultans. So, the Hindus considered Mughal representatives as one of them. 
On the other hand, in their private life they followed their own ethnic and Islamic traditions 
which were of Indo-Arabian, central Asian and Persian nature. As many Muslims of those 
traditions already settled in Bengal and they became politically powerful over time, they 
also regarded Mughal representatives as one of them. Thus, they skilfully balanced between 
two contending political forces in Bengal: majority Hindus and minority Muslims. In this 
way they derived their political legitimacy from people of all walks of life. Thirdly, their 
state policy was secular. They equally patronized Hindu and Muslim religious institutions. 
They employed more Hindus especially from higher castes in all types of administrative 
posts than Muslims, as Hindus outnumbered Muslims by several folds. As a result, their 
employment policy was equitable. Fourthly, they gradually indigenized public 
administration by employing more indigenized Bengalis than non-Bengalis. Above all, 
they developed a healthy patron-client relationship both horizontally as well as vertically 
(Eaton, 1993:159-163). In this way they minimized the likelihood of internal rebellion and 
increased probability of victory against external invaders.  
3.6.2 Rise of socioeconomic and political chasm among Indian Muslims 
Though the Muslim rule in India, especially the Mughal rule, brought about 
fundamental change in the economy, society, politics, culture and literature, a kind of 
hierarchical caste system developed among Indian Muslims over time under their 
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patronage. Muslims in India got split into two main types - the upper class called Ashraf 
and the lower class called Ajlaf. The Ashraf included all descendants of foreign Muslims 
(Arabs, Persians, Afghans and Turks) and converts from upper castes of Hindus. They 
considered it disgraceful to do any sort of menial works. On the other hand, the Ajlaf 
included those Muslims who were local and did all sorts of menial works and were 
descendants of converts from lower castes of Hindus (Levy, 1961:73). The Muslim rulers 
in Delhi patronized the Ashraf and posted them in various high administrative posts. As a 
result, they became socioeconomically better-off and as such politically more powerful. On 
the contrary, they did not like to appoint any Ajlaf in any administrative posts. If someone 
from the Ajlaf was appointed in any administrative posts inadvertently and if it was 
revealed later, they were instantly dismissed. Thus, Ajlaf Muslims were socioeconomically 
and politically marginalized by the discriminatory employment policy of the Muslim rulers 
in Delhi.   
The socioeconomic conditions of indigenous Muslims were as pitiful as lower caste 
Hindus and did not improve under the reign of Muslim rulers. Moreover, members of the 
Ashraf community lived mostly in the capital cities of provinces and the Ajlaf communities 
lived in rural areas. There were little social interactions between them (Misra, 1964:23). 
This man-made social stratification among Muslims had serious adverse effects on the 
Hindu-Muslim relationships in India including Bengal. It was also partly responsible for 
the partition of British India along a religious line in 1947 and later, the partition of Pakistan 
along an ethnic line in 1971.   
3.7 Phase V: The British East India Company’s colonial rule (1757-1858) 
  This section discusses the disastrous outcome of the East India Company’s 
oppressive rule in Bengal and the British Government’s subsequent takeover of ruling 
power. 
3.7.1 The Sepoy mutiny: the first freedom movement in India 
In 1757 the British East India Company seized ruling power from the last 
independent and indigenized Muslim ruler of Bengal. As soon as the company gained the 
power to collect land revenue in 1765, it imposed the tax rate twice as much as the Mughal 
revenue collectors did. As a result in 1770 there was a Great Famine in Bengal in which 
one-third of Bengal population died. In that year the company collected more revenue too.  
In order to guarantee income from the land revenue, the company introduced ‘permanent 
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settlement’ in 1793. It destroyed the backbone of agrarian socioeconomic and political 
structure in Bengal. On one hand, the new land-owning class called Zaminders were not 
interested to improve productivity of land by further investment, because they could live 
comfortable life in cities with their income from the rural estates. As agricultural 
production went down, so did the company’s tax revenue. In the end, many Zaminders 
became bankrupt, losing their investment in estates. The rest became tyrants, exploiting 
peasants as much as possible. 
Figure 3.2: British colonial rule and freedom movement in British India (1757-1947) 
 
Source: Constructed by the author 
 
As the agricultural production fell leading to shrinkage in the volume of trade and 
commerce and manufacturing outputs, it ultimately reduced the volume of trade of the 
company (Arnold, 2005). On the other hand, to facilitate the collection of land tax 
efficiently, the Zaminders leased lands to others who subsequently leased to others. In this 
way tiers of hierarchical intermediaries were created between Zaminders and peasants. 
Each tier expropriated as much rent as possible from the lower one leaving no surplus for 
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the peasants. The final outcome was an increasing incidence of poverty among the 
peasantry. The weaving class and other artisan classes became unemployed, because the 
company imposed higher tariffs on Bengal’s exported textiles and lower tariffs on Britain’s 
imported textiles. So, the Bengal market was flooded with British textiles. All these 
oppressive policies ruined Bengal’s agrarian economy. The company’s discriminatory 
trade and tax policies harmed not only peasants and artisans, but also Hindu and Muslim 
petty rulers, former revenue collectors of Mughals, tribal chiefs in hill regions and local 
landed military officers. When they revolted against excesses perpetrated on them by the 
company officials, masses of peasants and artisans joined with them. Between 1765 and 
1857 there were many revolts to end the company’s rule and restore the previous agrarian 
relations. The company brutally suppressed them (Gough, 1974). The great revolt that 
shaked the foundation of the company’s rule in India was the 1858 Sepoy Mutiny. It had 
far-reaching effects on the subsequent socio-political and economic development in India 
including Bengal (Pannu, 2006:11-13). The movement was spontaneous, but ended with 
tragedy.  
3.8 Phase VI: British Government’s colonial rule  
This section discusses causes of partition of Bengal by the British Government 
and violent protest against it by upper and middle class Hindus to protect their vested 
interests. It also discusses rise of some communal forces in Bengal as well as Indian 
politics.   
The Indians (including Bangalee) Hindu and Muslim soldiers revolted against the 
British for two reasons: (i) the company did not maintain parity between Indian and British 
soldiers in terms of salary, promotion, living conditions and other aspects; and (ii) they 
were closely integrated with their parental families which were groaning under the 
oppressive rule of the company (Gough, 1974). When Bengal soldiers revolted, the 
impoverished peasants and artisans of Bengal also joined with them. Very soon the soldier-
peasant-artisan revolt spilled across British India. Though the company was able to bring 
rebels under control by ruthlessly killing them, it revealed its incapacity to rule a vast 
country efficiently (Pylees, 2006:35). The British Government realized that it was not safe 
to leave such a large country under the control of a trading company. Moreover, it realized 
that the gap between the ruler and the ruled must be reduced for ensuring peace and stability 
and running the administration more efficiently (Rashiduzzaman, 1964:1). So, it took over 
the ruling power by the Indian Council Act of 1861 and gradually introduced limited self-
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government at different levels. In order to be legitimate ruler of India, the British Indian 
Government wanted to associate some educated Indians with legislative and administrative 
activities and make them the mouthpiece of Indians. Having been encouraged by the British 
Indian Government, some Indian elites formed the Indian National Congress (INC) in 
1885. Until 1906 it was the sole political party in British India.    
3.8.1 Partition of Bengal: birth of religion-based nationalism in Bengal 
 
Map 3.2: Partition of Bengal in 1905 
 
 
Causes of partition 
In 1905 the British Indian Government partitioned Bengal province, the 
largest province of British India, into two parts – West Bengal and East Bengal 
which included Assam (Map 3.2). The basis of partition was spatial inequality 
in terms of their socioeconomic and religious characteristics. The reasons of 
partition is highly controversial. The British Government argued that the 
partition of Bengal was long overdue for accelerating socioeconomic 
development of East Bengal. East Bengal Muslims who were predominantly 
Ajlaf were considerably backward with respect to their Hindu neighbours and 
fellow Ashraf Muslims (McLane, 1965). The main occupation of the Ajlaf 
Muslims was farming and they share-cropped lands mostly owned by Hindus. 
As they were poor, they could not afford modern education. They used to send 
their children to less expensive indigenous and religious-based institutions 
(Bandyopadhyay, 2004:265-266). Of the total English-medium high schools 
and Arts Colleges in Bengal 23 percent was in East Bengal and 77 percent were 
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in West Bengal (Al-Masum, 2012). In this context the British Government 
expected that Dhaka, the capital of the newly created East Bengal and Assam 
province, would develop faster economically. This is because Assam’s 
exportable goods would be exported through the Chittagong port. There would 
be new public offices and educational and cultural institutions as public 
servants and political elites would relocate to Dhaka from Kolkata. All these 
would benefit East Bengal and Assam economically and eventually increase 
the British Government’s revenue (Ludden, 2012). 
 
Another argument for Bengal partition advanced by the British 
Government was that Bengal was very large in terms of population (78.5 
million) and size (189,000 square metres). It was hard for the Kolkata-based 
provincial administration to rule East Bengal efficiently. The public service 
sector of East Bengal was under-staffed and as such it was infested with 
criminals. This was the genuine reason for partition (McLane, 1965). On the 
other hand, the Indian nationalists argued that it was an ‘evil design’ by the 
British Government to ‘divide two sons of the same mother Bengal’ and thus 
weaken Kolkata-centric anti-British nationalistic movement. This argument 
was very popular at that time and is still widely accepted, but it was not a 
genuine reason (McLane, 1965). 
Positive effects of partition on East Bengal 
The partition yielded tangible socioeconomic and political benefits to East Bengal. 
The government allocated more funds to develop infrastructure connecting hinterlands with 
the capital Dhaka and the port city Chittagong (Ludden, 2012). Secondly, the East Bengal 
Government established many educational institutions with some special facilities such as 
scholarships, residential accommodation and so no. As a result, enrolment of Muslim 
students in primary schools increased from 59.97 percent in 1906-7 to 64.27 percent in 
1911-12 (Al-Masum, 2012). Thirdly, new tax-paying businesses and educational 
institutions started to crop up. Fourthly, the export from East Bengal increased by 8 percent 
within a few years with a prospect of more increase in coming years (Ludden, 2012).  
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The anti-partition movement of middle-class Hindus  
The partition of Bengal angered the Kolkata-based middle class Hindus, especially 
the professionals who apprehended that creation of a new province with Dhaka as its capital 
would downgrade Kolkata. This would in turn reduce value of their properties in Kolkata 
and they might have to move to under-developed East Bengal leaving their residences and 
lucrative professions in Kolkata (Ludden, 2012). So, they attempted to annul it by all 
means. The Hindu-dominant INC also supported the anti-partition movement which was 
consistent with its ongoing Swadeshi (Gandhi’s call to use locally produced goods and 
abandon British goods) movement1. Since the size of the Bengal Muslim middle class was 
very small at that time, they could not effectively highlight the ‘emotional blackmailing’ 
attempt of opponents of partition.  
Ill-consequences of Bengal partition 
The Bengal partition of 1905 gave birth to multiple unwarranted developments not 
only in Bengal politics, but also in Indian politics. In 1906 some Muslim landed aristocrats 
and professionals mostly belonging to the Ashraf class established the All-India Muslim 
League (AIML) to protect and promote sectarian interests of Indian minority Muslims. As 
a result, the political structure of British India got transformed from monopoly to duopoly 
bringing Indian majority Hindus and minority Muslims at loggerheads officially. Secondly, 
the Bengali nationalism, culture and literature that developed through subsuming some 
elements from both Islam and Hinduism and Indian language, literature and culture, got 
fractured. The long-established ethnicity and language based Bengali nationalism split 
along a religious line – Bengali Hindu nationalism and Bengali Muslim nationalism. It 
created a ‘fertile’ ground for the emergence of communalism. Thirdly, following partition 
of Bengal, politics became plagued with increasing terrorist activities perpetrated by some 
Hindu ultra-nationalists (Rashiduzzaman, 1964:12). This was absent before partition. 
Fourthly, Bengal partition brewed a sense of regionalism among the Bengal population 
who enriched jointly Bengali literature, language and culture over generations and who 
were proud of these collective achievements (McLane, 1965). Last not the least, Muslims 
marginally outnumbered Hindus in Bengal (Das, 1991:17). Bengal partition made Hindus 
minority in East Bengal and Assam province and majority in West Bengal. So, it added 
minority-majority electoral politics on both sides of the partition line (Palit, 2004).  
                                                            
1 Gandhi’s call to use locally produced goods and abandon British goods. 
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Annulment of Bengal partition and aftermath 
Bengal partition was an outcome of a long-term planning of the British 
Government. When the Bengal partition started to produce some positive impacts on East 
Bengal and Assam, the British Government had to surrender to the militancy of the anti-
partition movement (Palit, 2004). The British Government annulled it in 1911. Along with 
militancy of the middle class Hindus, two other factors were responsible for it: (i) the 
Swadeshi movement led by the INC; and (ii) likelihood of the World War I. The annulment 
of the Bengal partition agonized the East Bengal Muslims and lower caste Hindus. 
Secondly, in 1913 a Hindu nationalist party named the All-India Hindu Mahasabha was 
established. It became promoter of Hindutva in the Indian politics and posed a challenge to 
the INC which attempted to promote Hindu-Muslim unity on the basis of secular Indian 
nationalism. Thirdly, in 1923 some Bengali Hindu and Muslim politicians formed the 
Bengal Pact with a view to bridge the socioeconomic gap between Bengali Hindus and 
Muslims. For lack of support from the INC’s national leaders and rising communalism in 
Bengal the Pact could not be implemented. As a result, Bengal politics became a ‘complex 
pattern of power squabble among the forces of imperialism, nationalism and 
communalism’ (Palit, 2004).  
3.9 Phase VII: Electoral politics in India including Bengal  
 This section discusses the introduction of elections in India, including Bengal, and 
a rise of Hindu-Muslim hostility in India including Bengal. 
The British Government passed the Morley-Minto Reform Act of 1909 and 
subsequently, the Montagu-Chelmsford Reform Act of 1919 to derive support from 
‘natural leaders’ of Indian people who constituted the pro-British factions of the INC, upper 
class Muslims belonging to the AIML and supporters of Westminster-style democratic 
system (Chattopadhyay, 1984:69; Chatterji, 1994:18-19). Some key elements of these 
reforms were as follows: (i) favouritism to minority Muslims by reserving more than 
proportionate seats in the Central Assembly and separate electorates were established for 
each minority communities; (ii) more seats were reserved for Indians in legislative 
assemblies; (iii) the criteria for becoming a voter were relaxed to increase the size of the 
electorate; (iv) the power of dealing with local issues was delegated to provinces to involve 
more Indians with legislative and executive; (v) division of executive power at the 
provincial level between Indian representatives and British advisors of the Governor  
(Pylees, 2006:38; Chatterji, 1994:18). The AIML accepted reforms lukewarmly, because 
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its demand was partially met. On the other hand, the INC rejected them outright on the 
ground that reserving seats on the basis of religion was designed to hinder development of 
much-needed national unity among Indians. Moreover, they did not meet the expectations 
of Indians towards achieving the status of ‘self-governing’ British colony. The Act included 
many ‘safeguards’ to fend off the British colonial rule in India (Chatterji, 1994:18; Pylees, 
2006:38). The actual objective of the 1919 Act was to give some political concessions to 
Indians and divert their attention to provincial issues (Jalal, 1994:9).  
Central and provincial elections in British India 
The INC was riddled with internal fighting mainly among four large factions: 
Gandhians, Indian nationalists, Hindu nationalists and socialists. It carried out non-
cooperation movement under Gandhi’s leadership in the 1920s, but leaders of the party 
were divided in their opinions regarding its outcomes. The socialist faction argued that the 
non-cooperation movement failed to achieve its ends. So, they advocated for participation 
of the INC in the 1923 Central Legislative election, but Gandhians opposed it. So, the 
socialist group broke away from the INC, established the Swaraj Party and participated in 
the 1923 election. The Swaraj Party argued that if the INC did not participate in the election, 
the anti-independence groups would dominate the legislatures. Secondly, they were aware 
that the power of the elected candidates was almost nil, because representatives of the 
British Government had absolute power over them. As elected members of the legislative 
assemblies and councils they would be able to do some ‘solid constructive work’ for the 
people and hence increase their support base (Chattopadhyay, 1984:69). Thirdly, their 
participation in the elections would not make them ‘collaborators’ of the British Indian 
Government, rather they would work as ‘liberators’ of India through Gandhian 
programmes. (Chattopadhyay, 1984:76). Finally, the election campaigns would enable 
them to take the INC’s message of independence and strategies of getting independence to 
the common people (Chattopadhyay, 1984:69).  
The Swaraj Party won 27 percent of the provincial council seats and majority seats 
in the key provinces such as Bengal and Madras with the slogan “Swaraj (self-government) 
for the 98 per cent”. The key drivers of its success were Indian nationalism and integrity in 
party organization. Secondly, the party made a Pact with Muslims (the Lucknow Pact and 
the Bengal Pact in 1923) to garner Muslims’ support for the party (Chattopadhyay, 
1984:75). Thirdly, the party made agreements with independent nationalists to resist the 
influence of the anti-independence forces in the assembly. Fourthly, its election manifesto 
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demanded immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners (Chattopadhyay, 
1984:77).  As to the failure of loyalists2 and moderates3  it is argued that their parties did 
not have any policy to ‘sell’ to the people. Personalities, local influence or promise to solve 
local problems did not play an important role in the choice of candidates in the 1923 
election (Chiriyankandath, 1992).   
Challenges encountered by the Swaraj Party 
The Swaraj Party tried to implement its manifesto as much as possible and make 
the Government dysfunctional (Chattopadhyay, 1984:78-83). While the Swaraj Party had 
been achieving a lot of stunning successes, it needed to change its tactics following some 
development in Bengal politics. Radical nationalists in Bengal were inspired by the 
Bolshevik revolution in Russia. At the same time there were peasant insurgencies in some 
districts in Bengal. The peasants demanded abolition of the Permanent Settlement Act of 
1793 and as such the Zamindary system and distribution of land to peasantry. The landlord 
and the upper class elements of the Swaraj Party were alarmed when peasants and 
communists joined together to form “The Worker-Peasant-Swaraj Party of the Indian 
National Congress”.  
In the 1926 election the Swaraj Party’s performance was poor with respect to its 
performance in 1923, because its socialist and nationalist faction had left. Secondly, the 
Khilafat and the non-cooperation movements were going on hand-in-hand in the early 
1920s making the period as one of the ‘golden’ periods in the Hindu-Muslim relationship 
in India including Bengal. However, the Khilafat movement lost its momentum when 
Gandhi ceased the non-cooperation movement in 1924 in the face of rising violence. This 
strained the relationship between the Muslim and the Hindus leading to emergence of 
conflicting and parallel social organizations in both communities (Chattopadhyay, 
1984:91; Das, 1991:26; Rashiduzzaman, 1964:33). Thirdly, Muslims wanted rapid 
implementation of the Bengal Pact, but many Hindus opposed it. All these factors reduced 
its overall popularity among Bengal masses (Chiriyankandath, 1992).   
Revival of the INC and death of the Swaraj Party 
Between the 1926 and the 1930 provincial elections some important events took 
place. Gandhi brought many leaders of the Swaraj Party into the INC’s fold which in turn 
                                                            
2 Political elites who were loyal to the British Government. 
3 Political elites who were in-between socialists and nationalists. 
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reinvigorated political influence of the INC in Indian politics. Secondly, two diverging 
trends were taking place in the INC. While the moderate group showed a tendency to swing 
to more constitutional reforms leading to a complete self-rule, the younger left-leaning 
group showed a tendency to move towards more direct action against the British. The INC 
leaders had to take them into consideration for future actions. Thirdly, the British 
Government established a commission (Simon Commission) to review the impact of the 
Montagu-Chelmsford Reform Act of 1919. Both the INC and the AIML rejected it as it did 
not include any Indians. On the other hand, having found the British Government’s 
reluctant to grant India a dominion status soon, the INC produced a report in 1928. The 
report outlined a Dominion Constitution for India with responsible governments at the 
centre as well as provinces. It proposed joint electorates with a reservation of seats for 
minorities with a view to address minority issues. It also included a list of fundamental 
rights. The INC gave an ultimatum to the British Government to implement it. On expiry 
of the ultimatum it launched the second civil disobedience movement on 25 January, 1930 
(Rothermund, 1962). The INC also asked its members to resign from legislative assemblies. 
The 1930 provincial election took place in the midst of the INC’s civil disobedience 
movement. As the INC did not participate, the election was not competitive and as such 
the legislatures were dominated by moderates for the 1931-34 period (Rashiduzzaman, 
1964:38-43).  
The 1934 Central Assembly election and change of the INC’s strategy 
The AIML did not support the INC-led civil disobedience movement and 
participated in 1930. So, majority Muslims were alienated from the INC-led national 
movements (Chiriyankandath, 1992). Both the INC and the AIML participated in the 1934 
election of the central assembly. The INC representatives did not try to obstruct the 
government in its every step what they did in the 1920s. They criticized the Government’s 
policy when it was worthy to be criticized. They also cooperated with the government when 
it was good for the country. Under the proposed Communal Award system, which was 
announced by the British Government in 1932, Muslims were given separate electorates as 
well as differential weightage in various provinces.  While AIML accepted it and the 
Hindu-Nationalist faction of the INC fought vigorously against it, it was ultimately 
accepted by the central assembly after a long debate with some amendments 
(Rashiduzzaman, 1964:45-49).               
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3.9.1 The 1937 provincial elections 
Key features of the Government of India Act, 1935   
The 1937 provincial election was held under the Government of India Act, 1935. 
This Act had following key features: (i) separate electorates and reserve seats for all types 
of minorities; (ii) relaxation of the criteria of adult franchise so that at least 10 percent of 
the population (30.1 million) could be voters; (iii) a federal system with delegation of a lot 
of power to the provinces; and (iv) the provincial government was accountable to the 
provincial legislature and ministers would be selected from the members of the legislative 
assembly; (v) establishment of a federal court to interpret the Act and settle disputes 
regarding federal matters; (vi) incorporated safeguards for minorities; (vii) the governor 
was the constitutional head of the province and would act on the advice of council of 
ministers  and so on. However, the Act also incorporated some legal instruments which 
empowered the British Government to take full control of any Indian administration when 
it would feel necessary to do so. In fact, on the one hand, by granting provincial autonomy 
the Act aimed at granting autonomy to Indians. On the other hand, by keeping central 
control to the British the Act aimed at helping the British to stay in India (Jalal, 1994:15). 
Since the Act was not sufficient to establish self-rule instantly and even did not include any 
built-in mechanism so that self-rule could come into being incrementally within a 
reasonable time, all political parties rejected it (Pylees, 2006:39). However, they decided 
to participate in the 1937 elections for different purposes. While the INC intended to take 
its ‘message’ to millions of Indians and deter entrance of ‘opponents of Indian freedom’ 
into the legislative assemblies, the AIML wanted to protect interests of Muslims by 
utilizing whatever opportunities were available under the 1935 Act (Chattopadhyay, 1984: 
138-39; Rashid, 2003:54). 
Result of the election: All British Indian provinces 
Only 14 percent of the British Indian population was franchised in the 1937 election 
against 3 percent in the 1934 election (Schwartzberg, undated: 222). Of the 14 percent 
franchised people only 71.20 percent voted in the provincial legislative council elections 
and 54.55 percent voted in the provincial legislative assembly elections where candidates 
contested (British Indian Election Report, 1937:5). The results (Appendix 3A) of the 1937 
election reveal some key features of the 1937 provincial council and assembly elections. 
Overall, the INC’s success was much better in both the legislative council and legislative 
assemblies than the AIML’s and even in Muslim constituencies it did much better than the 
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AIML. Secondly, the AIML did better in Muslim-minority provinces (64.42 percent) than 
in Muslim-majority provinces (35.57 percent) (Harun, 2003:80). The results implies that 
most Muslims were in favour of Indian nationalism being propounded by the INC. In other 
words, the Hindu-Muslim relationship was better in Muslim-majority provinces than in 
Muslim-minority ones. Thirdly, at least 10 percent of candidates were elected without 
contest. It implies that those elected candidates were personally popular.  
Provincial elections in Bengal  
Manifestos of major political parties in Bengal 
Kolkata, the capital of Bengal, was the hub of British Indian politics. As a result, 
Bengal occupied a unique position in the Indian politics. The contesting parties presented 
‘customized’ manifestos to Bengal’s voters. The poor consisted of Muslim peasantry and 
lower class Hindus and they were majority in Bengal. So, the manifesto of the Bengal 
provincial branch of the INC (henceforth BINC) could not eschew their problems. It 
proposed revision of the land tenure system favouring peasants and reduction of their 
indebtedness (Chattopadhyay, 1984:138). As the BINC was dominated by Zaminders and 
large landlords, it did not propose abolition of the Zamindary system which was the root 
cause of agrarian poverty in Bengal. In the same vein, the manifesto of the Bengal 
Provincial Muslim League (BPML) cautiously avoided abolition of the Zamindary system, 
because it was also dominated by landed aristocrats. However, it could not ignore suffering 
of Muslim peasantry under the contemporary taxation and usury system. So, ‘relief of 
agricultural indebtedness’ was one of 14 points in the manifesto of the BPML. It 
emphasized reforming the taxation and tenancy problems (Rashid, 2003:54-55). In Bengal, 
Krishak Praja Party (KPP) was an indomitable challenger to both the BPML and the BNIC. 
It was very popular with lower class Hindus and Muslim peasantry. So, it was likely to 
reduce vote shares of both and act as a ‘king maker’ if not becoming a ‘king’ itself. It 
presented a 14-point manifesto to Bengal people. The key points were abolition of 
Zamindary system without compensation, universal free and compulsory primary 
education, complete self-government for Bengal and release of political prisoners (Rashid, 
2003:56). A close analysis of the manifestos of the three main parties show that the KPP’s 
manifesto was very similar to the BNIC’s.  
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Political marketing strategies of major parties in Bengal 
In Bengal, the political competition was between the BPML and the KPP. This is 
because there was an informal alliance between the KPP and the BNIC which had very 
similar programmes. The BNIC did not nominate any candidate in Muslim seats and the 
KPP did the same in general seats. Thus, they supported each other (Chattopadhyay, 
1984:141). The KPP was largely middle-class Muslim-dominant. In order to garner vote 
of the poverty-stricken Muslim peasantry, the KPP emphasized Hindu-Muslim harmony as 
well as abolition of the Zamindary system (Gandhi, 2000:196,202). Secondly, the KPP 
carried out its election campaigns primarily through public meetings, and house-to-house 
contact by its volunteers. On the contrary, the electioneering strategies of the BPML was 
based on money, politicization of religion, emotions and vilification. It emphasized the 
Indian Muslim solidarity. It claimed that it was the ‘real’ praja (subject) party and thus 
appealed to the praja to vote for it. Moreover, the BPML leaders vilified KPP leaders 
calling them the ‘paid agents of the Hindu Mahasabha, Congress and some of the Hindu 
secret societies engaged in betraying the Muslim cause and wiping Islam out of India’ 
(Harun, 2003:72). In addition, the BPML tried to tickle the religious sentiments of Muslims 
by using the slogan ‘Islam in Danger’ (Pandey, 1978).  
Result of the election in Bengal province: triumphant secularism  
Only 13.10 percent of the Bengal population was franchised in the 1937 provincial 
election and of them, only 40.50 percent turned out for voting in contested constituencies 
comprising 5.06 percent of the total population of Bengal (Indian Election Report, 1937:2 
and Census of India, 1931:2). The Bengal legislative assembly had 250 seats. The number 
of seats received by participating parties and independents were as follows: BINC 52, 
Independent Hindu 39, Hindu Nationalist 3, Hindu Mahasabha 2, Independent Muslim 43, 
BPML 39, KPP 36, Tippera Krishak Samity 5, European Group 25, Anglo-Indian 4 and 
Indian Christian 2 (Rashid, 2003:74). No party had absolute majority.  
An analysis of the results (Appendix 3B) reveals some interesting features. The 
BPML polled more votes in urban constituencies (61.67 percent) than rural ones (26.52 
percent). On the other hand, the KPP polled more votes in rural constituencies (35.61 
percent) than urban ones (15.39 percent). The independents received more votes in rural 
constituencies (37.87 percent) than urban ones (23.14 percent) (Harun, 2003:75). It may 
imply that the KPP and the independents were more popular in rural areas than urban ones. 
Most Bengal Muslims lived in rural areas. Secondly, the KPP won in more constituencies 
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in East Bengal (38.77 percent) than the BPML (27.55 percent). Overall, the BINC and the 
KPP, which emphasized secularism, together won in 37.20 percent of total constituencies. 
The BPML, which emphasized Indian Muslim nationalism, won only in 15.60 percent 
constituencies. So, secularism seemed to have triumphed in the 1937 election.  
The electoral results (Appendix 3B) further show that the BINC’s success was 
much better than the Muslim-only BPML and Muslim-dominant KPP parties. Secondly, 
independent Muslim candidates did marginally better than their Hindu counterparts. 
Thirdly, the smaller parties did well too. In essence, the election was very competitive and 
no parties got absolute majority. When the results in Muslim constituencies are broken 
down further into East and west Bengal, it reveals some more interesting features. The 
BPML and independent Muslim candidates did better in West Bengal than in East Bengal. 
On the other hand, the KPP did better in East Bengal than West Bengal. It signifies that the 
demand for abolition of Zamindary and regulation of tenancy and interest rate raised by the 
KPP and its allies appealed to majority Muslims and lower-class Hindu peasantry of East 
Bengal more than their counterparts in West Bengal. So, the key driver of the electoral 
behaviour of Muslims and lower-class Hindu peasantry of East Bengal was their 
devastating economic condition and aspiration of getting rid of it under public programmes 
(Rashiduzzaman, 1964:80-95).       
Consistency with electoral behaviour models   
 
The electoral behaviour of the Bengal electorate was consistent with several 
electoral models. It was consistent with the economic vote model, because East Bengal was 
more agriculture-based, more Muslim-dominant and economically less developed than 
West Bengal. More people were employed in the agriculture than industry in districts where 
Muslims were majority. The average employment in the agricultural sector in Muslim-
majority divisions of East Bengal (Rajshahi, Dhaka and Chittagong) was 76.33 percent 
against 58 percent in Muslim-minority divisions of West Bengal (Durdwan and 
Presidency) in 1931. The average employment in the industrial sector in Muslim-majority 
divisions of East Bengal was 7.66 percent against 15.5 percent in Muslim-minority 
divisions of West Bengal in 1931 (the Census of India, 1931, Vol. V, Bengal and Sikkim, 
Part II: p. 263). It implies that more Muslims lived in rural areas and in East Bengal and 
their principal source of living was agriculture. As the Zamindary system was the root cause 
of agricultural problems and the KPP offered a practical solution to it through abolishing 
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it, Muslim and lower caste Hindus of East Bengal overwhelmingly voted for the KPP. This 
behaviour was consistent from the perspective of prospective economic vote model. 
Secondly, the electoral behaviour of Bengal Muslims was consistent with the voting 
behaviour of Indian Muslims living in Muslim-minority states where most Muslims voted 
for Muslim-only party the AIML. The BPML (Muslim-only) and the KPP (Muslim-
dominant) together won in 32 percent constituencies in Bengal. It was, therefore, consistent 
with the ethnic voting model. It is because, Muslim voters seemed to have trusted co-
religious leaders more than cross-religious ones.  Thirdly, manifestos of the KPP and the 
BINC specifically addressed the problems of the socioeconomically lower class rural 
Hindus and Muslims. They together won in 37.20 percent of total constituencies. So, the 
electoral behaviour of the socioeconomically lower class rural Hindus and Muslims was 
consistent with the sociological model. 
Post-election political development in Bengal: Horizontal political conflict and 
cooperation  
When it was found that no parties obtained absolute majority in the election and a 
coalition government was inevitable, independent winners started jockeying. Nearly half 
of independent Muslim winners joined the BPML raising its number to 60. Others joined 
the KPP raising its number to 58. The KPP-BPML coalition was not possible, because 
Fazlul Huq (the leader of the KPP) defeated Nazimuddin (a top leader of the BPML) in 
latter’s Zamindary area. It was a prestige issue for the latter. On the other hand, KPP-BINC 
coalition was most probable. However, when leaders of the BINC and the KPP discussed 
about formation of a coalition government, the KPP emphasized that the first and foremost 
task of the government would be to pass bills concerning tenants and money lenders to 
relieve sufferings of peasants. On the other hand, the leaders of the BINC emphasized that 
the first and foremost task of the government would be to demand release of political 
prisoners of Bengal. As they could not agree on the priority of the tasks of the government, 
they could not form a coalition. Also, the central leaders of the INC were extremely 
unhelpful in this regard. So, Bengal missed an opportunity to unite Hindus and Muslims to 
fight against the British (Chattopadhyay, 1984:147). As soon as the bid to form the KPP-
BINC coalition government failed, the KPP formed a coalition with the BPML.  
From the very beginning, the KPP-BPML government was put under pressure by 
the BNIC and the radical faction of the KPP. The BNIC and the militant faction of the KPP 
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pushed Fazlul Huq, a secular pro-peasant leader, towards communalism (Chattopadhyay, 
2003:154). Some influential central leaders of the INC did not like the strategies being 
followed by the BNIC, because they believed that it ‘would further poison the communal 
atmosphere in Bengal and create an unbridgeable chasm between the Congress and the 
League all over India’. Even some leaders of the BINC (e.g., P. C. Roy) opposed it and 
opined that though the Bengal coalition Government had some serious limitations, it was 
the Chief Minister of the Bengal government (Fazlul Huq) who ‘symbolized unity of all 
Bengalees – both Hindu and Muslim and he was also genuinely for the downtrodden 
masses, especially the peasantry.’ Fazlul Huq quickly managed to pass several Acts and 
took some other pro-peasant measures that benefited majority Muslim and lower caste 
Hindu peasantry. Thus, he realized some demands of the Bengal lower class Hindus and 
Muslims. While Fazlul Huq (the Chief minister and leader of the KPP) wanted to present 
those measures as secular ones benefitting common people, the coalition partner (BPML) 
of the Government wanted to reap political dividends by some sort of communal twist and 
the BINC tried to belittle prospective benefits from those measures (Chattopadhyay, 
1984:157).  
Post-election problems encountered by the INC and the AIML  
While the KPP-BPML formed a coalition government in Bengal and had been 
under an intense pressure from the BNIC and the militant faction of the KPP, conditions in 
other provinces were different. The INC won in 24.90 percent of total seats in provincial 
legislative councils and 44.60 percent of total seats in provincial legislative assemblies 
(Appendix 3A). It had clear majority in six provinces (Muldon, 2009:1; Hardy, 1972:225). 
However, it lacked absolute majority and thus could not claim that it was the ‘only 
representative organization of the masses of India, irrespective of religion, caste or creed’ 
(Pandey, 1978). Moreover, its dominance was also challenged by some influential rival 
regional parties which won in Punjab, United Province (now Uttar Pradesh), Bengal and 
Bombay (Mumbai) on the basis of regional and sectarian interests (Chiriyankandath, 1992). 
While the INC’s electoral performance was less than warranted, the AIML’s electoral 
performance was far below the warranted level. The INC won in 42.37 percent of total 
Muslim seats, whereas the AIML won in 21.57 per cent of the same (Appendix 3A). So, it 
could not claim as the ‘sole representative’ of the Indian Muslims and as such its very 
existence was under threat (Pandey, 1978). Moreover, the AIML polled more Muslim votes 
in the Hindu-dominant states than in Muslim-dominant ones. It implies that the Hindu-
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Muslim relationship was worse in the former states than in the latter ones. It further 
signifies that Muslims in Muslim-dominant areas were holding more pro-Indian secular 
attitude than their counterparts in Hindu-dominant areas. This type of political preference 
was not in favour of the AIML.   
AIML’s reaction to post-election offensive political marketing strategies of the INC 
We have seen that neither the INC nor the AIML secured even simple majority 
seats in 485 Muslim constituencies in the 1937 election. This posed a serious political 
legitimacy problem to both of them, because this indicated that none was politically 
legitimate party of majority Indian Muslims. So, securing political legitimacy from 
majority Indian Muslims was their common goal in the post-election period. In order to 
achieve this goal, the INC launched some programmes under the supervision of its Muslim 
leaders. The AIML highlighted their toxic effects on Muslims whether they were real or 
perceived. Even it sometimes exaggerated them. When the AIML criticized the INC’s 
programmes, the central leaders of the INC did not take them into account seriously. They 
rather tried to justify their actions (Pandey, 1978).  
While in the political arena Hindu-Muslim elite conflicts increased, the same also trickled 
down to the masses. Some Hindu leaders developed communal organizations which aimed 
to revive orthodox Hinduism in the face of rising neo-Hinduism among Hindu modernists 
(Das, 1991:4). These organizations rose to the status of ‘gate-watchers’ of indigenous 
religion and culture in India. The political party Hindu Mahasabha and a growing faction 
of the INC (Hindu nationalists) presented a militant image of Hinduism and represented 
those organizations in the political arena. Thus, politics and Hinduism were blended 
together giving birth to politicisation of Hinduism (Thursby, 1975:7).  
In the early decades of the British rule both Muslims and the Hindus fought against 
the British, but over time their symbiotic relationship became toxic. For these reasons the 
criticisms of the AIML against seemingly noble ventures of the INC became gradually 
credible to many pro-INC Muslim leaders as well as Muslim masses. So, political 
legitimacy of the AIML had been increasing to them and as such they tended to rally behind 
it. By default, political legitimacy of the Gandhi-led Hindu-dominant INC had been falling 
to them.  
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The AIML’s post-election mixed political marketing strategies and phoenix rise of 
Jinnah 
The political legitimacy of the Jinnah-led AIML to Indian Muslims increased 
exponentially in the post -1937 election due to defensive and offensive strategies followed 
by Jinnah. The toxic criticism of the INC’s programmes by Jinnah, leader of the AIML, 
may be termed as his defensive political marketing strategy. As an offensive political 
marketing strategy Jinnah tried to encroach on the political constituencies that were 
ambivalent towards both the AIML and the INC. In the 1937 election the AIML 
encountered immense challenge in all four Muslim-majority provinces – Bengal, Punjab, 
Sind and NWFP. Between 1937 and 1939 Jinnah and his AIML were able to convince the 
leaders of the Muslim-dominant Unionist Party in Punjab and that of the KPP in Bengal 
about the importance of a single Muslim party like the AIML to protect interests of Indian 
Muslims against ‘onslaught’ of Hindu-dominant INC. At the request of provincial Muslim 
Chief Ministers, many Muslim members of those parties joined the AIML and agreed to 
follow its policy regarding the All-India issues (Hardy, 1972:229). Between 1937 and 1939 
many Muslim pro-INC political leaders and religious dignitaries expressed their solidarity 
with Jinnah and the AIML (Pandey, 1978).  
Fazlul Huq, the KPP leader and Chief Minister of Bengal, was a genuine secular 
leader. The Huq-led KPP was concerned with socioeconomic development of the poor 
Hindu and Muslim peasantry of Bengal, but the KPP was a partner of the KPP-BPML 
Bengal coalition government. As a tactical strategy Jinnah formed a committee under 
Fazlul Huq and assigned it a task of investigating into ‘misdeeds and atrocities committed 
against the Muslims in the provinces under Congress administration’. The Huq-led 
committee reported shocking conditions of Muslims under the INC’s rule (Chakrabarty, 
1978:15). This drifted him away from the INC and its Indian secular nationalism. In this 
way by 1939 Jinnah, who lacked support of majority Muslims in Muslim constituencies 
until 1937, managed to possess their overwhelming support and emerged as a powerful 
leader whom neither the British nor the INC could ignore.  
British Government’s ‘Quit India’ intention and the AIML’s Lahore Resolution 
Over time it became clear that the British wanted to hand over British India to 
Indians and under the 1935 Act, the Muslims would be a minority dependent on the mercy 
of the majority Hindus. Evidently, they may eventually lose their identity as Muslims. So, 
in the 1940 Lahore Resolution the AIML demanded several Muslim states in British India. 
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Thus, Jinnah-led AIML gradually shifted from its demand for ‘safeguards’ for minority 
Indian Muslims to creation of several Muslim-dominant states in British India (Gordon, 
1978). As soon as the Lahore resolution was accepted, Jinnah emerged as an ‘unchallenged 
leader and spokesperson of Muslim interests to the Government of India’ (Riddick, 
2006:112).  
Until 1940 the AIML operated at the national level with little grass-root level 
connections. When some Muslim political leaders, religious dignitaries and scholars joined 
the AIML, its mass-level connection started to roll out rapidly (Hardy, 1972:240-242). 
Within a short period the demand for establishing independent Muslim states in Muslim-
dominant regions received enthusiastic support especially in Eastern India, that is, Bengal. 
However, the Lahore Resolution was obscure in many respects. As time passed on, the 
AIML leaders from the Northern and the Western India thought about it and finally came 
up with the idea of one Muslim state called Pakistan consisting of Western and Eastern 
regions of British India (Moore, 1983).  
Vertical conflict between the provinces and the centre: Bengal case 
Bengal politics was affected not only by its own territorial Hindu-Muslim politics 
but also by extra-territorial INC-AIML politics at the national level. In Bengal Fazlul Huq 
was leading the BPML-KPP coalition government. Many assembly members of the KPP 
including Fazlul Huq joined the BPML at his request. Fazlul Huq did so as per his prior 
agreement with Jinnah. In July 1941 he along with other Muslim Chief Ministers accepted 
the Viceroy’s invitation to join the National Defence Council formed by the Viceroy to 
help the British Government in its War against enemies. Since he accepted invitation 
without consulting with Jinnah, the latter charged him with breach of party discipline. 
Fazlul Huq treated it as an ‘arbitrary use of power vested’ in the hand of the AIML’s 
President Jinnah. So, he resigned from the AIML. He realized that he would immediately 
receive a backlash from the BPML. On 1 December, 1941 the BPML’s members of the 
cabinet resigned causing fall of the Fazlul Huq-led coalition government. Fazlul Huq again 
formed a coalition government excluding the BPML which produced mixed reaction in 
Bengal. The nationalists were happy, while sympathisers of the BPML were unhappy. It 
aimed to strengthen the Hindu-Muslim unity in Bengal (Chattopadhyay, 1984:171-173). 
However, the Huq-led Government faced many hurdles due to conflicting interests of 
different powerful groups in the Bengal provincial assembly.  
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While a series of quixotic episodes took place in Bengal during the provincial 
autonomy period, there were similar unpredictable episodes at the centre too. In December 
1939 the British Government sent Stafford Cripps with a proposal to form a constituent 
assembly and giving India a dominion status after the end of the World War II. The INC 
rejected the proposal, because the defence was not put under the control of Indians. The 
AIML also rejected it, because nothing but Pakistan was acceptable to it (Riddick, 
2006:114). On 6 July, 1942 Gandhi announced the ‘Quit India Movement’ which allowed 
use of violence against any sort of repression by the British Government. The Government 
arrested many political leaders and the movement continued spontaneously and 
sporadically in the face of brutal repression by the Government. Though the Government 
controlled it within a week, it was a severe blow to the political legitimacy of the British 
Government. It was as powerful as the Sepoy Mutiny of 1858. Though the ‘Quit India 
Movement’ was unsuccessful, the INC could show its power of mass mobilization (Talbot, 
2009).  
British Government’s decision to quit British India 
The foundation of the British Imperial rule in India became weak for several 
reasons: (i) Britain became the world’s largest debtor country following the War; (ii) the 
British Indian Government failed to maintain law and order resulting from communal 
conflicts, socioeconomic and political unrest, and violent movement for independence; and 
(iii) tendency of  Indian bureaucrats and soldiers to swing their loyalty from the British 
Indian Government in favour of Independence Movement in critical moments (Singh, 
1982; Chakrabarty, 1992).. As soon as the War ended on 7 May, 1945 the British planned 
to leave India. In order to form the constituent assembly, the election was scheduled to be 
held in 1946 under the Government of India Act, 1935. One distinctive feature of this 
election was that in the 1946 election 11.9 per cent of the total population was franchised 
against 10.80 per cent in the 1937 election (Chiriyankandath, 1992, Census of India, 1931 
and Election Report, 1937). 
3.9.2 The 1946 provincial and central elections in British India 
Political marketing strategies of the INC and the AIML at the centre 
While the INC participated in the election with a single slogan – ‘keep India united 
and free India’, the AIML participated with a single slogan of a different nature; ‘divide 
India and get Pakistan’ (Rashid, 2003:181; Chattopadhyay, 1984:204). So, they were at 
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loggerheads largely on a single issue: undivided India versus divided India. The INC aimed 
to win in majority provinces with special focus on Muslim-majority provinces so that it 
could obtain political support from majority Muslims in favour of united India and falsify 
Jinnah’s claim that the AIML alone represented Indian Muslims. In order to achieve this, 
the INC was ready to back any Muslim- and non-Muslim-dominant organizations that 
opposed the AIML (Rashid, 2003:194, 196, 201).  On the other hand, the AIML’s strategy 
was to win in most Muslim constituencies in all Muslim-majority provinces so that it could 
claim that it was the only Muslim party and its demand for proposed Pakistan was 
legitimate. Thus, the INC and the AIML competed for votes of majority Muslims.  
The INC’s election manifesto covered some twelve vital issues, which included that 
the state would have a federal structure, provinces would have maximum autonomy, the 
state would maintain neutrality to religions, do everything possible to remove poverty and 
improve standard of living of the people, nationalise key industries and so on (Harun, 
2003:193). On the other hand, the AIML did not publish any election manifesto. However, 
Jinnah, the leader of the AIML, sometimes outlined the defining characteristics of Pakistan. 
According to him, it would be a Muslim state comprising of North-West Frontier, 
Baluchistan, Sind, Punjab, Bengal and Assam. The constitution would be democratic and 
provinces would have full autonomy. He did not outline prospective economic and social 
policy of Pakistan. During the election campaigns no AIML’s leaders gave details of 
Pakistan with a view to avoid divisions among Muslims of different regions. However, 
leaders of the AIML were able to give Muslims a message that creation of Pakistan would 
cure all problems of Indian Muslims (Harun, 2003:205-206). On the other hand, the INC 
claimed that partition of India as demanded by the AIML would not be economically and 
politically ‘sound’ (Kuwajima, 1998:130-135).  
While  the election fund of the INC was mostly provided by Hindu businessmen 
like Birla, Dalmias and Kasturbhais, that of the AIML was provided by Muslim 
businessmen like Adamjees, Ispahanis, Monons, Khaojas and Bohrajs. However, the 
AIML also appealed to the common people who contributed a huge amount to the election 
fund popularly known as ‘Jinnah Fund’ (Harun, 2003:207). While this was the INC’s and 
the AIML’s overall policy and sources of political finance at the national level, their 
provincial bodies customized provincial manifestos within the broader framework of their 
national ones.  
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Political marketing strategies of major parties in Bengal 
Bengal politics was riddled with intra- and inter-party fighting. The major parties 
that competed in the 1946 provincial election were the BPML, the BNIC, the Hindu 
Mahasabha, the Communist party, the Radical Democratic Party, the KPP, the Scheduled 
Caste Federation and the Kshatriya Samaj. Within the BPML there were two groups 
(leftists versus rightists) trying to overpower each other in nominating candidates. 
Ultimately, the leftist faction became dominant and the rightist faction became dormant for 
the sake of winning in the ensuing election.  
The Huq-led KPP was in a precarious position in the 1946 election. Most KPP 
leaders and activists were disillusioned with the KPP and joined the BPML. When Huq left 
the AIML in protest of the ‘authoritarian’ attitude of its central leader Jinnah, he was away 
from it for some years. However, on the eve of the election he opted several times to return 
to the BPML. He could not re-join due to opposition of its dominant faction. Later he joined 
the BINC-sponsored anti-BPML party named Bengal Muslim Parliamentary Board, but 
later contested in the election as a KPP candidate. Secondly, like the 1937 election Fazlul 
Huq and his other KPP candidates advocated for abolition of the Zamindary system, but 
failed to garner public support in their favour. It is because, the BPML also included it in 
its election manifesto. Thirdly, the KPP did not have any organized source of fund. It had 
to rely on private political finance and the INC for it (Rashid, 2003:209, 213).  
In Bengal, the anti-BPML forces were weak and the BPML took it as an opportunity 
to enhance its political legitimacy there. The BPML declared some socioeconomic policies 
that the AIML did not. Those policies were especially designed to address needs of Bengal 
Muslims. The election promises of the BPML were almost replication of the socioeconomic 
programmes of the INC at the centre and the KPP in Bengal.  
In addition to presentation of a competitive election manifesto, the BPML also 
followed several effective electioneering strategies: (i) it involved thousands of Muslim 
students and provided them training regarding election campaigns. It formed branches of 
the BPML down to the village level. It instructed activists to contact local influential social 
elites; (ii) it paid special attention to some constituencies where its candidates were likely 
to face tough competition from influential anti-BPML leaders; (iii) in order to counter the 
‘anti-Pakistan’ campaigns of the INC-sponsored Muslim-dominant organizations, it also 
employed influential Muslim religious dignitaries (Ulemas) in its election campaigns 
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(Rashid, 2003:196-211);(iv) with a view to garnering support of destitute Muslim 
peasantry, the vote-bank of the KPP, the BPML used the language of political 
communication appealing to them. Its posters inscribed slogans: ‘land belongs to the 
plough’, ‘abolish Zamindari without compensation’, ‘down with vested interests’, 
‘labourers will be owners’, ‘Pakistan for peasants and labourers’ and so on (Rashid, 
2003:206).  Thus, the BPML left no stone unturned to win in every Muslim seat in Bengal.  
Results of the central legislative assembly elections  
The central legislative Assembly elections were held before the provincial ones. In 
the central legislative assembly election the INC won in 53.92 (55 out of 102 seats) percent 
seats and polled 88 percent votes in general seats. The AIML won in 100 percent seats (30 
out of 30 seats) reserved for Muslims. Thus, Muslims who opposed the creation of Pakistan 
lost to Muslims who supported it. The Hindu Mahasabha, which promoted India as a 
Hindustan (the homeland of Hindus only), failed to win in a single seat and thus its demand 
for Hindustan was lost. The results of the central Assembly elections showed that the 
demand for united independent India by general masses (mostly Hindus and some 
Muslims) was as strong as that of Pakistan by most Muslims. Secondly, three parties 
emerged as main players in the British Indian politics – the INC, the AIML and the ‘small 
but effective European group’ (W.W.J., 1946).  
On the basis of the electoral results the AIML demanded that it got mandate for 
Pakistan from Indian Muslims. The INC rebutted it claiming that as only 10 percent people 
were franchised, the AIML did not get the mandate for Pakistan. While the AIML was 
complacent with the results of the central legislative assembly elections, the INC was not. 
This is because, it failed to win in any Muslim constituencies in that election and hence it 
was hard for the INC to claim that it had support of Muslims in favour of united 
independent India.  
Results of the 1946 provincial elections: triumphant Muslim nationalism     
In the 1946 provincial elections the INC won in 58.38 percent (923 out of 1581) of 
total constituencies which includes Muslim and special constituencies (Chiriyankandath, 
1992), but polled 80.9 percent of votes in general constituencies (Kuwajima, 1998:167). In 
Muslim constituencies, the INC performed poorly. On the other hand, the AIML won in 
87.76 percent (423 out of 482 constituencies) of total Muslim constituencies and 74.2 
percent of total votes of those constituencies (Harun, 2003:219-220). So, the performance 
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of the AIML was outstanding in comparison with that of the INC and its allies in Muslim 
constituencies.  
The performance of the BPML in Bengal was more impressive than that of the 
AIML in all Muslim constituencies. It won in 94.01 percent (110 out of 117) of Muslim 
constituencies and polled 83.64 percent of total vote cast (Harun, 2003:215,219). Its overall 
popularity can be understood from some other measures: (i) it won in 93.69 percent of rural 
constituencies; (ii) none of its candidates lost deposits; and (iii) only 7 of its candidates 
lost, but 2 lost at narrow margins (Harun, 2003:216-219).  
The BPML’s electioneering strategies seemed to have been effective in mobilizing 
Muslim voters. The turnout rate of Muslims in Muslim constituencies increased by 30.94 
percentage points between 1920 and 1946, while turnout rates in non-Muslim 
constituencies increased by 22.72 percentage points during the same period despite 
vigorous campaign by the INC. In Muslim constituencies the key reason might be an 
increasing rate of hostility between the Muslim and the Hindu communities and hence a 
rapid rise in political consciousness of Muslims (Rashiduzzaman, 1964:86-87).  
Electoral behaviour of Muslims and models of electoral behaviour 
The electoral behaviour of Muslims was consistent with some models of electoral 
behaviour. It was consistent with the prospective economic vote model, because the AIML 
highlighted retrospective and prospective economic plight of Muslims under the Hindu-
dominant INC rule. In general, Muslims were relatively economically much backward than 
Hindus. Muslim-dominant regions were less industrially developed than Hindu-dominant 
ones. Muslim-dominant regions were more agricultural based than Hindu-dominant ones. 
So, economic interests of Muslims were different from those of Hindus. As a result, 
Muslims voted for the BPML which advanced practical solutions to their economic 
problems. Secondly, their electoral behaviour also followed the ethnic voting model, 
because majority Muslims voted for Muslim-only party (AIML) despite differences in their 
mother tongues, cultures and ethnic identity. Islam, the common religious identity, was the 
driving force behind this sort of electoral behaviour. Thirdly, since the 1937 election 
through the 1946 election Muslim voters grew up in an environment characterized by 
Hindu-Muslim animosity. They were likely to have developed partisanship with the AIML, 
because it emphasized Muslim identity. So, their voting behaviour was consistent with 
psycho-sociological model. Fourthly, the electoral behaviour of Bengal Muslims was 
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consistent with the sociological model. This model predicts that people with lower 
socioeconomic status tend to vote for left-leaning parties and the people with higher 
socioeconomic status for right-leaning parties. In Bengal Muslims’ position in the 
socioeconomic hierarchical structure was lower than that of Hindus. The manifesto of the 
BPML was more left-leaning and the party was dominated by left-leaning faction.  
3.9.3 Comparison between the 1937 and the 1946 election results  
Some features of the results of the 1937 and the 1946 election at different levels 
and in different types of constituencies are worthy to be explored. Table 3.1 shows that 
both the INC and the AIML were able to increase their seat and vote shares at all levels at 
the expense of other smaller parties and independents. In the central legislative council the 
INC’s seat share increased from 24.90 percent in 1937 to 57.84 percent in 1946, while that 
of the AIML’s increased from 4.66 percent in 1937 to 29.41 percent in 1946. The INC 
polled 91.5 percent vote in general seats. Across Indian provinces the INC’s seat share 
increased from 44.60 percent in 1937 to 58.23 percent in 1946 and that of AIML’s 
increased from 6.68 percent in 1937 to 26.81 percent in 1946.  
In the Bengal legislative assembly the seat share of the BINC and its ally (KPP) 
increased from 37.20 percent in 1937 to 45.3 percent in 1946, whereas seat share of the 
BPML increased from 15.60 percent in 1937 to 37.2 percent in 1946. It implies that Indians 
were more polarized along religious line, that is, most Hindus rallied behind the INC and 
most Muslims behind the AIML. Thus, the INC emerged as a Hindu party and the AIML 
as a Muslim party.  The polarization was so much acute that Muslim leaders and activists 
supporting the INC or any Muslim organization other than the AIML were considered ‘not 
pure Muslims’ by supports of the AIML.  
Since the AIML claimed to be the custodian of Muslim interests in British India, 
we need to explore its comparative performance with respect to the INC and other Muslim 
parties in the Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority provinces in the 1937 and the 1946 
elections. Bengal, Punjab, Sind and North-West Frontier provinces were Muslim-majority 
and Madras, Bombay, United Province (Uttar Pradesh), Bihar, Central Province (Madhya 
Pradesh), Assam, Orissa were Muslim-minority provinces in those years.     
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Table 3.1: Results of the 1934, the 1937 and the 1946 elections: central, All-Indian provinces and 
Bengal province 
Party Central 
Legislative 
Council (% all 
seats) 
Central 
Legislative 
Council (% vote 
all general seats) 
Provincial 
Legislative 
Assembly (% 
all seats) 
Bengal 
Legislative 
Assembly (% 
all seats) 
  1934 1946 1934** 1946 1937 1946 1937 1946 
INC 24.90** 57.84   91.5 44.60 58.23 37.20* 45.3 
AIML 4.66 29.41   - 6.68 26.81 15.60 37.2 
Other 
parties 
27.23 9.80   5.9 25.04 7.76 14.40 13.3 
Independent 43.19 2.94   2.6 24.29 7.19 32.80 4.2 
Total 100 100   100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Compiled and calculated by the author from the Election Report, Government of India 
(1937:1-19); Election Report, Government of India (1946:1-41); Harun (2003:77-80, 215-210); Sen 
(1997:137). Note:*KPP included;**INC split and its splinter the Congress Nationalist Party won a 
significant number of seats; *** the author could not find them for that year.  
Table 3.2 shows that the INC did better in Muslim-minority, that is, Hindu-majority 
provinces in both elections. It also did better in Muslim-majority provinces due to electoral 
alliance with some Muslim-dominant parties. So, alliance arithmetic was effective in 
winning in Muslim-majority provinces, such as NWFP and Punjab.  Secondly, both minor 
Muslim and Hindu-alone parties vanquished in the 1946 election in both types of provinces. 
Thirdly, the electoral support of smaller parties declined but did not disappear in any type 
of provinces. It is because, they had special appeal to some groups of voters and hence they 
filled up the demand of the niche political markets. Fourthly, independents vanquished in 
the Muslim-minority provinces, while they survived in the face of onslaught of the AIML 
in Muslim-majority provinces. It might be that they were personally popular due to their 
social services.  
Table 3.3 shows that the INC and its allies did better in 1937, but they performed 
poorly in 1946 in terms of shares of seats and votes. On the other hand, the AIML 
performed better in 1946 at the expense of the INC and its allies and independents. 
Secondly, in Bengal rural seats the INC’s ally (the KPP) had strong roots in 1937, but the 
BPML was able to uproot it in 1946. All these show that the BPML’s pro-poor policy and 
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electioneering strategies under the leadership of Bengali-speaking middle class political 
elites were effective in mobilizing Bengal Muslims and garnering their support for it. These 
were absent in the 1937 election. However, the disunity in the anti-BPML camp was a 
powerful contributing factor in the BPML’s winning by a large margin in Bengal.  
 
Table 3.2: Constituencies won by parties and independents in Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority 
provinces in the 1937 and the 1946 provincial elections  
Party Muslim majority provinces  Muslim minority provinces 
  1937 1946 1937 1946 
INC 6.07 11.76 38.52 46.61 
AIML 2.53 14.61 4.30 12.59 
Minor Muslim 
parties 
2.72 0.32 2.27 0.95 
Minor Hindu 
parties 
2.08 0.06 0.00 0.00 
Other small  
parties 
10.75 3.92 17.33 5.44 
Independents 9.68 3.16 3.73 0.57 
 Source: Calculated by the author from Chiriyankandath (1992, Table 5)  
Aftermath of the 1946 election: All-India case 
Following extraordinary performance in the central and provincial elections in 1946 
the INC formed ministries in six provinces. On the other hand, the AIML also performed 
well in all Muslim-majority provinces except North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and 
formed ministries in two provinces - Bengal and Assam. While the AIML could demand 
itself as the only representative body of Indian Muslims, the INC could not. So, the demand 
for Pakistan raised by the AIML was undeniable by the INC as well as by the British 
Government. During the 1940-45 period the idea of Pakistan was kept vague in 
apprehension of a rise of chasm among Indian Muslims. When the AIML performed well 
in the 1946 election, the Lahore resolution was converted into Pakistan resolution in a 
special working committee meeting of the AIML. While the Lahore Resolution proposed 
to establish a few independent Muslim states in Muslim-majority regions, the Pakistan 
resolution proposed to establish a single state called Pakistan. This was opposed 
vehemently and instantly by some Bengal Muslim leaders (Rashid, 2003:234-239).   
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Table 3.3: Results of the 1937 and the 1946 elections in the Muslim constituencies: All-India and 
Bengal 
Party Muslim seats 
(All-India) (%) 
Muslim seats 
(Bengal) (%) 
Muslim vote 
(Bengal) (%) 
Muslim rural 
seats (Bengal) 
(%) 
  1937 1946 1937 1946 1937 1946 1937 1946 
INC 
(INC only) 
42.36 2.11 16.40* 
(20.8) 
3.30 
(0) 
35.28* 5.87 32.43* 3.60 
ML 21.57 87.76 15.6 94.21 27.10 83.64 26.13 93.69 
Other parties - - 14.4 - - 2.84 - - 
Independent -   32.80 1.65 37.62 7.65 36.94 1.80 
Total 63.93 89.87 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Compiled and calculated by the author from the Election Report, Government of India 
(1937:1-19); Election Report, Government of India (1946:1-41); Harun (2003:77-80, 210-216); Sen 
(1997:137); Nugent (1977: 145); Chiriyankandath (1992). Note:* The Congress’ ally (the KPP). 
In March 1946 a British Cabinet Mission came to discuss with Indian leaders about 
the future of British India. When the Commission failed to make Indian leaders agree on a 
united independent India, it placed its own formula under which it proposed to divide 
provinces into three groups under a central body. The groups would be autonomous in all 
matters except those vested with the centre. Both the INC and the AIML accepted it. Later 
Nehru, the President of the INC and head of the interim government at the centre, declared 
that the constituent assembly would not be bound to accept any pre-arranged formula. It 
implied that the constituent assembly might overturn the Commission’s proposal of 
autonomous provinces under a centre. Jinnah apprehended that Nehru might reject the 
Pakistan proposal. So, Jinnah asked Indian Muslims to observe ‘the Direct Action Day’ on 
16 August, 1946. As soon as it was declared, Hindu-Muslim-Sikh riots started in different 
parts of India causing death of many people and deterioration of law and order situation. 
The police under the directive of the British Indian Government remained silent allowing 
killing of thousands of innocent Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. These riots made a lasting 
impact on subsequent political events in Bengal (Chattopadhyay, 1984:208). In this context 
the British Government sent Lord Mountbatten to facilitate transfer of power to Indians. 
He discussed with the Indian leaders specially leaders of two arch rival parties - the INC 
and the AIML. He eventually agreed to create two separate independent states - India and 
Pakistan (Map 3.3) – in order to avoid political uncertainty in the future. He also agreed to 
partition Bengal (Map 3.4) in religious line.     
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Map 3.3: Partition of British India into India and Pakistan in 1947 
 
Map 3.4: Density of Muslims in the districts of Bengal before partition in 1947 
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Aftermath of the 1946 election: Bengal case 
In Bengal, the BPML and the BINC won 45.6 percent and 34.4 percent of total seats 
and 36.75 percent and 42.12 percent of total votes cast respectively (Kuwajima, 1998:225). 
So, the BINC was ahead in terms of vote share and the BPML was ahead in terms of seat 
share. As the BPML did not have an absolute majority, it needed support from others to 
form the government. In this context Suhrawardy-led faction of the BPML, which was 
dominant during the 1946 election, approached the BINC to form a coalition government 
in Bengal. However, the attempt was lost in the fiasco, because they could not agree on 
some key demands set by the INC’s high commands. When it was revealed that Bengal 
was going to be partitioned into East and West, and East Bengal would be annexed with 
Pakistan, some Hindu and Muslim leaders of Bengal tried to form an independent Bengal. 
It was also lost mainly due to opposition of the high commands of both the INC and the 
AIML (Rashid, 2003:319-322). Thus, external forces (the central leaders of the INC and 
the AIML and the British Indian Government) unduly influenced Bengal politics and foiled 
initiatives of Bengal Hindu and Muslim leaders to keep Bengal united. The Bengali Hindus, 
who put their lives at a great risk during the 1905-1911 anti-partition movement period to 
keep Bengal united, agreed to divide Bengal into two parts to avoid more communal 
violence. The relationship between the Hindus and the Muslims had been strained for a 
long time, but the 1946 Kolkata and other contemporary riots in Bengal made the hostility 
unbridgeable (Gordon, 1978). During the partition millions of people were killed in 
communal violence. Following partition and communal riots, 7.5 million Muslims 
migrated from India to Pakistan and 5.0 million Hindus and Sikhs migrated from Pakistan 
to India causing the greatest humanitarian disaster in the post-War period. Muslims who 
migrated from India to Pakistan became more anti-Hindu contributing to an increase in 
vote share of communal parties in Pakistan. Hindus and Sikhs who migrated from Pakistan 
to India became more anti-Muslim inflating vote shares of communal parties in India. 
Many arrived as destitute in the host country losing their homestead, properties and social 
status they possessed in their countries of origin. Many of them became activists of left-
leaning parties, because they blamed religion for the partition and subsequent distress of 
the migrants.   
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3.10 Phase VIII: The elections in East Pakistan under Pakistan’s neo-colonial rule  
This section discusses how exploitive rule of united Pakistan triggered the rise of 
Bengali nationalism and how East Pakistanis expressed their grievance against the 
government in ballot-boxes. .  
3.10.1 The 1954 provincial election  
Background: Pakistan’s ploughing through an unchartered territory 
The Muslim-only AIML successfully mobilized Indian Muslims against the Hindu-
dominant INC and carved out Pakistan from British India. During the 1946 election under 
British India the leaders of the AIML hardly clarified the purpose for which Pakistan would 
be created. According to the Lahore resolution of 1940 Pakistan was supposed to be one of 
several democratic Muslim states. According to the Pakistan resolution of 1946, it would 
be a single federated Muslim democratic state with maximum autonomy to be vested in 
provinces. The Muslim religious dignitaries, who joined the Khilafat movement in the 
1920s as well as in the Pakistan movement in the 1940s, propounded that Pakistan would 
be a theocratic (Islamic) state based on Islamic Shariah. So, the objective of Pakistan was 
undefined during its formative stages, but it was certain that in Pakistan Muslims would be 
able to develop socially, economically, politically and religiously in absence of domination 
by Hindus. However, the political elites, who came to power in Pakistan immediately after 
its creation in 1947, did not rule the country according to democracy or Islamic Sariah. As 
a result, Pakistan faced many unwarranted problems. 
State language: the origin of conflicts between East and West Pakistan 
It was Bengali Muslims who fought for an independent Muslim state in the eastern 
part of India or as a part of Pakistan. The BPML won in 114 out of 117 Muslim seats which 
was unique among Muslim-majority provinces in British India. In Pakistan the ruling 
power was conferred to the Urdu-speaking political elites of Pakistan who migrated to West 
Pakistan from Northern British Indian states. The first conflict between East Pakistanis and 
West Pakistanis took place on the issue of state language of Pakistan. On 21 March, 1948 
Jinnah, the first Governor General and the father of Pakistan, declared in Dhaka that Urdu 
and only Urdu would be the state language of Pakistan (Ahmed, 2004:137; Khan, 1985). 
This declaration caused repercussion in East Pakistan, because it was an undemocratic 
decision. They argued that Pakistan was a multi-linguistic country. Already Islam tied them 
together. A single language would be able to unite them further and foster the Pakistani 
Muslim brotherhood. However, it was an undemocratic decision. At that time mother 
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tongue of 3 percent people of Pakistan was Urdu and these people were mostly immigrants 
from northern Indian states. On the other hand, Bengali was the mother tongue of 56 
percent Pakistanis and all of them lived in  East Pakistan for generations (Siddiqui, 
2013:76). So, Bengali deserved to be the state language of East Pakistan, if not of Pakistan. 
Ever since Bengali Muslims (along with Bengali Hindus) had been pressing the central 
government of Pakistan for making Bengali one of its state languages. On 21 February, 
1952 some students became martyrs at police firings in the procession when students 
demanded Bengali as one of state languages of Pakistan. This event transformed the protest 
into a movement. 
Stamping of democratic principles  
While democracy was declared as the system of government in Pakistan, it was 
never institutionalised. The Pakistan Provisional Constitutional Order, 1947, did not vest 
any discretionary power to the Governor-General. This was a constitutional figurehead 
post. The Governor-General was required to act upon the advice of the Cabinet, which was 
accountable to the Constituent Assembly, the highest policy making body of Pakistan. 
However, Jinnah, the first Governor-General and father of Pakistan, overreached the Prime 
Minister’s office and none dared to challenge him (Choudhury, 1969: 3). One reason of 
non-institutionalization of democracy in Pakistan from the very beginning might be that 
most Pakistani ruling elites did not have any social roots in Pakistan. They were immigrants 
from northern Indian states. So, they wanted to cling to power through conspiracy.  
The first blow to democracy in Pakistan was orchestrated in 1953 when the 
erstwhile Governor-General of Pakistan (Ghulam Muhammad) arbitrarily dissolved 
Nazimuddin-led Central Cabinet which commanded the support of the majority members 
of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. However, he did not dissolve the Constituent 
Assembly. It may be mentioned that Nazimuddin was from East Pakistan, but Urdu-
speaking. Thus, the Pakistani ruling elites tried to cleanse the central administration from 
East Pakistanis, even from loyalists like Nazimuddin. When the Constituent Assembly took 
initiative to restrict the arbitrary power of the Governor-General, he dissolved the 
Constituent Assembly too (Khanam, 2008:2-3). While this was happening in the centre, 
the Bengal Muslim League Working Committee was dissolved on the ground that ‘new 
Committee and Council would be required that would be representative of the partitioned 
province of Bengal’ (Siddiqui, 2013:76). The same principle was not applied for Punjab 
which was partitioned too. While activists and leaders of the East Pakistan Muslim League 
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(EPML) asked the Central leaders of Pakistan Muslim League (PML) to revive the 
Working Committee, they were told that Jinnah was against mass membership of the PML 
(Ahmed, 1984:236). The Central PML cancelled provincial election in East Pakistan to 
patch up its weaknesses, because its candidate was defeated in a by-election in East 
Pakistan. Thus, even leaders and activists of the EPML, let alone all East Pakistanis, were 
deprived of their basic political rights in the early formative years of Pakistan. Moreover, 
the incumbent PML termed its opponents as enemies of Pakistan despite their immense 
contribution to its creation (Sayeed, 1967:52). Thus, democratic practices were nipped in 
the bud in Pakistan.     
Figure 3.3: Political episodes before the 1954 and the 1970 elections in East Pakistan under united 
Pakistan’s neo-colonial rule
 
Source: Constructed by the author 
Discriminatory economic policy of West Pakistan against East Pakistan   
On the economic front, East Pakistan was discriminated against West Pakistan on 
many accounts. The peasantry of East Pakistan was victimized by the decision of Pakistan 
not to export raw jute to India. So, price of jute, the major cash crop of East Pakistani 
peasants, plummeted throwing them into an unescapable poverty trap. Secondly, following 
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the partition many Hindu landlords and traders left East Pakistan and settled in India. This 
provided opportunities for East Pakistani Muslims to avail themselves of those 
opportunities. Ironically, at the patronage of Pakistani ruling elites those opportunities were 
grabbed by West Pakistani Punjabis and Muslim immigrants from northern Indian states. 
So, East Pakistani Muslims felt that before partition they were subjugated by Hindus, after 
partition they were subjugated by West Pakistani Punjabis and immigrants from India 
(Barnds, 1971). Thirdly, in the 1949-50 fiscal year public investment in East Pakistan was 
Rs. 80 million against Rs. 250 million in West Pakistan, whereas the population of East 
Pakistan was more than that of West Pakistan (Huq, 1963:254-155). Fourthly, all decision-
making power was vested in the hand of West Pakistani senior bureaucrats who had 
privileged access to their political counterparts. There was not a single senior bureaucrat in 
the Central Pakistan administration from East Pakistan (Choudhury, 1972). These are a few 
examples of deprivation of East Pakistanis by West   Pakistani Punjabi elites and immigrant 
Muslims. For all these reasons, within 5 years of partition, the economic disparity between 
East and West Pakistan increased from1.04 in 1949-50 to 1.17 in 1954-55 (Bose, 
1983:1023). As East Pakistani Muslims became disillusioned for the inefficient rule of the 
West Pakistani elites, some leaders of the PML broke away from it and formed the Pakistan 
Awami Muslim League (PAML) on 23 June 1949. The party demanded provincial 
autonomy for East Pakistan in the light of the 1940 Lahore resolution and recognition of 
Bengali as one of the state languages. Fazlul Huq, the ex-Chief minister of Bengal, revived 
his old Krishak Praja Party under the name of Krishak Sramik Party (KSP). Abul Hashim, 
the ex-General Secretary of the BPML, formed the Khilafat-e-Rabbani Party. In this 
context the provincial election was declared in March 1954 on the basis of restricted 
franchise. 
Marketing strategies of political parties  
With a view to defeat the ruling PML, some leading parties (the PAML, the KSP, 
Khilafat-e-Rabbani Party, Ganatantri Dal and Nizam-i-Islam) formed the United Front 
(UF) on some common minimum programmes despite differences in personalities of 
leaders and ideologies of parties. The fear of repression by the incumbent PML motivated 
them to combat it unitedly (Mustafa, 2010). Under the charismatic leadership of three ex-
PML leaders the UF quickly gained popularity. Its manifesto included 21 programmes, 
such as full autonomy for East Pakistan and recognition of Bengali as one of the state 
languages, nationalization of jute trade and so on. These programmes were also common 
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platforms of all constituent parties of the UF. They were called ‘Charter of Freedom’. Thus, 
the UF aimed to capitalize on the grievances of the common people of East Pakistan.  
In order to win the election, the UF nominated those candidates who were 
personally popular in their constituencies, whose families were locally influential and who 
had the capacity to finance election expenses (Ahmad, 1970:113). Thus, wealthy 
candidates were preferred to people who were faithful to the ideologies of parties. As a 
result, the UF was about to collapse, but fear of the incumbent PML kept them united. The 
PML did not encounter any problem like the UF. Both the UF and the PML nominated 
candidates for 237 Muslim seats.   
As to the election strategies, the PML emphasized its great contribution to the 
establishment of Pakistan and asked people to vote for it to maintain the very existence of 
Pakistan. It argued that if it was not re-elected East Pakistan would be annexed with India. 
Moreover, it accused that the constituent parties of the UF did not support Pakistan and so 
they were trying to destroy it. Secondly, it directed personal attack on two prominent 
leaders of the UF - Fazlul Huq and Suhrawardy. The PML blamed that Huq formed a 
coalition with Hindu fundamentalist party (the Hindu Mahasabha) which wanted to make 
India a Hindu state and wipe out Islam from India.  Moreover, Huq did not support the 
BPML in the 1946 election when the AIML contested in the election on the issue of 
Pakistan. Thirdly, the PML blamed that the UF leaders tried to form independent Bengal 
and subsequently annex it with India. Fourthly, it was necessary to establish harmonious 
relationship between East and West Pakistan and it was only the PML which could do it. 
Fifthly, the PML claimed that if re-elected it would make constitution of Pakistan on the 
basis of Islamic principles (Huq, 1966:61). Sixthly, it pointed out to the inherent disunity 
among constituent parties of the UF and claimed that only hatred against the PML kept 
them united. If they were elected, they would fight with one another plunging East Pakistan 
into political turmoil that would invite the Governor’s rule for a long period. Seventhly, it 
aired that the UF received Rs. 10 million as donation from India and as such it would be 
controlled by India if elected. Eighthly, like the 1946 election campaign the PML used 
reputed Muslim religious dignitaries (ulemas) in their election campaigns. Ninthly, the 
PML Government imprisoned many leaders and activists of the UF using the Public Safety 
Act (Mustafa, 2010). Tenthly, in violation of the constitution the PML forced the 
government officials to canvass for its candidates. Last but not least, to apprehend voters’ 
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backlash it wanted to use Jinnah’s image in the election. So, it invited his sister (Fatima 
Jinnah) to tour East Pakistan during the election campaign (Afzal, 1976:127-128).           
While the PML spent money lavishly in election campaigns, the UF was financially 
handicapped. It was financed by small donations of millions of common people including 
students and workers (Morning News, 3 January, 1954)). Secondly, the UF emphasized the 
social, political and cultural domination of West Pakistan on East Pakistan since partition 
in 1947. Thirdly, the leaders of the UF tried to counter the personal allegations raised 
against them by the PML. Fourthly, the UF leaders held the PML responsible for all ills, 
such as acute food shortage, higher food prices, and a sharp fall of the jute price and 
suffering of people due to maladministration and so on. Among all issues the language 
issue stirred the public seriously.  
                 Table 3.4: Results of the 1954 East Pakistan provincial election 
 Party Percentage of total Muslim 
seats  
ML 4.21  
UF 94.09 
Alliance partners of the UF: 
East Pakistan Awami 
League 
Krishak Sramik Party 
Nizam-i-Islam Party  
Ganatantri Dal 
  
60.39  
20.25  
8.01    
5.48    
Source: Compiled and calculated by the author from Chaudhuri (1968:50) and Chiriyankandath 
(1992).  
Results of the 1954 election: triumphant Bengali nationalism  
The election was held on the basis of the restricted franchise. 46.45 percent people 
of East Pakistan was franchised and of them 37.19 percent voters cast their votes (The 
Economic Weekly, 15 April, 1961). The election was free and fair. In the election the UF 
won a landslide victory (Table 3.4). It won 94.09 percent Muslim seats and 72.17 percent 
of all seats. It polled 97.5 percent of Muslim votes in Muslim constituencies. On the other 
hand, the PML won in 4.21 percent (10 seats) of Muslim seats and 3.23 percent of all seats 
(Chaudhuri, 1968:193).  
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Consistency with electoral behaviour models   
 
The electoral behaviour of East Pakistanis was consistent with some electoral 
behaviour models. It was consistent with the economic vote model, because relative per 
capita income of East Pakistanis with respect to West Pakistanis fell by 0.13 percentage 
point in just 5 years (1949/50-1954/55) So, East Pakistanis punished the incumbent party 
for relatively poor economic performance. Secondly, it was consistent with the ethnic vote 
model, because except a few percentage of tribal people East Pakistani Hindus and 
Muslims are ethnically homogeneous and as such they voted for the UF which stood up for 
realization of their legitimate demands. The UF was solely dominated by their co-ethnic 
leaders. Thirdly, it was consistent with the sociological model, because the socioeconomic 
status of East Pakistanis fell over time with respect to West Pakistanis. The PAL and the 
Krishak Sramik Party were left-leaning parties. The model hypothesizes that lower 
socioeconomic status people tend to vote for left-leaning parties.  
Aftermath of the 1954 election  
The UF formed the government with Fazlul Huq as the Chief Minister. However, 
it was dismissed by the Governor General after only 2 months in the office on a lame 
excuse. As there was personality clashes among the leaders of the UF and they had 
ideological differences, they could not take stern measures unitedly against it. However, 
the election of the UF showed that the opposition parties could defeat the ruling elites by 
forming alliances. Thus, it became a source of inspiration for opposition parties in Pakistan 
in following elections. Secondly, it further showed that disunity among political leaders 
strengthened the unholy alliance between bureaucrats and military (Mustafa, 2010). As a 
result, the fall of the UF Government and disunity among its leaders provided opportunities 
for the Pakistan military to take over power in 1958 and the civil-military alliance ruled the 
country with a heavy hand until the break-up of Pakistan in 1971. Thirdly, through this 
election the Bengali middle class and its leaders came to the epicentre of East Pakistan 
politics and demonstrated that alternative effective leaders were available. Overall, the 
election results boosted the morale of the East Pakistani people. It also manifested that 
people of East Pakistan were politically conscious and were able to make revolution 
through ballot-boxes. 
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Comparison of the 1946 and the 1954 election results 
The PML’s seat share has dropped drastically from 94.02 percent in 1946 to 4.21 
percent in 1954 (Appendix 3C). In just 7 years a ruling party had such an electoral defeat 
which was unprecedented in the history.  Some key factors were responsible for this 
catastrophic result. They were as follows: (i) refusal of the PML to recognize Bengali as 
one of the state languages, (ii) West Pakistan-biased policy, (iii) opposition to provincial 
autonomy, (iv) economic depression in East Pakistan, (v) delay in framing the constitution, 
(vi) concentration of power in a single hand, (vii) lack of charismatic leadership in the PML 
and (viii) failure to eliminate corruption.  Through its movement for Pakistan over the 
1940-46 period the AIML (the parent party of the PML) was able to struck socio-political 
roots in East Pakistan, but being indifference to the hopes and aspirations of East Pakistanis 
the PML lost the same quickly. It further implies that it was easy for some Muslim political 
elites to mobilize their co-religious voters to combat a common enemy by strategic use of 
their religious sentiment, but the same strategy became ineffective when the co-religious 
voters discovered hypocrisy in their behaviour. On the other hand, the UF won 94.09 
percent of the total Muslim seats by capitalizing grievances of an ‘oppressed’, ‘persecuted’, 
‘neglected’ and ‘economically discontented’ people against the incumbent PML. Its 
dominant partners the PAML won 60 percent and the Krishak Sramik Party won 20.25 
percent of the total Muslim seats. Thus, through the 1954 election the PAML came out as 
an irresistible challenger to the PML and shattered its political foundation.  
3.10.2 The 1970 national and provincial elections  
This section discusses sequentially, events that caused the 1969 mass upsurge and 
made the 1970 election and birth of Bangladesh inevitable.   
Background: gradual maturing of Bengali nationalism  
The members of the UF who were elected in the 1954 election participated in the 
second Constituent Assembly and contributed to frame the 1956 Constitution of Pakistan. 
The Constitution declared Pakistan as an ‘Islamic Republic’ where ‘democracy, freedom, 
equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam, should be fully observed’. It 
made a clause that the President of Pakistan must be a Muslim. Except this, literally there 
was no discrimination against any citizen on the basis of religion, colour, race and 
nationality. The non-Muslims were guaranteed all fundamental rights as well (Choudhury, 
1956). In 1951 there were around 22 percent Hindus in East Pakistan (Census of Pakistan, 
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1951:1). As Hindus were the largest religious minority in East Pakistan, they resented 
against it. It is because, they apprehended that Pakistan might become a theocratic state 
relegating them to the status of second-class citizens. The PAML realized that Hindu-
Muslim unity was pivotal to realize its demand for autonomy for East Pakistan. Secondly, 
the left-leaning faction of the party had been demanding to make it a secular party in the 
emerging context. So, it dropped the word ‘Muslim’ from the name of the party in 1956 
and renamed it as the Pakistan Awami League (PAL) (Khan, 1985). As a result, Hindus 
could become members of the party, which was not possible before. Thus, the dominant 
political party in East Pakistan revived the Bengali nationalism that banded Hindus and 
Muslims together before 1905. In 1956 the Bengali Hindu nationalism and the Bengali 
Muslim nationalism merged together on the basis of Bengali ethnicity, language, literature 
and culture. It added extra momentum in the movement for autonomy of East Pakistan.  
First military rule in Pakistan: a politico-economic tsunami for East Pakistan 
Between 1954 and 1958, several governments were formed in East Pakistan and 
dissolved at the will of the central government. The conflicts among East Pakistani 
nationalist political elites were also responsible for it. Since 1947 the West Pakistani civil-
military bureaucracy ruled Pakistan and deprived East Pakistanis from their due share. With 
the installation of military rule in 1958 all political activities as well as the 1956 
Constitution were suspended and the military came to the forefront. They deprived the East 
Pakistani political elites from exercising any influence in the Pakistan politics (Jahan, 
2005:23). In 1959 he introduced a hybrid democracy called Basic Democracy. Basic 
Democrats were directly elected by universal adult franchise, but the president and 
members of central and provincial assemblies were elected by Basic Democrats. In order 
to obtain political legitimacy Ayub, the Chief martial law administrator, lifted martial law 
and held referendum in 1960 on his leadership as president and he managed to win by vote 
rigging. He held National Assembly election in 1962 on non-partisan basis. The Ayub-led 
military government put a new constitution in 1962 with some noteworthy features. It was 
a presidential form of government vesting absolute executive and legislative power in the 
hand of the president and thus making him a ‘constitutional monarch’. It claimed to be a 
federal form of government, but provinces had no power. In fact, it revived ‘the 
authoritarian regime of the old British colonial type (Singhal, 1962). The people of Pakistan 
especially those of East Pakistan revolted against it, because they preferred the 
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parliamentary form of government. Moreover, the constitution was not made by peoples’ 
representatives (Ahmed, 2004:155). 
The 1962 Constitution of Pakistan created one national political institution (i.e., the 
presidency) at the expense of two other national institutions (i.e., the National Assembly 
and the Cabinet). Since the power of the National Assembly was limited, the East Pakistani 
Bengali-speaking political elites had limited participation in the system. So, on any vital 
national issues East Pakistanis could only ‘react instead of act’ (Choudhury, 1970:247). 
They protested against the system in the streets. They also wanted to protest against it by 
participating in the 1962 National Assembly election. As the political parties were 
suspended and political activities were restricted, the incumbent president Ayub’s 
nominees easily won in the election by massive vote rigging. Though the members of the 
National Assembly were elected on non-partisan basis, on being elected they started to 
polarize on partisan as well as regional basis. In order to combat this problem, President 
Ayub passed the Political Parties Bill on 16 July 1962. With the support of a group of PML 
leaders and others he formed the Pakistan Muslim League (Convention) and assumed its 
presidency in December, 1963. Thus, he became the head of the ruling party, the 
government, and the state. Under the new constitution of 1962 he declared the presidential 
election in 1965.  
Electioneering strategies of “President” Ayub and opposition parties   
The opposition parties dominated by East Pakistani parties (the Awami League, 
National Awami Party, Jammat-i-Islami and Nizam-i-Islam) joined forces under the name 
of Combined Opposition Parties (COP) to oust Ayub Khan and nominated Fatima Jinnah 
(sister of Jannah), as their presidential candidate in the 1965 election (Sayeed, 1967:107). 
Their manifesto included nine vital concerns of Pakistan. The most important ones were as 
follows: (i) restoration of the parliamentary system with full legislative and budgetary 
power to be given to the National and Provincial Assemblies; (ii) removal of economic 
disparity between East and West Pakistan within a period of ten years; and (iii) taking a 
number of measures to reduce inequality in wealth distribution, and so on. Though these 
points were vague in many respects, they were accepted as a common platform. It is 
because, they satisfied concerns of constituent parties (Sayeed, 1966). As to the election 
strategies the COP wanted to capitalize personal popularity of Fatima Jinnah, Jinnah’s 
sister. She was known as the Khatoon-i-Pakistan (the first lady of Pakistan) and mother-i-
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millat (the mother of the nation). Her nomination bolstered spirit of the COP further. In her 
election campaigns Fatima Jinnah criticized the presidential form of the government as 
well as the Basic Democracy introduced by the Ayub regime. Secondly, the COP asked its 
urbanite activists and supporters among students to carry out campaigns in their ancestral 
rural homes with a view to mobilizing the public opinion in favour of the COP’s manifesto 
so that the Basic Democrats dare not to defy it.  
While the COP’s strategy was to criticize the Basic Democratic system, Ayub 
reminded the Basic Democrats about the development in rural areas under his leadership. 
Secondly, he allocated the rural development fund for East Pakistan (Rs. 2000 million) 
twice as much as for West Pakistan (Rs. 1000 million) breaking the tradition of allocation 
of the same since partition in 1947. For example, under the 2nd Development Plan (1959/60-
1964/65) 31 percent of the development expenditure was allocated for East Pakistan against 
69 percent for West Pakistan. Under the 3rd Development Plan those were 36 percent and 
64 percent respectively (Jahan, 2005:31). Moreover, he allocated more fund for 
economically underdeveloped Northern and Western districts of East Pakistan to 
demonstrate that a strong presidential government system was more effective in reducing 
economic disparity than a parliamentary form of government which was plagued with 
internal conflicts in Pakistan. So, the underlying factor behind this biased allocation of the 
rural development fund was to garner political support in East Pakistan in general and 
economically depressed Western and Northern regions of East Pakistan in particular 
(Sobhan, 1968:258-259). Thirdly, Ayub deliberately created chasm among leaders of the 
COP. Bhashani was a popular leader and fiery orator of the COP. It is alleged that as Ayub’s 
and Bhashani’s attitude towards China was identical, they had a tactical understanding with 
each other. As a result, Bhashani did not actively campaign against Ayub in the Western 
and Northern districts of East Pakistan where Ayub was popular due to massive rural 
development programmes. Thus, Bhashani despite being a leader of the COP indirectly 
helped his political opponent (Sayeed, 1966). Fourthly, Ayub managed some Muslim 
religious dignitaries to give verdict that a woman was not entitled to become the head of a 
Muslim state and thus he tried to tickle the religious sensitivity of Muslims (Al-Mujahid, 
1965).       
The COP’s campaign was able to trigger a tremendous enthusiasm among the East 
Pakistani people and their candidate Fatima Jinnah received more votes (73 percent) of 
Basic Democrats in East Pakistan and less votes in West Pakistan. Over all, Ayub polled 
 CHAPTER 3  
143 
 
63.3 percent vote and Fatima Jinnah polled 36.3 percent vote in Pakistan. It may be 
mentioned that during Ayub’s rule the overall economic development of Pakistan was 
substantial, but it was more in West than in East Pakistan (Rose, 1989). Though Ayub tried 
to reduce imbalance by re-directing more development fund to East Pakistan under the 2nd 
and the 3rd Five Year Development Plans, the per capita income disparity between East and 
West kept increasing even under his rule. It had been 1.32 in 1959-60 when he assumed 
the power, rose to 1.45 when he got himself elected as a president in 1965 and further rose 
to 1.61 in 1969-70 when he was forced to step down in the face of mass upsurge in both 
East and West Pakistan (Bose, 1983:1023).  
Consistency with electoral behaviour models   
The presidential and central assembly elections were not based on universal adult 
franchise. The 120,000 Basic Democrats were directly elected by the universal adult 
franchise and they in turn voted in those elections. These Basic Democrats belonged to 
privileged sections of the society. They were socioeconomically better-off than average 
people. Moreover, the Ayub-led government offered them many direct and indirect 
benefits. So, they were likely to vote for the incumbent. However, many of them used their 
conscience in the case of voting. The electoral behaviour of Basic Democrats of East and 
West Pakistanis was consistent with the economic vote model. West Pakistanis voted for 
him due to increase in their absolute per capita income by 68.85 percentage point between 
1959/60 and 1969/70 and in their relative per capita income with respect to East Pakistanis 
by 28.5 percentage point over the same period. Over the same period the per capita income 
declined in East Pakistan with respect to West Pakistan (Sobhan, 2015:263 and Bose, 
1983:1023). So, East Pakistanis were likely to vote against him. Secondly, though Fatima 
Jinnah was not an East Pakistani and Bengali-speaking, she became a symbol of economic 
development of East Pakistan. As a result, more East Pakistanis voted for her from 
prospective economic performance. Thirdly, it was consistent with the sociological model, 
because East Pakistanis were socioeconomically lower than their counterparts in West 
Pakistan. The manifesto of the COP included some left-leaning propositions, such as 
removal of economic disparity between poorer East Pakistan and richer West Pakistan. 
This model predicts that lower socioeconomic people tend to vote for policy that equitable 
distribution of resources. As the COP supported such a policy, East Pakistani voters voted 
for the COP’s candidate. Fourthly, it was consistent with sociotropic voting model.  Though 
Basic Democrats were better-off and the government provided them with some 
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temptations, still they voted against it. This is because, they were likely to be concerned 
with social interests rather than personal interests. Lastly, one but all opposition members 
of the National Assembly were from East Pakistan. The Basic Democrats might have 
believed that co-ethnic members would serve East Pakistan’s interests better than cross-
ethnic ones. So, they voted for co-ethnic members. Thus, it was consistent with the ethnic 
voting model.    
Sharp decline in Ayub’s political legitimacy in both wings of Pakistan 
Failure to satisfy competing demands 
Though the COP failed to make its presidential candidate win in the face of massive 
electioneering tactics and use of state machinery by the incumbent Ayub-led ruling party, 
the results of the election revealed some facts. East and West Pakistan had been moving in 
different directions politically. President Ayub received 73 percent vote in West Pakistan 
and 53 percent vote in East Pakistan and one but all opposition members of the National 
Assembly were elected from East Pakistan despite massive vote rigging and electioneering 
tactics of the ruling party (Jahan, 2005:27). It implied that Ayub’s and his party’s political 
legitimacy was in sharp decline even in the face of some economic development in East 
Pakistan. This is because, the Basic Democracy promulgated by Ayub disillusioned the old 
middle class in East Pakistan. As a result, it created more enemies than friends (Jahan, 
2005:25). Secondly, his administration created enemies in West Pakistan too despite 
massive development. He tried to be more equitable in the distribution of administrative 
positions and government development fund and foreign aid between two wings of 
Pakistan and he was successful to some extent. However, more public service positions, 
development fund and foreign aid for East Pakistanis meant less for West Pakistanis (Rose, 
1989). While his economic policy favoured East Pakistanis to some degree, they were 
equally not ready to give him credit for it. This is because, they wanted effective and equal 
participation in national political affairs (Choudhury, 1972). Thirdly, it was also clear to 
opposition political parties of East Pakistan that the system sponsored by Ayub would not 
allow them to oust him ever. Only and only popular upsurge could do so. So, they formed 
the Pakistan Democratic Movement in both wings of Pakistan.  
Indo-Pak war of 1965 and PAL’s six-point programmes 
The Indo-Pak War of 1965 weakened political legitimacy of the Ayub regime to its 
support base – the Pakistan army. Bhutto, the then Ayub’s foreign minister, claimed that 
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Pakistan was about to win in the 1965 War and hence Ayub’s decision to cease-fire was a 
great mistake and it defamed Pakistani army as well as Pakistan in the international arena 
(Siddiqui, 2013:92). Many Generals of the Pakistan army agreed with Bhutto and thus 
Ayub lost his traction on the army. As a result, the army was not ready to support him in 
his oppressive measures against people in Pakistan especially in East Pakistan (Rose, 
1989). Secondly, during the Indo-Pak War East Pakistan was totally exposed to Indian 
attack. So, it became clear to East Pakistanis that Pakistani civil-military bureaucrats 
headed by Ayub were more concerned with Kashmiri Muslims than with East Pakistani 
Muslims (Ahmed, 2004:157; Sobhan, 2016:67). As a result, the question of full autonomy 
of East Pakistan came to the fore. In this context, the Mujib-led PAL, the largest nationalist 
party in East Pakistan, put forward six-point programmes in the framework of the ‘Lahore 
Resolution’ of 1940 and Jinnah’s ‘two-nation theory’ (Ludden, 2011).  
Mass upsurge against Ayub and his decision to quit power  
Ayub came to East Pakistan to deliver a message to East Pakistanis that the six-
point programmes were launched to trigger a civil war in Pakistan. He termed Mujib (the 
leader of the PAL) as a separatist and arrested him. Mujib along with 34 other nationalist 
East Pakistani civil and military officers were charged with a conspiracy called Agartala 
Conspiracy. It was alleged that they were planning to make East Pakistan independent by 
armed uprising and with the help of Indian army officers (Khanam, 2008:63). As time went 
on, the movement against the Agartala Conspiracy was getting stronger and Ayub’s 
oppression on East Pakistanis was concomitantly becoming harsher. In the face of 
persistent and escalating upheaval in East Pakistan Ayub regime withdrew the Agartala 
Conspiracy case and released all political prisoners on 22 January 1969. Through this mass 
movement the AL struck its roots among the masses more firmly and Mujib emerged as a 
charismatic leader of East Pakistan and ‘champion of Bengali rights’ (Jahan, 2005:41; 
Ludden, 2011). Ayub stepped down on 25 March 1969 and handed over power to Yahiya 
Khan. In fact, Ayub was required to transfer power to the Speaker of the National Assembly 
as per his own “customised” constitution, but he did not. It is because, the Speaker was an 
East Pakistani.  
Yahiya Khan’s liberal martial law 
Yahiya Khan re-imposed Martial Law on 28 November 1969, but he assured the 
nation that he would not follow his predecessor’s trail (Figure 3.4). He identified restoration 
of democracy as his first and foremost duty (Al-Mujahid, 1971).  He declared that the 
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election would be held in October 1970 and promulgated the Legal Framework Order 
(LFO) for providing a framework for the elections and the new constitution. He also 
announced that (i) the One-Unit Government of West Pakistan would be split into four 
units and (ii) representation in the National Assembly would be on the basis of population, 
that is, East Pakistan would elect 65 percent members of the National Assembly (Baxter, 
1971). However, the election was re-scheduled on 7 December, 1970 due to occurrence of 
the deadliest tropical cyclone ever recorded in the coastal area of East Pakistan. It killed 
between 200,000 people (official estimate) and 1,000,000 people (unofficial estimate). It 
also affected 3.0 million people, destroyed 90 percent crops and one-third houses in a 
7769.96 sq. km. area, and washed away 321.87 km coastal embankment (Al-Mujahid, 
1971; McHenry and Bird, 1977). During the cyclone Yahya Khan was visiting China and 
after four days of the cyclone on his way to West Pakistan he toured the devastated areas 
for two hours by a helicopter. Though it was a natural disaster, the timing of its occurrence 
and handling of relief works among the victims bore some serious political implications 
for the government. The government took inordinately long time to respond to relief efforts 
and the amount of relief was insufficient (The Daily Tribune, 22 November, 1970). 
Moreover, as the President of Pakistan Yahya Khan was expected to land on devastated 
areas as a kind gesture to the victims, but he did not. It revealed utter negligence of West 
Pakistan to East Pakistan’s grievance (Baxter, 1971).  
Diverse and contesting interests of Pakistan’s two wings and manifestos of parties  
Since the socioeconomic interests of the two wings of Pakistan were different, it 
was extremely difficult for any party to aggregate diverse provincial interests at the national 
level. So, major parties became largely provincial. The PAL was completely identified as 
an East Pakistani party, and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) as a West Pakistani Party.  
The manifestos of different parties had some striking similarities. Almost all parties 
promised not to make any law contrasting with the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Secondly, they 
vowed to follow a non-aligned foreign policy and normalize relationship with India. 
Thirdly, all parties declared that they would reduce inter-regional disparities and ensure 
fair arrangements for peasants and workers. Fourthly, most parties proposed to nationalize 
heavy industries, banks and insurance companies, or at least bring them under some sort of 
social control. While they agreed on some vital issues, they differed on some important 
issues too. Some rightist and centrist parties advocated for reasonably strong centre as well 
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as province, some leftist parties (e.g., NAP) and centre-leftist parties (e.g., AL) advocated 
for weak centre and strong provincial government (Baxter, 1971).  
In East Pakistan the case was completely different from West Pakistan. The PAL’s 
election manifesto was its six-point programmes. It emphasized full provincial autonomy 
and favoured moderately socialist economic programmes. Other East Pakistani parties had 
differential attitudes towards the demand for autonomy for East Pakistan.  
Results of the 1970 election: triumphant Bengali nationalism 
Table 3.5: Results of the Pakistan National Assembly and Provincial Assembly elections, 1970 
  National Assembly Provincial Assembly 
Party East 
Pakistan 
Total seats 
(percent) 
West 
Pakistan  
Total seats 
(percent) 
Total 
Seats 
(percent) 
East 
Pakistan 
Total seats 
(percent) 
West 
Pakistan 
Total 
seats 
(percent) 
PAL 160 
(53.33) 
- 160 
(53.33) 
288 (96) - 
PPP - 81 (27) 81 (27) - 144 (48) 
Other parties 1 (0.33) 42 (14) 43 
(14.33) 
5 (1.66) 103 
(34.33) 
Independents 1 (0.33) 15 (5) 16 (5.33) 7 (2.33) 53 (17.66) 
Total 
  
162  
(54) 
138  
(46) 
300 
(100) 
300 
(100) 
300 
(100) 
Source:  Calculated by the author from Baxter (1971, Table 1)         
The election was free and fair. Table 3.5 shows that the AL won in 98.76 percent 
of the total seats allocated for East Pakistan in the National Assembly. It won 53.33 percent 
of all seats of the same. So, it won majority seats in the National Assembly. The AL also 
won in 96 percent of total seats in the East Pakistan Provincial Assembly. So, the people 
of East Pakistan gave the AL a clear mandate for its six-point programmes. On the other 
hand, the PPP won only 27 percent seats in the National Assembly and 48 percent of the 
total seats in West Pakistan. Of all seats in the National Assembly other parties won only 
one seat (0.33 percent) in East Pakistan and 42 (14 percent) seats in West Pakistan. Other 
parties also won more seats in the West Pakistan Provincial Assembly than in the East 
Pakistan one. Similarly, independents won more seats from West Pakistan in both the 
National and Provincial Assembly. It implies that other parties and independents were 
likely to play an important role in the case of West Pakistan. In the election the PPP 
emerged as the 2nd largest party in Pakistan and the largest party in West Pakistan. The 
immediate past incumbent party was the Pakistan Muslim League (Convention). Only a 
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few of them were re-elected, but they were re-elected either as candidates of the PPP in 
West Pakistan or as candidates of the AL in East Pakistan. So, being an incumbent during 
the Ayub’s rule was a liability (Baxter, 1971).  
Aftermath of the election: political elites in crisis  
The winners of the 1970 election in the National Assembly were members of the 
constituent assembly assigned to make a constitution for Pakistan. As the PAL has won in 
53.33 percent and the PPP won in only 27 percent seats in the National Assembly, the PAL 
was entitled to form the government and the PPP would be the main opposition party. As 
the PPP was not interested to work as the main opposition party, it offered to form a 
coalition government with its chief (Bhutto) as the Deputy Prime Minister. The PAL 
rejected this offer, because its leaders apprehended that this sort of coalition would not last 
long (Rose, 1989). The serious disagreement between the PAL and the PPP resulted from 
their respective support base (Jahan, 2005:40-48; Maniruzzaman, 2009:69-71).The PAL 
aroused a strong sense of Bengali nationalism among the middle class people of East 
Pakistan. They wanted their fair share in national resources, but they could not get it due 
to domination of West Pakistanis in the politics, public services, and trade and commerce. 
When the PAL got majority seats in both the National and Provincial Assemblies, it 
provided the PAL with an opportunity to end the deprivation of East Pakistanis by West 
Pakistanis. So, it had to stick to implement the six-point programmes. Any concession in it 
would be a political suicide for the PAL and its leader Mujib. On the other hand, Bhutto’s 
PPP polled more seats in Punjab and Sind and emerged as the largest party in West 
Pakistan. Most army officers were from Punjab and they were the main beneficiaries of the 
massive military budget of Pakistan. If the proposed constitution was made on the basis of 
the six-point programmes advanced by the PAL, the massive military budget of Pakistan 
could not be maintained. So, any cut in the military budget would harm the Punjab 
economy, reduce benefits of the Punjabi army officers and he would not be able to maintain 
his popularity in Punjab. As a result, he declared that any constitution based on the six-
point programmes would not be acceptable to West Pakistanis. Thus, Bhutto’s and majority 
West Pakistani army officers’ interests converged at this point and they started conspiracy 
to stop transfer of power to the PAL. A series of discussions were held between Mujib, 
Bhutto and Yahiya to solve the stalemate, but all failed.  
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PAL-led non-violent-non-cooperation movement in East Pakistan and emergence of 
Bangladesh  
When Yahiya Khan postponed the National Assembly session scheduled to be held 
in Dhaka on 3 March, it was clear to East Pakistanis that the West Pakistani ruling elites 
were ‘unwilling to share politico-economic power with the Bengalis’ (Khan, 1972). In this 
context the PAL called for a Gandhian-style ‘non-violent non-cooperation movement’ 
against the central government of Pakistan for an indefinite period. Its objective was to 
compel the concerned opposition parties to come forward for a political solution. As the 
whole of East Pakistanis religiously followed Mujib-led PAL’s instructions, Mujib became 
the de facto ruler of East Pakistan. Instead of negotiating with the PAL, on 25 March 
midnight the Pakistani army attacked the innocent and unarmed people of East Pakistan to 
crush down their legitimate demand for full autonomy for ever. In that night only the 
Pakistan Occupation Army killed thousands of East Pakistanis and also arrested Mujib, the 
leader of East Pakistanis. On 26 March Zia4  declared Independence of Bangladesh on 
behalf of Mujib. It sparked the spirit of Bengali nationalism and thousands of East Pakistani 
youth joined the freedom struggle. With the military help of India and moral support of the 
then Soviet Union, East Pakistan emerged as independent Bangladesh on 16 December 
1971 after a 9-month long armed struggle against the Pakistan Occupation Army.   
3.11 Conclusion   
When no election system like the present-day existed, rulers still needed to derive 
their political legitimacy from some sources. It could be military power or moral support 
of another higher political authority, such as Emperor in Delhi or Caliphs in Bagdad during 
the medieval age. It could be the intellectually or numerically dominant section of the 
population, such as Brahmins during the Pala dynastic rule and higher caste Hindus during 
Sena dynastic rule in Bengal. A consensus of general people or their leaders could be a 
source of political legitimacy, such as Gopal, the founder of the Pala dynasty, was elected 
by a consensus of chiefs in Bengal. A ruler could derive political legitimacy from the ruled 
by force, but it does not last long. The East India Company did so, but faced debacle. The 
British Government tried to derive its political legitimacy by associating a group of 
loyalists with administration and legislative affairs.  
                                                            
4  An East Pakistani Bengali-speaking Major-ranked soldier stationed at Chittagong 
cantonment of East Pakistan. 
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  Under the present-day democratic system the candidate who polls more votes is 
elected and the party which wins in simple majority seats in the parliament or can manage 
support of simple majority members of the parliament forms the government. Candidates 
and parties present their policy before voters and voters decide whether to turnout for 
voting. If they turn out for voting, they need to decide which candidate or party to vote for. 
In the 1937 election Muslim and Hindu voters in Bengal did not vote absolutely along their 
religious lines. Some crossed their religious line and voted for secular parties. In contrast, 
in the 1946 election most Hindu and Muslim voters voted along their religious lines. It 
seems that religious identity rather than ethnic identity motivated them to vote for co-
religious candidates. In fact, socioeconomic factors rather than religious identity were 
drivers of voter turnout and party choice in elections held during British colonial rule. The 
higher class Hindus may have voted for the INC, because it did not have any redistributive 
policy that would tax them more and channel this revenue to the poor. The lower class 
Hindus may have voted for the INC due to social pressure exerted by the upper class 
Hindus. Moreover, they expected that their socioeconomic condition would increase under 
state-sponsored poverty alleviation programmes. The Muslims voted for the AIML due to 
its prospective economic performance to alleviate poverty under its rule. As neither the 
INC nor the AIML was immediate past incumbent, they could not dispense patronage to 
voters. So, patronage politics was absent at that time. The most important factor was the 
prospective performance of the INC and AIML that motivated voters to turnout and cast 
votes for them. 
We find a partially different scenario in elections held under the Pakistan’s neo-
colonial rule. In the 1954 election East Pakistani voters voted against the incumbent PML 
to express their grievance against its misrule. By default, they voted for the UF for its 
prospective socioeconomic performance. The patronage politics was overshowed by anti-
incumbent sentiment of voters. The patronage politics played an important role in the 1962 
and the 1965 presidential elections. The incumbent president distributed state patronage 
strategically to reap political dividends in the upcoming election and he was successful to 
some extent. The voters turned out in the 1970 election to express their grievance against 
the Pakistani regime and support for full autonomy for East Pakistan. Though Bengali 
nationalism stimulated them to turn out for voting for the PAL, it is the socioeconomic 
deprivation that stirred this nationalistic spirit. 
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In the next chapter we discuss the background of elections held in Bangladesh in 
the post-independent period. Elections held between 1972 and 1990 were massively rigged 
by incumbents, as they were held under their supervision. Elections held between 1991 and 
2008 were free and fair, as they were held under non-partisan caretaker governments. 
Though contexts were different to some extent, political parties borrowed some of their 
electioneering strategies from past authoritarian regimes.                               
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Background of Elections in Bangladesh: the Post-independent Era 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed backgrounds of elections held under the British 
colonial rule. We have seen that the long-lasting symbiotic relationship between Hindus 
and Muslims soured in the early decades of the 20th century under the British colonial rule, 
and that the results of successive elections (1937 and 1946) under the British colonial rule 
reflected this antagonistic relationship. Hostility between Hindus and Muslims ended with 
the partition of British India into Hindu-dominant India and Muslim-dominant Pakistan in 
1947. Eventually, relationship between East Pakistani Bengalees and political elites of 
West Pakistan became strained shortly after the creation of Pakistan, and the results of 
successive elections reflected the grievance of East Pakistan Bengalees against West 
Pakistani ruling political elites. As ruling political elites of West Pakistan tried to suppress 
East Pakistani Bengalees, who made an immense contribution to the creation of Pakistan, 
the spirit of Bengali nationalism fired up. Ultimately, East Pakistan came into being as an 
independent state named Bangladesh in 1971.  This chapter explores the background of 
each election, manifestos of dominant parties, electioneering strategies of parties, and the 
causes of defeat and success of dominant parties in elections held over the 1973-2008 
period with a special focus on fair elections held between 1991 and 2008. 
Bangladesh emerged as an independent state in 1971 through a nine-month long 
bloody Liberation War. The propelling force behind the long and arduous struggle against 
the Pakistani neo-colonial rule was the demand for full autonomy of East Pakistan (present 
Bangladesh). It was sparked by a strong sense of Bengali nationalism. The Bengali 
nationalism-based autonomy movement was not merely a political movement to establish 
Bengali as a national language and remove all barriers that hindered development of 
Bengali language, literature and culture under the colonial rule. It was also a socioeconomic 
movement aiming to eliminate socioeconomic inequality in the society. In order to achieve 
these objectives the Constitution of Bangladesh, framed by the immediate post-Liberation 
Awami League (AL) Government, incorporated nationalism, secularism, socialism, and 
democracy as the fundamental principles of Bangladesh. When this regime failed to 
establish good governance due to its own weaknesses as well as external shocks, it became 
authoritarian. It managed to win in the 1973 election by a moderate level of vote rigging. 
A severe famine occurred in 1974 and the government failed to manage it. As a 
consequence, its political legitimacy further plummeted. Some left-leaning opposition 
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parties banked on this precarious condition of the country, and by 1975 its existence came 
under threat. So, it constitutionalized an authoritarian rule, but the regime was overthrown 
by a military coup in late 1975.  
 The newly installed military regime suffered from political legitimacy. As this 
regime inherited a staggering economy, it focused on reinvigorating the economy as 
quickly and possible with a view to gain some political legitimacy. It, therefore, reversed 
the economic policy of the previous regime and crafted it according to the suggestions of 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund which the previous regime did not 
follow. It also improved relationship with Islamic countries of the Middle East with which 
the previous government had strained relationship. All these efforts of the new military 
regime resulted in an inflow of a huge amount of foreign aid into the country. It also 
liberalized the economy. These are some important factors that contributed in revamping 
the staggering economic condition and consequently increased its political legitimacy to 
the people. In this context it held referendum on the leadership of the head of the regime 
and managed to get peoples’ approval by massive vote rigging. The regime further 
strengthened its claim of political legitimacy by winning a landslide victory in the 
presidential election. The candidate of the incumbent party got re-elected by massive 
electoral corruption including substantial vote rigging. However, its only effective 
challenger was the previous AL regime. So, it tried to counter the AL by launching a new 
party – the Bangladesh Nationalist Party.  It organised the 1979 parliamentary election 
under its supervision and got elected again by massive vote rigging. This regime was 
overthrown by another military regime in 1982.  
The new regime followed the trails of the previous military regime. However, it 
was challenged by two heavy-weight parties (the AL and the BNP) as they launched 
movement against it. The anti-government movement gained momentum when the regime 
lost its credibility by organizing two parliamentary elections in which it managed to get re-
elected by unprecedented level of vote rigging. Initially, dominant opposition parties 
demanded free and fair elections to the government. When it became clear to opposition 
parties that this regime would never hold a free and fair election and as such it cannot be 
deposed by elections, they demanded unconditional resignation of the government. The 
government stepped down in the face of popular upsurge in late 1990.  
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In order to facilitate the transfer of power to a democratically elected government, 
a non-partisan caretaker government (NCG) was formed to organize a free and fair election. 
This election restored the trust of voters in the electoral system. The BNP formed the 
government following the election. Initially, both the incumbent BNP and the opposition 
AL cooperated with each other and the parliament became a place of resolving disputes. 
However, it was alleged by the AL that its candidate in a safe seat was defeated by the 
incumbent BNP by vote rigging. So, all opposition parties demanded holding of all 
elections under NCGs. The incumbent BNP did not agree, but opposition parties forced it 
to agree through prolonged strikes. The incumbent BNP lost in the 1996 election and the 
dominant opposition the AL formed the government. The AL realized that voters would 
backlash due to its poor performance, and so it wanted to organise the 2001 election under 
its supervision. The opposition parties foiled the AL’s plan. The AL lost and the BNP won. 
The BNP formed the government. When the 2006 election came to close, the president 
appointed a NCG. The dominant opposition AL questioned its neutrality. When a lasting 
impasse arose due to the uncompromising attitude of the BNP and the AL, a military-
backed civilian government took the position of the NCG and held election two years later 
in 2008. Meanwhile, it launched a drive to eradicate corruption bringing in charges against 
many BNP leaders. The AL won by a landslide victory in the 2008 election.       
The above discussion reveals that elections held in the post-independent period 
before 1991 were rigged by incumbent governments, because they were held under their 
supervision and they rendered the election commission as their rubber stamps. On the 
contrary, all four elections held between 1991 and 2008 were free and fair, because they 
were held under the supervision of NCGs. Moreover, except one (1973) all other elections 
organised between 1972 and 1990 were held under the presidential form of government, 
whereas all elections organized between 1991 and 2008 were held under the parliamentary 
form of government. The parliament under the presidential form of government was not as 
powerful as the parliament under the parliamentary form of government. Yet, incumbent 
governments tried to influence the electoral outcomes as much as possible.   
The following section gives a brief idea about electoral fairness, the changing nature 
of state-sponsored nationalism, types of rule, government system, and regimes. The third 
and the fourth sections explain backgrounds, political marketing strategies of parties and 
results of elections held in 1973 and 1979 respectively. The fifth section explains 
backgrounds, political marketing strategies of parties and results of elections held in 1986 
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and 1988 respectively. The sixth section elaborates backgrounds, political marketing 
strategies of parties and results of elections held in the post-1990 period. They were held 
in 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2008. The seventh section focuses on positive and negative 
political developments following four consecutive free and fair elections under NCGs. The 
eighth section juxtaposes socioeconomic development indicators against political 
development ones over the 1991-2008 period. The ninth section concludes this chapter.    
4.2 Overview of electoral fairness, nationalism, types of rule, government system 
and regime (1971-2008) 
 
Figure 4.1: Parliamentary elections, state-sponsored nationalism, types of rule, government system, 
regimes and fairness in elections in Bangladesh (1971-2008) 
 
Source: Constructed by the author 
Figure 4.1 shows that Bangladesh had had nine parliamentary elections since 
independence in 1971 until 2008. All elections held until 1990 were massively rigged, 
whereas all elections held between 1991 and 2008 were free and fair except one held on 15 
February 1996. Bangladesh had been ruled by three parties – the AL, the BNP and the JP. 
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While she was ruled by populist civil authoritarian rulers over the 1972-1975 and the 1991-
2006 periods, she was ruled by military authoritarian rulers over the 1976-1990 period. The 
AL regime sponsored the Bengali nationalism, whereas the BNP regime sponsored the 
Bangladeshi nationalism. In addition to supporting the BNP’s Bangladeshi nationalism, the 
JP regime went one step of the BNP. It declared Islam as a state religion with a view to 
differentiate itself from the BNP. The people of Bangladesh also experienced parliamentary 
as well as presidential form of government.  
4.3 The pre-1990 elections in Bangladesh: the Mujib-led AL regime (1972-1975) 
The AL formed the immediate post-independent government with Mujib as the 
prime minister. The government framed the Constitution of Bangladesh in Westminster 
style. It tried to build up the war-ravaged economy from the scratch with the help of 
countries that supported Bangladesh’s Liberation War. However, it faced a lot of problems 
and failed to reduce suffering of the common people. As a result, the opposition parties 
challenged its political legitimacy. In order to demonstrate that it had a high level of 
political legitimacy it held the 1st parliamentary election on 7 March 1973.  
Figure 4.2: Background of 1973 election and the Mujib-led AL regime (1971-1975) 
 
 
Source: Constructed by the author 
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4.3.1 The 1973 election 
This sub-section explores the background of the 1973 election held under the supervision 
of the incumbent AL. It also explains the aftermath of the election (Figure 4.2).  
Background 
The incumbent’s performance  
The Pakistan Awami League (PAL) won in 53.33 percent seats in the Pakistan 
National Assembly and 96 percent of the East Pakistan Provincial Assembly and the 
government-in-exile was a PAL’s partisan government. Following independence in 1971 
the PAL became the Bangladesh Awami League (AL). It formed the post-independent 
government against the demand of the opposition parties which asked to form a national 
unity government, because they also actively participated in the Liberation war. The AL 
regime performed significantly better than expected in the first twelve months in the power. 
Almost all sectors of the economy recovered slowly from the heavy losses incurred during 
the 1971 Liberation War. It made several trade agreements with India, the then USSR and 
some other socialist countries. It managed to get recognition from 97 countries by this time 
(Jahan, 1972).  
Chasms in civil and military bureaucracy 
The immediate post-independent AL-led-government faced some difficult 
problems (Jahan, 2005:98-114). The regime had to make a trade-off between state-building 
and nation-building. It emphasized the building of a national government at the expense of 
the building of a state. The two important apparatuses of the state are the bureaucracy and 
the armed forces. After the Liberation War both were in disarray. Chasms brewed among 
bureaucrats: (a) collaborators versus patriots.  Those who went to India for military training 
and fought for independence were known as patriots, while those who stayed inside the 
country and served the Pakistan Government during the Liberation War were known as 
collaborators; and (b) political appointees versus meritocratic appointees. The AL 
government recruited some civil servants from among the freedom fighters. It also had to 
retain those civil servants who were recruited on the basis of merit during the united 
Pakistan period. Many meritocratic officers were dismissed or demoted for their alleged 
collaboration with the Pakistan Government during the Liberation War. The political 
appointees who had little experience in formulating and implementing ‘sound’ public 
policies were promoted due to political patronage and they created a ‘buffer layer’ between 
the high-ranking non-freedom fighter bureaucrats and ruling political elites. Overtime a 
BACKGROUND OF ELECTIONS: POST-INDEPENDENCE ERA 
 
158 
 
high inefficiency and mismanagement engulfed the bureaucracy leading to its utter 
demoralization (Rashiduzzaman, 1980). As a result, the government lost its political 
legitimacy to victims.  
Like the civil bureaucracy, there were chasms among armed forces: freedom 
fighters versus repatriated soldiers. The soldiers who were recruited during the Pakistani 
rule, who were stranded in West Pakistan during the Liberation War, and who later joined 
the Bangladesh armed forces were regarded as repatriated non-freedom fighters. On the 
other hand, some freedom fighters were recruited in armed forces after the Liberation War. 
Some soldiers were recruited during the Pakistan era but posted in East Pakistan before the 
beginning of the Liberation War. They also joined the Liberation War. All of them are 
called freedom fighter soldiers. These two groups contended on the issue of seniority and 
promotion (Ahmed, 1995:10). This situation became more complicated when the AL 
government created a paramilitary force called Rakhi Bahini (Protection Force) which was 
under the direct control of the Prime Minister and which was empowered without any limit. 
They received preferential treatment in terms of training, logistics and equipment. It was 
built by the AL as a ‘counter-force’ to the army. The all-powerful authority of this force 
undermined the status of the armed forces and lowered their morale (Ahmed, 1976:54-55). 
As a result, the AL government lost its political legitimacy to many members of armed 
forces. 
Chasm in polity 
The AL government was more concerned with the consolidation of the political 
input sector than that of the political output sector. In the political input sector it tried to 
establish its partisan hegemony from the very beginning of the Liberation War. So, it 
rejected a proposal of opposition parties to form a national unity government-in-exile, 
whereas they also participated in the Liberation War. Winners in the Pakistan National 
Assembly and the East Pakistan Provincial Assembly constituted the Constituent Assembly 
which was assigned to draft the Constitution of Bangladesh in the framework of the 
Westminster-style parliamentary form of government as mentioned in the six-point 
programmes. The new constitution came into effect on 16 December 1972. It declared 
nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism as basic ideologies of Bangladesh. Thus, 
the Bengali nationalism, which united and inspired the East Pakistanis to fight against 
socioeconomic and political exploitation of West Pakistanis, received formal recognition 
in the Bangladesh Constitution. It also stated that it was the basic responsibility of the state 
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to meet basic needs of the people through ensuring steady economic growth 
(Maniruzzaman, 2009:148). However, except one all other opposition parties criticized the 
Constitution as undemocratic, because there was not enough debate on it and it was rapidly 
passed by a majority vote. They also criticized it for not including some radical measures 
that were necessary to bring about rapid socioeconomic transformation in Bangladesh from 
the perspective of socialism (Khanam, 2008:77).        
During the immediate post-Liberation period the organizational structure of the AL 
was very weak to withstand any internal or external shock. The AL rose to power through 
popular movements against West Pakistani oppression. Its organizational structure evolved 
around street politics. Its activists were drawn mainly from the middle class and their 
ideological orientation ranged from extreme-left to extreme-right with concentration 
around the middle. The charismatic leadership of Mujib could not contain the factional 
fighting for a long time. Like the PML in the immediate post-partition period the AL faced 
the same problem. Some top leaders of the AL who were also members of the government-
in-exile split on the issue of receiving US aid after the independence. One group opposed 
it and took pro-Indian pro-Soviet stance. This group also favoured socialism as the state’s 
economic policy. On the other hand, another group favoured acceptance of the US aid and 
the mixed economy. Mujib seemed to have ‘sandwiched’ between these two groups and 
patchily balanced between them for a while. Sometimes Mujib directly interfered to diffuse 
the conflict or co-opt factional leaders into the regime. Secondly, a group of the AL’s 
leaders and their cronies became super-rich within a short time through bureaucratic 
corruption and smuggling. This contributed to increase the cost of living index by 50 
percent between January and October 1972 (Jahan, 1972). During the Pakistan period 
(1947-71) 22 families owned the majority of the wealth of Pakistan. Within a much shorter 
period, 2000 families became owners of majority wealth of Bangladesh. They used this ill-
gotten money to increase their influence in the party as well as in the economy. The AL 
government did not take any action against them, rather it surrendered to them 
(Maniruzzaman, 2009:152). Thirdly, a group of student activists belonging to the student 
wing of the AL were freedom fighters and they believed in socialism. They demanded 
implementation of socialist policies in Bangladesh. Since the AL was not a revolutionary 
party, it could not meet the demands of this group. So they broke away from the AL and 
formed a new party called Jatiyo Samajtantrick Dal (JSD)/(National Socialist Party) on 23 
October 1972. The activists of this party were a group of left-leaning freedom fighters who 
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received guerrilla training in India during the Liberation War. It became popular among 
students and workers quickly. Many members of this group did not surrender their arms 
which they possessed during the Liberation War. They started to attack members of the law 
enforcing agencies in different districts in Bangladesh. As a result of their rebellious 
activities, the law and order situation of the country deteriorated rapidly. They also 
capitalised on the deteriorating economic conditions in Bangladesh under the AL regime 
and the anti-Indian sentiment of the people resulting from India’s interference in 
Bangladesh’s policy. It quickly emerged as the strongest challenger to the ruling AL regime 
(Jahan, 2005:111). Instead of co-opting the dissident leftists, the AL used all sorts of 
coercive measures to eliminate them (Maniruzzaman, 2009: 167). As the AL regime 
became more coercive, they became more popular. Fourthly, the AL government banned 
some religio-political parties which actively collaborated with the Pakistan Occupation 
Army in perpetrating genocide in Bangladesh during the Liberation War. Many members 
of those parties were arrested and waiting for trial. When some left-leaning opposition 
parties were trying to overthrow the AL government by force, the government pardoned 
and subsequently released many ‘collaborators’ of the Pakistan Occupation Army. The AL 
anticipated that they would counter the ‘revolutionaries’. This is because, their ideologies 
were conflicting (Maniruzzaman, 2009:166). However, this strategy backlashed. Many of 
them joined the anti-AL parties and killed many activists of the AL (Khanam, 2008; 96-
97). 
Though the AL had a long list of success in the immediate-post independence 
period, it had a long list of failure too. Some moderate left-leaning opposition parties 
initially offered their support to the AL in its effort to reconstruct the war-torn economy. 
When it failed to reduce the suffering of the common people resulting from lack of essential 
commodities including foods and take action against corrupt party leaders and smugglers, 
they withdrew their support. Bhashani, a veteran nationalistic politician, had been critical 
of the AL regime. He led a hunger march in Dhaka in early September 1972 and formed 
an electoral alliance with some small parties to combat the AL in the 1973 election.     
Marketing strategies of political parties  
Bangladesh is divided into 300 constituencies (Map 4.1). One member is elected 
from each constituency by universal adult franchise. So, the parliament of Bangladesh 
consists of 300 members.  
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Map 4.1: Constituencies in parliamentary elections in Bangladesh 
 
Source: Statistical Report, 7th Jatiya Shangshad, Election, Bangladesh Election Commission 
 In the 1973 election 14 parties and 1075 candidates competed for 289 seats. Eleven 
AL candidates were elected unopposed. All parties presented their manifestos. The main 
parties were the AL, the JSD, the NAP (Bhashani) and the NAP (Muzaffar). Harun 
(1986:65-87) gave a detail description of manifestos of parties. The AL manifesto outlined 
some pragmatic programmes, such as making the country self-sufficient in food through a 
‘Green Revolution’, establishment of small scale cottage industries, radical land reform 
programmes, implementing population control programme, keeping key industries under 
state ownership, making education more technical-oriented and meeting peoples’ basic 
needs. The AL asked people to vote for it to ensure stability of the government.  
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In the 1973 election the JSD did not promise anything to the people, because it did 
not believe in democratic electoral political system. It participated in the election to uproot 
the democratic system and the AL. The NAP (Muzaffar) advocated for establishing an 
honest and efficient government to meet basic needs of the people. The NAP (Bhashani) 
vowed to replace the current authoritarian constitution with one that better reflected the 
hopes and aspirations of the toiling masses. It also wanted to make all agreements with 
India null and void. A survey showed that 82.65 percent believed that the AL would win 
(Harun, 1986:280). So, people did not have any interest in election campaigns. The major 
campaign issue was the ‘manufacturing’ of a number of conspiracy theories. Jahan 
(2005:121) observed that every party designated other opposition parties as ‘foreign agents 
indulging in conspiracy against the interest of the country.’ Though the AL could win in 
majority seats with lower margins, but it wanted to prove that it had a high level of political 
legitimacy. So, it indulged in massive vote rigging (Jahan, 2005:122). 
Results of the 1973 election: incumbent overkilled opposition parties 
The AL won in 282 seats, where elections were held. It won 11 seats where its 
candidates were elected unopposed. So, it won altogether 293 out of 300 seats. Its main 
contender, the JSD, won only in 1 seat. However, the AL polled 73.20 percent and other 
three left-leaning parties polled 20.17 percent of the total vote cast (Harun, 1986:251). The 
disunity of the opposition parties and charismatic leadership of Mujib were responsible for 
the AL’s success (Riaz, 2016:52). However, the percentage of seats and votes do not reflect 
the actual popularity of the AL due to moderate vote rigging. Barua (1978:168) estimates 
that if the election was free and fair, about 50 to 60 opposition candidates would have won 
including 15 to 20 opposition leaders.   
Determinants of electoral results 
 Using survey data and secondary data some studies have investigated various 
aspects of the 1973 election. Using survey data, Jahan (2005:207-226) discovers some 
important aspects of the electoral behaviour of the people in Bangladesh. A large majority 
of voters did not possess partisanship. Political propaganda helped voters to develop their 
partisanship. Voters’ partisanship was transient for lack of regular elections. Secondly, 
most people were afraid of disclosing their party choice. Thirdly, the AL had support in 
all socioeconomic classes. Fourthly, voters who benefitted from some public programmes 
supported the government more than those who did not. This suggests the existence of 
patronage politics in Bangladesh. Using secondary data, Blair (1979) finds the same for 
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the same election. Fifthly, voters tended to vote for more educated, experienced and 
honest candidates.  
 Using another set of survey data, Harun (1986:252-285) finds that support for 
the AL was the highest among the 41-50 age cohort, whereas for the JSD it was the highest 
for the 18-25 age cohort. Secondly, people of lower income brackets supported the AL 
more than those of higher ones. Thirdly, more illiterate and lower educated people voted 
for the AL. Fourthly, the AL had more support among the rural people. Fifthly, voters 
cared about personal qualities of candidates. Sixthly, professional people were more 
aware of the personal aspects of candidates than any other social groups.    
Aftermath of the 1973 election 
When the JSD and some other left-leaning parties failed to uproot the AL through 
constitutional means, they intensified their underground activities. Fearing taking over of 
the power by force, the AL regime declared a state of emergency1 on 28 December, 1974.  
On 25 January 1975 the Constitution of Bangladesh was amended and accordingly all 
parties were banned and one party (Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League 
(BAKSAL)) was created on 20 February 1975. The presidential form of government was 
introduced. All powers were vested in the hand of the president. The formation of one party 
was followed by some other repressive measures which closed all channels of venting 
political opposition. All these measures along with failure to rejuvenate the staggering 
economy caused a sharp decline in the political legitimacy of the AL regime. In this 
backdrop a military coup was engineered by some disgruntled army officers on 15 August 
1975 and the AL regime was overthrown by a military regime. Through a series of coups 
and counter-coups, Zia who earned a towering reputation by announcing the Independence 
of Bangladesh in late March 1971 on behalf of Mujib and successfully commanding a 
brigade of freedom fighters during the Liberation War, seized the power.  
4.4 The pre-1990 elections in Bangladesh: the Zia-Sattar-led BNP regime (1976-
1982) 
Zia gradually consolidated his position. He was Deputy Chief Martial Law 
Administrator as well as Chief-of-staff of the army forces just after the 7 November coup 
d'état. On 30 November 1976 he became Chief Martial Law Administrator. On 21 April 
1977 he became president and also retained his two other posts. On 30 April 1977 he 
                                                            
1 It is a condition when personal freedom being guaranteed by the constitution is restricted.  
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declared his 19-point programme designed for socioeconomic development of the country. 
On 30 May he organized a referendum on his presidency and won through massive vote 
rigging (Jahan, 2005:236). He held presidential election on 3 June 1978 and again managed 
to win by massive vote rigging. He was popular, but the percentage of vote polled was not 
tenable. He polled 76.72 percent vote, while his nearest rival General (retired) Osmani, the 
Commander-in-chief during the Liberation War and a candidate supported by some centre-
left parties including the AL, polled 21.65 percent vote. Upon winning in the presidential 
election Zia launched a party named Bangladesh Nationalist Party on 1 September 1978. 
He welcomed any political elite to his party who opposed the AL. So, they came from 
different parties having different ideological orientations. He also dispensed patronage to 
bring them to his party’s fold. When Zia was sure about the support of the majority people 
for him and his party, he declared the parliamentary election on 18 February 1979.  
4.4.1 The 1979 election 
This sub-section explores the background of the 1979 election held under the 
supervision of the incumbent BNP. It also explains aftermath of the election (Figure 4.3).  
Background  
Following the August 15, 1975 coup, Zia brought about some major changes in the 
policy and civil and military administration (Rashiduzzaman, 1980; Ahmed, 1995:35-53). 
Under the Mujib-led AL regime the status of the civil and the military bureaucracy was 
downgraded and they were put under the control of the political elites. He restored their 
pre-independence status and established his administration on the alliance between them. 
However, he could not totally integrate bureaucrats coming from different backgrounds. 
The conflict between ‘collaborators’ and ‘patriots’ that troubled the previous regime 
persisted but became mute for a while in the face of Zia’s charismatic leadership and 
intimidation. 
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Figure 4.3: Background of the 1979 election and the Zia-Sattar-led BNP regime (1975-1982) 
Source: Constructed by the author 
The previous AL regime officially declared Bangladesh as a secular country, but 
among the common people Bengali Muslim nationalism that was the driving force behind 
the creation of Pakistan remained alive and flourished in a different way in the face of the 
AL’s overly emphasis on secularism. So, the Zia regime dropped secularism from the 
constitution and calibrated it with some Islamic flavour by adding some Islamic ethos. It 
also replaced national identity ‘Bengali nationalism’2 with another sort of national identity 
called the ‘Bangladeshi nationalism’3. Moreover, the Mujib-led regime banned all parties 
that collaborated with the Pakistani Occupation Army in carrying out genocide in 
Bangladesh during the Liberation War. The Zia regime allowed them to start politics 
openly. The Mujib-led AL regime had developed a good relationship with India and the 
then Soviet union (the supporters of Bangladesh’s Liberation War) at the expense of 
                                                            
2 The sense of unity among people whose mother tongue is Bengali. This includes people who live inside 
as well as outside the international boundary of Bangladesh, especially in Indian states around 
Bangladesh.  This is a language-based identity.   
3 The sense of unity among people who live within the international boundary of Bangladesh. This 
excludes people who live outside the international boundary of Bangladesh, especially in Indian states 
around Bangladesh. This is a geography-based identity.     
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hostility with the Middle Eastern Muslim countries, China and the United States (the 
opponents of Bangladesh’s Liberation War). Since India was the closest ally of the Mujib 
regime, its relationship with the Zia regime became bitter following the 1975 military coup. 
In order to counter this axis of power, Zia developed a good relationship with the enemies 
of the Mujib regime - the Middle Eastern Muslim countries, China and the United States. 
As a result, a huge amount of aid flew into Bangladesh. Foreign aid revamped the 
staggering economy of Bangladesh. Within a very short time Bangladesh accumulated 
enough foreign exchanges to import essential commodities and industrial raw materials. 
So, the per capita growth jumped from (-) 5.98 percent in 1975 to (+) 4.15 percent in 1978 
(World Bank, undated).  
The Farakka Dam created a life and death question for Bangladesh. Bangladesh was 
becoming a desert over time due to unilateral withdrawal of water by India from the Ganges 
basin. The previous AL regime could not make any ‘respectable’ long term agreement with 
India in this regard. The Zia regime raised this issue in the international fora and drew the 
attention of the world community to it. Moreover, Zia took personal initiatives for 
implementing rural development programmes and as such revitalized the rural economy of 
Bangladesh under his 19-point programmes. Furthermore, though the Zia regime was not 
free of corruption, Zia himself was well-known for his sublime honesty. There is no 
evidence that any of his relations was involved with any corrupt activities. Even before the 
1975 coup he was well known as a great freedom fighter soldier and people appreciated his 
role in announcing the Independence of Bangladesh when the AL leaders were at their wit’s 
end in the face Pakistani Army’s crackdown in Bangladesh. Though he came to power after 
several coups and counter-coups, he was not directly involved with any coup. So, he was 
not a part of the conspiracy to oust the AL regime. This enhanced his image in the eyes of 
the people.  
Zia reversed AL’s socialist economic policy. He liberalized the economy and 
divested many nationalized industries to attract foreign investment.  In the first two and a 
half years of Zia’s rule the country experienced a marked improvement in its economic 
condition and maintenance of law and order. Overall, Zia proved himself an extraordinary 
statesman capable of maintaining integrity and sovereignty of the country (Khan, 1980).  
 
 
 CHAPTER 4  
167 
 
Marketing strategies of political parties 
A total of 2125 candidates contested in the election for 300 seats in the parliament. 
Of these 1709 candidates were partisan and the remainder were independent. The two 
major contenders were the BNP and the AL.  Khan (1980) identifies some important 
features of the 1979 election. There were three types of alliances: (i) left-centric; (ii) right-
centric; and (iii) mixed. Their objective was to counter the domination of the two major 
parties –the AL and the BNP. Secondly, both the BNP and the AL nominated a large 
number of retired military personnel. Thirdly, they also nominated a large number of 
professionals, businessmen, landlords and retired civil servants. Fourthly, the election 
manifestos of the BNP and the AL were vague. The BNP expressed its determination to 
unite people of all walks of life under the Bangladeshi nationalism. It also vowed to retain 
the existing presidential form of government with a sovereign parliament. The 19-point 
programmes that Zia presented before the 1977 Referendum became its socioeconomic 
development programmes. On the other hand, the AL’s manifesto included restoration of 
the 1972 constitution, implementation of administrative, economic and social reforms 
envisioned in the Mujib’s unfinished ‘Second Revolution’4, and repeal of all ‘black laws’. 
No parties identified any significant national issues as a matter of concern for the nation.  
Results of the 1979 election: the incumbent again overkilled the opposition  
The voter turnout rate was 50.94 percent. The incumbent BNP won 207 seats (69 
percent of the total) and polled 41.2 percent of the total vote. Its nearest rival the AL won 
54 seats (18 percent of the total) and polled 25.4 percent of the total vote. The BNP won in 
over two-third majority seats and formed the government. Though the BNP became popular 
under Zia’s leadership, there were charges of massive vote rigging against the incumbent 
BNP (Khan, 1980). Like the AL in the 1973 election, it ‘over-killed’ the opposition. Khan 
(1980) points out to some factors that were responsible for the BNP’s landslide victory. 
Zia, the leader of the BNP, was personally popular. He singlehandedly dealt with the 
nomination process. Many of his nominees were honest and dedicated. He carried out 
election campaigns all over the country. Secondly, he managed his ‘guided democracy’ in 
such a way that opposition parties could not unite against him. He organized the local 
elections followed by the referendum and the presidential election. Thus, he struck the root 
of his party in the society gradually. It was hard for the AL to unite opposition parties on a 
                                                            
4 By it the AL meant the socioeconomic programmes of the BAKSAL, the single party formed by the Mujib 
regime in 1975.  
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common anti-Zia or anti-BNP platform, because they were heterogeneous. Thirdly, he 
distributed patronage to leaders of different tiers to bring them to his party’s fold. 
Moreover, some political elites of his party were well-known and successful in their 
professions. Alongside Zia, they also enhanced the party’s image in the eyes of the public. 
Analysing the results of the 1978 presidential election and the 1979 parliamentary election 
Maniruzzaman (2009:213-214) finds that Zia was personally more popular than the 
candidates of his party. Secondly, despite the incumbent’s attempts to marginalise the AL, 
its presidential candidate received 21.70 percent in the 1978 presidential election and all of 
its candidates in the 1979 parliamentary election received 25 percent vote. It implies that a 
quarter of voters were the AL’s hard core supporters. Thirdly, the voter turnout rate in the 
1979 parliamentary election was a few percentage points lower than those of the 1970 and 
the 1973 elections. This may imply that voters had been becoming politically apathetic due 
to lack of regular and fair elections. Though Zia was personally popular, he was an 
authoritarian leader like Mujib. He did not tolerate any criticism of his rule. Anyone critical 
of his rule was punished severely (Khanam, 2008: 124). So, both nation-building and state-
building suffered in his hand too.  
Aftermath of the 1979 election 
Though Zia successfully managed opposition parties, he could not control factional 
feuds within the army. He was assassinated on 30 May 1981 by some soldiers. Following 
his assassination, his Vice-president Sattar became the Chairperson of the BNP and was 
elected president through an election held on 18 November 1981. During his tenure Ershad, 
the then Chief-of-staff explicitly demanded constitutional role of armed forces in the 
governance of the country. Sattar tried to accommodate this demand by agreeing to set up 
a National Security Council consisting of the President, the Vice-president and the Prime 
Minister representing the civilian side and the Chiefs of three services representing the 
military side. Ershad was not happy with this arrangement. On 24 March 1982 Ershad 
overthrew the Sattar-led BNP Government accusing it of pervasive corruption, 
ineffectiveness in dealing with national problems and economic mismanagement. He 
suspended the constitution, dissolved the parliament and imposed the martial law. He was 
promoted to the Chief-of-staff of the armed forces on 1 December 1978 by Zia. After the 
coup d'état he also assumed the position of the Chief Martial Law Administrator.  
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4.5 The pre-1990 elections in Bangladesh: the Ershad-led JP regime (1982-1990) 
Figure 4.4 shows the major landmarks during the Ershad-led military rule (1982-
1990) in Bangladesh. It is seen that from the very beginning of his military rule he faced 
an escalating opposition. As soon as he declared military rule students brought out 
processions against it defying the martial law and intimidation of being persecuted. When 
Majid Khan, his education minister, declared an elitist and Islamist education policy, 
political parties, professional organizations and some non-government organizations joined 
with students and the protest against the military rule became stronger. In the face of the 
heightened protest, Ershad had to retreat. He then tried to increase his political legitimacy 
through elections, but at each election he faced mounting opposition. At last he had to step 
down in the face of mass upsurge in late 1990.   
4.5.1 The 1986 election 
This sub-section describes the background of the 1986 election and aftermath.  
Background  
Ershad was a repatriated army officer who had been stranded in West Pakistan 
during the 1971 Liberation War. As already noted above, since independence there were 
feuds between repatriated soldiers and freedom fighter soldiers. Zia himself was a freedom 
fighter soldier, but he gave preference to repatriated soldiers due to their long service in the 
army. This angered many freedom fighter soldiers. As a result, during Zia’s tenure there 
were a number of mutinies which were foiled and anyone connected with them in any way 
was hanged. Of these, the 1975 and the 1977 mutinies were especially serious. Most 
freedom fighter soldiers were victims of those mutinies. In this way repatriated soldiers 
became dominant in armed forces. In addition, the soldiers recruited in the post-Liberation 
period also resented ‘the monopoly of patriotism’ being claimed by freedom fighter 
soldiers (Maniruzzaman, 1992). So, Ershad found a more homogeneous armed force. On 
seizure of power he started to increase his political legitimacy with the armed forces, his 
chief constituency, by dispensing patronage to them in various ways. While he was 
successful in increasing his political legitimacy to them, he encountered tough opposition 
from political parties, civil societies and labour organizations.  
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Figure 4.4: Background of the 1986 and the 1988 elections and the Ershad-led JP regime (1982-
1990) 
 
Source: Constructed by the author 
Protest of civil societies  
While Ershad was the Chief Martial Law Administrator, he established permanent 
benches for the High Court Division of the Supreme Court outside the capital city (Dhaka) 
on 8 June 1982. Ershad claimed that his objective was to bring justice closer to people. 
However, lawyers rebutted that the ulterior motive was to disperse them all over the country 
and thus reduce the anti-Ershad movement. The lawyers protested against it by boycotting 
the sessions of the Supreme Court for some a while.   
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Local government reform and protest of opposition political parties  
Ershad ruled the country as the Chief Martial Law Administrator from 24 March 
through 10 December 1983. On 11 December 1983 he assumed presidency. From the very 
beginning he asked political parties to participate in local elections under martial law, but 
they refused. However, in order to increase his political legitimacy among the masses he 
reformed the second tier of the local government. Previously they were called thanas. 
Between November 1983 and February 1984 he renamed 460 thanas as upazila/subdistrict 
and gave them more administrative and judicial functions. He established civil and judicial 
courts at the upazila level. He also created 64 districts out of old subdivisional unit 
administration. All political parties opposed it, because they argued that only elected 
members of the parliament were entitled to take such a nationally important issue. As the 
Ershad-led military Government was not elected, it had no right to take such an important 
decision. Its objective was to create a rural power-base for the military government. In the 
face of protest by opposition parties, Ershad succeeded in organizing the first upazila 
election on the basis of universal adult franchise during May 1985. Despite protests from 
all opposition parties and call for boycotting the referendum Ershad also organized national 
referendum on his leadership on 21 March 1985 under re-imposed martial law. While the 
Election Commission claimed that the turnout rate was 72 percent and Ershad polled 94.14 
percent ‘yes’ votes, observers found it unbelievable (Los Angles Time, 23 March, 1985).  
Proposal for basic reforms in education system and protest of students 
The Ershad-led Government angered students by proposing an education policy 
called Majid Khan Education Policy on 4 September 1982. According to that policy Arabic 
along with Bengali and English would be compulsory from the primary level. Moreover, 
access to higher education would be available to talented students only. Students as well as 
political elites protested against this. During protest against this policy at least 10 students 
were killed by police on 14 February 1983. In the face of continued and prolonged protests 
the Ershad-led Government withdrew the proposal, but students’ protest continued 
unabated. It gradually turned from the anti-Majid Khan Education Policy to anti-Ershad 
Government. 
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 Accelerated pace of privatization and protest of manufacturing workers 
As part of privatization policy initiated by the previous Zia-led BNP regime(,) by 
March 1984 the Ershad-led Government finalized privatization of 33 jute mills, 25 textile 
mills and 31 other industrial units and more were in progress. As a result, trade unions 
revolted against the government. They put forward a number of demands, such as minimum 
national wage, amendments of repressive laws on trade unions, stopping privatization and 
re-opening of closed industrial units (Maniruzzaman, 1992).  
Split in the opposition camp 
Ershad organized the presidential referendum, the upazila election, the presidential 
election ‘successfully’ and won in each election by massive vote rigging. He was able to 
win in those elections without a party, but he needed a party to win in parliamentary 
elections and ratify all actions taken by him since his unconstitutional assumption of power 
on 24 March 1982. So, he created his own party called the Jatiya Party (JP) by drawing 
defectors from two dominant opposition parties (the AL and the BNP) and some other small 
parties. The Election Commission declared the date of holding the 3rd parliamentary 
election on 7 May 1986. When the election was declared, a rift was created among 
opposition parties which were carrying out anti-Ershad movement. The AL and some of its 
centre-left-leaning alliance partners decided to take part in the election, while seven far-
left-leaning parties allied with the AL-led alliance decided to boycott the election. So, the 
AL-led 15-party alliance dwarfed into an eight-party alliance. The BNP decided to boycott 
the election, unless three preconditions were fulfilled: restoration of fundamental rights, 
release of all political prisoners and annulment of judgment against politicians convicted 
under the martial law (Islam, 1987). As the BNP-led alliance did not participate in the 
election, the main competition was between the AL and the JP.  
Manifestos and electioneering strategies of parties 
The incumbent JP highlighted the benefits of Ershad’s development works and his 
decentralization scheme. It also warned people of the possible adverse consequences if the 
AL came back to power. On the other hand, the AL termed the Ershad’s Government a 
military dictatorship and promised to re-install the parliamentary form of government of 
1972. It also used Mujib’s image in the campaign. The anti-election camp headed by the 
BNP asked people to boycott the election. The election was marked by an unprecedented 
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scale of violence and hijacking of many ballot boxes. So, the election had been deemed 
unfair (Islam, 1987).   
Results of the 1986 election  
The JP won 153 seats, the AL 76 seats and other small parties and independent won the 
remaining 71 seats. Of the 71 seats independents won in 32 seats and of these 23 
independents joined the JP. The JP formed government. The political legitimacy of the JP 
to the people declined sharply due to massive corruption by its leaders including Ershad 
and violation of human rights. On the other hand, the political legitimacy of the AL to the 
public increased due to its leading role in the anti-Ershad movement over the previous four 
years. This was evident from growth in the total number of the AL’s seats increased, from 
39 in the 1979 election to 76 in the 1986 election. Though the election was massively rigged 
by the incumbent, the government gained some credibility from the AL’s participation 
(Islam, 1987).    
Aftermath of the 1986 election  
 The AL, the major opposition party of the 3rd parliament, boycotted its first session 
and held a two-hour “mock assembly” in the parliament premise. The BNP, which 
boycotted the election, demanded immediate dissolution of the parliament. In this context 
the government declared that a presidential election would be held on 15 October 1986. In 
order to participate in the election as a JP candidate Ershad resigned from the army, but did 
not remove martial law. No major opposition parties participated in the presidential election 
because of martial law. Instead, they called a country-wide strike on that day. Through a 
massive vote rigging Ershad won a ‘landslide’ victory. According to the Election 
Commission, the turnout rate was 54 percent and Ershad polled 83.57 percent of total votes 
cast. All major opposition parties rejected the result of this election. In order to ratify his 
unconstitutional assumption of power in 1982 and indemnify his government from any 
legal action taken ever since, he called the 2nd session of the 3rd parliament and got the bill 
passed on 10 November 1986 with the help of some small parliamentary parties and 
independents except the AL (Islam, 1987). Upon passing of this bill Ershad withdrew the 
martial law and revived the constitution. Since unconstitutional assumption of power on 24 
March 1982 Ershad had been trying hard to satisfy his principal constituency (the armed 
forces) and he was successful in this regard. It was evident from the fact that there was no 
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sepoy5 mutiny against him. In order to institutionalize militarization of the local 
administration he put forward a bill which aimed to include military representatives at the 
district level. It was easily passed by the JP-dominant parliament, but in the face of the 
protest by dominant opposition parties Ershad had to send it back to the parliament for 
reconsideration (Hakim, 1998). However, Ershad ultimately withdrew the bill due to 
continuous agitation against it by major opposition parties (Shehabuddin, 2016).     
4.5.2 The 1988 election 
This sub-section discusses the background of the 1988 parliamentary election and its 
aftermath.  
Background  
The fraudulent electioneering strategies of Ershad during all elections held under 
his government made it clear to all opposition parties that no elections could be free and 
fair under his government. As such, he could not be ousted by elections. So, they demanded 
Ershad’s resignation and a free and fair election under a NCG. The AL was also 
disillusioned with the Ershad Government. As they had failed to meet the AL’s demands. 
So, it boycotted the parliament and joined the anti-Ershad movement (Shehabuddin, 2016).  
On 10 November 1987, all anti-Ershad opposition parties organized a rally demanding 
Ershad’s resignation. When police shot dead several protesters, the anti-Ershad agitation 
was elevated to a new height (Maniruzzaman, 1992).  
Opposition’s all-out attempts to make Ershad-led Government dysfunctional 
Though a serious rift was created in the anti-Ershad camp following the AL’s and 
JI’s decision to participate in the 1986 parliamentary election, in the emerging situation 
they agreed to carry out anti-Ershad movement simultaneously from different platforms. 
So they persistently and frequently launched the anti-Ershad movement through general 
strikes, surrounding government offices and mass demonstration which affected normal 
functioning of government offices and public life. These actions also adversely affected 
the economy negatively. Foreign donors pressed for a political solution. In this context 
Ershad dissolved the 3rd parliament and declared to hold the 4th parliamentary election on 
3 March 1988. However, no major parties participated in this election; they also asked the 
people to boycott it and called a general strike on Election Day.  
                                                            
5 A member of armed forces. 
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Results of the 1988 election  
By resorting to unprecedented electoral corruption, Ershad’s JP won in 251 seats in 
the parliament. However, Ershad failed to increase his political, because, no major parties 
participated in the election. The voter turnout rate was very low and there was a widespread 
vote rigging. The government claimed that the voter turnout rate was about 50 percent, but 
it was less than 5 percent   (Mydans, 1988). Instead of reducing the political crisis, this 
election deepened it. The opposition parties kept demanding Ershad’s resignation.  
Aftermath of the 1988 election  
On 9 June 1988, the parliament passed a new bill which made Islam the state 
religion. This action refuelled the anti-Ershad movement, because it undermined the 
cardinal value that united people of East Pakistan to fight against the neo-colonial Pakistani 
rule for nearly 25 years. It was the spirit of secularism that motivated people of East 
Pakistan to fight for independence in 1971. The bill changed the basic character of the 
Constitution of Bangladesh (Alam, 1991).  
The year 1989 was more or less quiet due to the holding of local elections. However, 
towards the end of 1990 the anti-Ershad movement regained momentum on the issue of 
state religion. By this time many professional and non-government organizations joined 
the movement. Students’ organizations spearheaded the movement. All 22 students’ 
organizations assembled under a single banner. Under their pressure their parent political 
organizations which formed opposition alliances (AL-lead 8 party alliance, BNP-led 7 
party alliance and 5 party alliance pro-Beijing parties) issued a joint statement on 19 
November 1990. The joint statement declared that Ershad would be forced to appoint a 
new vice-president acceptable to the three alliances. The vice-president would act as the 
acting president and form a neutral government which would organize a free and fair 
election. The joint declaration added further momentum to the movement. The anti-Ershad 
movement elevated to a new height when a leader of the movement was killed on 27 
November 1990. Having failed to crack down the movement, Ershad imposed emergency6 
on 27 November 1990. At that time Ershad’s administration was at a critical juncture. On 
one hand, thousands of protesters were on the street everyday defying curfew. On the other 
hand, some key donor countries threatened to withdraw foreign aid if emergency was 
                                                            
6 This law allows the government to restrict or suspend fundamental rights of citizens. The law enforcing 
agencies can arrest, detain, search and interrogate suspects. In developing countries it is used to suppress 
opposition to the regime in power.  
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continued. Having seen thousands of protesters in streets every day Ershad’s chief 
constituency (the armed forces) withdrew their support on 4 December 1990 and distanced 
themselves from him. This was a deadly blow to his administration, because Ershad ruled 
the country for more than 9 years relying more on the army than any other institution 
(Ahmed, 1995:345). The armed forces could read the mood of the people that any army 
intervention might trigger a civil war. Moreover, they were of the opinion that the army as 
an institution was more important than a member of the armed forces (Kabir, 1995). Ershad 
resigned on 6 December 1990.  
4.6 The post-1990 elections: populist authoritarian regimes (1991-2008) 
 
Figure 4.5 Important political episodes during the populist authoritarian rule (1991-2008) 
 
 
Source: Constructed by the author 
Figure 4.5 highlights the important political episodes during the populist 
authoritarian rule (1991-2008). It also shows periods ruled by the AL, the BNP and the 
NCGs. It is seen that there were some political turmoils during the tenure of each 
government. Each government enjoyed a honeymoon period in the early years of its tenure 
and its rule was challenged by opposition parties on some grounds in later years. Initially 
the opposition parties boycotted the parliamentary sessions off and on on some issues, such 
as they were not allowed to talk in the parliamnet or the government had been monopolizing 
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the parliamentary sessions. Later they started to boycott the parliamentary sessions 
indefinitely on some more politically salient issues, such as institutionalization of the 
(NCG) to ensure free and fair elections and ‘misurle’ of the government.  Whether the 
opposition was the AL or the BNP they used the same tactics to make the government 
dysfunctional. As the elections were nearing, the intensity of political chaos increased 
exponentially. Only the 5th parliemant had had honeymoon period for an extended period.   
4.6.1 The 1991 election 
This sub-section discusses background of the 1991 election, marketing strategies of 
parties, results of the election, and causes of success and failure of dominant parties.  
Background  
Emergence of more competitive political environment 
Ershad followed the same trajectory of his military-turned-civilian predecessors - 
Ayub and Zia with a few exceptions (Baxter and Rahman, 1991b). He launched a political 
party called Jatiya Party, but failed to establish its political legitimacy to the common 
people. Theoretically, the existing mainstream parties - the AL and the BNP - were holding 
centre-left and centre-right position respectively along the left-right ideological distribution 
spectrum. Around the centre there was no room for any centric party. However, he built up 
his party through dispensing patronage. So, his party was able to struck roots in some areas 
in Bangladesh especially in the northern districts of Bangladesh where his ancestral home 
is and where he carried out massive infrastructural development projects. His rule 
transformed the political landscape of Bangladesh to some extent. The Bangladesh politics 
had been dominated by two parties until 1982. Since 1982 the Ershad-led JP also dominated 
the political scene as an incumbent party. With his resignation his party became an 
opposition party and lost influence substantially but not totally. It remained popular in 
northern districts and some other regions in Bangladesh. So, the immediate post-Ershad 
politics in Bangladesh was dominated by five political forces: the AL-led 8 party alliance, 
the BNP-led 7 party alliance, the pro-Beijing 5 party alliance, the Ershad-led JP and the JI.  
According to the previous agreement among the major opposition alliances that 
spearheaded the anti-Ershad movement, a NCG was formed through consensus decision 
and it organized an election on 27 February 1991.    
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Election campaigns under quasi-charismatic leaders 
The mainstream opposition parties ruled the country in the distant past and managed 
to get re-elected through malpractices in elections organized under their supervision. They 
agreed to participate in elections under a caretaker government, because only a NCG could 
organize a free and fair election. Moreover, their probability of coming back to power was 
fifty-fifty if a free and fair election was held. The caretaker government took a number of 
measures to ensure free and fair elections (Mannan, 2005:111).  
It may be mentioned that Mujib is regarded as the father of the nation. He earned 
this glorious status by his relentless struggle against the oppressive Pakistani rule over the 
1947-1970 period. He was the leader of the 1971 Liberation War. The Mujib-led AL ruled 
the country during the 1972-75 period. He was overthrown and assassinated in the 1975 
military coup. After his assassination, the leadership of the AL was eventually bestowed to 
Hasina, his eldest daughter. Similarly, Khaleda became the leader of the BNP after the 
assassination of Zia, her husband in 1981. The Zia-led BNP ruled Bangladesh during 1977-
81 period. Zia was a sector commander in the 1971 Liberation War. He announced the 
independence of Bangladesh on behalf of Mujib on 26 March 1971. So, both the AL and 
the BNP were led by close relations of their assassinated leaders. As a result, feudalism 
was inserted into the politics of Bangladesh like some other South Asian countries.  They 
did not have any political or administrative experiences, but they led the anti-Ershad 
democratic movement for nearly a decade and showed their leadership in leading street 
politics. So, both parties participated in the 1991 election under new leaders.   
Marketing strategies of political parties 
The main parties did not have time to publish any manifestos. They communicated 
their manifestos to people verbally during election campaigns. Baxter and Rahman (1991a) 
find some differences between major opposition parties – the Al and the BNP and recently 
ousted Jatiya Party. The AL promised to re-install the parliamentary system of government 
and restore the original 1972 constitution with secularism, democracy, nationalism and 
socialism as basic principles of the country. During election campaigns it used the slogan 
‘Joy Bangla’ which gives a feeling of Bengali nationalism and ‘togetherness’ among 
Bengali-speaking people living inside and outside Bangladesh. The AL emphasized 
finishing the social, economic and political reforms that the father of the nation and 
assassinated leader of the AL (Mujib) wanted to achieve but could not due to his 
assassination in 1975. It also highlighted the extraordinary leadership that the AL gave 
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during the Liberation War and before. It wanted to capitalize the success of the AL under 
Mujib’s leadership. On the other hand, the BNP promised to continue the presidential form 
of the government introduced by the Mujib-led AL regime. During election campaigns it 
used the slogan ‘Bangladesh Zindabad’ which gives a feeling of ‘togetherness’ among all 
people living within Bangladesh irrespective of their religion and ethnicity and exclude all 
Bengali-speaking people living outside Bangladesh. It also highlighted the political 
accomplishment of Zia during his rule, such as Zia introduced multi-party democracy 
which was abolished by Mujib. The manifesto of the Ershad-led Jatiya Party was very close 
to the BNP. It focused on development under Ershad during his recent rule. However, while 
there was no formal alliance between parties, there was some sort of tacit understanding 
between some parties.   
Results of the 1991 election: issue-based politics triumphed           
Voter turnout in the 1991 election was 55.35 percent (Mannan, 2005:180). The BNP 
won in 140 (46.66 percent) seats polling 30.8 percent votes, the AL won in 88 (29.33 
percent) seats polling 30.1 percent vote, the Jatiya Party won in 35 (11.67 percent) seats 
polling 11.9 percent vote and the Jamaat-i-Islami Bangladesh (JIB) won in 18 (6 percent) 
seats polling 12.1 percent vote (Baxter and Rahman, 1991a). Since the BNP did not secure 
a majority, it formed government with the support of the JIB. Though the AL won in 29.33 
percent seats, its vote share was very close to the BNP’s. Baxter and Rahman (1991a) 
highlighted some important features of this election. Some seasoned politicians lost in this 
election. The BNP received more seats in the Dhaka division, which is economically far 
more developed and has a higher literacy rate. 
Causes of BNP’s success and AL’s defeat 
 As to reasons behind the success of the BNP, Baxter and Rahman (1991a) find that 
BNP’s leaders were more cohesive while addressing in public meetings. Secondly, the 
widespread support of its student wing was also helpful in this regard. Thirdly, the BNP 
led its campaigns on the basis of important national issues. 
 According to Baxter and Rahman (1991a), reasons of defeat of the AL its attempt 
to capitalize on Mujib’s image as the father of the nation. It did not have any appeal to new 
generation voters who grew up after the Liberation War in 1971; these voters were more 
future-oriented. Secondly, Hasina, leader of the AL, made some personal attacks on the 
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leaders of the BNP and associated the birth of the BNP with armed forces. History-
conscious voters did not like this. Thirdly, the AL failed to present itself as a unified party.  
Causes of marginal success of Ershad-led JP and JI  
As to the success of the Ershad-led JP despite allegation of massive financial 
corruption, its win can be explained by the ‘home boy’ effect (Ahmed, 2002:54). The party 
won mainly in the northern districts of Bangladesh where the party leader’s ancestral home 
is. Many voters seemed to have ignored the corruption charges against him and his cronies, 
because voters were benefitted from the infrastructural development in their localities 
performed by him. The JIB received 18 seats scattered all over Bangladesh. It implies that 
they built up some solid support base in some areas through their socioeconomic and 
religious activities (Momen, 2009).  
Lessons learned from the 1991 election          
The 1991 parliamentary election was a historic one, because it was free and fair in 
terms of any international standard (Baxter and Rahman, 1991a). It was held under the 
supervision of a NCG and thus it was proved beyond doubt that only and only a NCG can 
ensure free and fair elections in a highly factional political environment of Bangladesh. 
Secondly, as all the post-independence elections until 1990 were massively rigged by 
incumbents, people lost their confidence in elections. This election restored people’s 
confidence in elections and infused a hope in the mind of the people about the prospect of 
developing Western-style democratic institutions in Bangladesh. Thirdly, since no parties 
polled absolute majority seats, the party (the BNP) which won the highest number of seats 
in the parliament had to make coalition with a minor party. Forging a coalition is not easy, 
because the main coalition partner had to give concessions to the minor coalition partners 
which they usually ignore due to its hegemony in politics. Thus, it ushered a new era of 
compromise politics in Bangladesh. Fourthly, though the loser (the AL) complained that 
there was subtle ‘vote rigging’ against its candidates, it could not prove it and consequently 
remained silent on this issue. So, this election opened a new window of accepting the 
people’s verdict, however unpleasant it was.  
4.6.2 The 1996 election 
This sub-section discusses the background of the 1996 election, marketing 
strategies of parties, results of the election, and causes of success and failure of dominant 
parties.  
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Background  
Short-lived political spring in Bangladesh politics 
The 5th parliament was functioning reasonably well due to active participation of 
the opposition members of the parliament (MPs) in the parliamentary debates and 
committees, and hence the executive body was made more accountable to the parliament 
(Ahmed, 2002:184). Secondly, both the incumbent and the dominant opposition cooperated 
to amend the constitution to transform the system of government from the presidential to 
the parliamentary one (Jahan, 2005:286). Thirdly, the government abolished the upazila 
system which was created by the Ershad-led JP to consolidate its power at the grass root 
level (Lewis, 2011:86). While everything was going on well, the results of the by-election 
held on 20 March 1994 in the Magura constituency put a sudden brake on the functioning 
of the parliament. It was considered a safe seat of the dominant opposition AL and it 
expected to win in that election, but it lost by a narrow margin. It was alleged that the 
incumbent BNP won through massive electoral corruption (Hasanuzzaman, 2009:42). In 
fact, the by-elections are never highly competitive, because winning or losing in those 
elections does not change the government. The Magura election was an exception. By 
winning in the Magura by-election the BNP government wanted to show that its political 
legitimacy was as high as ever. On the other hand, by winning in the same election the 
opposition AL wanted to demonstrate that the ruling BNP lost popularity and it had no 
political legitimacy to rule the country.  In this context all opposition parties asked the BNP 
Government to bring a bill in the parliament to this effect that all future parliamentary 
elections including by-elections be held under NCGs. The government was unwilling to do 
so. While the opposition parties were putting pressure upon the government through 
prolonged strikes to accept their demand for institutionalising the NCG, the government 
tried to resist it by all brutal means.  Defying the demand it held the 6th parliamentary 
election on 15 February 1996 without participation of the dominant opposition parties. 
Under intense pressure from different political parties and social groups and after much 
political turmoil, it raised the proposed bill in the 6th parliament and got it passed on 25 
March 1996. Thus, the constitution incorporated the provision of the NCG. Both the 
government and the opposition claimed credit for this (Jahan, 2005:287). The Khaleda-led 
incumbent government claimed credit to this effect that it saved the democracy by 
following the constitutional process. On the other hand, the Hasina-led dominant 
opposition party claimed credit to this effect that it forced the government to add a 
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nationally important provision in the constitution. Under intense pressure from opposition 
parties the BNP Government dissolved the 6th parliament and stepped down. An NCG 
organized the 7th parliamentary election on 12 June 1996 (Rahman, 1997:579-580; 
Hasanuzzaman, 2009:44-45). However, a military coup was going to take place to foil the 
scheduled election, but the NCG took steps in time to avert it (Kochanek, 1996).    
Marketing strategies of political parties  
There were 2572 candidates for 300 constituencies. The main contestants were the 
AL and the BNP. Kochanek (1996), Mannan (2005:150-152) and Islam (2001) narrate the 
election strategies of the BNP and the AL. The BNP claimed that Bangladesh had ‘a golden 
time’ during its recent rule. Khaleda Zia (leader of the BNP and wife of assassinated Zia, 
also complained that her party took all measures to take the country to the level attained by 
Singapore, Malaysia and South Korea, but the AL foiled it through prolonged strikes. 
Secondly, she blamed that the AL was ‘anti-democratic, politically incompetent, and a pro-
Indian stooge’. Thirdly, she tried to impress people that only the BNP could offer a stable 
government. Fourthly, the BNP claimed that the AL established one party rule, while the 
BNP revived the multi-party rule. 
Hasina, the leader of the AL, realized that her arrogance was responsible for the 
AL’s defeat in many seats by narrow margins in the 1991 election. So, she was very 
‘humble and positive’ in this election. She asked people to forgive her father for any 
mistakes he made during his rule over the 1972-75 period. Secondly, she also assured 
people that she would not renew the 25-year ‘treaty of peace and friendship’ with India. 
Thirdly, she also promised that she would free the judiciary from the control of the 
executive body, free universities from terrorism, allow freedom of press, extend financial 
help to farmers, eradicate corruption, repeal all ‘black’ laws and secure a fair share of 
Ganges water and so on. Fourthly, while Hasina attended the public meetings, she used to 
cover her face and body as prescribed in Islam. She also quoted from the Qur’an and 
sayings of prophet (Hadiths) in her speeches. Fifthly, the AL criticized the BNP terming 
its recent past rule as an ‘inefficient and corrupt’ rule. Sixthly, it advocated for re-
installation of the Upazila system introduced by the Ershad-led JP Government and 
subsequently abolished by the Khaleda-led BNP Government. Finally, like the BNP, she 
also advocated for the free-market economy instead of the planned economy.           
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Results of the 1996 election: humbleness triumphed 
Voter turnout was 74.81 percent in 1996 against 55.35 percent in 1991. This implies 
that the 1996 election was more competitive than the 1991 one. The AL, the dominant 
opposition of the 1991 parliament, won in 146 seats (48.6 percent) polling 37.4 percent 
votes. On the other hand, the incumbent BNP won 116 seats (38.6 percent) polling 33.6 
percent votes. The Jatiya Party won in 32 seats (10.9 percent) polling 16.4 percent votes 
and the JIB won only 3 seats (1 percent) polling 8.6 percent votes (Khan, 1997). As the AL 
did not win in the majority seats, it could not form the government on its own. The Ershad-
led Jatiya party offered unconditional support to the AL to enable it to form the 
government. Analysing results of this election Ahmed (2002:55) reveals the following 
salient features: (i) the incumbent party of the immediate past parliament became the 
dominant opposition in the current parliament and vice versa; (ii) the dominant opposition 
party of the last parliament secured more seats and percentage of popular vote in 1996 than 
what it did in 1991; (iii) the incumbent BNP secured more votes in 1996 than it did in 1991, 
but lost some seats to the opposition AL; (iv) the JIB suffered most. Hasanuzzaman 
(2009:45) adds that the 7th parliament had the highest number of opposition MPs. It is 
because, some leftist parties unofficially merged with the AL in this election and they 
contested with AL’s party symbol. 
Causes of AL’s success and BNP’s defeat 
The electoral defeat of the BNP (the incumbent party) in the 1996 parliamentary 
election can be attributed to a number of factors. Rahman (1997:586), Hossain (2000) and 
Ahmed (2002:520) focus on these factors. There were some negative votes against some 
of its candidates. Secondly, it failed to garner support from its traditional ally, the JIB and 
also from the civil and military bureaucracy. Thirdly, its political campaigns were more 
focused on rhetorical achievement rather than current issues and future policies. Fourthly, 
Khaleda Zia (leader of the incumbent party), whose image increased due to her 
uncompromising attitude towards the unpopular Ershad regime during the late 1980s, lost 
her image following her defensive stance against inclusion of NCG in the Constitution of 
Bangladesh. Fifthly, some AL leaders were murdered before the election and some BNP 
leaders were implicated in this connection. As a result, the AL received some sympathy 
votes. Sixthly, the BNP government failed to protect basic human rights of the people, 
especially women and children. Seventhly, the BNP, after assumption of power in 1991, 
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liberalized the economy so quickly that some socioeconomic classes were adversely 
affected by it and this reduced its electoral support among those groups.  
Ahmed (2002:55-6), Hossain (2000:520) and Karim (2004:463) attributed the 
success of the AL to some other factors. It acknowledged its past ‘mistakes’ and begged 
forgiveness for them. Secondly, its election campaigns were better coordinated than 
before. Thirdly, its leaders and workers campaigned door-to-door. Fourthly, its leader 
appealed to the people to give the party a second chance to ‘serve the people’ again. 
Fifthly, the AL was able to split the anti-AL votes into two or more than two blocks. 
Sixthly, it seemed that while immediate past incumbent party was more arrogant, the 
dominant opposition AL was more humble. Humility rather than arrogance was more 
effective in garnering votes. Seventhly, the AL banked successfully on hardship of various 
socioeconomic classes resulting from quick liberalization of the economy under BNP-led 
government. 
Lessons learned from the 1996 election          
Rashiduzzaman (1997) identifies a key lesson that can be learned from the 1996 
election results. The AL carried out prolonged strikes against the BNP government and 
brought it down from power, which it obtained legitimately. Thus, the strikes became a 
powerful weapon to bring down a legitimate government in Bangladesh. It also showed 
that determined opposition parties did not need to be patient and go through the institutional 
processes to bring no-confidence motion against the government and get it passed by 
convincing majority members of the parliament. It does not matter how much political 
legitimacy the government obtained and how. What mattered most was to make some 
issues politically salient. As long as the opposition parties can justify the reasons of strikes 
and claim it as their democratic right and enforce them by any means, persistent strikes are 
likely to increase their popularity. However, by doing so the incoming government created 
problems for itself. Due to prolonged strikes during 1994-95 the economy of Bangladesh 
collapsed and the new government had to bear the cost by losing in the next election.   
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Comparing and contrasting between the 1991 and the 1996 elections 
Table 4.1 Comparison and contrasting between the 1991 and the 1996 elections 
1991 election 1996 election 
1.   No dominant parties were 
incumbents. 
1. One dominant party (the BNP) was 
incumbent. 
2. Parties built up their popularity on 
the basis of their retrospective and 
prospective performance as well as 
by leading popular movements.  
Dispensing of the political patronage 
was the main vehicle of cultivating 
popularity during incumbency. 
2.   The incumbent had recent past 
performance. It retained popularity 
through dispensing political 
patronage.   
The dominant opposition (the AL) 
had retrospective performance in the 
socioeconomic development and it 
dispensed political patronage during 
its incumbency. It also obtained 
popularity by leading anti-
government movements.   
3.   Following tacit alliance two parties 
(AL and BNP) emerged as major 
and two parties (Jatiya Party and 
JIB) emerged as minor parties. So, 
alliance was crucial for winning and 
forming the government. 
3. For lack of alliance between the 
BNP and the JIB, both lost votes as 
well as seats. Percentage of seat lost 
was more than that of vote lost. 
4. Less competitive, because turnout 
was low (55.35 percent). For lack of 
free and fair elections for a long time 
since 1973 people became 
politically apathetic.  
4.   More competitive, because turnout 
was high (74.81 percent). 
Subsequent free and fair elections 
made people more politically 
conscious.   
 
5.   Uncompromising attitude of the BNP 
to the authoritarian incumbent 
(Jatiya Party) made the BNP 
popular. 
5. Uncompromising attitude to the 
legitimate demands of opposition 
parties made the BNP unpopular. 
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Kochanek (1997) highlights another lesson. In order to stimulate the anti-
government movement opposition parties made some un-implementable promises. When 
the opposition was elected, it needed to deliver those promises. When it could not deliver 
so, it lost the political legitimacy obtained during the movement and faced electoral defeat 
in the subsequent election. When the incumbent became opposition in the following 
election, it followed the same path. So, political legitimacy earned through anti-government 
movement was very short-lived. Secondly, free and fair elections are necessary but not 
sufficient condition for development of democratic institutions. More is needed than just 
elections. Thirdly, according to the Duverger’s law, under the first-past-the-post electoral 
system competitive elections gradually led to development of two-party political system. 
Small parties and independents either merged with dominant parties or vanished. Though 
Duverger gave his law in the context of developed countries, it is also applicable in 
emerging democracies like Bangladesh.     
4.6.3 The 2001 election 
This sub-section discusses background of the 2001 election, marketing strategies 
of parties, results of the election, and causes of success and failure of dominant parties.  
Background  
 The tug of war between the government and the dominant opposition  
The 7th parliament, like its preceding ones, could not become the centre point of 
resolving all disputes between the incumbent party(s) and their opposition counterparts, 
mainly due to confrontational politics both inside and outside the parliament. While the 
incumbent party tended to monopolize the parliamentary affairs, the opposition parties 
tended to oppose the government initiatives sometimes for the sake of opposition 
disregarding their merits (Hasanuzzaman, 2009:48). The opposition (mainly the BNP, the 
JP and the JI) parties continued with their anti-government agitations both inside and 
outside the parliament. Those were the same instruments that the incumbent AL exercised 
when it was in the opposition bench. As Ahmad (2008:53) observes ‘…..street politics by 
the opposition is believed to have replaced the voice of the people.’ As the next election 
was approaching nearer and nearer, the law and order situation of the country was 
becoming worse day by day due to agitation by opposition parties on the ‘misrule’ of the 
government. The incumbent AL government miserably failed on all fronts. ‘Lawlessness, 
intractable governance, executive-judiciary acrimony, enfeebled diplomacy, and economic 
stagnation’ engulfed the entire nation (Rashiduzzaman, 2001). The 1996 election was held 
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under the supervision of a NCG and the election was free and fair. Anticipating ‘crushing’ 
defeat in the coming election following its ‘five-year misrule’, the incumbent AL 
questioned the efficacy of holding election under a NCG. While the opposition kept 
demanding for holding the 2001 parliamentary election under a NCG, the incumbent 
government insisted on holding the same under its supervision. The opposition parties 
could have anticipated the ulterior motive of the incumbent AL that it would try to be re-
elected through applying all sorts of electoral malpractices. As a result, both the incumbent 
and opposition parties were at loggerheads. While the opposition political parties exercised 
their traditional means (e.g., prolonged strikes, surrounding important public offices and 
indefinite work stoppages) for realizing their legitimate demands, the government used the 
law-enforcing agencies as well as its activists including armed cadres to suppress 
opposition parties (Ahmad, 2008:69), which in the end reduced its electoral support. 
Secondly, the AL government followed the ‘divide and rule’ policy. It arrested Ershad, the 
leader of the JP, who was released on parole for corruption charges. His party also joined 
the anti-government movement. Later Ershad was released on the condition that his party 
would withdraw from the anti-government movement. At the expiry of the government’s 
term the president took an initiative to appoint a NCG to hold a free and fair election as per 
demands of the opposition political parties as well as the Bangladesh Constitution. The 
NCG declared that the 8th parliamentary election would be held on 1 October 2001. In an 
attempt to influence the coming election results, the AL government posted its loyal 
bureaucrats in important posts. So, the new caretaker government carried out a major re-
shuffling of bureaucracy to ensure a free and fair election (Rashiduzzaman, 2002).    
Importance of the 2001 election 
Ahmed and Ahmed (2003:503-5) and Hossain (2000) highlight the significance of 
the 2001 parliamentary election. This election was a turning point towards consolidation 
of democracy which was likely to have rooted in the political structure of Bangladesh over 
the 1991-2000 period when at least minimum representative democracy was practiced in 
Bangladesh. Secondly, the two dominant parties (AL and BNP) were incumbents in the 
recent time and hence voters could evaluate their recent promises and performance. The 
voters were unlikely to be influenced by charismatic images of deceased leaders of the AL 
and the BNP. Thirdly, electoral behavior became more predictable. More voters have 
become anti-incumbent. Both dominant parties commanded at least 30 percent (minimum 
vote share of each party in the 1990 election) of total votes cast. It would be hard for any 
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party to poll absolute majority seats. So, coalition government was anticipated. Fourthly, 
as per Duverger’s law, within one decade of electoral politics they have converged towards 
the centre in the left-right ideological policy spectrum in almost all respects (Hossain, 
2000). So, it was hard for voters to distinguish between them mainly in terms of many 
policies.  
Marketing strategies of political parties  
The election campaigns of both dominant contending parties (AL and BNP) were 
lacklustre. Both parties identified the same issues, such as terrorism and corruption as the 
most important problems of the country and vowed to eradicate them. Both agreed on the 
most important issues, such as separation of judiciary from executive body and making the 
administration more accountable and transparent, and appointment of an Ombudsman. 
Both sought to gain electoral support from teachers and farmers by promising to them more 
benefits if elected (Mannan, 2005:168-170). They held identical views on economic 
policies, but they were ambivalent on issues such as privatization, public sector 
expenditure, and financial sector reforms. Despite differences in their ideological 
orientation, they chose candidates with similar demographic and economic characteristics, 
Muslims, men, and economically affluent people. Both the incumbent and the opposition 
parties used their traditional campaign strategies (Ahmed and Ahmed, 2003:504-5).    
Results of the 2001 election: re-spring for Bangladeshi nationalism 
The BNP-led opposition alliance won 215 seats and of these the BNP alone won 
192 seats. The alliance won in 71.66 percent of seats and received 47.18 percent votes. The 
BNP alone won in 63.44 percent seats and 41.40 percent votes. So, the alliance was entitled 
to form the government. On the other hand, the AL lost a lot of seats winning only 62 
(20.67 percent) seats and received 40.02 percent votes (Riaz, 2016, Appendix 4). The JIB 
and Jatiya Party (Naziur) benefitted by joining the BNP-led alliance (Rashiduzzaman, 
2002).  
Causes of BNP’s success and AL’s defeat 
Since the BNP-led coalition was a right-leaning alliance and its ideological identity 
is Bangladeshi nationalism, the result may be treated as a verdict in favour of Bangladeshi 
nationalism. On the other hand, the AL which claims itself as a custodian of Bengali 
nationalism polled fewer votes. So, one argument is that Bangladeshi nationalism 
influenced more voters than Bengali nationalism. Secondly, Rashiduzzaman (2002) and 
Karim (2004:445) opine that a key driver of the victory of the BNP-led coalition was the 
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coalition formation, because the BNP-led coalition candidates defeated the AL’s 
candidates by very narrow margins in more than 50 percent constituencies. Moreover, 
Mannan (2005:173) found that the BNP secured 2nd position in 43 seats, whereas the AL 
secured 2nd position in 225 seats. So, the competition between the AL and the BNP-led 
coalition was very tough. Thirdly, while alliance arithmetic played a vital role in the case 
of victory of the BNP-led alliance, terrorist activities carried out by the incumbent AL’s 
activists in many constituencies was a major cause of its defeat (Rashiduzzaman, 2002; 
Karim, 2004:445).  Fourthly, another important reason of the AL’s defeat was its utter 
failure to protect life and property of the common people. Though public safety was 
endangered by the activities of both the incumbent and the opposition parties, voters 
seemed to have blamed the incumbent AL for its failure to do so (Rashiduzzaman, 2002). 
On average during 1996-2000 period six persons were killed per week (New Nation, 18 
Nov., 2000). More than 100 people were killed in the AL’s factional strife in 1999 
(Rashiduzzaman, 2001). Fifthly, the poor economic performance of the AL government 
may be a potentially responsible factor for its poor electoral performance (Rashiduzzaman, 
2002). During the 2000-2001 period the per capita income grew by only 1.6 percent which 
was lowest among all South Asian countries. Moreover, the average domestic debt grew to 
34.51 percent in the pre-election 2000-2001 period from 12.8 percent in 1999 and 18.6 
percent in 2000. It was only 9.5 percent during the BNP’s recent tenure (1991-1996) 
(Rashiduzzaman, 2001, 2002).   
Lessons from the 2001 election 
The 2001 election sent a warning to political actors on the centre-left that a strong 
sense of pan-Islamic sentiment was the driver for a landslide victory of the BNP-led 
coalition. However, this sentiment was not equivalent to the militant Islam as posed by the 
JIB and Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ), the coalition partners of the BNP. The BNP distanced 
itself from them on the issue of declaring Bangladesh as an Islamic country 
(Rashiduzzaman, 2002). The high vote shares of the AL-led coalition also indicates that 
people of Bangladesh still cherish secularism in their mind, but the AL’s secularism was a 
brand of secularism which has lost appeal to many Muslim voters. Secondly, though a 
strong pan-Islamic sentiment prevailed, there is no chance to turn Bangladesh into a 
theocratic country. This is because, it would be hard for a coalition of Islamic parties to 
win more than 50 percent seats in the parliament. They need to make coalitions with one 
of the mainstream centrist parties which would tend to pull them towards the centre 
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(Rashiduzzaman, 2002). Thirdly, the left-leaning parties did not win in any seats. This 
implies that traditional socialism has lost appeal. Fourthly, when competition is tough, 
number of seats is not proportional to the number of votes. Seat share is much less than 
vote share.         
Political development between the 1991 and the 2001 elections 
As some minimum democratic practices had been taking roots under NCGS, the 
dominant parties had been moving closer to the centre and in terms of pro-market policy 
they were becoming more and more indistinguishable. The two medium-sized minor 
parties clustered around two major parties. Many independents either retired from the 
politics or joined the dominant parties. So, support for the dominant parties grew to such 
an extent that each has enough popular support to overthrow the other through 
unconstitutional means, such as street politics. In elections they were competing for a small 
percentage of swing voters who determine the election results. Since they exhausted all 
their pro-market policy reforms, they confronted each other on non-policy grounds, such 
as trial of collaborators of the 1971 genocide in Bangladesh. Secondly, the pro-Indian 
versus anti-Indian debate disappeared from the electoral politics of Bangladesh, as both 
parties realized that they would have to rule accommodating their policy with India, a large 
and important neighbour of Bangladesh. Attempts to get votes by tickling anti-Indian 
sentiment no longer worked. Thirdly, political rhetoric was no longer a vote-gaining tool. 
Now, voters evaluate parties by their performance especially the economic one. Fourthly, 
about 7 percent voters of Bangladesh vote for Islamist parties. This percentage has 
remained steady over the 1991-2001 period. This implies that Islamist parties have failed 
to make inroads into new segments of voters, but they have been able to retain their support 
base intact (Riaz, 2014:165). Fifthly, political parties have realized that pre-election 
alliance is a powerful instrument to poll more votes and seats and capture ruling power. 
The danger is that if they can manage two-third majority in the parliament through alliance, 
they can bring about fundamental changes in the constitution. Thus, they can change the 
constitution as per their political necessity (Chaudhury, 2012). Sixthly, dominant parties 
are finding it difficult to shrug off outside pressure in a more globalized world. International 
pressure has disciplined dominant parties over and over again.  
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4.6.4 The 2008 election 
Background: the tug of war between the government and the dominant opposition 
reappeared 
While all international observers of the 2001 election termed the election as free 
and fair, the losing AL brought allegations of vote rigging against its candidates and asked 
for a fresh election (BBC News, 2001). It may be mentioned that the winner BNP did the 
same thing after its defeat in the 1996 election. So, it became a ‘nasty’ political culture in 
Bangladesh that when a party won, the election was considered by it as fair and when it 
lost the election was considered unfair. As a result the 8th parliament could not function 
well for the same confrontational politics like before (Rahman, 2008:85).  The Prime 
Minister herself had been absent 178 days and the opposition leader herself refrained from 
attending the parliament 328 days out of 373 working days (Hasanuzzaman, 2009:51). The 
opposition AL kept boycotting the parliament. Not a single outstanding issue was resolved 
in the parliament through debates (Jahan, 2005:290). The confrontational politics turned 
into a dangerous direction when the AL-led opposition parties decided to launch movement 
to topple the government before expiry of its term. On 27 October 2006 the parliament was 
dissolved and the President appointed himself as the Chief Advisor of the caretaker 
government. The opposition AL-led coalition parties alleged that the caretaker government 
and the Bangladesh Election Commission were biased towards the BNP and hence they 
vowed to boycott and prevent the upcoming election at any cost.  
NCG’s drive against corruption: ‘untouchable’ became ‘touchable’ 
When the situation deteriorated further following the opposition parties’ movement 
to force the NCG to accept their demands, the President declared emergency and appointed 
a new caretaker government on 11 January 2007. This new NCG, backed by the army, 
gradually implemented some legal reforms to ensure free and fair election. Meanwhile, on 
assumption of power it started a sweeping anti-corruption drive leading to arrest of many 
people which included political leaders and activists, government officials and 
businessmen (Hagerty, 2008:178). It also arrested two ‘untouchables’ – the topmost leaders 
of both the AL and the BNP - on corruption charges. One hundred seventy political leaders 
belonging to the BNP were charged with corruption cases (Hagerty, 2008:178). At first 
people supported this anti-corruption drive, but later it became controversial. However, 
following much political bargaining and postponement of election dates several times, the 
caretaker government announced that the 9th parliamentary election was to be held on 29 
December, 2008.  
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Importance of the 2008 election 
The holding of the 9th parliamentary election was challenging for the NCG, because 
the incumbent BNP did everything to manipulate the election results indirectly. While the 
BNP incorporated the provision of the caretaker government into the constitution, it added 
that immediate past Chief Justice would be the Chief Advisor of the NCG. The BNP-led 
coalition government increased the retirement age of the judges of the Supreme Court from 
65 to 67 years so that its preferred judge could be the Chief Advisor of the NCG. Secondly, 
before stepping down the BNP-led coalition government re-shuffled all tiers of the 
bureaucracy so that the election would be conducted mostly by its loyalists in the 
administration. Such manoeuvring would make the election a farce. So, all opposition 
parties protested against it. The tussle ultimately boiled down to the BNP and the AL only. 
Both parties confronted each other in streets. When the situation of the country was going 
to take the status of a failed state, the army took the power and declared emergency to save 
the country from a chaotic situation. Within a short period the law and order situation 
improved. The new NCG passed some laws that disqualified loan defaulters to contest in 
the election and thus reduce the influence of black money in politics. It also tried many 
corrupt officials and businessmen and was able to make the country free from massive 
corruption for a while. Transferring power to a civilian government through organizing a 
free and fair election, the army returned to the barrack and let the democratic practice rolled 
on. The army-backed NCG proved that if the government was determined, a free and fair 
election could be held in a multi-fractured political environment like Bangladesh. It was a 
critical election for several reasons. Both the BNP and the AL formed formal alliances. 
Before only one of them formed formal alliance. Secondly, while previous elections were 
held within three months from the expiry of the term of the government, it was held two 
years later from the scheduled date. By this time many important events took place. The 
caretaker government was not simply consisted of civilians. It was backed by the army due 
to emergence of a special situation. In turn, the caretaker government ventured to cleanse 
politics from ‘two Begums’ (Hasina and Khaleda, topmost leaders of the AL and the BNP 
respectively) but failed. The NCG tried many corrupt politicians, businessmen and 
bureaucrats, re-organized the Election Commission and the Anti-Corruption Bureau afresh 
and so on. The attempts taken by the NCG may be termed as revolutionary in the context 
of Bangladesh, because they targeted to reduce influence of black money in politics. 
Thirdly, for the first time the young generation, who comprised 32 percent of voters, used 
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digital technologies for political communication. Fourthly, a most accurate list of voters 
was compiled with the help of the army and voters were issued photo identification cards. 
This reduced fraudulent practices in voting. Overall, the army played an important role in 
the democratic transformation of the politics of the country for a while (Ahmed, 2011).        
Marketing strategies of political parties  
The AL-led Grand Alliance and the BNP-led Four-party Alliance were the main 
contestants in the 2008 election. One important feature of the alliances of this election was 
that some small co-alliance parties used the election symbols of the main co-alliance party 
and some did not (Ahmed, 2011). This implies that some parties tried to demonstrate 
distinctiveness in their ideologies as well as maintain unity for electoral victory. Ahmed 
(2011) highlighted the similarities and dissimilarities in the manifestos of both the 
mainstream parties (the AL and the BNP). Both identified the same problems as national 
problems, such as poverty, electricity shortage, and food crisis and promised to alleviate 
them as quickly as possible. Both pledged to make the administration accountable and 
transparent. They both also committed to make the parliament an effective place for solving 
national problems.  They did not have spectacular differences in their economic policies. 
Both emphasized the development of the industrial and information technology sectors. 
However, the AL was more specific in some cases. It prioritized some problems and gave 
a time frame to implement those (Alamgir, 2009). The AL also nominated a large number 
of new faces who did not have corruption charges against them (Alamgir, 2009). It also 
pledged to set up regional task forces to combat terrorism in regions. The AL promised to 
digitize Bangladesh by 2021. On the other hand, the BNP’s manifesto was more general 
and sometimes self-contradictory and barren (Zaman and Ahmed, 2008). Thirdly, both 
parties remained silent on some important issues, such as decentralization and 
democratization of local governments, time frame for implementing better governance, and 
democratization of their parties. They did not specify the ways and means of implementing 
their proposed policies. All parties agreed that strikes and blockades harmed the economic 
development of the country, but they did not propose any specific measures to stop them.     
Though the AL and the BNP were the main contenders, the JI and the JP were ‘king-
makers’ in the 1991 and the 1996 parliaments respectively. By 2008 they consolidated their 
positions in the political market in terms of percentage votes polled. So, Ahmed (2011) 
also highlights the main features of their manifestos. The Jatiya Party promised to make 
the government system federal by dividing Bangladesh into eight provinces with each 
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province having an assembly and a cabinet. This was a new promise. As an Islamic party 
the JI long ignored the constitution as the main source of laws. Now, alongside the Qur’an 
and the Sunnah (sayings, actions, and approvals of the prophet Mohammad) it had declared 
its faith in the Constitution of Bangladesh and described it as one of the main sources of 
laws. It promised to enact the blasphemy law and reform some other laws.      
The political marketing strategies of the AL and the BNP were more or less similar 
(Ahmed, 2011). Both parties carried out campaigns through ‘door-to-door’ knocking. 
Secondly, the topmost leaders of both parties campaigned throughout the country. The BNP 
leader travelled more distance and covered more constituencies than the leader of the AL. 
Thirdly, the topmost leaders of the dominant parties refrained from making derogatory 
comments about each other and digging out misdeeds of each other’s party. For the first 
time they carried out election campaigns in civilized ways. Fourthly, they also abstained 
from making any emotional appeal to voters as they did before. They concentrated on 
salient national issues to make Bangladesh better in the future.  
Results of the 2008 election: a new brand of Bengali nationalism triumphed  
About 86.3 percent voters turned out for voting in the 2008 election. This was the 
highest turnout rate since 1991. Riaz (2016, Appendix 5) shows the results as follows: (i) 
the AL alone won 230 seats polling 49 percent votes, while the BNP alone won in 30 seats 
polling 33.2 percent votes. The AL-led Grand Alliance won in 263 seats polling 57.1 
percent votes, while the BNP-led Four-party Alliance won in 33 seats polling 37.9 percent 
votes; and (ii) other parties and independents won in 4 seats polling only 4.9 percent votes. 
So, the AL itself and the AL-led Grand Alliance won a landslide victory in 2008 election. 
The AL alone received over two-third majority seats in the parliament. One important 
aspect of this election is that the defeated BNP accepted the verdict of the people (Ahmed, 
2011).  
Causes of AL’s success and BNP’s defeat 
Zaman (2009) and Alamgir (2009) identify the following major reasons for failure 
of the BNP-led alliance: (i) nomination of controversial and corrupt candidates; (ii) 
unbridled corruption of cronies of the leaders of the BNP; (iii) organizational weaknesses; 
(iv) the leaders of the BNP-led alliance made some ‘irresponsible’ comments against the 
caretaker government and media; (v) the BNP also sheltered the leaders of the JI who 
collaborated with the Pakistani Occupation Army for carrying out genocide in Bangladesh 
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during the Liberation war (Daily Jugantar, 31 December, 2008). There was no valid reason 
to protect them from trial, because they were war criminals. This might anger the older 
generations who witnessed the atrocities of the Pakistani army and their collaborators; (vi) 
the BNP-led alliance used Islam rhetorically, such as ‘save Islam, save the country’. Thus, 
it tried to give an impression that voting for the BNP and its allies was equivalent to support 
for Islam. Most people of Bangladesh are Islam-loving, but they did not like someone using 
Islam for political gain (Daily Star, 30 December, 2008 and 01 January and 2009; Alamgir, 
2009); (vii) young voters, who constituted 32 percent of total voters, were influenced by 
factors such as shortage of electricity supply, deterioration of law and order condition, rise 
of so-called Islamist militancy, rise of terrorist attacks on common people, politicization of 
administration, nepotism in allocating public tenders and recruitment, and so on, all of 
which rose sharply during BNP-led incumbent government, and hence they cast vote 
against them (Manik, 2008); (viii) the anti-incumbency factor might have worked against 
the BNP, because the BNP’s vote share declined by 20 percent, while the AL’s vote share 
increased by 25 percent (Daily Star, 1 January, 2009); (ix) instead of acknowledging their 
misdeeds and apologizing for them to voters, the government rather became more arrogant 
and showed zero respect to public concerns (Sobhan, 2008); (x) the economic growth rate 
was 6.7 percent in 2007 against 6.6 percent in 2006, the highest since independence in 1971 
(Hagerty, 2008). The BNP-led alliance could not communicate this message to voters.  
A number of factors are responsible for the grand success of the AL-led Grand 
alliance. The main driver of success might have been the campaign conducted by the sector 
commanders’ forum, an association of people who were leaders in different sectors in 
Bangladesh during the Liberation war in 1971 (Ahmed, 2011).  The forum organized 
meetings where they highlighted atrocities committed by the leaders of the JI during the 
Liberation War (Alamgir, 2009). Some leaders of the JI were candidates in the election. 
Since the BNP was sheltering those leaders and raising barriers to try them, the forum also 
focused on the evil motives of the BNP in this regard. The forum pointed out that the trial 
of war criminals was necessary for restoring existential identity of Bangladesh – Bengali 
nationalism. Since leaders of the forum were non-partisan and well-respected for their 
invaluable contribution to the Liberation War, they were able to convince the young voters 
more effectively than others. Moreover, the young voters may be influenced by the AL’s 
promise of making Bangladesh digital by 2021 and techno-centric electioneering 
techniques. As one-third of voters fell into this category, a large percentage of the AL’s 
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votes came from them. Secondly, the turnover of women voters in this election was higher 
than before. It might be possible that they voted against the BNP and by default in favour 
of the AL, because the BNP made alliance with the JI and IOJ which are conservative 
Islamist parties advocating for restricting rights of women granted under the liberal 
democratic system. Thirdly, since prices of rice and other daily necessities skyrocketed 
during the last part of the BNP’s rule, the AL promised to bring their prices down to the 
level affordable for the common people. This appealed to those who were hard hit by higher 
inflation rates (Ahmed, 2011).  
It may be noticed that the results of the 2008 election were somewhat different from 
previous elections. The average vote shares of the AL and the BNP were 35.89 percent and 
35.19 percent respectively in elections held over the 1991-2001 period; they were very 
close to each other. The maximum difference between their vote shares was 3.65 
percentage points in the 1996 election. However, in the 2008 election average vote shares 
of the AL and the BNP were 49 percent and 33.20 percent respectively. The difference was 
15.80 percentage points which was 4.32 times larger than that of the 1996 election. So, 
some ‘idiosyncratic’ factors might be behind it. The average voter turnout in the 1996 and 
the 2001 elections was 74.65 percent and it increased by 11.65 percentage points in the 
2008 election. So, the voter turnout definitely contributed to a substantial rise of the AL’s 
and a substantial fall of the BNP’s vote shares. This implies that more voters turned out to 
cast votes against the incumbent BNP. One remarkable abnormality of this election is that 
it was held two years later than the scheduled date.  Meanwhile, the military-backed 
caretaker government filed corruption cases against many leaders of the AL and the BNP 
including their topmost leaders (Alamgir, 2009). As the incumbent party was the BNP, 
more leaders of the BNP were charged with corruption than those of the AL. However, 
corruption of the BNP’s leaders might be an important factor in reducing its vote shares 
substantially, but there might be some other ‘hidden’ factors too. This is because, on the 
eve of the 1991 election many leaders of the immediate past incumbent party (Jatiya Party) 
were charged with corruption cases as gravest as those brought against the BNP’s leaders, 
but many of them won with high margins7.                      
 
                                                            
7 Ahmed (2014:282-295) has developed some ‘conspiracy’ theories in this connection which may or may 
not have any merits. 
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Lessons from the 2008 election 
The spirit of Bengali nationalism, which blossomed from a long interaction of 
common language, culture and ethnicity between Hindus and Muslims living in Bengal, 
was still alive in the heart of the people of Bangladesh and had the potentiality to make 
history time and again as evidenced in the 2008 election. However, this Bengali nationalism 
is a bit different from the one that inspired East Pakistani Bengalis to protest against 
exploitation of colonial rulers - West Pakistani Urdu-speaking civil and military 
bureaucrats. The contemporary Bengali nationalism cherished by young voters has a pan-
Islamic bias as evidenced in the 1996 election and is conditioned by socioeconomic 
performance as found in the 2008 election. As a result, any party that wants the support of 
the young voters must maintain a fine balance between pan-Islamic sentiments of young 
voters and programmes to meet their socioeconomic needs. The new generation had no 
bias towards the AL for its glorious role in the Liberation War. It is a past. If the AL fails 
to meet their socioeconomic needs, they may turn their backs against it too in the coming 
elections (Sobhan, 2009).  
Effective and ineffective election strategies 
From the above discussion, it is clear that some strategies were more effective vote-
gainers than others. The more effective election strategies were as follows: (i) door-to-door 
campaign: voters became biased towards a party when activists knocked their doors and 
begged for votes for their parties. So, direct contact was more important than any other 
forms of contact; (ii) humility: voters pardoned political elites when the latter or someone 
on behalf of them asked forgiveness for their mistakes and responded positively. So, 
humility was more effective than arrogance; (iii) divide and rule policy: splitting of the 
opposition parties by some means was a potentially effective election strategy to win; (iv) 
effective political communication: highlighting of socioeconomic contribution of the party 
and setting specific time frame for implementing future plans were effective election 
strategies. The voters liked specificity rather than vagueness; (v) popular uprising: a party’s 
popularity increased due to prolonged strikes for valid reasons. On the other hand, the less 
effective vote-gaining election strategies were as follows: (i) hypocrisy:  all hypocritical 
behaviour of political elites ultimately backfired. When voters discovered hypocritical 
behaviour in leaders, they punished them severely; (ii) derogatory remarks: the voters 
disliked them very much. So, they responded to them negatively; (iii) more reliance on 
legacy: the voters forgot legacy quickly. More dependence on legacy highlighted political 
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bankruptcy of the current political leadership. So, the voters responded negatively. Some 
strategies were context-based. On the basis of context sometimes they became more 
effective and sometimes they became less effective. For example, the Muslim League used 
the slogan ‘Islam in danger’ in the 1946 and the 1954 election. It reaped votes for the 
Muslim League (AIML) in 1946 election when it was in the opposition and it competed 
with the Hindu-dominant Indian National Congress. The 1946 election was held under the 
British colonial rule. In contrast, the same slogan backfired in the 1954 when the Pakistan 
Muslim League was incumbent in independent Pakistan and it competed mainly with 
Muslim-only Pakistan Awami Muslim League.        
4.7 Political development between the 1991 and the 2008 elections 
There were some qualitative developments in the politics of Bangladesh between 
1991 and 2008. Table 4.2 shows some political developments that Bangladesh achieved 
during the 1991-2008 period.  While voters became apathetic due to massive vote rigging 
by incumbents during the 1973-1988 period, they became more politically conscious about 
their choice of parties depending on the context. Consequently, voter turnout increased 
significantly.  
Initially, voters were moved by the emotional appeals of parties, but later they 
became more pragmatic. They assessed most recent retrospective performance of parties 
and their future plans with specificity and time-frame. In the context of globalization both 
parties moved towards the market economy and voters positively responded to this by 
voting for them. Their support base became equally strong. The dominant losing party lost 
for a shortage of a few percentage points votes. This indicates that the constitution needs 
to be amended to accommodate it with the government in some way to reduce the 
confrontational politics and involve it with governance. However, the parties did not 
advance any plan to reform themselves in the line of democratic practices within the parties. 
They wanted to establish democracy in the country, but they did not practice democracy 
within the party. Ultimately, this self-contradictory behaviour within the party might defeat 
the objective of establishing western-style democracy in Bangladesh. This is why they also 
failed to establish rules for holding credible elections despite holding of four consecutive 
free and fair elections under the supervision of NCGs (Jahan, 2015:7). Moreover, before 
every election there were some issues that could be resolved through consultation among 
parties, but they were made politically salient leading to confrontational politics between 
the incumbent party and opposition parties. Whatever political development was achieved 
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was lost due to confrontation. The dominant parties claimed that they were liberal, but they 
were not. In Western liberal democracies leaders of losing parties usually give up their 
posts following defeat of the parties the elections, but in Bangladesh this did not happen 
for any parties let alone the AL and the BNP. So, the party system in Bangladesh is too 
‘illiberal’ to punish an inefficient dynastic leader. Thus, it could arguably be called feudal 
democratic system.     
Before embarking on an exploration of potential factors that affected voter turnout 
and winners’ vote shares during the 1991-2008 period in the following chapters (the 5th and 
the 6th chapters respectively), it is necessary to look at the socioeconomic and political 
development and underdevelopment at the macro level that took place during this period.  
Table 4.2: Political development achieved between the 1991 and the 2008 elections 
Area of development 1991 2008 
Incumbency the winner (BNP) was not an 
immediate past incumbent 
Both the BNP and the AL were 
incumbents in the recent past 
periods. 
Turnout Low High 
Vote shares of dominant parties Low High 
Coalition No Yes 
Ideological orientation AL favoured more government 
intervention. 
BNP favoured less government 
intervention 
Both the AL and the BNP 
supported least government 
intervention 
Voter card No Yes 
Political participation of convicts 
and war criminals 
Yes No 
Appeal to emotion Yes No 
Highlight legacy of the party’s 
deceased leaders 
Yes No 
Issue-based politics No Yes 
Future plan ambiguous specific 
Socioeconomic plans Diverse converge 
Proposal for party reform No No 
Consensus on holding credible 
elections 
No No 
Source: Compiled by the author from various sources. 
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Table 4.3 highlights some important aspects of macro-politics and macro-economy 
over the 1991-2008 period. While the voter turnout rate had an increasing trend and was 
relatively high, percentage vote shares of both the AL and the BNP had been increasing 
too over the 1991-2001 period. So, the vote shares of parties may be positively correlated 
with voter turnout rates.  However, there was a sharp change in the trend of the seat share 
and vote share in 2008. While both the seat share and the vote share of the AL increased, 
they dropped considerably in the case of the BNP. In the 2001 election the BNP had a 
formal alliance with some Islamist parties and co-parties were benefitted from the said 
alliance. In the 2008 election the BNP had the same alliance partners, but it lost both seats 
and votes. However, loss in seat share was considerably higher than that of vote share.  So, 
depending on the context alliance may be asset or liability in Bangladesh.  
4.8 Socioeconomic and political trajectory over the 1991-2008 period 
The ruling authority alternated between the AL and the BNP. This is because, the 
successive regime could not deliver what it promised (Jahan, 2005:291). However, each 
regime was successful in sustaining economic growth rate. Per capita GDP and its growth 
rate had been trending upward over the 1991-2008 period. The inflation rate fluctuated 
over this period. Though the BNP managed to bring the inflation rate down to 5.72 percent 
during its rule (1991-1995) from the previous rate 7.78 percent that prevailed during the 
last half of the Jatiya Party’s rule, it lost in the 1996 election. Again, the AL managed to 
bring the inflation rate further down to 4.88 percent during its rule (1996-2001), but it lost 
in the 2001 election. It increased during the second term of the BNP and it lost in the 2008 
election. So, inflation may be potential determining factor of the vote share of incumbent 
parties. While the poverty rate had a consistently downward trend, the unemployment rate 
had a consistently upward trend. This seems theoretically implausible.  
Adult literacy rate had a consistent upward trend. So, it may have some kind of 
positive relationship with the voter turnout rate and vote shares of parties. It is seen that 
Bangladesh had economically developed under the rule of the BNP and the AL despite 
violent politics between them. This seems inconsistent, because political development is in 
the input sector and economic development is in the output sector. So, violent politics is 
likely to retard economic development. A dichotomy may exist between them. Therefore, 
researchers, who followed the political and economic development of Bangladesh over two 
decades of populist authoritarian rule (1991-2008), called Bangladesh case by various 
names: ‘development paradox’, ‘development puzzle’ or ‘development surprise’ (Riaz, 
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2016:220). As these data are related with macro-politics and macro-economy, they mask 
their relationship at the micro-politics and the micro-economy level. However, the macro-
politics and the macro-economy aggregate interactions between the micro-politics and the 
micro-economy. Hence, the following two chapters will investigate interactions at the 
micro level.       
Table 4.3: Socioeconomic and political trend over the 1991-2008 period 
Election year 1991 1996 2001 2008 
Voter turnout rate 55.35 74.81 74.50 86.30 
AL’s seat share (vote 
share) (%) 
29.30 
(30.08) 
48.67 (37.46) 20.67 (40.13) 76.67(49.00) 
AL’s and allies’ seat 
share (vote share) 
33.33 
(33.67) 
- - 87.66 (57.10) 
BNP’s seat share 
(vote share) (%) 
46.67 
(30.81) 
38.67 (33.81) 64.33 (40.97) 10.00 (33.20) 
BNP’s and allies’ 
seat share (vote 
share) 
- - 72.00 (47.04) 11.00 (37.90) 
Incumbent (dominant 
opposition (s)) 
Jatiya Party 
(AL and 
BNP) 
BNP (AL) AL(BNP) BNP(AL) 
Per capita GDP 
(constant at 2005 
US$)* 
315.32 344.59 390.14 451.07 
Per capita GDP 
growth rate* 
1.09 2.23 2.69 3.31 
Inflation rate* 
(consumer price) 
7.78 5.72 4.88 5.12 
Unemployment rate 
(percentage of total 
labour force)** 
1.9 2.5 3.3 4.3 
Poverty**,a 72.24 63.45 59.97 51.58 
Adult literacy rate** 24.89 35.27 45.66 48.31 
Source: Compiled by the author from various sources.  
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4.9 Conclusion 
The post-1990 politics inherited some legacies from the British and Pakistani 
colonial electoral politics. It has also inherited legacies from the Mujib, Zia and Ershad 
regimes of the pre-1990 independence period. The ‘rainbow’ and ‘jumbo’ alliance politics 
of the post-1990 electoral politics was the extended version of the mini-alliance politics of 
the 1937 and 1946 elections under the British colonial rule. In those elections only two 
parties made electoral alliance. In the 1954 election under the Pakistan’s colonial rule the 
United Front was an alliance of four parties. In the post-1990 elections the minimum 
number of parties in an alliance was four and maximum fifteen. Another legacy was 
opportunistic politics. On winning in the 1937 election many independents joined the 
mainstream parties for reaping political dividends. The same happened in the post-1990 
elections. Upon winning, some independents joined the government party to get some 
advantages. Some joined the incumbent party or the dominant opposition party before the 
election. Furthermore, during the British colonial rule Gandhi led anti-British movements 
under different names. Gandhi’s INC polled more votes in regions where more people were 
involved with his movements. He used general strikes to get people directly engaged with 
his movements. During the Pakistani rule Mujib-led AL used general strikes to press the 
government to accept the demands raised by it. In the post-1990 electoral politics prolonged 
general trikes became the most effective weapon to pull down a legitimate government. 
Additionally, in the 1937 election the Huq-led Krishak Praja Party had some specific 
proposals for eliminating plight of the Bengal peasantry. In the 1946 election Suhrawardy-
led Bengal Provincial Muslin League cloned Huq’s 1937 strategy. So, Huq won in 1937 
and Suhrawardy won in 1946. In the 1954 election the United Front had some specific 
proposal to reduce the economic disparity between East and West Pakistan. So, it also won 
in the 1954 election. The AL had copied this strategy in the 2008 election and won.  
Though the post-1990 electoral politics carried some legacies from the colonial 
electoral politics, it also possessed some unique characteristics. The political rhetoric used 
by the Bengal Provincial Muslim League in the 1937, 1946, 1954 and 1970 elections that 
“Islam is in danger if the Muslim League is not elected” worked in the British colonial 
period. In the post-1990 elections some religion-based parties tried to tickle the Islamic 
sentiment of Muslims by raising such slogans, but it failed to appeal to voters in the post-
1990 elections. Voters could no longer be fooled by such political rhetoric. Though both 
the BNP and the AL moved close to each other in terms of economic policy, voters could 
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distinguish between them in terms of their managerial efficiency in dealing with national 
economic problems. The BNP’s economic performance was poor during its 1991-95 tenure 
and the AL’s in its 1996-2000 tenure. They lost elections in spite of the closeness of their 
policy. As their economic policy was very close to each other, they distinguished 
themselves by re-positioning in terms of non-economic issues, such as the trial of 
collaborators of the 1970 genocide in Bangladesh. While the AL supported it, the BNP 
opposed it. Another defining characteristics of the post-1990 elections was that before each 
election there were some economic or political problems and the government and 
opposition parties came at loggerheads in streets. They did not try to solve problems 
through discussions in the parliament.  In addition to these, the dominant parties in the post-
1990 elections were not found to have financed their cost of election campaigns through 
donation of small amount from millions of voters as the Bengal Provincial Muslim League 
did in the 1946 elections and the United Front did in the 1954 election. It seems that these 
expenses are being financed by a large sum of political donation from cronies of the regime 
who benefit from large government contract.       
 
CHAPTER 5 
Determinants of Voter Turnout in Bangladesh: 1991-2008 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we discussed the social, economic, political and institutional 
conditions that emerged in Bangladesh following her independence in 1971. We also 
discussed the overwhelmingly critical political impasse in late 1990, when dominant 
contending political parties had to agree to form a non-partisan caretaker government 
(NCG) to organize a free and fair election in Bangladesh. Accordingly, the first free and 
fair election was held in 1991 and it was followed by three successive free and fair elections 
from 1996 through to 2008. Millions of voters turned out to cast their votes in those 
elections. As a result, by using a panel data set consisting of economic, social, electoral and 
political characteristics of constituencies and personal political capital stock of winners in 
elections held over the 1991-2008 period, this chapter attempts to identify determinants of 
voter turnout in Bangladesh. 
 Voters encounter two hurdles in the case of their calculus of voting. The first hurdle 
is whether they should or should not turn out, which depends on the cost-benefit analysis 
of voting and non-voting. When the net benefit of turning out for voting is positive, they 
decide to turn out for voting, otherwise they refrain from voting. If they decide to refrain 
from voting, the calculus of voting comes to an end. When they decide to turn out for voting 
they face the next and final hurdle – choice of the candidate or the party (henceforth 
candidate) to vote for or against. This again depends on the cost-benefit analysis of voting 
for or against a candidate. In a two-candidate political system, the decision about the choice 
of the party is simple: if the performance of the incumbent candidate is better than that of 
the challenger, voters tend to turn out to vote for the incumbent. By default, voting for the 
incumbent candidate is voting against the dominant challenger. In a multi-candidate 
political system the choice of the candidate is complex. Voters rank their preferences for 
candidates. The preferences may be made on the basis of net benefit from candidates. If 
their most preferred candidate has little chance to win, they prefer to vote for the second-
best candidate who has a better chance to win (Downs, 1957). If they refrain from voting 
due to least chance of winning of their most preferred candidate, their least preferred 
candidate may win. If they refrain from voting and their second best preferred candidate 
loses for lack of a single vote which any individual voter could have provided with, in that 
case their regret is maximum. In order to minimize their regret they may turn out to vote 
for their second best candidate (Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1974).  In some cases they may turn 
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out for voting for their most preferred candidates even though they have no chance of 
winning. The underlying reason of turning out for voting is to gain some non-material 
benefits (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). The reason may be to express their support for an 
issue, identity or ideology and so on for which a candidate stands or struggles for (Brennan 
and Lomasky, 1993). As a result, the decision to turn out for voting and choice of a 
candidate are sequential and interrelated.  
The voter turnout rate has multiple political implications and hence it is very 
important to identify determinants of voter turnout rates. It signals levels of political 
consciousness and hence engagement of voters with the political system. The more voters 
are politically conscious, the more the likelihood of their engagement with the political 
system and hence the higher the likelihood of voter turnout rates. When more voters tend 
to turn out for voting, the political system is bound to respond to the needs of majority 
voters. However, in the developing countries, voter turnout rates are much higher than in 
developed countries. The reasons might be many, such as candidates buying the votes of 
poor people by offering direct benefits, such as cash or food (Jensen and Justesen, 2014). 
Sometimes people in developing countries take voting in the polling booths as a special 
festival (Siddiqi, 1996). On the other hand, the less politically conscious the voters are, the 
less the likelihood of their engagement with the political system and hence the lower the 
likelihood of voter turnout rates. When fewer voters tend to turn out for voting, the political 
system is bound to respond to the needs of a few voters, because voters belonging to higher 
socioeconomic classes are regular voters (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944 and Berelson et al., 1954). 
As a result, the political system may become captive of a small coterie of higher 
socioeconomic class people. However, the voter turnout rate is lower in the Western mature 
democracies due to the apathetic attitude of people to the whole political system (Norris, 
1999). The lower voter turnout is also considered a protest vote against an existing political 
system (Booth and Seligson, 2005). Secondly, the voter turnout rate also signifies the level 
of political legitimacy of the government. When it is high, this implies that the government 
is representative of a higher proportion of population and hence it has a higher level of 
political legitimacy. On the other hand, when it is low the opposition may demand its 
resignation and ask it to seek a fresh mandate from the people. As a result, lower voter 
turnout rates are problematic and may cause uncertainty in the political system. In many 
developing countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan and some other African and Latin 
American countries, military governments that come to the power unconstitutionally 
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through coup d'états lack political legitimacy. Therefore, they try to obtain it through 
various means, such as organizing referendum on their capacity as leaders, presidential and 
parliamentary elections and so on. They usually resort to massive vote rigging to 
demonstrate to the international community that their regimes have a high level of political 
legitimacy.     
Bangladesh has a long but punctuated history of fair as well as unfair. The electoral 
politics in Bangladesh started long ago in 1920s during the British colonial rule. At that 
time the central legislative assembly was bi-cameral: Lower House and Upper House. The 
provincial legislative assembly was unicameral. Elections were held separately for central 
and provincial legislative assemblies. The franchise system was restricted. People paying 
a minimum amount of tax, holding a minimum amount of land and having a minimum level 
of education were franchised. It was abolished in 1956. The turnout rates were different for 
different levels of elections. Moreover, under the British colonial rule constituencies were 
of two types: general constituencies and minority constituencies. As the largest minority in 
British India Muslims like other minorities had separate constituencies. The voter turnout 
rates were different in general and Muslim constituencies. The separate electorate system 
was in force until the 1954 provincial election in East Pakistan.  
During the British colonial period elections were free and fair. During the Pakistani 
neo-colonial rule elections were not massively rigged, but various electoral malpractices 
were in force. In the 1954 provincial election in East Pakistan the incumbent tried to 
persecute the opposition parties in various ways. So, the result of the 1954 election was 
tampered to some extent. As the military government took a neutral position, the 1970 
provincial and national elections in East Pakistan were free and fair. So, the voter turnout 
rates were undistorted. Since independence in 1971 through 1990 there were no free and 
fair elections in Bangladesh. So, the voter turnout rates in those elections were unreliable. 
Only since 1991 through 2008 there were free and fair elections in Bangladesh under the 
supervision of the non-partisan caretaker governments (NCG) and hence voter turnout rates 
were most reliable.  
In each election, except the 1991 election, the voter turnout rate was above 75.55 
percent. In the 1991 election it was only 55.42 percent which was far below the historical 
average of 73.42 percent. In Bangladesh the voter turnout rate increased from 55.43 percent 
in 1991 to 75.55 percent in 1996 and from 76.06 percent in 2001 to 87.02 percent in 2008. 
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This trend is not consistent with what is observed in the East European emerging 
democracies over the 1990-2000 period (Kostadinova, 2003). He finds that in those 
countries the average voter turnout rate declined persistently over successive elections. It 
declined from 86.28 percent in the first elections to 74.88 percent in the second elections 
and from 68.43 percent in the third elections to 66.36 percent in the fourth elections. The 
average voter turnout rate declined by 5 percent between the first and the second elections, 
by 6 percent between the second and the third elections and by 5 percent between the third 
and the fourth elections. So, it is clear that while the trend in the voter turnout in East 
European emerging democracies is consistently downward, the same in Bangladesh is 
consistently upward. A key reason of consistent downward trend of the voter turnout rate 
in East European emerging democracies is that voters were increasingly dissatisfied with 
performance of successive governments (Kostadinova, 2003). The high turnout rate in the 
first elections is associated with a high level of expectation from democratically elected 
governments following collapse of authoritarian communist rulers. As successive 
governments failed to deliver what they promised earlier, voters became dissatisfied with 
the political system and tended to turn out less. In Bangladesh successive governments 
failed to deliver what they promised earlier. This is evident from the fact that no 
government was re-elected in the following election. This poor performance of successive 
governments did not dissuade voters from turning out, rather persuaded them to turn out 
more. The reason may be that they turned out more to express their grievance (Aguilar and 
Pacek, 2000). While poor performance of successive governments persuaded Bangladeshi 
voters to turn out more possibly to express their grievance, the same grievance dissuaded 
East European voters to turn out less. So, a paradox exists in the voter turnout in Bangladesh 
in relation to the same in East European emerging democracies.  
Another paradox is that in East European emerging democracies, variations (in 
terms of standard deviations) in voter turnout rates across elections did not change much 
whether voter turnout rates were high or low. They hovered around 10 percentage points 
(Kostadinova, 2003). On the other hand, in Bangladesh these variations were high when 
voter turnout rates were low and low when they were high.     
We find one more paradox in the voter turnout rate in Bangladesh. In East European 
emerging democracies the voter turnout rate was higher in high-interest elections than in 
low-interest ones (Pacek et al., 2008). In Bangladesh it was lower in the 1991 election and 
higher in all subsequent elections, but the 1991 election seems to be as high-interest as 
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other elections. This is because, Bangladeshi voters got an opportunity to express their 
political preferences in that election for the first time after 20 years since independence in 
1971. The anti-government movement preceding the 1991 continued for over 9 years, 
whereas the anti-government movement preceding the 1996, the 2001 and the 2008 
elections continued less than two years. So, the 1991 election was likely to be more high-
interest than other elections.  
While national-level aggregate voter turnout rates in Bangladesh over the 1991-
2008 period reveal some paradoxes with respect to the same in East European emerging 
democracies, constituency-level disaggregated voter turnout rates show some interesting 
turnout behaviour of voters. Across constituencies the minimum turnout rate was 28.46 
percent and the maximum turnout rate was 95.44 percent during that period, difference 
being 66.98 percentage points. When the voter turnout rate is much lower or higher than 
the national historical average in certain constituencies, there may be some idiosyncratic 
local factors that might have contributed to those atypical turnout rates. It is observed that 
29.94 percent of voter turnout rates are 10 percentage points higher and 22.98 percent of 
the same are 10 percentage points lower than the national historical average. Overall, each 
election was ‘critical’, because some issues became politically salient before each election. 
The opposition parties usually carried out a prolonged anti-government movement before 
each election to force the government to accept their demands. Since the dominant 
opposition party won highest number of seats in the parliament in each election that 
followed the 1991 election, this implies that issues raised by them seemed more reasonable 
to majority voters. However, the wave of anti-government movements did not sweep all 
constituencies similarly. This is evident from standard deviations of turnout rates over the 
period of interest. It was 10.76 percentage points in the 1991 election, whereas it was 7.37, 
8.9 and 5.58 percentage points in the 1996, the 2001 and the 2008 elections respectively.      
It is interesting to investigate determinants of voter turnout rates in Bangladesh 
during the 1991-2008 period, because they possess some paradoxical behaviours not only 
in relation to East European emerging democracies, but also in relation to Western mature 
democracies. In developed Western mature democracies the average voter turnout rate was 
as high as 77.18 percent during the 1981-90 period (Jackman and Miller, 1995). In 
Bangladesh it was 55.43 percent in the 1991 election lagging far behind the level of 
Western mature democracies, but within one electoral cycle, that is, in the 1996 election it 
caught up their level. It maintained the same level in the 2001 election, but in the 2008 
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election it exceeded the average voter turnout rate of Western mature democracies by about 
10 percentage points. Such a rapid rise in the voter turnout rate within three electoral cycles 
seems unnatural. Moreover, the standard deviation of voter turnout rates in Western mature 
democracies was 11.62 percentage points during the 1980-90 period, whereas it was 7.28 
percentage points in Bangladesh during the 1996-2008 period when the voter turnout rate 
in Bangladesh attained the level maintained by the Western mature democracies. This 
implies that voter turnout rates varies less in Bangladesh than Western mature democracies 
across elections.    
A large number of studies focus on determinants of the voter turnout rate in 
developed Western mature democracies as well as in developing countries where free and 
fair elections are held regularly. There are few studies that investigate determinants of the 
voter turnout rate in emerging democracies where each election becomes critical for violent 
politics between the government and opposition parties on some politically salient issues. 
Moreover, there are few emerging democracies where a NCG organizes the election. It is 
Bangladesh where four free and fair elections were held under the supervision of NCGs. 
There are only a few studies (Baldersheimj et al., 2001; Karim, 2007) that focus on 
determinants of variation in voter turnout rates in Bangladesh, but paradoxes in voter 
turnout rates in Bangladesh has gone unnoticed by them. While Baldersheimj et al. (2001) 
includes socioeconomic, demographic and political variables, Karim (2007) includes 
several electoral and one socio-political (terrorism) variables.  Baldersheimj et al. (2001) 
explore determinants of voter turnout rates across regions, Karim (2007) does the same 
across constituencies. Moreover, Baldersheimj et al.’s (2001) period of interest is the 1996 
election, whereas Karim’s (2007) periods of interest are the 1991, the 1996 and the 2001 
elections with special focus on the 2001 election. None of the above studies focus on the 
paradoxical behaviour of the voter turnout rate in Bangladesh. Moreover, one major 
shortcoming of those studies is that they do not test robustness of their results with 
competing variables and extending their baseline models. Additionally, they use cross-
sectional rather than panel data. So, they cannot identify patterns across elections. They use 
multiple regression models rather than fixed effect models. So, they do not control 
heterogeneity across constituencies or regions and as such their results may be less reliable 
to some extent. Using a panel data set consisting of four elections held over the 1991-2008 
period and fixed effect models, this study aims to identify the social, economic, electoral 
and political factors as well political capital stock that may potentially influence voter 
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turnout rates in Bangladesh across constituencies over the 1991-2008 period. Moreover, it 
attempts to test robustness of estimation by using competing variables and extending 
baseline models. 
In the following section we discuss the historical voter turnout rates in Bangladesh 
from the 1920s through to 2008. We relate it with types of franchise, fairness of elections 
and types of regimes. The third section discusses empirical studies on the voter turnout 
conducted before development of theories. The fourth section discusses theories that 
attempt to explain voter turnout rates. The fifth section reviews empirical studies across the 
world with special focus on developing countries, South Asian countries and some Muslim 
countries. It because, Bangladesh is a developing as well as a Muslim-dominant country 
located in South Asia. The sixth section includes discussion of empirical studies that deal 
with determinants of voter turnout rates in Bangladesh. Having discussed theories and 
empirical evidence this section identifies gaps in existing studies and hence justifies 
rationality of this study. The seventh section describes methodology, data and sources of 
data. The eighth section describes econometric models. The ninth section elaborates the 
summary statistics. The tenth section presents econometric estimations and analyses them. 
The eleventh section concludes this chapter. 
5.2 Historical overview of voter turnout in Bangladesh (1920-2008)  
Figure 5.1 (details in Appendix 5A) shows voter turnout rates in Bangladesh under 
different rules and franchise systems. The electoral politics started in 1920s and until 1930 
only 2.4 per cent of the population was franchised. The franchise was restricted to people 
who had a minimum level of literacy, who paid a minimum level of tax, and who possessed 
a minimum amount of land. Gradually the criteria of franchise were relaxed to make the 
government more representative of the population. Yet in the 1946 election only 13.4 
percent of the population was franchised. The 1954 election was organized under the 
restricted franchise. It was abolished in 1956. The 1970 election was held under the 
universal adult franchise. Secondly, all elections held under the colonial rule were free and 
fair. The incumbent government tried its best to influence the result of the 1954 election, 
but failed to win by organizing ‘media coups’ that was perpetrated by the populist civilian 
authoritarian ruler over the 1972-75 period and the military-turned-civilian ruler over the 
1976-90 period. Elections held under the supervision of the non-partisan caretake 
governments (NCG) over the 1991-2008 period were free and fair by any international 
standard (Akhter, 2001:26-7; Hasanuzzaman, 2009:49). 
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Figure 5.1 Voter turnout rates in Bangladesh under different rules and franchise systems over the 
1920-2008 period 
 
Minority communities had separate electorates in all elections held between 1920 
and 1954. Among all these elections only the 1954 election was held under the Pakistan 
neo-colonial rule and others were held under the British colonial rule. Figure 5.1 shows 
that while franchise rates were same over the 1920-30 period the voter turnout rate in 
general constituencies increased from 33.4 percent in 1920 to 39 percent in 1923 to 39.3 
percent in 1926. However, it declined in 1930 due to Civil Disobedience Movement led by 
Indian National Congress under Gandhi’s leadership (Rashiduzzaman, 1964:42). As the 
franchise rate increased from 5.6 percent in 1937 to 13.4 percent in 1946, so did the voter 
turnout rate from 40.5 percent in 1937 to 51.1 percent in 1946. The franchise rate increased 
from 13.4 percent in 1946 to 46.45 percent in 1954, but the voter turnout rate fell from 51.1 
percent in 1946 to 37.19 percent in 1954. While it was likely to be higher following 
introduction of the universal adult franchise and more freedom of Muslims in a Muslim-
domiant country, it was lower than the pre-partion level. There was no lack of efforts to 
mobilize voters by the incumbent party as well as the domiant opposition alliance to oust 
each other through ballot-boxes. One possible reason of lower voter turnout rates may be 
that Muslim voters who voted for the Muslim League in the 1946 election became 
dissatisfied with its post-partition performance. Had it been true, they were likely to turnout 
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more for expressing their grievance. Since voter turnout rates were low, the most possible 
reason may be that voters might become apathetic to politics due  to political anamoly since 
1947.  
Figure 5.1 also reveals that voter turnout rates in Muslim constituencies in the 
central legislative assemblies kept increasing since 1920 during the British colonial rule, 
but the same declined in the 1954 provincial legislative elections that took place in East 
Pakistan 7 years after the partition of British India. As Muslims were domianted by Hindus 
in the Hindu-domiant British India, they became more conscious politically over time. So, 
the Hindu-Muslim rivalry might contribute to higher turnout rates of Muslim voters during 
the British colonial rule (Rashiduzzaman, 1964:88). On the contrary, in the Muslim-
domiant East Pakistan turnout of Muslim voters fell. One reason might be that they did not 
have any threat from any dominant groups. So, the motivation that led them to turnout more 
in British India disappeared in East Pakistan. However, East Pakistani Muslims were 
dominated by West Pakistani Muslim ruling elites and the incumbent Muslim League 
helped the latter to perpetrate exploitation on East Pakistanis. So, the former was likely to 
turnout more for expressing their grievance against the incumbent party. This did not 
happen. The possible reason may be that the ethno-linguistic Bengali nationalism of East 
Pakistani Bengali-speaking Muslims took time to crystalize. Until 1954 it was nascent. In 
the 1970 election it crystalized fully. As a result, general voter turnout rates increased 
substatially from 37.6 percent in 1954 to 56.9 percent in 1970 while the franchise rate 
remained similar. It may be mentioned that Muslim population was 85 percent of the total 
population of East Pakistan in 1970. This implies that more Muslim voters turned out for 
voting in the 1970 election. 
Following the partition of British India in 1947 into India and Pakistan, elections 
were held under the restricted adult franchise system in 1954 and the universal adult 
franchise was introduced in 1956 in Pakistan. So, the 1970 election was held under it. 
Under the neo-colonial Pakistani rule both East Pakistan provincial legislative assembly as 
well as Pakistan’s central legislative assembly became unicameral. However, separate 
electorates remained for minority population in the 1954 election, but they were abolished 
in the 1970 election. The possible reason might be that the Hindus were the largest minority 
in East Pakistan, but their population gradually declined from 30 percent in 1947 to 13.5 
percent in 1970 due to migration of Bengali Hindus to India. Moreover, the pro-autonomy 
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movement in Bangladesh was conducted on the basis of Bengali nationalism. All this might 
have contributed to abolition of the separate electorate system in the 1970 election. 
As the percentage of people franchised increased during the British colonial rule, 
voter turnout rates also increased concomitantly with some exceptions. As for example, 
until 1930 the percentage of people franchised remained same, but the voter turnout rate in 
general constituencies in the central legislative council elections increased from 33.4 
percent in 1920 to 39 percent in 1923 to 39.3 percent in 1926. However, it dropped to 26.1 
percent in 1930 (Rashiduzzaman, 1964:59a). The principal reason of this sharp drop was 
Gandhi-led Civil Disobedience Movement over 1930-34 period (Rashiduzzaman, 
1964:40). The franchise rate increased from 5.6 percent in 1937 to 13.4 percent in 1946. 
Accordingly, the voter turnout rate also increased from 40.5 percent in 1937 to 51.1 percent 
in 1946. Despite an increased rate of franchise in 1954 the voter turnout rate in general 
constituencies fell far below the 1946 level in that year. In the 1946 election the turnout 
rate may have been influenced by extraordinary mobilization efforts of the Indian National 
Congress and the All-India Muslim League to garner support for their claims: the former 
claimed undivided India on the basis of Indian nationalism and the later claimed divided 
India on the basis of Indian Muslim nationalism. In contrast, in the 1954 election the issue 
was a mandate on the political legitimacy of the incumbent Muslim League. The context 
was different in those elections. In the 1946 election more Muslims turned out for voting 
to express their support for Pakistan and get rid of the oppression of dominant Hindus. On 
the contrary, in the 1954 elections more Muslims were expected to turnout for voting to 
express their grievance against the incumbent which deliberately deprived East Pakistanis 
from their fair shares in the national resources. However, this did not happen. There was 
no lack of mobilization effort by competing parties. One possible reason of lower voter 
turnout in the 1954 provincial legislative assembly might be that East Pakistani voters 
might be apathetic to politics following political turmoil in East Pakistan.  
Starting from 1920 through 1946 there were separate constituencies for Muslims as 
they were the largest minority in British India. It was most likely that fewer Muslims would 
be franchised than Hindus in British India, because Muslims were socioeconomically 
backward than Hindus. However, this was countered by relaxing the criteria of franchise 
in Muslim constituencies (Rashiduzzaman, 1964:60). The voter turnout rates in general and 
Muslim constituencies were low in the 1920 central legislative assembly. The possible 
reason might be joint-launching of the Non-violence Non-cooperation Movement of the 
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Hindu-dominant Indian National Congress and the Muslim-only Khilafat Movement. 
However, except in 1920 turnout rates in Muslim constituencies were much higher than 
general constituencies in all elections of the central legislative assembly. The principal 
reason was increasing communal riots between Hindus and Muslims (Rashiduzzaman, 
1964:33).  
Figure 5.1 shows that voter turnout rates in general constituencies had been usually 
lower than those in Muslim constituencies over the 1920-1946 period. As general 
constituencies were Hindu-dominant, voter turnout rates in those constituencies were 
influenced mostly by turnout rates of Hindu voters. Many Hindus did not turn out for voting 
due to their apathy to the Communal Award that gave Muslims more seats in the central 
legislative assembly than they deserved as their percentage in the population. On the other 
hand, more Muslims turned out for voting in Muslim constituencies due to their increasing 
political consciousness following increasing communal riots between Hindus and Muslims 
(Rashiduzzaman, 1964:33, 88).                 
The voter turnout rates in the pre-1990 period show a roller coaster trend. 
Depending on the context at the time, they sometimes steeply inclines and at other times, 
sharply declines. The voter turnout rates in the post-1990 period have a consistent pattern. 
They show an increasing trend. All elections held during this period were highly 
competitive. The voter turnout rate in the 1991 election was the lowest among all elections 
held in the post-1990 period. Several factors may be responsible for this. The older age 
cohorts might have lost their trust in elections due to massive vote rigging in last two 
decades. Moreover, they might have given up their old partisanship following poor 
leadership of their preferred parties in dealing with emerging national crisis during the pro-
autonomy movement. They may be in conundrum for emergence of new parties in the 
political landscape in the last two decades and are taking time for developing new 
partisanship. All these might motivate them to turnout less for voting. The new voters 
usually takes some time for political socialisation. In Western mature democracies it takes 
at least three elections to transform new voters into habitual voters (Franklin, 2004:204). 
However, when they observe that the 1991 election is free and fair, they regain their 
confidence in elections. The freedom to reward better-performing incumbents and punish 
poorer-performing ones might motivate them to turnout out more in subsequent elections. 
However, this trend was opposite to trends observed in the post-communist emerging 
democracies in Eastern Europe. Similarly to Bangladesh, those countries have established 
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democracies after overthrowing authoritarian communist rule. Solijonov (2016) observes 
that in the very first election following overthrowing of the authoritarian rule voter turnout 
rates were higher in those countries due to their high expectation from democratic 
governments elected through free and fair elections. In subsequent elections voter turnout 
rates fell substantially due to utter failure of successive democratic governments to deliver 
what they promise during election campaigns and an increasing hardship of people during 
the transitional period (Mason, 2003/4). This is called ‘founding elections’ hypothesis.  
5.3 Empirical studies focusing on the voter turnout prior to development of electoral 
behavioural models 
Though models encapsulating causes of voter turnout started to emerge in the 
1950s, researchers attempt to explore causes of variation in voter turnout rates long before. 
Merriam and Gosnell (1924) explore causes of non-voting behaviour of the people of 
Chicago city (USA) in the 1923 Mayoral election. They are mainly preoccupied with 
identifying causes of non-voting behaviour of 64.28 percent of eligible voters in the wake 
of serious motivational campaigns by a variety of civic groups and political parties. 
Merriam and Gosnell (1924:10, 37) identify four broad causes of non-voting, such as, (i) 
physical difficulties (25.4 percent), (ii) legal and administrative obstacles (12.6 percent), 
(iii) disbelief in voting (17.7 percent), and (iv) inertia (44.3). So, inertia is the main driver 
of non-voting. A gender-wise classification of reasons highlights that the reasons of men’s 
non-voting are hugely different from women’s. Absence from the polling station on polling 
day (21.7 percent), habitual indifference to voting (14.6 percent), fear of loss of income 
(12.9 percent), intention to vote but failure to turnout (10.9 percent), and illness (8.6 
percent) contribute in men’s non-voting. A habitual indifference to voting (30.4 percent), 
illness (13.8 percent), disbelief in women’s voting (11.4 percent), ignorance or timidity 
regarding the election (8.8 percent) are responsible for women’s non-voting. So, men are 
habitually more indifferent to voting than women. More women than men do not vote for 
illness.     
As to the socioeconomic and political factors that contribute to non-voting, 
Merriam and Gosnell (1924:x-xi) find that nearly 50 percent of non-voters are more 
interested in activities other than voting, such as social entertainment, social and religious 
activities, working in their own or others’ businesses, taking care of families and so on. By 
using both statistical and case study methods Merriam and Gosnell (1924:27-51) observe 
that one-half of women non-voters do not register for voting. One-seventh of women is 
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foreign-born and of them one-third is habitual non-voters. More elderly than young women 
are non-voters.  The former does not vote largely for illness and belief that it is not women’s 
task. The latter does not vote mainly for habitual indifference, neglect, insufficient legal 
residence and performing nursing duties at home. Secondly, 50 percent of male non-voters 
over forty years of age do not vote for being absent from the polling station, ill, or 
indifferent. The same percentage of male non-voters under 40 years of age does not vote, 
because they are absent from polling stations, fear loss of income and neglect. Thirdly, 
non-voters who live in the city for fewer than 10 years do not vote, because they are 
indifferent to voting, lack legal residence and possess little idea about local political 
condition.  Non-voters who live more than ten years in the city do not vote for illness, 
absence from polling stations, fear of losing income and repugnance to politics. Fourthly, 
male non-voters of the richest neighbourhood (rent $80 a month in 1920) do not vote for 
being absent from polling stations on election days, habitually indifferent to voting and 
illness, while one-half of female non-voters of that area do not vote for being absent from 
polling stations, habitually indifferent to voting and insufficient legal status. Male non-
voters of the poorest neighbourhood (rent $10 a month in 1920) do not vote for fear of 
losing income, whereas one-half of female non-voters of that area do not vote for being 
indifferent to voting, ignorance or objections of the husband. Fifthly, 66 percent of the 
businessmen do not vote for being absent from polling stations on election days and 
habitual indifference to voting. Sixthly, older immigrant communities, such as English, 
Irish, German and Scandinavian origin aged over 40 show higher tendency of non-voting 
than newly immigrant coloured groups of the same age. While coloured people of that age 
tend to vote more than their white counterparts, many coloured people cannot vote for lack 
of legal residences and lose incentives for voting for antipathy toward their traditionally 
preferred parties. Seventhly, thousands of traditional Republican voters do not vote, 
because they perceive large ideological gaps between their party’s stance on some key 
issues and their preferred positions. Eighthly, a large number of habitual non-voters are 
from those polling stations where percentage of registered voters is low. The non-voting 
rate is higher in areas that are hugely dominated by Negroes or White descendants. It is 
evident that age, ethnicity, economic status, gender, registration, naturalization, and length 
of residence are underlying factors of non-voting.  
By cross-tabulating national and local electoral and socioeconomic data of some 
European countries (Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, and Switzerland) for the 
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1884-1929 period, Gosnell (1930) tries to identify the factors that contribute to sustain 
higher voter turnover rate in those countries in the pre- and post-World War I (WWI) and 
the extent to which the European experience can be applied to American conditions. 
However, the voter turnover rates are higher after the WWI than they are before the WWI. 
This is because, the post-WWI economy and society are characterized by ‘general strikes 
or threats of general strikes, inflation, stabilization, dislocation of industries and 
unemployment, and the loss of old foreign markets and severe competition in new markets’ 
(Gosnell, 1930:ix). Since the government has a substantial control over the economic and 
social life of the country concerned, people across all socioeconomic groups would turn to 
the government for help in times of economic crisis. He finds that (a) proportional voting 
system is positively related with voter turnout, because people are likely to acquire more 
permanent interest in politics under it; (b) socioeconomic and spatial indicators such as age, 
place of birth, occupation and religious affiliation are related with voter turnout in 
elections; (c) the voter turnout is much lower in local elections than in national ones; (d) 
given that the voting system is unchanged and the economic condition is fairly stable, 
variations in turnout can be attributed to party issues and party organization; and (e) issues 
like religion and conditions of the economy (for example, inflation, unemployment and 
high cost of living and so on) too motivate more people to cast votes in the post-WWI 
period. He divides his period of interest into two sub-periods: pre- and post-WWI. As a 
result, his analysis takes into account the socioeconomic structural break that takes place 
around the WWI period. His familiarity with the European politics makes his investigation 
more insightful. However, he does not carry out any statistical analysis to estimate 
contribution of each abovementioned factor in influencing voter turnout in elections 
(Pollock, 1931). This is an important limitation of his analysis. 
While Gosnell (1930)’s study focusses on five major European countries, Tingsten 
(1937)’s study focusses on twelve European countries and one non-European country. By 
using simple statistical methods (partial correlation) and demographic data (available by 
regions in censuses) of twelve European countries (England, France, Germany, 
Switzerland, Austria, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland) 
and Australia related to the 1895-1935 period, Tingsten (1937) studies the statistical 
relationship between socioeconomic indicators (age, gender, social and marital status) and 
voter turnout rates in elections of the nation as a whole and localities. He observes that on 
average (a) turnout of women voters of each socioeconomic class is ten percent lower than 
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men’s; (b) voter turnout rates are lowest in the lowest age group, rise slowly with an 
increase in age, reach at a maximum among the middle-aged groups, and then decline 
slowly; (d) analysing the said data set he deduces two laws: (a) law of dispersion: 
differences in voter turnout of a certain socioeconomic group or across socioeconomic 
groups in elections are inversely proportional to the overall turnout rate; (b) law of the 
social centre of gravity: the voter turnout within a certain group in a country or locality is 
directly proportional to its relative strength in the electorate of that country or locality. 
Gosnell (1937) points out that his first law is important in analysing the effect of a higher 
or lower turnout of all socioeconomic groups or a certain group upon final results of an 
election. His second law identifies the factor that leads to a higher or lower turnout rate of 
a certain socioeconomic group in the election across the nation or a locality. Though those 
two laws are very naïve in predicting the turnout rate of a certain group in an election, they 
are pillars for the scientific analysis of comparative politics (Gosnell, 1937). His period of 
study covers pre- and post-World War I (WWI), but not the World War II (WWII). In his 
study he does not describe the historical context in which those elections are held. The 
historical background is characterized by industrial revolutions leading to prosperity in 
Europe before the WWI and by wars, revolutions and economic turmoils after the same. 
The electoral behaviour before and after the WWI is likely to be different because of the 
socioeconomic structural break that took place in the vicinity of the WWI. He analyses the 
data set without factoring it. Therefore, his study lacks meaningful interpretations of the 
role of socioeconomic variables in influencing electoral behaviour in aforementioned 
countries for that period. In addition to this, the electoral system of some countries 
undergoes some fundamental changes (for example, relaxing requirements of males to be 
voters and enfranchising women, and so on) which may influence turnout rates in those 
countries, but Tingsten (1937) does not consider those. Moreover, the relationships 
between the socioeconomic variables and voter turnout rates are likely to be spurious, 
because many important factors that are likely to affect them are not controlled for.        
Gosnell (1930) attempts to identify factors that possibly contribute to sustained 
voter turnover in national elections of some Western European countries. He uses time 
series data and thus his study gives us some idea about causal factors underpinning voter 
turnout in national elections of those countries. He carries out bivariate analysis. So, his 
estimations are most likely to be spurious. However, it gives us some idea about factors 
that might influence voter turnout in national elections.  While Gosnell (1930) emphasizes 
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factors influencing voter turnout in the Western European countries, Tingsten (1937) 
examines factors influencing voter turnout rates in national and local elections in a good 
number of OECD and non-OECD countries – some are small and some are large. In 
addition, Gosnell (1930) takes into consideration the socioeconomic structural breaks 
resulting from the World War I, but Tingsten (1937) does not. So, the former analysis is 
likely to be more meaningful than the latter. Despite some important limitations in those 
empirical analyses they help to develop electoral models concerning voter turnout in 
elections.  
It was Bean (1948) who first identified an electoral factor rather than physical, 
environmental and socioeconomic factors that can determine vote shares of candidates in 
elections. He first predicts that increasing the voter turnout in the 1948 Congressional and 
Presidential elections would be an effective instrument for the Democratic Party (the then 
opposition party in the US) to win more seats in the House of Representatives and get its 
presidential candidate elected. Consequently, he suggested that the opposition Democratic 
Party (his favourite party) could mobilize voters to turnout more by capitalizing financial 
hardship of common people under the rule of the Republican Party. The underlying 
motivation of potential voters for turning out more for voting could be their current 
financial hardship (measured in terms of Ayer’s index which measures the volume of 
manufacturing products). So, Bean (1948) positively correlates the voter turnout rate with 
economic downturns. As his suggestion helps Democrats to win more seats in the House 
of Representatives and get their presidential candidate win in that election, Bean (1948) 
becomes a classic study in the US electoral behaviour studies.  
In another follow-up study, Bean (1950) tries to predict results of the 1950 
Congressional elections and the 1952 presidential elections. He realizes that, as Rosenof 
(1999) explains, the emergence of new issues outside the US but having some kind of 
relationship with the US would have some impact on US voters. Those issues include the 
US involvement with the Korean War, consolidation of communist regimes in some 
countries, a rise in the probability of communist takeover of ruling power in many 
countries, and the US role in arresting that trend. He warns his fellow Democrats that their 
party would encounter problems in banking on positive economic impacts the New Deal 
policy produced in late 1940s and early 1950s. The emerging new non-economic issues 
might overshadow the Democratic Party’s success in creating employment for the lower 
socioeconomic classes in the post-Great Depression decades. He eventually acknowledges 
DETERMINANTS OF VOTER TURNOUT 
 
220 
 
that it is hard to factor new issues quantitatively in his statistical forecasting methods which 
he uses to predict outcomes of the 1948 presidential elections. Thus, Bean (1948, 1950) 
makes a significant contribution in the study of the US electoral behaviour by highlighting 
the importance of internal economic factors as well as some external non-economic factors 
that might affect the voter turnout and consequently electoral outcomes in US 
Congressional and presidential elections.  
The aforementioned studies reveal that voter turnout rates are influenced by a wide 
range of factors, such as gender, preoccupation with activities other than voting, length of 
residency in cities, personal as well as national economic conditions, gap between personal 
political ideology and ideology of the most preferred party, current issues, organization of 
the party, effectiveness of political communication, identification of a salient issue, 
connection between domestic and overseas events and so on.     
5.4 Determinants of voter turnout in electoral behaviour models 
This section explains electoral behaviour models focusing on identification of 
factors that influence the voter turnout in elections.  
5.4.1 Ethno-cultural vote model 
Beard (1945/2005) introduces the ethno-cultural voting model. It is Benson 
(1961:165) who first emphasizes that life styles and values deeply rooted in communities 
cultivate differences in economic outlooks and hence divergences in the electoral behaviour 
of communities. He uses historical data and statistical techniques to explain ethnocultural 
roots of voters’ political behaviour and sets in the beginning of study of the ethnocultural 
voting model. This model cannot be equated to a simple instrumentalist ethnic voting 
model where ethnic political elites would expect to receive votes from co-ethnic voters by 
appealing to their ethnic, religious and racial prejudices irrespective of their performance 
(retrospective or prospective) and in turn ethnic voters would expect to receive some kind 
of favour from their co-ethnic political elites (Carlson, 2015). It is something beyond the 
ethnic voting model. When members of an ethnic group vote for or against candidate which 
cannot be explained by their social, demographic and economic characteristics, or when 
candidates belonging to certain ethnic groups cross their party lines, it may be called 
ethnocultural voting (Wolfinger, 1965). Voters’ commitment to parties flows from 
ethnocultural loyalties deeply ingrained in the innermost kernel of the ethnocultural group 
they belong to. Most voters choose their parties on the basis of their religious and ethnic 
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commitments and subsequently support the economic policies of their preferred party 
which in turn chooses policies preferred by those ethnocultural groups. Thus, they reinforce 
each other. So, ethnocultural background is the main breeding ground of voters’ party 
choice.   
According to McCormick (1974) and Sibey et al. (1978), three hypotheses explain 
how cultural differences are translated into political differences. Negative feelings against 
some ethnocultural groups called reference groups are determinants of party support.  
Voters tend to turnout for voting against the party which shelters those ethnocultural groups 
disliked by them. On the other hand, they tend to turnout for voting for a party which 
effectively protects their interests against aggressive ethnocultural groups. Elections act as 
a balancing mechanism and the parliament acts as the balancing arena of conflicting interest 
Figure 5.2: Historical development of electoral models that encapsulate voter turnout 
 
Source: Constructed by the author 
Note: Similar colour indicates similar models. 
groups. Secondly, dominant ethnocultural groups want to impose their own values on 
minority groups through controlling the state machinery. On the contrary, would-be 
suppressed groups want to resist this cultural imperialism through controlling the same. So, 
cultural conflicts break out between them. They work out political programs to attain their 
respective objectives. They realize that without being economically strong they cannot 
become politically strong too. In this way, cultural conflicts trigger political conflicts via 
economic ones. Thirdly, it is assumed that antagonistic ethnocultural groups evolve 
through natural historical progressions. In the US they are mainly pietists and liturgists. 
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Their social, economic, religious and political values are diametrically opposite to each 
other. Political parties target one of them as their potential supporters. So, they design their 
policies as close to the values preferred by their target groups as possible. This symbiotic 
relationship between the party and its supporters gradually leads to an acutely polarized 
society and polity. Hay (1967:158-159) claims that these hypotheses explain how cultural 
differences culminated in political differences through party realignment before the 
American Civil War and different ethnocultural groups turned out for voting for different 
parties or candidates.        
5.4.2 Information-based vote model 
Some empirical studies show that a good number of socioeconomic, political and 
demographic factors contributed to variations in voter turnout rates in the OECD and non-
OECD countries before the 1950s. However, none incorporated the role of information in 
this regard. Simon (1955) incorporates it in his ‘bounded rationality’ theory. He argues that 
voters cannot maximize their utility from turning out for voting or non-voting, because they 
do not have complete information about all alternatives. Even if they have the same they 
do not have enough intellectual capacity to process all available information. So, they 
cannot choose the best alternative. They must be content with the most satisfactory 
alternative. So, they are ‘satisfiers’ rather than ‘utility maximizers’. Matsusaka (1995) 
assumes that every voter has a natural propensity to turnout for voting, but for lack of 
information she faces difficulties in identifying the ‘right’ candidate. Once she is able to 
identify the ‘right’ candidate by gathering enough information, and she believes that she 
can change the electoral outcome by voting for the ‘right’ candidate confidently, she turns 
out for voting. 
While Matsusaka (1995) does not distinguish voters into different categories, 
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1997) do so. They classify voters into two distinct 
groups: informed and uninformed voters. While informed voters tend to vote for ‘right’ 
candidates, uninformed voters tend to vote for ‘wrong’ candidates. So, uninformed voters 
are better-off by abstaining from voting even if voting is costless. Degan and Merlo (2004) 
attempt to explain the turnout of heterogeneous voters in the context of Ferejohn and 
Fiorina’s (1974) minimax regret model. Since it is hard for uninformed voters to choose 
‘right’ candidates, they tend to choose ‘wrong’ ones and hence their expected regret is high. 
As they gather more information their level of regret from voting falls. Thus, their model 
predicts a positive relationship between volume of information and tendency to turnout for 
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voting. Using individual level data for eight presidential elections held over the 1972-2000 
period they find a systematic and positive relationship between scale of information and 
the voter turnout rate.   
Matsusaka (1995) opines that the information-based models can explain why some 
people have higher probability to turnout for voting and some have lower probability. They 
can also explain differential voter turnout rates in different elections. However, they cannot 
predict the actual level of the voter turnout rate.  
5.4.3 Rational choice vote model 
The rational choice model developed by Downs (1957) explains voter turnout from 
three perspectives: (i) instrumentalist; (ii) expressiveness; and (iii) strategic. His initial 
hypothesis is that voters tend to turnout for voting if the net economic benefit from voting 
is positive. However, he finds that the net economic benefit from turning out for voting is 
always negative. It is because, voters as individuals cannot influence the electoral outcome 
in their favour. So, direct benefits from turning out for voting is nil, but they incur costs by 
turning out for voting. As a result, it is irrational to turn out for voting. In contrast, it is 
observed that in democratic elections millions of voters are turning out for voting and 
millions of people cannot be wrong. Thus, Downs’ instrumentalist approach to voter 
turnout encounters “the paradox of voting”.  
Having faced this paradox of voting, Downs (1957) approaches the issue of turning 
out for voting from an expressiveness perspective. He changes his assumption that the 
probability of an individual voter to influence electoral outcomes in her favour is constant.  
He argues that an individual voter realizes that if she does not vote, a democratic 
government cannot be formed and hence the democratic system would collapse in the long 
run. So, she willingly incurs costs of voting in the short-run and casts vote to discharge her 
civic duty to preserve democratic practices in the long run. Downs (1957:270) further 
argues that the scale of an individual voter’s benefits depends on several factors: (i) how 
much she values preservation of democratic practices in making public choices; (ii) how 
much she is concerned with which party wins; (iii) how much, he anticipates, would be the 
difference in vote shares between the winner and the runner-up; and (iv) how many other 
voters, he anticipates, would turnout for voting. Thus, a wide range of factors affect the 
level of benefits accruing to an individual voter from turning out for voting. Similarly, there 
are a wide spectrum of costs involved with turning out for voting, such as spending time 
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for registration for voting, cost of collecting and processing information, cost of 
transportation, and queuing for casting votes, and so on. He assumes that the ability to bear 
these costs varies inversely with income levels (Downs, 1957:241, 266). As costs and 
benefits are different for different voters, their turnout rates are also different. Thus, Downs 
(1957) seems to have solved the “puzzle of non-voting” by adding expressive approach 
with instrumentalist one. He argues that the “civic duty” or the consumption value of 
turning out for voting outweighs its instrumentalist value, because the former is 
independent of the results of the elections. 
In the Downsian model it is assumed that a voter has a constant level of “civic duty” 
and she would turnout for voting either for her most preferred candidate or for her second-
best preferred candidate for different reasons. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) argues that 
Down’s (1957) ‘civic duty’ is not enough to motivate voters to turn out for voting. There 
are some other benefits from turning out for voting such (i) compliance with the ethics of 
voting, (ii) demonstrating loyalty to the political system and preferred candidate, and (iii) 
being at the polling station, and so on. Thus, they extend the sources of psychological 
satisfaction obtainable from the act of turning out for voting from a single factor to multiple 
factors. While the ‘civic duty’ in the Downsian model is dependent on others’ actions, all 
elements of the expressiveness of voting in Riker and Ordeshook (1968)’s model are 
independent of others’ actions (Wolfinger, 1993).  In fact, they generalize it and subsume 
Downs’ notion of civic duty aimed to preserve the democratic system. To them like Downs 
(1957) voting per se yields satisfaction and it has nothing to do with bringing about desired 
results from election outcomes.  However, by extending sources of expressive utility they 
degrade the model down to the status of a tautology (Fiorina, 1976).  
Riker and Ordeshook (1968) show that given the instrumental costs and benefits, 
the higher the ‘citizen duty’ score (low, medium, high) and the closer the contest in 
elections, the higher is the probability of turning out for voting. Barry (1970:16) questions 
why some people attach strong values to “civic duty” than others. Barry (1970) further 
points out that Riker and Ordeshook (1968) do not estimate weights of each factor (low, 
medium, high) in determining the probability that a given person will turnout for voting. 
Barry (1970:17) shows that ‘citizen duty’ has the most important effect and the expected 
competitiveness in elections has little effect in determining the probability of turning out 
for voting. By a more rigorous analysis Barry (1970:18) finds that Riker and Ordeshook 
(1968) do not take into account the interaction effect between the ‘citizen duty’ and the 
 CHAPTER 5  
225 
 
expected ‘candidate differential’ (how much difference the respondent believed which 
candidate would win). Examining Riker and Ordeshook (1968)’s data from this 
perspective, Barry (1970:18) observes that when the ‘citizen duty’ score is medium or high, 
candidate differentials contribute a moderate difference in turning out levels (6 percent to 
12 percent), whereas when it is low candidate differentials contribute a high difference of 
nearly 20 percent in turnout levels. In this context, Barry (1970:18) makes out that the 
Downsian type of instrumental analysis may explain it. Empirically, it is possible to find 
some kind of relationship between some economic variables and voter turnout rates and 
results may be interpretable from an economic perspective. This kind of interpretation is 
likely to be untenable when people having lower civic duty score and higher perceived 
candidate differentials turnout at relatively higher rates than their counterparts. In this 
context Campbell (1962) argues that the higher contribution a vote is expected to make in 
candidate differentials, the higher is the motivation to turn out. However, when the 
expected higher contribution is multiplied by the probability that a vote can change the 
election outcome, the expected change in party differential arising from a single vote 
becomes infinitesimally small. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) are aware of this and support 
the prediction of their model by arguing that voters may ‘irrationally’ attach much higher 
probability that a single vote can make in candidate differentials. They do not explain 
further why and how they can do so. Barry (1970:19) is not convinced by the simple 
statement of irrationality of voters regarding attachment of higher probability with 
instrumental utility. Thus, Riker and Ordeshook (1968)’s irrationality of voters is left 
unexplained.  
Riker and Ordeshook (1968)’s model has an important strength. They are quite 
aware that the probability of a single vote in making significant contribution in candidate 
differentials is infinitesimally small in an electorate of large size irrespective of number of 
issues. In this context, if the expressive utility from turning out for voting outweighs 
instrumental one, it might motivate many voters to vote. They explore it in the context of 
large electorates like the USA, but do not do so in the context of small-sized electorates 
concerned with a single issue. Using data from 366 local liquor referenda in Texas (USA) 
held over the 1976-1996 period involving relatively small-sized electorate (fewer than nine 
hundred eligible voters) Coate et al. (2006) observe that as the size of the electorate 
increases, the turnout rate falls.  
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Fiorina (1976) extends the Downs-Riker-Ordeshook models by adding another 
source of expressive utility/disutility obtainable from satisfying/violating one’s partisan 
allegiance.  He builds up his hybrid model by borrowing two important assumptions from 
preceding two main stream voting models: (a) voters maximize utility from voting 
(economic theory of voting by Downs, 1957) and (b) partisanship is a firmly implanted 
psychological relationship irrespective of a voter’s issue positions. It may change in the 
long run (Michigan model by Campbell et al., 1960: chapter. 6). His model is hybrid in the 
sense that he attempts to build a richer model by combing the instrumental and expressive 
aspects of voting. He differentiates his model from Downs-Riker-Ordeshook models in this 
way that to them the payoffs from the sense of civic duty and others are same irrespective 
of their voting strategies. In reality, the expressive utility is likely to vary across voting 
strategies. Moreover, they find that the probability of voter turnout rates increases with an 
increase in closeness of competition between two candidates.  Fiorina (1976) argues that 
for some groups of voters the reverse might be true. He hypothesises that given that a voter 
has low partisanship, and is under cross-pressure, and the competition is high, her dominant 
strategy is not to turnout for voting. On the other hand, given that a voter has high 
partisanship, and is under cross-pressure and the competition is high, her dominant strategy 
is to turnout for voting.  
While some earlier models (e.g., Downs, 1957; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968 and 
Fiorina, 1976) focus on the expressive aspect of voting, they do not completely decouple it 
from the instrumental aspect of voting. In their models the expressive voting complements 
the instrumental voting and they jointly influence the voter turnout. Brennan and Lomasky 
(1993:21-24) emphasize solely the expressive aspect of voting. They claim that the basic 
foundation of those theories that use the consumer theory to explain the political behaviour 
of voters is basically flawed. As an individual, vote is not vital in influencing the electoral 
outcome. A voter turns out for voting for some other reasons. She votes to express her 
preferences for ‘something’. This ‘something’ may be manifested in various forms. This is 
more coherent and consistent with actual observed voting behaviour. 
Downs (1957) discusses voter turnout from the strategic perspective in two 
contexts. When an individual voter anticipates that other voters value their votes and as 
such they are going to turnout for voting, she tends not to turnout. This is because, her vote 
would not be pivotal in turning electoral outcomes in her favour. So, her net benefit from 
turning out would be negative. On the other hand, when an individual voter foresees that 
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other voters do not value their votes at all and as such they are not going to turnout for 
voting, she tends to turnout for voting. This is because, her vote would be decisive in 
turning electoral outcomes in her favour. So, her net expected benefits from turning out for 
voting would be positive. This game-theoretic approach to voter turnout assumes that every 
voter has complete information about political preferences and costs of voting of others. 
Keeping aside this decisiveness of a single vote in any election, a voter also tends to turnout 
for voting in a multi-candidate election strategically (Downs, 1957:48-50). In a multi-
candidate election a voter ranks candidates on the basis of her preferences. When her most 
preferred candidate has a high chance of winning she is most likely to turnout for voting 
for her most preferred candidate. On the contrary, if her most preferred candidate has little 
chance of winning she tends to turnout to vote for her second or third preferred candidate 
who enjoys a lot of electoral support and hence he has a high chance of winning. So far, a 
voter is taking her decision to turn out for voting in a static political system. When voters 
and candidates are both ‘future-oriented’, sociotropic strategic interactions among them 
turn to new directions. When some voters are future-oriented and sociotropic, they may 
turn out to vote for ‘visionary and missionary’ candidates. Those candidates have a little 
chance of winning in the current election but a high chance of winning in future elections 
when most voters would realize the merits of those candidates’ policy. Voting for them in 
the current election would have snowball effects on others over time making substantial 
inroad in the future vote market. So, voting for them in the current election is not a ‘waste’ 
of votes. It is rather an investment for reaping benefits in the future. As a result, Downs’ 
(1957) “future-oriented” voters turn out to vote in the current election in favour of 
‘visionary and missionary’ candidates as “peasants” sow seeds in growing seasons in the 
hope of reaping crops in harvesting seasons (Mackuen et al., 1992).     
Ledyard (1981, 1984) attempts to extend Downs’ (1957) strategic model. He 
assumes that every voter has a “rational expectation” about the extent of decisiveness of 
her vote, because she knows the size of the electorate and her own political preferences, 
but she has limited idea about voting costs and political preferences of others. He assumes 
that they are normally distributed and this knowledge is common to all. A voter then 
positions herself somewhere in the wide spectrum of political preferences of the whole 
electorate. On the basis of these assumptions he concludes that an equilibrium cannot take 
place when everyone abstains from voting. It is expected that some voters would turnout 
for voting when their benefits are reasonably greater than costs. Moreover, there is a single 
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equilibrium turnout rate. However, he cannot show how much turnout takes place in voter 
equilibrium in large electorates (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985). 
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985) further extend Ledyard’s (1981) model. They 
assume that voters are self-interested and they are divided into two groups – the majority 
group and the minority group. Every voter has complete information about preferences and 
voting costs of others in the same group. Each voter has two alternative: vote for the most 
preferred candidate or abstain. On the basis of these assumptions they infer that there is a 
substantial turnover, even when the size of the electorate is large and the cost of voting is 
relatively high. The turnover rate of members in the majority group is twice as much as the 
minority group. As the size of the electorate increases, the voter turnout rate falls. It implies 
that the absolute voter turnout is likely to be higher in large electorates and lower in small 
ones. Jankowshi (2002) argues that given the size of the electorate, the turnout rate is higher 
in national than state and local elections.  So, Palfrey and Rosenthal’s (1983, 1985) model 
cannot explain this. However, their conclusion is as good as Riker and Ordeshook (1968) 
that in large electorates only voters having high level of civic duty turnout for voting 
(Jankowshi, 2002).    
Aldrich (1993) casts doubts about the key finding of Ledyard (1981, 1984) and 
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985) who find a positive but low turnout rate in voter 
equilibrium in large electorates. This inference is derived from a critical assumption that 
all voters have perfect information about the voting cost and political preferences of others. 
This assumption is highly unrealistic. When this assumption is relaxed, rational voters tend 
to abstain as the cost of voting is positive. Moreover, Aldrich (1993) claims that in large 
electorates the strategic interaction among voters is very weak. A high level strategic 
interaction among voters is feasible only in small electorates. As a result, Mueller 
(2003:307) argues that the game theoretic approach cannot adequately explain the positive 
voter turnout in voter equilibrium in large electorates. While other studies regard the 
turnout as a significant collective action problem, Aldrich (1993) considers it an 
insignificant one. According to him, turning out for voting is a low-cost low-benefit public 
choice problem.       
5.4.4 Minimax regret vote model  
Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) argue that an individual voter may be motivated to 
minimize the cost of voting with a view to avoid the maximum regret resulting from the 
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defeat of her most preferred candidate by a single vote. Voters make regret matrices on the 
basis of alternative decisions. Thereafter, they choose the action that yields the smallest 
maximum regret. They barely think about the probability of occurring such an event. 
Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) argue that the minimax regret model would predict higher 
turnout rates than the rational choice model, because regret would be higher if one’s 
preferred candidate fails to be elected for lack of a single vote. So, a potential voter has an 
incentive to minimize her maximum possible regret. Moreover, they argue that it is possible 
to associate turnout rates of different socioeconomic and demographic cohorts (for 
example, age, occupation, education and so on) with their voting strategies. The low voter 
turnout rate of extremely disadvantaged groups of the society may be due to pursuit of their 
maximin voting strategy, while the high voter turnout rate of the educated and the rich 
voters may be due to pursuit of their minimax voting strategy. They provided support for 
their model intuitively. They broke away from the long-lasting approach (in terms of 
instrumental and expressive utility) of explaining voter turnout and explained it from the 
decision-theoretic perspective.    
While Ferejohn and Fiorina’s (1974) minimax regret model uses a pure strategy. 
Grofman (1979) advances a mixed strategy model and shows that under this model, voters’ 
choices are probabilistic rather than deterministic. When voters use a mixed strategy, their 
long-run security level increases. As a result, their chances of turning out for voting 
increases even when the cost of voting is high and a single vote is not pivotal in influencing 
electoral outcomes in favour of concerned voters.  
Tideman (1985) extends the minimax regret model by introducing two concepts – 
elation and remorse. Remorse is an emotion that arises when a voter feels guilty for 
emergence of a situation created by her own action. Let us suppose that a voter faces two 
situations. In the first case she does not vote and her favourite candidate loses by a wide 
margin. So, she is unhappy. In the second case, she does not vote and her favourite 
candidate loses by a single vote in a tied contest. In this case she is unhappier than before. 
If the magnitude of her unhappiness is E+G, of which E is under her control and G is 
beyond her control, E is her magnitude of remorse. Similarly, when a voter votes and her 
favourite candidate wins by a single vote, she is happier than when she votes and her 
favourite candidate win by a wide margin. If the magnitude of her happiness is R+L, of 
which R is under her control and L is beyond her control, R is her magnitude of elation. 
However, introduction of these two concepts does not explain the paradox of voting, 
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because they are multiplied by the decisiveness of a vote in influencing electoral outcomes, 
which again make the scale of benefits from voting infinitesimal.     
Though the minimax regret model is theoretically very much sound, many 
researchers highlight some of its weaknesses. Stephens (1975) points that one of the 
assumptions of the model is that the cost of voting and the utility associated with various 
outcomes from voting are fixed. This assumption is questionable. He argues that while 
casting votes many voters are likely to consider the possibility of tie-breaking or tie-making 
outcomes in elections. They also examine the degree of risks associated with the cost of 
and the utility from voting. Secondly, Stephens (1975) further claims that voters need to be 
as much imaginative as possible to work out all possible outcomes from various actions, 
because there would be innumerable outcomes which are beyond the imaginative capacity 
of average voters. So, this model may be highly inadequate to explain the electoral 
behaviour of most voters. Thirdly, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) do not distinguish between 
the levels of ‘regret’ arising from different levels of defeat. According to them, a voter’s 
preferred candidate may fail to be elected for short of one vote which she could have 
delivered (but she did not vote) if he knew the outcome beforehand. In this situation she 
has no regret, as she incurred no cost for turning out for voting. On the other hand, if her 
preferred candidate fails to be elected for short of more than one vote despite her one, her 
regret is more, as she incurred some cost in turning out for voting. He argues that the level 
of ‘regret’ differs depending on the margin of victory/defeat of someone’s preferred 
candidate and her feeling of personal responsibility for this margin. For an identical margin 
of defeat/victory, a voter having a higher level of responsibility for the outcome is likely to 
be more regretful/joyful than a voter having a lower level of responsibility for the same.  
Beck (1975) argues that voters hardly cast votes on ‘purely rational grounds’ as is 
suggested by the minimax model. According to Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974), the 
probability that a voter breaks a tie and the probability that a voter creates a tie, is the 
probability of influencing the electoral outcome by a voter. She cannot exactly measure 
probabilities of those events, but she knows that they are very insignificant. She needs to 
compare between the near-certainty of a small loss and near-impossibility of a large gain 
from voting. Since she is not sure about the magnitude of gains and losses and probabilities 
associated with them, she is bound to take decisions under risks. So, she cannot be purely 
rational on any ground. Secondly, the model assumes that a voter is more likely to forgo a 
small gain with high probability in order to avoid a large loss with low probability. Ferejohn 
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and Fiorina (1974), for example, have equated the level of risk associated with an injury or 
death while a voter travels to and from the polling station to that associated with the defeat 
of her preferred candidate by a single vote.  In this context Beck (1975) and Stephens 
(1975) argue that it contradicts with the decision-making under risks, where a voter is likely 
to prefer a small gain with high probability to a large loss with low probability. Thus, the 
model suffers from a serious theoretical difficulty.  
5.4.5 Ethical vote model 
The ethical vote model assumes that a voter may turnout for voting for two motives: 
(i) instrumental/egocentric and (ii) expressive/sociotropic/ethical. Whether a voter is likely 
to turn out to vote for instrumental or expressive motive depends on two factors: (i) her 
stakes in the electoral outcome, i.e., the cost if the outcome goes against her and the benefit 
if it goes in her favour; and (ii) efficacy, that is, her chance of influencing the electoral 
outcome. Her motive of turning out for voting is ethical, when both her stakes and efficacy 
are low. On the contrary, when her stakes are high and she has a high probability of 
influencing the electoral outcome, she turns out to vote for the social policy that serves his 
personal interests better. Thus, a voter adopts pure strategy of voting. However, when 
stakes and efficacy are coupled in ways shown by Goodin and Roberts (1975), one key 
inference can be drawn: voters may turn out more to support parties that advocate for the 
ethical policy. Thus, ethical policy and voter turnout may reinforce each other. Goodin and 
Roberts (1975)’s model shows conditions under which a voter behaves egoistically or 
ethically. A voter’s dominant voting strategy is either ethical or egoistic voting. However, 
a voter may follow mixed strategy to optimize her utility from turning out for voting.  
While Goodin and Roberts (1975) treat the utility associated with the ethical motive 
of voting as indivisible, Jankowski (2002) divides the ethical motive into two distinct parts: 
pure altruism and egoistical altruism. A voter may turn out for voting for pure altruistic 
motive when she wants to make others happier given her own level of happiness. Her 
degree of happiness is directly related with that of others. On the other hand, a voter may 
turn out for voting for egoistic altruistic motive when she herself wants to become happier 
by an altruistic action irrespective of what happens to others. The pure altruism and the 
egoistical altruism are dependent on each other. They also reinforce each other. Moreover, 
the level of utility derived from pure altruism is likely to be greater than that from egoistic 
one. Jankowski (2002) argues that neither Downs’ (1957) ‘civic duty’ nor Riker and 
Ordeshook’s (1968) ‘expressiveness’ can explain five facts of the US voters’ turnout: (i) 
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voter turnout rates are different in different types of elections. They are higher in 
presidential elections than in state and local elections; (ii) voter with higher formal 
education have higher tendency to turnout for voting than illiterate voters; (iii) costs of 
voting are inversely related with turnout rates; (iv) voter turnout rates are associated with 
race identity of both voters and candidates. The turnout rates are higher when voters and 
candidates have same ethnic identification; and (v) voters frequently vote strategically. 
Jankowski (2002) extends Goodin and Roberts’ (1975) ethical voting model by including 
those two altruism separately and argues that while egoistic altruism cannot explain 
variation in voter turnout rates in different types of election, pure altruism can do so. It is 
because, as decisions being taken by an US president affect more people than those being 
taken by a Senator or a House of Representative, a pure altruistic voter receives 
substantially higher utility from voting in presidential elections than in state or local 
elections. Even though the probability of a vote being decisive in influencing the electoral 
outcome is small, the product of the probability and benefits is large enough to offset costs 
of voting and thus the net benefit is sufficient enough to motivate a voter to turnout for 
voting. So, voter turnout rates are higher in presidential elections than state and local 
elections. Given the level of pure altruism of a voter, she is expected to turn out in each 
type of election at the same rate, but she does not. So, other factors need to be included to 
explain it. Jankowski’s (2002) ethical voting model predicts positive voter turnout, but it 
fails to predict the size of the turnout due to free-riding problem. While Jankowski (2006) 
assumes that the egoistic altruism is exogenous, Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) assume 
that it is determined endogenously and it is a function of behaviour of other members of 
the group an individual belongs to. Each member of the group believes that other members 
of the group would behave consistently as per expectation of the group. Their model 
predicts that the voter turnout rate is higher for members of the majority group and lower 
for members of the minority group. The candidate supported by the majority group wins.  
5.4.6 Group-based vote model 
Most voter turnout models assume that each voter takes the decision to turnout for 
voting in isolation. They ignore this fact that individual voters living in a society are related 
to one another in some way. The society develops a social structure in which some are 
political elites and some are followers. It is Uhlaner (1989) who incorporates it into his 
model. In his model an individual voter derives benefits for herself as well as for the group 
she belongs to when she turns out for voting. The political elites of the group mobilize 
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members of the group by appealing to their civic duty as well as to their group loyalty. 
They offer benefits to the group members in exchange of their votes. The political elites of 
the group can influence candidates to shift their policy stance closer to the group’s interests. 
They also manage resources for giving benefits to group members. By using the 1978, 
1982, and 1986 US National Election Survey data he shows that members of families 
belonging to trade unions are more likely to turn out for voting than those who do not 
belong to trade unions. Schram (1991:187-217) extends Uhlaner’s (1989) model by 
dividing the members of the group into two distinct groups: producers and consumers of 
social pressure. The producers of the social pressure, who have a high degree of credibility 
to consumers of social pressure, motivate them to turn out for voting.  The reluctant 
consumers of social pressures are induced by active ones to turn out for voting. Bufacchi 
(2001) has presented the same in a different way. He explains the paradox of voting in the 
framework of reputation-game – a game played between two groups of people. One group 
is called opinion leaders who have reputation-of-power and another group is called voters 
who have reputation-of-trust. The powerful opinion leaders use their reputation-of-power 
(power to impose sanctions) to get voters turn out for voting. Voters turn out to vote in the 
way being asked by opinion leaders to maintain their reputation-of-trust with opinion 
leaders. Grossman and Helpman (2001:85) argue that voter turnout is stimulated by 
enforcement of a social norm at the group level. Three elements ensure enforcement of 
norms: (i) more interaction among actors increases the opportunity to reward desirable 
behaviour and punish undesirable one; (ii) deviation from social norms can be easily 
detected and measured; and (iii) group members can observe each other’s action without 
much effort.    
The group-based approach has some key advantages: (i) it is more realistic than 
traditional models in which a voter is assumed to act independent of others living in the 
same society; (ii) turning out for voting is irrational for an individual voter when she is 
isolated from the society, but the same action is considered rational when an individual 
takes action as a member of a group; and (iii) it can explain adequately ‘stylized facts’ on 
the voter turnout.  
5.4.7 Learning-based vote model 
Some researchers (e.g., Sieg and Schulz, 1995 and Kanazawa, 2000) attempt to 
explain the voter turnout with the help of elements being borrowed from psychological 
learning theories.  They argue that voters can learn from two sources. One source of 
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learning is their own past actions. They work out a relationship between their past voting 
behaviour (turnout/abstain) with electoral outcomes (win/defeat of candidates they voted 
for) and use it as a guide for future actions. When their actions produce satisfactory results, 
they tend to repeat those actions. On the other hand, when their actions produce 
unsatisfactory results, they tend to avoid those actions and follow new strategies. Kanazawa 
(2000) calls it ‘win-stay, lose-shift’ strategy. Another source of learning is the behaviour 
of other people. They observe strategies being followed by others. If those strategies seem 
‘successful’ to them, they also follow their strategies (Sieg and Schulz, 1995). When voters 
keep learning from either their own past actions or past actions of others, their habit of 
voting pass through a transformative process. If they would turn out to vote or abstain from 
voting in past elections, they are more likely to turnout to vote or abstain from voting in 
future elections. Thus, the habit of turning out for voting or abstention from voting are 
inculcated in their political life and hence voting becomes endogenous (Gerber et al., 2003).   
Learning-based voter turnout models predict substantial turnout rates in large 
electorates in the presence of substantial costs of voting. Secondly, they attempt to measure 
the marginal effect of past reward and punishment of preferred candidates on individuals’ 
tendency to turn out for voting in following elections. Thus, they explain changes in voting 
behaviour of individual voters over time. Thirdly, they also explain differential turnout 
rates among different socioeconomic groups in different elections.  
The aforementioned electoral behaviour models reveal that information level, cost 
of and return from turning out, income level, margin of victory, competition, social pressure 
and so on are potential determinants of the voter turnout.    
5.5 Empirical studies on voter turnout in the post-1950s 
This section identifies factors that influence voter turnout rates in Western mature 
democracies, East European emerging democracies, emerging democracies in developing 
countries, Muslim countries and South Asian countries.  
5.5.1 Voter turnout in mature Western democracies 
Powell (1982, 1986) and Jackman (1987) trigger empirical studies on the voter 
turnout in recent decades in Western mature democracies. Powell (1982) analyses voter 
turnout rates in 29 countries. He identifies three types of variables as determinant of the 
voter turnout: (i) social and economic factors, (ii) institutional factors, and (iii) party 
systems and election outcomes. Analysing individual level data of nine mature Western 
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democracies (USA, UK, West Germany, Netherland, Switzerland, Finland, Canada, 
Australia, and Italy) covering the 1960-1980 period Powell (1986) finds that only in the 
USA and Switzerland middle and post-secondary level education have significant positive 
effect on voter turnout rates and voter turnout rates increase with an increase in the level 
of education. Secondly, for all nine countries age has significant effect on the voter turnout 
and voter turnout rates increase with an increase in the age of voters. Thirdly, in all 
countries partisan voters tend to turnout more than non-partisan ones. Voters who have 
more interests in politics turnout more in elections. Fourthly, political efficacy has mixed 
effect on voter turnout rates. In the USA and Italy a higher level of political efficacy leads 
to a higher level of voter turnout.  
Powell (1982) specially focuses on the determinants of voter turnout rates in the 
USA, where voters with higher levels of education turn out more in elections than voters 
with lower education levels. When educational grade of voters increase from the 6th grade 
to the 9th grade, there is no increase in turnout rates. However, when voters’ educational 
grade increase from the 9th grade to the 11th grade, voter turnout rates increase by 10 
percent.  The turnout rate increases by 17 percent for voters who have completed high 
school. The difference of turnout rates is 35 percent between voters having completed 
primary education and voters having completed college education. The female voters have 
less tendency to turn out than male ones. 
Additionally, Powell (1986) also analyses aggregate level voter turnout data of 17 
western democratic countries linking them with institutional factors. His period of interest 
is 1960-1980. He finds that the voter turnout rate is higher in countries with “nationally 
competitive districts” and “strong party-group linkages”. Secondly, the age factor 
(population over 34 years of age) is not a significant determinant during the 1960-70 period, 
but it is a significant determinant during the 1970-80 period.  Jackman (1987) also studies 
effects of institutional factors on voter turnout rates in 19 Western mature democracies over 
the 1960-70 and 1971-80 periods. He identifies five institutional factors that might 
potentially influence the voter turnout rate. The factors are (i) nationally competitive 
districts, (ii) electoral disproportionality, (iii) multi-party system, (iv) unicameral system 
and (v) compulsory voting. Except one, Jackman’s (1987) all other variables are different 
from Powell (1986). Jackman (1987) finds that all his five institutional factors are 
significant. The effect of the nationally competitive districts on the voter turnout is positive. 
It is expected, because both parties and candidates have equal incentives to mobilize voters. 
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Powell (1986) finds similar results. The effect of the disproportionality between votes and 
seats on the voter turnout is negative. It is expected, because voters have less incentive to 
turnout as many votes are wasted. The effect of the multi-party system on the voter turnout 
is negative. It is expected, because voters are uncertain about coalition partners. So, they 
turnout less.  The effect of the unicameral system on the voter turnout is positive. It is 
expected. As there no division of responsibility between the federal and state government, 
voters have more incentive to turn out and hold the government accountable for its actions. 
The effect of the compulsory voting system on the voter turnout is positive. It is expected. 
The most important finding of his analysis is that the difference between turnout rates 
across countries can be attributed partly to differences in their political cultures. 
While Jackman (1987) emphasizes long-term cultural forces as determinants of the 
voter turnout, Powell (1982, 1986) emphasizes institutional factors as determinants of the 
voter turnout.  Jackman and Miller (1995) test this contentious issue by extending the 
sample size of countries (they add 3 more countries) and covering most recent decade 
(1981-90). They also include some other variables (turnout and economic growth in the 
previous election period and voting age) in addition to Jackman’s (1987) ones. They find 
that voter turnout rates in the previous election is significant, while economic growth 
during the previous electoral cycle is not. Jackman’s (1987) all the institutional variables 
are significant and have expected signs. However, the age limit of voting is not significant.  
5.5.2 Voter turnout in East European emerging democracies 
 
While Powell (1982, 1986), Jackman (1987) and Jackman and Miller (1995) focus 
on determinants of turnout in Western mature democracies, Kostadinova (2003) analyses 
determinants of voter turnout in 15 East European emerging democracies in the post-
communist era. He includes temporal (sequence of elections) and spatial differences 
(electoral system type, party system characteristics and economic development) as 
potential determinants of the voter turnout. He finds each election significant. This implies 
that the voter turnout rate is context-based.  The number of parties is significant and the 
sign is negative, which is expected. The proportional voting system is significant and it has 
positive effect on the voter turnout rate. It is expected. The economy and closeness of 
competition are insignificant.  
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5.5.3 Voter turnout in developing countries 
Aguilar and Pacek (2000) analyse determinants of the voter turnout rate in 10 
developing countries. The data set covers 67 elections held between 1953 and 1994. They 
find that economic downturns hurt some sections of the population and hence they tend to 
turn out more in elections to express their grievances. A 5 percent decline in the national 
income increases the voter turnout rate by more than 2.5 percent.  The lagged voter turnout 
rate is also significant and the sign is positive, which is expected. 
Legoucq and Wall (2004) attempt to identify determinants of the voter turnout in 
the 1985, the 1990 and the 1995 presidential, legislative and presidential run-off elections 
in Guatemala. They include a good number of sociological (urban population, indigenous 
population, households using electricity, female as share of registered voters, literacy rate), 
institutional (district area, eligible voters, effective number of parties, closeness) and 
Spatio-institutional (size of the municipality, ratio of registered voters to voting stations, 
municipal capital) variables.  In the case of presidential elections they find that female 
voters as a percentage of registered voters is significant in all elections and the sign is 
positive.  This implies that the higher the percentage of female voters the higher the turnout 
rate. The number of eligible voters is also significant and the sign is negative. It means that 
as the size of the electorate increases the turnout rate falls. It is expected. The closeness in 
competition is significant and the sign is positive. It implies that the higher the competition 
the higher is the voter turnout rate.  So, the sign is expected. They find the same result in 
the case of legislative elections.    
5.5.4 Voter turnout in Muslim-dominant countries  
Using the local and national elections of Turkey held between 1950 and 2014 
Taskin (2015) finds that the number of registered voters (log) has significant effect on the 
voter turnout rate and the sign is positive, which is expected. The effect of per capita GNP 
(log) on the voter turnout rate is significant and the sign is negative. The sign is expected 
and consistent with Aguilar and Pacek (2000). The effect of the compulsory voting system 
on the voter turnout rate is significant and the sign is positive, which is also consistent with 
Powell (1986).   
Wilder (1999:228-229) investigates voter turnout rates in Punjab state of Pakistan. 
He finds that between 1993 and 1997 voter turnout rates declined by 6.4 percent in rural 
constituencies and 13.5 percent in urban constituencies of Punjab. Adeney (2009) works 
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out that the average national voter turnout rate in 2008 election is 44 percent. The pre-
election rigging and fear of violence are accountable for this lower voter turnout rate. The 
voter turnout rate is lower than the national average in North West Frontier Province and 
Baluchistan due to boycott of the election by All Party Democratic Movement (APDM), 
which is an alliance of 32 parties. The APDM boycotted the 2008 election to protest against 
military rule in Pakistan. While Wilder (1999) and Adeney (2009) marginally focus on the 
voter turnout issue. The Gallup Pakistan and Election Commission of Pakistan (2017) 
jointly carry out an in-depth study of voter turnout rates in Pakistan over a long period 
(1970-2013). They find that during the period of concern the average voter turnout in 
Pakistan is 45.3 percent which is above Egypt (45.1 percent), Ivory Coast (37 percent) and 
Mali (21.3 percent). It is lower than her three South Asian neighbours: India (66.4 percent), 
Afghanistan (58 percent) and Bangladesh (58.2 percent) (Shahid, 2013). The higher 
literacy rate is accountable for higher turnout rates in India. The voter turnout rate is higher 
in Afghanistan in the 2014 election despite threat of violence by the Taliban.  As to reasons 
of low voter turnout rates Gallup Pakistan and Election Commission of Pakistan (2017) 
find that a wide range of factors ranging from security to sociological issues are 
accountable for low voter turnout in Pakistan. Many people have lost interest in the political 
process. Many Pakistani women consider that voting is a function of male. So, they are 
reluctant to turnout for voting. There are some logistical issues that cause lower turnout 
rates, such as long distance between voters’ residence and election booths and lack of 
transport to travel to and from polling booths. The widespread violence on election days 
also scare off people. For all these reasons voter turnout rates in Pakistan are low.      
Gallup Pakistan and Election Commission of Pakistan (2017) also find that contrary 
to usual expectation most ‘underdeveloped, neglected and illiterate’ regions of Pakistan 
have registered higher voter turnout rates than economically developed regions. It is 
because, these areas are vote-banks of some left-leaning political parties. As a result, 
campaign infrastructure already exists there and it is cost-effective to carry out campaign 
activities there.      
Gine and Mansuri (2011) conducts a field level experiment in Pakistan to measure 
the effect of non-partisan campaigns on women voter turnout rates in the 2008 national 
elections. The campaigners carry out door-to-door campaigns to inform women voters 
about the importance of voting and choice of candidates. The intensity of campaigns is 
varied across clusters of women voters to estimate the effect of information externalities. 
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Using the data of that field experiment Gine and Mansuri (2011) find that turnout rates of 
treated women are 12 percentage points higher than untreated ones. There is also spillover 
effects of campaign on the voter turnout rate. For 10 treated women there are 7 additional 
turnout of untreated women. Moreover, the voter turnout is higher in more competitive 
polling stations than less competitive ones.     
5.5.5 Voter turnout in South Asia 
Using fixed effect model Diwakar (2008) explores determinants of voter turnout 
rates in Indian legislative (state) elections over the 1951-2004 period. She includes a good 
number of socioeconomic (number of electors, literacy rate, urban population, effective 
number of religious groups, schedule tribe population, schedule caste population) and 
electoral (closeness of elections, number of contesting parties) and other variables. She 
finds that the effect of number of electors (log) and degree of urbanization on voter turnout 
rates are significant and the signs are negative, which are expected. The effect of the 
literacy rate on voter turnout rates is significant and the sign is positive, which is also 
expected. The lagged voter turnout rate is significant and the sign is positive, which is 
expected. It implies that voter turnout rates are autocorrelated across elections. The effect 
of closeness in competition is significant and the sign is negative, which is expected. Thus, 
her findings subscribe to predictions of the rational voter model.   
The aforementioned empirical studies reveal that researchers find a wide range of 
factors determining the voter turnout, such as literacy rate, age, partisanship, efficacy of a 
vote, competition, electoral system, political culture, economic condition, turnout in the 
previous election, size of the constituency and the electorate, voter per polling booth, per 
capita income, economic growth, urbanization, anticipated rate of violence and probability 
of vote rigging, number of ethnic groups, level of terrorist activities and so on.    
5.6 Studies on voter turnout in Bangladesh  
In the case of Bangladesh Baldersheim et al. (2001) explore determinants of the 
voter turnout rate from the perspective of modernisation and democratic development. 
Their focus is to identify factors that determine the voter turnout in regions of Bangladesh 
in the 1996 national election. They include four broadly defined modernization factors 
(education, wealth, industrialization and urbanization). These factors are again sub-divided 
into sub-factors. They also included six broadly defined political factors (community 
characteristics, religion, age of voters, pressure groups, rural development programmes and 
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regional identity). These factors are again sub-divided into sub-factors. They run three 
multiple regressions: (i) only modernization factors (restricted model); (ii) only political 
factors (restricted model); and (iii) all modernization and political factors (full model). In 
the full model they find that number of educational NGOs, households with electricity, 
young aged population, percentage of businessmen and police stations under rural 
development programmes are significant and the signs are positive. It implies that they 
affect voter turnout positively. On the other hand,   size of the population, percentage of 
Muslim population, percentage of middle aged people, and police stations under poverty 
alleviation programmes are significant and the signs are negative. It implies that they have 
negative effect on the voter turnout.  The full model explains about 47 percent variation in 
the voter turnout.  
Though Baldersheim et al.’s (2001) study is very comprehensive in terms of 
variables included, it is not comprehensive in terms of elections covered. The 1991 election 
result is available, but they do not include it. They use cross-section data. So, we do not 
know effects of those factors on the voter turnout rate over time. Moreover, many of their 
variables are competing and as such their analysis may suffer from multicollinearity 
problems. They use multiple linear regressions and hence do not control heterogeneity 
across regions. For all these reasons, their results are not very much reliable.       
Karim (2007: 403-5) attempts to identify factors affecting the voter turnout in the 
1996 and the 2001 elections. He does not ground his analysis on any theoretical models. 
He uses some political, electoral and one social (terrorism) variables in this regard. He also 
includes lagged turnout as an explanatory variable. He uses a cross-section data instead of 
a panel data set. By using stepwise multiple regression models he finds that voter turnout 
rates are autocorrelated. He also finds that voter turnout rates were low in constituencies 
where rates of increase in voters are high, urban constituencies, constituencies being 
plagued with medium-scale terrorism. In the 2001 election the voter turnout rate is low in 
constituencies where the BNP-led alliance candidates won in the 1996 election. His 
analysis has a lot of intuitions, but his econometric estimations suffer from some serious 
methodological problems. As a result, his estimations are less reliable.     
In this context this study attempts to fill up some gaps in the existing literature 
regarding determinants of the voter turnout in Bangladesh. Its key objective is to explore 
determinants of the voter turnout in Bangladesh on the basis of well-grounded theories. 
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Since no single model can adequately explain voter turnover rates, it uses an eclectic model 
consisting of some electoral behavioural models. It includes a good number of economic, 
social, political, electoral and spatial variables. It uses fixed effect model to control 
heterogeneity across constituencies and elections. This study also extend models by 
including some competing variables to test robustness of estimations. We use a panel data 
set so that we are able to identify factors that influence voter turnout rates across elections. 
The period being covered is 1991-2008 when all four elections were held freely and fairly. 
One key strength of this study is the use of the data extracted from night time satellite 
imageries which capture the level of economic activities during the period of concern. As 
the data associated with most socioeconomic variables in Bangladesh are prone to 
measurement errors, these night time satellite imageries are likely to provide more reliable 
estimation of determinants of the voter turnout in Bangladesh. Overall, econometric 
estimations of this study are likely to be more robust than existing ones.  
5.7 Data and methodology 
This section discusses some problems associated with compilation of the data set. 
It also discusses econometric models, response as well as explanatory variables, 
significance and method of construction of each variable, and sources of data.   
5.7.1 Mismatch between electoral and socioeconomic data 
For lack of socioeconomic and demographic data at the constituency level, we 
follow the fifth operational strategy outlined by Richter (1975) where he suggests to use 
constituencies as units of analysis taking socioeconomic data from “closest-fitting” census 
units, such as districts. In the case of Bangladesh the closest census unit is the district. In 
some cases data are unavailable at the district level. They are available at a higher level, 
such as divisional level. We substitute upper sub-national level data as closest to the 
constituency level as possible for constituencies under respective sub-national 
administrative unit on the assumption that those are likely to be very close to the actual 
level in all constituencies under the same sub-national administrative unit. This is because, 
all non-land factors are more mobile within an administrative unit than across same level 
administrative units. Though this may usher some errors, but errors would be reduced if 
they are unsystematic and uncorrelated with one another (Richter, 1975). It is may be noted 
that in Bangladesh socioeconomic trends of some economic variables like per capita gross 
domestic product of districts under the same divisions tend to converge in some divisions 
over some specific periods (Hossain, 2000). However, Rahman and Hossain (2009) find 
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non-converging trends of per capita income in some divisions over some specific periods. 
From this, it may be inferred that some converging trends are more likely to be operative 
in constituencies under the same district or in districts under the same division for other 
variables. 
5.7.2 Response variable 
Our response variable is the voter turnout as the percentage of total registered 
voters. This may overestimate the voter turnout rate if some voting age people are not 
registered. Some studies use the voter turnout as the percentage of total population or total 
voting age population. These measures also underestimate the voter turnout rate, because 
some people may not qualify for voting. The Bangladesh Election Commission reports the 
voter turnout rate as the percentage of total registered voters. So, we use it.  
5.7.3 Explanatory variables 
Distilling the existing literature we identify some key variables that might be 
potential determinants of the voter turnout rate in Bangladesh. The concerned variables are 
hard to classify into distinct groups, because they are interacting as well as overlapping. 
For convenience of analysis we classify them into four distinct groups: (a) Economic 
variables (e.g., night time satellite imageries and hard core poverty), (b) Social variables 
(e.g., adult literacy rate, Hindu population and urbanization), (c) Electoral variables (e.g., 
winning margin, power-match, registered voters per polling station and road length per 
polling station) and Political capital variables (e.g., whether a winner is ex-incumbent or 
not).    
Economic variables 
It is theoretically and empirically well-documented that economic conditions 
(retrospective and/or prospective, personal and/or national) influence voter turnout rates 
(e.g., Downs, 1957; Kramar, 1971; Mueller, 1970; Bloom and Price, 1975; Claggart, 1986; 
Hibbs, 1975; Mackuen, 1983 and so on). However, researchers use different economic 
variables (e.g., national income, per capita income, unemployment rate, inflation and so 
on) to measure the effects of economic conditions on voter turnout rates. Therefore, their 
findings are varied. These indicators are highly correlated and measure different aspects of 
the economy. None of them are as comprehensive and accurate as they are warranted. 
Moreover, they affect voter turnout rates of different socioeconomic groups differently. As 
such, their findings are difficult to compare. In addition to these problems, some 
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researchers (e.g., Nordhaus, 1975; Hibbs, 1977) find that incumbents attempt to manipulate 
these indicators to reap electoral benefits. However, some researchers (e.g., Drazen, 2000) 
find mixed evidence for the manipulation of economic indicators by incumbents. In this 
context, researchers attempt to find some indicators that are more comprehensive than 
abovementioned economic indicators and too difficult to manipulate by incumbents. One 
such indicator is night-time satellite imagery (NSI).  
The key underlying reason of using the NSI as an indicator of the economic activity 
is that it measures the level of electricity consumption, which has a strong positive 
correlation with the gross domestic product (GDP) of a country or her regions (Elvidge et 
al., 1997). As a result, it is likely to be a better representation of a country’s or a region’s 
economic condition. Secondly, the socioeconomic data is collected either at the national 
level or at higher sub-national administrative levels, such as divisions or districts. It is not 
collected at the lowest administrative or political levels such as the sub-district or the 
constituency. The NSI can capture radiance down to an area of one square kilometre let 
alone the size of the lowest administrative or political level, which is likely to be larger 
(Sutton and Costanza, 2002). Measurement of the socioeconomic condition below the 
district-level is necessary to address problems of inequality across them (Doll et al., 2006). 
Thirdly, the magnitude of benefits accruing from the usage of NSI overwhelmingly 
outweighs its costs of collection at any level (Sutton et al., 2007). As such, it is more cost-
effective than the collection of the same data through surveys or censuses.  
While the usage of NSI has some potential benefits, researchers who use it to map 
socioeconomic conditions of a political or an administrative unit make their findings 
questionable for some palpable reasons. NSI can capture the emission of light outside 
instead of inside of establishments and as a result, the production of goods and services 
taking place under the roof of an establishment is unlikely to be captured. Secondly, it 
cannot distinguish between the production of services by high-paid IT personnel and 
production of goods by low-paid workers (Mellander et al., 2015). Thirdly, it can capture 
the quantum of output in the manufacturing and the service sector better than that of the 
agricultural sector (Keola et al., 2015). Doll et al. (2006) find that for an increase in radiance 
of the NSI by one unit, an increase in output of the agricultural sector is lower than that of 
the service sector, while an increase in the output of the industrial sector is in-between. 
Consequently, Mellander et al. (2015) argue that NSI overestimates output of goods and 
services in urban areas and underestimates the same in rural areas. Hence, the NSI is likely 
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to overestimate the GDP in developed countries and underestimate the same in developing 
countries. In contrast, Mellander et al. (2015) find a stronger correlation between the 
radiance of NSI and gross domestic product (GDP) in developing countries than in 
developed countries. This is because, the service sector accounts for a larger proportion of 
the GDP in developed countries and its output does not require as much physical 
infrastructure. The demand for electricity increases at a slower rate with an increase in 
income. Similarly, NSI is a poor proxy for economic activity at the micro level and a robust 
proxy for the same at the national level. Using the state level GDP in the USA, Sutton et 
al. (2007) observe that the percent of the mean absolute deviation between the recorded 
GDP and the GDP estimated by using the NSI is larger for US states with very low GDPs 
than for states with very high ones. It is almost zero at the national level and non-zero at 
the sub-national level. With a view to make the GDP estimated by using NSI to be more 
representative of the actual output of goods and services of an administrative or political 
region, Mellander et al. (2015) and Doll et al. (2006) argue that to be more robust than 
traditional economic indicators (e.g., per capita income, unemployment, and inflation and 
so on), NSI needs to be complemented by some other factors. These factors can include 
population density, industrial establishment density, total regional wage as a percentage of 
the national wage, differences in historical backgrounds and culture and so on.            
Whether the NSI can be a more robust representative of the actual district-level 
output of total goods and services in Bangladesh demands investigation from several 
perspectives. The NSI is likely to underestimate the same in many districts in Bangladesh, 
with the exception of Dhaka, Chittagong and Khulna metropolitan areas. While nearly 55 
percent and 16 percent of the total employment in the manufacturing sector are 
concentrated in Dhaka and Chittagong regions in 1995-96, they are 58 percent and 21 
percent respectively in 2005-6 (Jahan, 2017). Secondly, though Bangladesh is largely an 
agricultural country, different regions experience markedly different growth rates in 
agricultural output due to differences in rainfall, temperature, humidity and other ecological 
factors. While topological and ecological phenomena are partly responsible for 
spectacularly differential agricultural output rates in different regions, politically-
motivated implementation of the same public policy regarding distribution of agricultural 
inputs is also responsible (Quddus, 2007). Thirdly, Bangladesh experiences a shortfall in 
electricity supply amounting ranging from 1400 MW to 1800 MW during the summer 
season. At that time, different areas regularly experience load shedding both during the day 
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and the night. Incumbents may use load shedding for gaining electoral benefits in different 
ways (Min, 2015:76-77).  Irrespective of their ulterior motives, this reduces output in the 
manufacturing sector (Ehsan et al., 2012). Consequently, this is likely to break down the 
relationship between the radiance of the NSI and the output of the manufacturing sector. 
All these problems cast doubt as to the appropriateness of using NSI as a better 
representative of the regional GDP or per capita district-level income in Bangladesh.  
One key argument for using NSI as a better representative of the regional GDP in 
Bangladesh is that it may be a composite indicator of population density, urbanization, 
concentration of manufacturing units, wage employment and overall, human welfare 
(Ghosh et al., 2013). It may be argued that people who can afford to keep their lights on 
for a longer period at night are likely to have higher incomes and hence they possibly enjoy 
a higher welfare level than those who are forced to turn their lights off after completion of 
bare necessary tasks due to financial hardship. Secondly, it captures both market and non-
market goods and services, while the regional GDP or the per capita income captures only 
marketed goods and services (Sutton and Costanza, 2002). It may also be able to capture 
the large shadow economy of Bangladesh, which is estimated to be 35.9 percent during the 
1999-2007 period (Schneider et al., 2010). Thirdly, for the 1991-95 period we substitute 
old district-level per capita GDP for new ones formed by partitioning old ones. We assume 
that all new districts formed by partitioning old districts have average GDP of old districts, 
which is very unlikely. We have new district-level per capita GDPs for the 1996-2000 
period only. We do not have new district-level per capita GDPs for the 2000-2005 period. 
We forecast them based on the historical GDPs over the 1991-2000 period. The forecast is 
less robust due to the small size of the historical data set. As such, our measurement of the 
per capita district-level GDPs has some inconsistency as well as inaccuracy. On the other 
hand, the NSI is likely to be consistent across years. Fourthly, while the recorded economic 
indicators may be manipulated by incumbents for partisan electoral benefits, they would 
find it hard to manipulate the NSI (Min, 2015:81).  For all these reasons, we believe that 
the NSI may be a reasonably better proxy of the district-level per capita output of goods 
and services reflecting overall human welfare.   Hence, we use white pixels as a percentage 
of black pixels of the NSI to indicate the economic activities and consequently human 
welfare of the people of districts in Bangladesh.  
As far as the author of this study is concerned, only Min (2015:102) relates the NSI 
via the degree of electrification of public roads with the poor voter turnout rates in some 
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developing countries with a special focus on 98,000 villages in the Uttar Pradesh state in 
India. He argues that electrification of public roads is a public good. The more the public 
roads are brought under electrification, the more the poor tend to turn out for voting in 
favour of incumbents. This is because, the poor cannot afford private lighting. The lighting 
of public roads makes transport of goods and services easier for them. As such, incumbents 
use electrification of public roads strategically as a means of increasing their own 
popularity and hence electoral support. Consequently, the higher the degree of 
electrification of public roads, the higher is the radiance of the NSI and the higher is the 
turnout of poor voters. Min (2015:1-10) finds that in developing democratic countries the 
turnout of poor voters is higher in rural regions where the rate of electrification captured 
by the radiance of the NSI is higher. He finds the same in the rural areas of Uttar Pradesh 
state of India over the 1992-2010 period. We expect the same in the case of Bangladesh. 
More specifically, we expect that a higher radiance of the NSI is likely to increase the voter 
turnout rate in rural regions in Bangladesh where the percentage of the poor is higher. 
However, the overall relationship between the radiance of the NSI and the voter turnout 
rate depends on the percentage composition of voters based on the socioeconomic 
condition.    
In addition to the NSI, we use the hard core poverty as another key economic 
variable. We use it to capture the possibility of ‘turnout buying’ and ‘turnout selling’ 
practices between political elites and severely poverty-stricken voters. We expect that it 
would have a negative effect on the voter turnout rate in the absence of ‘turnout buying and 
selling’. This is because as poverty increases, the hard core poor would tend to turn out less 
for their higher opportunity cost of time. On the other hand, its effect is expected to be 
positive in the presence of ‘turnout buying and selling’ practices. This is because, the 
poorer the voters, the higher is the likelihood of their ‘exchange’ votes for ‘cash’. The 
relationship may be positive if the hard core poor turn out more to express their grievance 
against the political system that fails to reduce their poverty. Therefore, the effect of hard 
core poverty on the voter turnout is likely to be ambiguous.     
Social variables 
Voters with higher academic achievements are likely to turnout more for voting 
than those with lower academic achievements. As we do not have information about 
academic achievements of different categories of voters, we use the adult literacy rate as a 
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proxy for it. As all types of educated people are pooled together, we are not sure about its 
effect on the voter turnout rate.  
The urbanization rate is another potential factor that may influence the voter turnout 
rate in Bangladesh. We expect that its effect on the voter turnout rate would be positive, 
because urban voters are likely to be more educated and hence more politically conscious. 
Its effect on the voter turnout can be negative too. This is because, urban dwellers in 
Bangladesh are first or second generation urban residents. They still have a strong 
relationship with their ancestral rural homes. So, during elections they tend to go there to 
cast their votes. Moreover, candidates in their ancestral rural homes may be linked with 
them by kinship. So, they not only tend to turn out to cast votes for their favourite 
candidates but also mobilize other voters to turn out to vote for their preferred candidates. 
Furthermore, they tend to approach to members of the parliament of their ancestral homes 
if needed. They usually do not approach to members of the parliament in urban 
constituencies they reside in, because voters hardly know them personally.   
In addition to these factors, we use Hindu population as percentage of the total 
population to capture the effect of the largest religious minority group on the voter turnout 
rate. We expect that its effect would be positive, because they would tend to turn out more 
to protect and promote their sectarian interests.  
In Bangladesh number of strikes and politically motivated murders increase as 
elections approach nearer. They have great political implications. So, we use number of 
strikes and murders to capture their effects on voter turnout rates in Bangladesh.  
Electoral variables 
We include the political competition (effective number of parties being measured 
by the inverse of the HHI index) as a potential determinant of the voter turnout rate in 
Bangladesh.  We expect that it would have a positive effect on the voter turnout rate. This 
is because, the more the competition the more the mobilization efforts by candidates and 
parties. The more the competition the more the utility from voting. So, voters have more 
incentive to turn out for voting. However, there are two more variables that also capture 
the level of competition. They are winning margin and number of contestants.  
We include power-match to capture joint effect of partisan biased public resource 
allocation, volume of campaign expenses and intensity of mobilization efforts on the voter 
turnout rate. By power-match we mean election of candidates belonging to the immediate 
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past incumbent party at the centre. Though campaign expenses are reported by contestants, 
they are hugely under-reported for lack of accountability and transparency. Since we do 
not have any information in these regards, we use power-match to capture their effect on 
the voter turnout rate. We assume that power matching candidates would spend more on 
campaigns and mobilization effects and receive more allocation of public fund than non-
power matching ones. So, we expect a positive relationship between the power-match and 
the voter turnout rate.  
Furthermore, we include registered voters per polling station to capture cost of 
voting in terms of queuing time for casting vote. We expect a negative relationship between 
registered voters per polling station and the voter turnout rate.  
In addition to these variables, we include road length per polling station to capture 
ease of voting in terms of access to polling stations for casting vote. We expect a positive 
relationship between the road length per polling station and the voter turnout rate. This is 
because, the easier and less expensive it is to have access to the polling station the higher 
is the likelihood of the voter turnout rate. 
Personal political capital variable 
We include ex-incumbency as a potential determinant of the voter turnout rate. We 
are not sure about the relationship between ex-incumbency and the voter turnout rate. This 
is because, if ex-incumbents earn ‘good’ reputation through ‘better’ constituency services 
and project works, the relationship is expected to be positive. This is because, beneficiaries 
would tend to turn out to reward them for their good services. On the other hand, if ex-
incumbents earn ‘bad’ reputation through ‘poor’ constituency services and project works, 
the relationship is expected to be negative. As all types of incumbents are pooled together, 
the relationship is likely to be ambiguous. This relationship would depend on the 
composition of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ ex-incumbents in the pool of incumbents. 
5.7.4 Sources of the data 
The electoral and personal political capital data are compiled from Reports of the 
Bangladesh Election Commission. The socioeconomic and demographic data are collected 
from Bangladesh Censuses, Bangladesh Statistical Yearbooks and Household Income and 
Expenditure Surveys. Since socioeconomic data in Bangladesh is subject to more 
measurement errors relative to their counterparts in developed countries, we use night time 
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satellite imageries to complement them. We collect murder and strike data from a widely 
circulated vernacular national daily newspaper (the Ittefaq).  
5.8 Econometric models 
A review of the existing literature shows that the voter turnout rate may be 
determined by (i) socioeconomic and demographic conditions prevailed in the year just 
before the election year, or (ii) socioeconomic and demographic conditions prevailed 
during the election year, or (iii)   change in socioeconomic and demographic conditions 
between two consecutive election years or (iv) socioeconomic and demographic conditions 
prevailed in an election unit with respect to the national ones in the election year, or (v) a 
combination of all or some of them. Some researchers (e.g., Rosa, 1980) take averages of 
explanatory variables for some previous years to identify determinants of the response 
variable in the current election. In the vein of the existing literature we take an exploratory 
approach in determining factors affecting voter turnout rates. Our econometric models are 
as follows: 
 
(a) Static models: fixed effect models (the base line model) with explanatory 
variables at the level: 
     0
1
..............................(5.1)it j ijt i t it
i
VTO Xβ β α γ ε
=
= + + + +∑  
(b) Dynamic model: fixed effect models with explanatory variables at the level 
and one-lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable: 
0 1
1
...................................(5.2)it it j ijt t it
i
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=
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(c) Long-difference model: fixed effect models with both dependent and 
explanatory variables at long first-difference: 
0 , 1
1
............................................(5.3)it j ijt t t it
i
VTO Xβ β γ ε−
=
∆ = + ∆ + +∑  
Where VTOit = the voter turnout rate in the constituency і in election t; 
            Xijt= Continuous explanatory variable Xj in the constituency і in election 
t; 
        αi= Constituency fixed effect; 
           Δ= long first-difference 
            γt=time fixed effect; 
        εit=error term.  
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5.9 Analysis of summary statistics 
5.9.1 Summary statistics of voter turnout rates  
The voter turnout rates vary across constituencies in a given election as well as 
across elections. Figure 5.3 shows means and standard deviations of voter turnout rates in 
Bangladesh in each election held over the 1991-2008 period.  
The Bangladesh parliament consists of 300 members elected from 300 
constituencies. The number of constituencies is 292 instead of 300 in the 2008 election 
(Appendix 5B). It is because, in that election the Bangladesh Election Commission (BEC) 
re-constructed eight new constituencies in the metropolitan Dhaka city by de-constructing 
eight long-existing constituencies in the rest of the country. We omit newly created 
constituencies, because their electoral data for elections other than the 2008 election does 
not exist. We keep the de-constructed constituencies for other elections, because their 
electoral data for the 1991-2001 is available.  The Figure 5.3 shows that the average voter 
turnover rate is the lowest in the 1991 election. Moreover, the minimum and the maximum 
turnout rates are lowest too in that election (Appendix 5B). Interestingly, the standard 
deviation of voter turnout rates is highest in that year. It may imply that the 1991 election 
is an ‘exceptional’ election in terms of voters’ turnout rates. This ‘exceptionality’ may arise 
from the fact that for the first time in the history of Bangladesh a free and fair election was 
held in 1991 under the supervision of a NCG following collapse of a military-turned-
civilian government which survived over 9 years through ‘oppressive’ measures. The voter 
turnout rate is expected to be higher than the long-term average in the 1991 election, 
because under the leadership of two major parties mass people were involved with protests 
against the then ‘unpopular’ (Jatiya Party-led) incumbent government. One possible reason 
of low voter turnout rates may arise from the demand side. The two dominant parties – the 
Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh nationalist Party (BNP) – were out of power for 
a long time. The AL was out of power since 1975 and the BNP since 1982. So, they might 
lack resources necessary for mobilizing voters. Another possible reason of low voter 
turnout rates may arise from the supply side. Many voters might have lost interests in the 
political system following ‘dodgy’ behaviour of mainstream political parties in 
Bangladesh.         
Figure 5.3 shows that the average voter turnover rate is the highest in the 2008 
election. Moreover, the maximum turnover rates is the highest too in that year (Appendix 
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5B). Interestingly, the standard deviation of turnout rates is the lowest in that year 
(Appendix 5B). This may imply that the 2008 election was also an ‘exceptional’ election 
in terms of the voter turnout rate. Again, this ‘exceptionality’ may arise from the fact that 
the 2008 election was scheduled to take place in 2006. Like previous elections, an NCG 
was expected to take over the ruling power for holding free and fair election on time. As a 
consequence of the emerging stalemate in the political arena a military-backed civilian 
government became the NCG. They re-scheduled election dates several times on some 
grounds and ultimately organized the election in early 2008. During this interim period  
Figure 5.3: Voter turnout rates in elections held over the 1991-2008 period 
 
Source: Bangladesh Election Commission Reports 
(2006-2008) the ‘self-selected’ NCG imposed a number of restrictions on political 
activities of parties as well as political discussions in public spheres. Overtime their 
oppression reached to such a great extent that mass people seemed to have preferred to go 
back to the ‘popular authoritarian’ rule of the BNP or the AL. The suffocating political 
environment of that time might have motivated voters to turnout more for voting. The NCG 
also used media to motivate people to turnout more for voting. Given the demand for vote, 
these factors contributed to increase voter turnout rates.   
Figure 5.3 further shows that the standard deviation of voter turnout rates in the 
1991 election is higher than any other year. This implies that voter turnout rates across 
constituencies deviate substantially from the 1991 national average. On the supply side this 
may happen due to enthusiasm of voters in that election in some constituencies contributing 
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to a rise in the voter turnout rate above the national average. On the other hand, in some 
other constituencies voters might be apathetic to turnout for voting causing to a fall in the 
voter turnout rate below the national average. On the demand side dominant political 
parties might not be able to mobilize voters for lack of resources, because none of them 
was immediate past incumbent. The candidates of dominant parties might have mobilized 
voters in different degrees using their personal resources. On the other hand, the standard 
deviation of voter turnout rates in the 2008 election is the lowest. It implies that voter 
turnout rates across constituencies do not deviate substantially from the 2008 national 
average. The reason may be that a common sentiment swept the nation equally. The past 
three democratic elections may be instrumental in inculcating the sense of civic duty among 
mass voters. They might have realized the importance of turning out for voting to make 
their ‘voices’ heard by the state as well as by political elites. In India a poor voter votes 
because of her realization from past electoral experiences that if she does not vote, she is 
“dead to the state” (Ahuja and Chhibber, 2012). In the 2008 election the general voters in 
Bangladesh might want to demonstrate to political elites that they were not ‘dead’.      
The summary statistics of the Figure 5.3 (details in the Appendix 5B) may not 
appropriately represent voter turnout rates if their distribution is skewed and there are some 
outliers. It is observed that the distribution of voter turnout rates is left-skewed (Appendix 
5C and Appendix 5D) and some values are outliers at the lower end (Appendix 5E). So, 
 
medians and inter-quantile ranges may represent the data set better than means and standard 
deviations.  Table 5.1 shows that the inter-quantile ranges have declined over subsequent 
elections. This means that more voter turnout rates are concentrated around medians in the 
2008 election than the 1996 election. Moreover, medians have been increasing over time. 
It is seen (Appendix 5B and Table 5.1) that medians and means are very close. So are inter-
quantile ranges and standard deviations. However, the distribution in question is not 
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normal. A visual inspection of kernel and normal distribution (Appendix 5C) subscribes to 
it.  
5.9.2 Summary statistics of continuous explanatory variables 
  
Table 5.2 shows that average white pixels as percentage of black ones is 22.66 
percent. The minimum percentage is 0.05 and the maximum is 117. The very low values 
may be associated with very underdeveloped areas. Moreover, images may be taken at the 
time of power outage.   The high values may associated with metropolitan centres. The 
spread of the hard core poverty is large. The maximum value is 47.4 percent and the 
minimum value is 8.1 percent. The high values may be associated with severely poor areas. 
There are some pockets in the Northern region where poverty is severe all the year round. 
They may influence the maximum value. The Hindu population is unevenly distributed 
across districts. The lowest adult literacy is 14.05 percent, while the highest one is 67.65 
percent. Since unban population are more educated, the maximum percentage of adult 
literacy may be in metropolitan constituencies. The winning margins vary sharply too. It 
implies that some constituencies are safe haven for some partisan candidates, while others 
are not. Densities of registered voters and roads are high in polling stations of some 
constituencies. They may be urban constituencies.     
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5.10 Econometric estimations and their analysis 
This section discusses some problems associated with the compilation of values of 
socioeconomic variables as well as merits and demerits of exclusion or inclusion of 1991 
values of power-match variables. It also highlights findings of econometric estimations and 
analyses them.  
5.10.1 Some trade-offs 
In the course of running the model 5.1 we face some problems. Our data set covers 
the period 1991-2008. The free and fair election started with the 1991 election and ended 
with the 2008 election. Thirty eight members (12.67 percent) of the 1991 parliament 
belonged to the immediate past ruling party (the Jatiya Party). So, we need to make a choice 
whether we should include them or not. It is because the 1988 parliamentary election was 
massively rigged by the incumbent party. Moreover, the two major opposition parties (the 
AL and the BNP) not only boycotted the election, but also vowed to resist it by any means. 
They also asked voters not to vote. So, voter turnout rates were very low. However, in the 
1991 election candidates belonging to that party were elected without any sort of vote 
rigging, as the election was held under the NCG. So, arguments for and against inclusion 
of the power match values for the 1991 election are strong.  As a result, we estimate our 
models with values of the power-match variable for the 1991 election and without them. 
Secondly, according to Downs’ (1957) economic vote model, voters turnout to vote for (or 
reward) incumbents whose retrospective economic performance is above or equal to the 
expected level. They may also turnout to vote against (or punish) them, if the same is below 
the expected level. The economic performance is usually measured by the level of per 
capita income, inflation and unemployment rates. For unavailability of inflation and 
unemployment rates at the district level let alone at the constituency level, we use per capita 
GDP at the district level as proxy for the constituency level to capture level of economic 
activities at the constituency level. However, whether per capita GDP does adequately 
capture the level of economic activity in a developing country like Bangladesh is a 
contentious issue, because the size of the black economy of Bangladesh is speculated to be 
one-third of its GDP (Reza, 1989). So, we use another measure of the level of economic 
activity – the white pixels as percentage of black pixels being extracted from night-time 
satellite imageries. It is a better measure of the level of economic activities in comparison 
to the per capita GDP reported in the national accounts of developing countries (Sutton, et 
al., 2007). However, we use both to check robustness of the real per capita GDP. Thirdly,  
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Table 5.3 Fixed effect estimation of the static model 5.1 
 (With 1991 power-match values, night-time satellite imagery and political competition):1991-2008 
Variables Model 5.1 Model 
5.1a 
Model 
5.1b 
Model 
5.1c 
Model 
5.1d 
Model 
5.1e 
Model 
5.1f 
Night-time satellite 
imagery (NSI) 
-0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 
 (-0.41) (0.33) (-0.66) (-0.11) (-0.08) (-0.37) (-0.10) 
Hard core poverty -0.06* -0.07** -0.07** -0.07** -0.06** -0.06* -0.06* 
 (-1.86) (-2.18) (-2.03) (-2.29) (-2.00) (-1.80) (-1.84) 
Hindu population 0.92* 0.95* 0.93* 1.02** 0.91* 0.96* 0.95** 
 (1.88) (1.90) (1.90) (1.98) (1.90) (1.94) (2.07) 
Adult literacy -0.61*** -0.61*** -0.62*** -0.61*** -0.59*** -0.61*** -0.60*** 
 (-4.57) (-4.49) (-4.58) (-4.70) (-4.48) (-4.40) (-4.42) 
Urban population 0.29*** 0.18* 0.31*** 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.27*** 
 (3.20) (1.77) (3.43) (2.71) (3.45) (3.22) (3.11) 
Political  -0.58* -0.42 -0.58* -0.53 -0.54 -0.56 -0.55 
competition (-1.68) (-1.22) (-1.65) (-1.57) (-1.61) (-1.63) (-1.59) 
Power-match 0.54* 0.51* 0.55* 0.52* 0.53* 0.48* 0.44 
 (1.93) (1.84) (1.95) (1.83) (1.91) (1.66) (1.55) 
Registered voters -0.38a*** -0.37a*** -0.38a*** -0.37a*** -0.28a*** -0.37*** -0.38a*** 
per polling station (-6.20) (-6.13) (-6.19) (-6.19) (-4.46) (-5.85) (-6.29) 
Road length per -2.17* -2.25** -2.21* -2.10* -2.48** -1.58 -2.19* 
polling station (-1.89) (-2.00) (-1.91) (-1.83) (-2.16) (-1.52) (-1.94) 
Ex-incumbency 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.03 
 (0.14) (0.44) (0.14) (0.39) (0.31) (0.18) (0.08) 
Population density  -0.00***      
  (-2.70)      
Gender ration   0.15     
   (1.49)     
Number     0.17***    
of contestant    (2.87)    
Total voters     -0.16b***   
     (-2.93)   
Land size per      -0.49*  
polling station      (-1.86)  
Murder       -0.00 
       (-0.03) 
Strike       -0.03** 
       (-2.44) 
Observations 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,183 
Adjusted R-squared 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91 
Number of 
constituency 
299 299 299 299 299 299 299 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the voter turnout rates at the level; 
all continuous explanatory variables are at the level; a, the coefficient*100; b, coefficient*10000; time and constituency fixed 
effects and constant are included but not reported; standard errors are clustered by constituencies. 
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political competition can be measured by at least three variables, such as inverse of the sum 
of squares of vote shares of each contestant (we call it political competition), the winning 
margin and the number of contestant. Each variable has some merits and demerits. Among 
them, political competition and the winning margin variables are more appropriate than the 
number of contestant variable. So, we use both of them separately to check robustness of 
the political competition variable.  
5.10.2 Estimates and analysis of the Model 5.1  
The base line model 5.1 is built on the assumption that current voter turnout rates 
are influenced by explanatory variables at the level.  The estimates of the model is reported 
in the Table 5.3. We also control time and constituency fixed effects in this model. Models 
5.1a-5.1f are sub-models to test robustness of some variables.  The base line model 5.1 (1st 
column) of the Table 5.3 shows that the night-time satellite imagery variable is insignificant 
(from now on only insignificant) and the sign is negative, which is unexpected. We do not 
find any studies that use satellite images as a proxy variable for determining voter turnout 
rates. So we are not able to compare our finding with those of other studies. Since real per 
capita GDP also represents well-being of the people, we regress voter turnout rates on it 
and control the same variables. We find it significant (Appendix 5F), but the sign is 
negative, which is unexpected. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficient is very 
infinitesimal. However, using the individual level world-wide survey data Kasara and 
Suryanarayan (2015) find that the rich are likely to turnout more for voting when they 
apprehend that political parties having income redistribution policy biased towards the poor 
have higher probability of winning and the state has the capacity to use the fiscal policy to 
redistribute income. Similarly, using the aggregate level data Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) 
find that per capita income has significant positive effect on voter turnout rates in rich 
countries. In contrast, Fornos et al. (2004) find that per capita income has little significant 
effect on voter turnout rates in Latin American poor countries. From these studies we may 
infer that in terms of the magnitude of the coefficient it is consistent with Fornos et al. 
(2004), in terms of the level of significance of the coefficient it is consistent with Blais and 
Dobrzynska (1998), but in terms of the direction of relationship it is inconsistent with both 
Kasara and Suryanarayan (2015) and Blais and Dobrzynska (1998). 
In the base line model 5.1 of Table 5.3 it is seen that the hard core poverty variable 
is significant at various levels of significance and the sign is negative, which is expected. 
For one percentage point higher hard core poverty level the voter turnout rate is lower by 
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0.06 percentage points. According to Downs (1957:265,299), the hard core poverty 
variable is most likely to be insignificant. This is because, in Bangladesh 30.50 percent 
population are hard core poor and they are most unlikely to turnout for voting due to higher 
opportunity costs of voting and higher costs of collecting and processing of relevant 
information. In contrast, in highly competitive elections in Bangladesh the hard core poor 
are more likely to be willing to “exchange” their votes for immediate financial benefits 
from political elites and their cronies and hence it is expected to be significant. This is 
reflected in Jensen and Justesen (2014) who observe widespread “vote-selling” practices 
among the hard core poor and “vote-buying” practices among political elites of new 
democracies in the African continent. Moreover, given that there is little vote buying and 
selling practices the Bangladeshi hard core poor like their counterparts in other countries 
may be self-motivated to turnout more for voting to punish the government which is 
believed to have the moral responsibility as well as the logistic capability to reduce the 
incidence of poverty (Kernell, 1977). In contrast, like the US poor the financial duress of 
the Bangladeshi poor may keep them preoccupied with earning ‘bread and butter’ for the 
family in the short-run and in turn force them to withdraw from the political participation 
including turning out for voting (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980:25-26, 29). Sniderman 
and Brody (1977) argue that poverty does not have a significant effect on the turnout rate 
of the poor when they hold themselves personally responsible for their poverty. So, our 
finding is consistent with Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980:25-26, 29).  
The Hindu population variable is significant at various levels of significance and 
the sign is positive, which is expected. This is because, as the largest religious minority 
group, they are expected to turnout more in elections to protect and promote their group 
interests. For 1 percentage point higher Hindu population the turnout rate is higher by 0.92 
percentage points. In many constituencies they inhabit in large number and hence they may 
play an important role in influencing electoral outcomes in those constituencies. In the case 
of Indian states Diwakar (2008) finds positive relationship between percentage of people 
belonging to social minority groups and percentage of voter turnout in Indian states. In 
developed countries like USA, UK and so on many ethno-religious groups are minority. 
Analysing the British General Election results of 2001 Fieldhouse and Cutts (2008) find 
that the turnout of ethno-religious minority voters increases as their concentration in 
constituencies increases, because it is easy to mobilize them. So, our finding is in consistent 
with Diwakar (2008).  
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 Table 5.3 shows that the adult literacy rate variable is significant at a 1 percent level 
of significance across all models. For 1 percentage point higher adult literacy rate, voter 
turnout rate is lower by 0.75 percentage points. However, the sign is negative, which is 
unexpected. It is unexpected, because voter turnout rates are likely to increase with 
increasing literacy rates. Gallego (2010) finds positive relationship between probability of 
voter turnout and level of education in 28 advanced industrial countries. 
 In contrast, Brody (1978) argues that higher literacy rates are not necessarily 
translated into higher voter turnout rates in the US, because all types of formal education 
do not empower voters with similar political knowledge necessary for political 
participation. While some researchers identify factors (e.g., decline in partisanship, elite 
mobilization, and generational replacement of more participatory cohorts with less 
participatory ones, growing popularity of electronic and social media, increasing 
geographical mobility and so on) that depress voter turnout, Burden (2009) finds that 
education has a dynamic rather than a static effect on voter turnout rates. It is the voters 
with college education who turnout more in elections than their counterparts who have 
educational level less than college education. So, level of education matters in the case of 
voter turnout rates in elections. Moreover, types of elections are also an important 
determinant. Lehoucq and Wall (2004) find that in emerging democracies like Guatemala 
literate people turnout less in presidential and legislative elections and more in presidential 
runoff elections. They may regard presidential runoff elections as ‘critical’ elections and 
as such participate more in those elections. On the other hand, they may regard presidential 
and legislative elections as ‘normal’ and as such participate less in those elections. As our 
elections are legislative type, our finding is quite consistent with Lehoucq and Wall (2004). 
The urban population variable is significant at a 1 percent level of significance in 
the base line and all sub-models except one (sub-model 5.1a) when population density is 
controlled with all other variables. The sign is positive, which may be expected. It is 
because, urban people are relatively more politically conscious and involved. Due to a high 
level of concentration of voters, it may be easy to mobilize them. Moreover, they have 
higher incomes. So, they may afford to spend their leisure time for turning out to vote 
(Jongryn et al., 1991). For 1 percentage point higher urban population rate, the voter turnout 
is higher by 0.29 percentage points. The relationship may be unexpected too, because the 
opportunity cost of time of higher-income people is higher than that of the lower-income 
people. It appears that relationship between income and turnout for voting is ambiguous 
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(Anderson and Beramendi, 2008). However, our finding is in sharp contrast with electoral 
behaviour of urban voters in developed industrialised countries, where urban people vote 
less due to weakening of partisanship and erosion of faith in government regarding 
effective solution of problems countries have been encountering (Brody, 1978; Abramson 
and Aldrich). Moreover, it does not conform to the turnout behaviour of urban voters in 
Indian states. Diwakar (2008) finds negative relationship between degree of urbanization 
and voter turnout in Indian states over the 1951-2004 period. So, the relationship may be 
context-dependent. Moreover, urbanization process in Bangladesh may be unusual. It is 
because, usually industrialization precedes urbanization. In Bangladesh this is not 
happening. A huge number of rural people are migrating to urban centres in each year and 
surviving on casual employment in the urban informal sectors with little chance to get jobs 
in formal sectors (Rahman, 2014). Another reason is mere political. When a government 
increases the boundary of a city, value of land of those newly enclosed areas increases and 
people are satisfied with the government for windfall gains. This may motivate them to 
turnout more and vote for the party which did it. 
Table 5.3 shows that the political competition variable is significant in the base line 
model and another sub-model (model 5.1b) only at a 10 percent level of significance, but 
the sign is negative across all models. The sign is unexpected, because perceiving a higher 
level of competition parties and candidates are likely to increase their campaign expenses 
and hence voter mobilization efforts which in turn stimulate higher voter turnout rates (Cox 
and Munger, 1989). Similarly, when voters feel that each vote is decisive they get more 
utility from voting. So, they tend to turnout more (Simonovits, 2012). However, when 
individual level survey data sets are used, relationships between competition and voter 
turnout rates are found weak. On the other hand, when aggregate level data sets are used, 
there are strong evidences that competition has a strong positive effect on the voter turnout 
rate. Using both survey data (Quebec Referendum Panel Study) and aggregate data (1974, 
1979, and 1980 Canadian National elections) Matsusaka and Palda (1993) show that 
relationship between political competition and voter turnout rates in the case of aggregate 
data is spurious and they attribute this to ecological fallacy. Our data is aggregate data and 
we find it significant in some models only. However, the sign is negative which is 
unexpected. Our estimated relationship may be spurious as per Matsusaka and Palda 
(1993).  There may be some measurement errors in the values of the political competition 
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variable. Moreover, winning margin and number of contestant may capture the level of 
competition better than this variable.        
The power match variable is significant at a 10 percent level of significance in the 
base line as well as all sub-models except one (sub-model 5.1f) when the murder and the 
strike variables are controlled. The sign is positive, which is expected. It is because, when 
contestants belong to the immediate past ruling party the voter turnout is higher by 0.54 
percentage points. The ruling party has more control on public resources and creates more 
private resources for their cronies through crony capitalistic techniques. As a result, they 
have more money to spend for electoral campaigns and mobilization of voters. As we do 
not have data related to partisan biasedness in public resource allocation, campaign 
expenditures of contestants and mobilization efforts of candidates, we use power match as 
a proxy. As a rational actor in the political market the government tends to use all available 
resources strategically for “buying” votes through “buying” the voter turnout (Nichter, 
2008). Our finding is consistent with Patterson and Caldeira (1983) who find that in the US 
gubernational elections the voter turnout is positively related with campaign expenditures, 
but the turnout increases at decreasing rates with increases in campaign expenditures. We 
do not test the second part of their finding.  
The registered voters per polling station variable is significant at a 1 percent level 
of significance.  The sign is negative, which is expected. It is because, the greater the 
number of registered voters per polling station, voters need to spend more time in the queue 
to cast vote. So, their cost of turning out increases. As a result, voters tend to turnout less 
as size of registered voters per polling station increases (Lehoucq and Wall, 2004). For 1 
percentage point higher registered voters per polling station, the turnout rate is lower by 
0.0038 percentage points. The magnitude of the coefficient is very small. Our finding is 
consistent with Lehoucq and Wall (2004) in terms of both the sign as well as the magnitude 
of the coefficient. Their study attempts to identify factors that affect voter turnout in 
Guatemala which is a newly democratised country like Bangladesh.  
The road length per polling station variable is significant at various levels of 
significance. The sign is negative, which is unexpected. It implies that for each kilometre 
higher road length per polling station, the voter turnout rate is 2.17 percentage points lower. 
Using the New Zealand Election Study survey data of the 2005 election Gibson et al. (2013) 
find that travel time to the nearest polling station and time cost (dollars) of reaching there 
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are significant at 10 percent level of significance and the signs are negative, which are 
expected. From these findings, we may infer that a higher density of road is likely to reduce 
opportunity costs of turning out (in terms of time required to travel to and from polling 
stations and income) for voting and thus increase the voter turnout rate. So, our sign is 
unexpected. This paradoxical finding may originate from elsewhere especially from the 
voters’ perception of corruption level related with construction of roads.  
Politicians prefer to implement spectacular projects like the construction of roads 
and highways in their respective areas and claim credit for them while seeking votes in 
elections. It may motivate people to turnout for supporting them when they perceive that 
concerned politicians have done it with ‘honesty’. On the other hand, it may make people 
uninterested in turning out for voting when they perceive that a large part of the public fund 
allocated for road construction has gone ‘missing’ and ‘noisy news’ of corruption 
implicating local political elites is in the air. Most people may trust ‘noisy news’, because 
infrastructure is one of the topmost corrupt sectors in developing countries (Kenny, 2006). 
In Bangladesh approximately 45 percent citizens perceive political parties and 41 percent 
citizens perceive the parliament as the two most corrupt institutions followed by the police 
and the judiciary. Moreover, they have been sheltering criminals and terrorists (McDevitt, 
2015). In this context it may be argued that many voters are likely to be disillusioned with 
political system and hence may tend to refrain from any sort of political involvement 
including turning out for voting. Using data of the Comparative Study of Electoral System 
collected before elections in 34 countries during the 2001-2006 period and several macro 
level data (Quality of Government data) Dahlberg and Solevid (2016) find that in general 
when voters believe that politicians are corrupt, they tend to turnout less for voting.    
Another possible reason for the negative relationship between road length per 
polling station and voter turnout rates may be that road network may be high in a 
constituency but distributed unevenly across it. Usually, road density is high around civic 
centres and in areas inhabited by the upper socioeconomic classes. It is low in peripheral 
areas and in areas inhabited by lower socioeconomic classes. So, the cost of turning out for 
voting for people of peripheral areas is higher and as such they tend to turnout less leading 
to a fall in average voter turnout rates. Moreover, lower socioeconomic classes have lower 
tendency to turnout for voting due to their preoccupation with earning daily livelihood. So, 
a greater income inequality depresses voter turnout rates (Solt, 2008). The income 
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inequality has been increasing in Bangladesh over time. The Gini coefficient has increased 
from 0.36 in 1973/74 to 0.46 in 2010/11 (Matin, 2014).    
In the sub-model 5.1a we find population density significant at a 1 percent level of 
significance and the sign is negative, which is unexpected. It is because, when population 
density is higher voters are concentrated and it is easier to mobilize them. Blais et al. (2003) 
find the relationship positive but insignificant. In the sub-model 5.1c we find the number 
of contestant variable significant at 1 percent level of significance and the sign is positive, 
which is expected. It is because, this variable represents competition. When one more 
contestant in a constituency is likely to make the level of competition higher and as such 
the voter turnout rate is expected to be higher due to increased mobilization efforts by all 
contestants. When 1 contestant is higher per million voter, the voter turnout rate is higher 
by 0.17 percentage points. In the extended model 5.1d we find the total voter variable is 
significant at 1 percent level of significance and the sign is negative and the coefficient is 
small, which are expected. It is because, when the size of the electorate is higher each vote 
becomes less pivotal in influencing the electoral outcome and hence each voter is likely to 
derive less utility from voting. So, a voter has less incentive to turn out for voting (Downs, 
1957). When a constituency has one registered voter more, the turnout is 0.0016 percentage 
points lower. In the sub-model 5.1e we find land size per polling station is significant at 10 
percent level of significance and the sign is negative, which is expected.  It is because, the 
greater the land size per polling station the more is the distance a voter needs to travel to 
come to the polling station and hence her cost of voting is higher. When the land size is 
higher by 1 km2, the voter turnout rate is lower by 0.49 percentage points. In the sub-model 
5.1f we find that the strike variable is significant at 5 percent level of significance and the 
sign is negative, which is expected. It is because, strikes disrupt economic activities. The 
voters especially the lower and lower-middle class people bear the brunt of these 
disruptions most (Roy and Borsha, 2013). So, they are likely to turnout less. The GDP in 
Bangladesh fell between 3 percent and 4 percent during the 1990s due to strikes (UNDP, 
2005). When 1 million people experience 1 more strike per year, the voter turnout rate is 
0.03 percentage points lower. 
The econometric estimations of Table 5.3 are found by using the values of the 1991 
power-match variable and the political competition (inverse of the HHI index) variable. 
The political competition can be measured by winning margins as well. So, we check 
robustness of the political competition variable by the winning margin variable and by 
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using the values of the 1991 power-match variable and without them (Appendix 5G-
Appendix5I). Though we find the real per capita GDP variable significant, we keep using 
the night-time satellite imagery variable. This is because, it has fewer measurement errors 
than the real per capita GDP. The results are summarized in the Table 5.4. 
5.10.3 Comparison between estimates of the model 5.1 under different specifications  
 
Table 5.4 Model 5.1: Comparison of determinants of voter turnout under different specifications: 1991-
2008 
Variables Model 5.1 Model 5.1 Model 5.1 Model 5.1 
 With 1991 power-match 
(includes less competitive 
elections) 
Without 1991 power-match 
(excludes less competitive 
elections) 
Night-time satellite 
imagery (NSI) 
-1.72 -1.59 -1.92 -1.85 
 (-0.41) (-0.38) (-0.45) (-0.44) 
Hard core poverty -0.06* -0.06* -0.07** -0.07** 
 (-1.86) (-1.79) (-2.05) (-2.01) 
Hindu population 0.92* 0.94* 0.85* 0.86* 
 (1.88) (1.94) (1.75) (1.79) 
Adult literacy -0.61*** -0.61*** -0.59*** -0.59*** 
 (-4.57) (-4.51) (-4.24) (-4.20) 
Urban population 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 
 (3.20) (3.32) (3.15) (3.24) 
Political  -0.58* - -0.44 0.00 
competition (-1.68) - (-1.23) (0.30) 
Winning margin - 0.00 - 0.00 
 - (0.34) - (0.30) 
Power-match 0.54* 0.51* 0.85*** 0.81** 
 (1.93) (1.77) (2.74) (2.59) 
Registered voters -0.38a*** -0.38a*** -0.37a*** -0.37a*** 
per polling station (-6.20) (-6.26) (-5.86) (-5.90) 
Road length per -2.17* -2.18* -2.25* -2.28* 
polling station (-1.89) (-1.87) (-1.96) (-1.95) 
Ex-incumbency 0.04 0.03 0.15 0.14 
 (0.14) (0.11) (0.47) (0.43) 
Observations 1,183 1183 1,145 1,145 
Adjusted R-squared 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 
Number of constituency 299 299 299 299 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the voter 
turnout rates at the level; all continuous explanatory variables are at the level; a, the coefficient*100; 
b, coefficient*10000; time and constituency fixed effects and constant are included but not reported; 
standard errors are clustered by constituencies; reproduced from the Table 5.3, Appendix 5G-
Appendix 5I.  
We use Table 5.4 to compare and contrast significance of some variables in more 
competitive and less competitive elections. As the 1988 election was boycotted by the two 
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dominant opposition parties, it was less competitive. All elections held between 1991 and 
2008 were participated by many parties. So, they were more competitive than the 1988 one. 
Table 5.4 shows that the sign of the hard core poverty variable is negative and its coefficient 
is lower in more competitive elections than less competitive ones. It implies that the hard 
core poor poverty affects the turnout rate less in more competitive elections than in less 
competitive ones. Alternatively, the hard core poor turnout more in competitive elections 
than less competitive ones. Moreover, the hard core poverty is statistically more significant 
in more competitive elections than less competitive ones. The turnout rate is higher in 
constituencies where winners belong to the immediate past incumbent party and the rate is 
higher in more competitive elections than less competitive ones. The power-match variable 
is more significant in more competitive elections than less competitive ones.  
5.10.4 Estimates and analysis of the model 5.2 
In the model 5.2 we regress the voter turnout rate in the current election on the same 
in the previous election and other explanatory variables at the level, because some studies 
including Jackman and Miller’s (1995) seminal and pioneering study on the determinants 
of the voter turnout in the industrial democracies in the 1980s did so and find it significant.  
We run this regression to test whether the voter turnout rate in the previous election has 
any effect on the voter turnout rate in the current election given other explanatory variables.   
In Table 5.5 the model 5.2 is the base line model and others (model 5.2a-model 
5.2f) are sub-models. Table 5.5 shows that one-long-period lagged voter turnout is 
statistically significant at a 1 percent level of significance. The sign is negative. This 
implies that when the turnout rate in the previous election is 1 percentage point higher, the 
turnout rate in the current election is 0.22 percentage points lower. This also implies that 
the voter turnout is negatively autocorrelated over elections. This finding is consistent to 
some extent with Berdiev and Chang (2013) who find it significant at a 5 percent level of 
significance. They find the sign negative using GMM and OLS, but they find it 
insignificant using the fixed effect model. Their study uses results of the legislative 
assembly elections in Taiwan over the 1998-2008 period. The sign is also negative when 
they use the fixed effect model. However, it is inconsistent with Martins and Veiga (2013) 
who find it significant at 1 percent level of significance and the sign positive using GMM, 
OLS and weighted least squares method. Their study uses results of the legislative 
assembly elections in Portugal over the 1979-2005 period. So, it may be inferred that the 
effect of the turnout rate in the preceding year on the current one may be context-dependent.  
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Table 5.5 Fixed effect estimation of the dynamic model 5.2 (With 1991 power-match values, night-time 
satellite imagery and political competition):1991-2008 
Explanatory 
variables 
Model  
5.2 
Model 
5.2a 
Model 
5.2b 
Model 
5.2c 
Model 
5.2d 
Model 
5.2e 
Model 
5.2f 
One-long-period 
lagged voter turnout 
-0.22*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** 
 (-4.79) (-4.66) (-4.79) (-4.78) (-4.80) (-4.85) (-4.93) 
Night-time satellite 
imagery (NSI) 
0.29*** 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 
 (4.53) (3.40) (4.31) (4.15) (4.54) (4.24) (4.28) 
Hard core poverty -0.07** -0.07** -0.07* -0.07** -0.07** -0.07* -0.08** 
 (-1.99) (-2.00) (-1.94) (-2.07) (-2.07) (-1.97) (-2.21) 
Hindu population 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.83 0.83 0.86 
 (1.16) (1.13) (1.17) (1.19) (1.18) (1.18) (1.28) 
Adult literacy -0.86*** -0.87*** -0.86*** -0.85*** -0.85*** -0.85*** -0.86*** 
 (-4.14) (-4.12) (-4.14) (-4.16) (-4.09) (-3.99) (-4.16) 
Urban population 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 
 (2.79) (2.95) (3.06) (2.72) (3.08) (2.79) (2.83) 
Political competition -0.19 -0.20 -0.16 -0.17 -0.20 -0.19 -0.18 
 (-0.42) (-0.45) (-0.35) (-0.38) (-0.46) (-0.44) (-0.41) 
Power match 0.81** 0.81** 0.80** 0.82** 0.81** 0.80** 0.75** 
 (2.51) (2.49) (2.48) (2.52) (2.50) (2.46) (2.26) 
Registered voters 
per polling station 
-0.24a*** -0.24a*** -0.24a*** -0.24a*** -0.19a*** -0.24a*** -0.24a*** 
 (-3.60) (-3.56) (-3.60) (-3.63) (-2.92) (-3.54) (-3.66) 
Road length per 
polling station 
-2.90** -2.91** -2.94** -2.79** -3.00*** -2.69** -2.97*** 
 (-2.55) (-2.55) (-2.58) (-2.38) (-2.64) (-2.40) (-2.65) 
Ex-incumbency 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.61 0.61* 0.59 0.58 
 (1.62) (1.59) (1.62) (1.64) (1.67) (1.63) (1.59) 
Population density  0.00      
  (0.38)      
Gender ratio   0.13     
   (0.85)     
Contestant    0.05    
    (0.80)    
Total registered 
voters 
    -0.00   
     (-1.56)   
Land size per polling 
station 
     -0.17  
      (-0.56)  
Murder       -0.00 
       (-0.36) 
Strike       -0.02* 
       (-1.74) 
Observations 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 
Adjusted R-squared 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 
Number of 
constituencies 
299 299 299 299 299 299 299 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the voter turnout rate at the level; all 
the continuous explanatory variables are at the level except the voter turnout rate which is one-long period lagged; a, the 
coefficient*100; time and constituency fixed effects and constant are included but not reported; standard errors are clustered 
by constituencies. 
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The satellite imagery (NSI) is significant at a 1 percent level of significance and the 
sign is positive, which is expected. This implies that when white pixels as a percentage of 
black pixels is one percentage point higher, the voter turnout rate is 0.29 percentage points 
higher.  The hard core poverty is significant at various levels of significance and the sign 
is negative, which is expected. This implies that for 1 percentage point higher poverty rate 
the voter turnout is lower by 0.07 percentage points.  This finding is consistent with Martins 
and Veiga (2013). Using the GMM method and results of the legislative elections of 
Portugal over the 1979-2005 period they find that unemployment is significant and has 
negative effect on the voter turnout rate. Since people are poor for being unemployed, the 
negative sign of the hard core poverty variable is consistent with our expectation. 
The literacy rate is significant at a 1 percent level of significance and the sign is 
negative, which may or may not be expected. The urban population variable is significant 
at a 1 percent level of significance and the sign is positive, which is expected. The power 
match variable is significant at a 5 percent level of significance and the sign is positive, 
which is expected. The registered voters per polling station variable is significant at a 1 
percent level of significance and the sign is negative. The road length per polling station 
variable is significant at 5 percent level of significance and the sign is negative, which may 
or may not be expected. The ex-incumbency variable is significant at a 10 percent level of 
significance in one sub-model (sub-model 5.2d) and the sign is positive, which is expected.  
5.10.5 Comparison between estimates of the model 5.2 under different specifications  
Table 5.6 shows that except one variable all other variables have similar 
relationships with the turnout rate whether we use the power-match variable with 1991 
values or not, whether we use political competition or winning margin variable as a 
measure of electoral competition. Only the ex-incumbency variable is significant at a 10 
percent level of significance when we exclude the 1991 power-match values and use 
winning margin as a measure of electoral competition. The sign is positive which is 
expected. When an ex-incumbent competes in a more competitive election, she is likely to 
poll 0.65 percentage points more votes than a freshman does. So, an ex-incumbent has a 
higher chance to win in a marginal constituency. This implies that in more competitive 
elections (in terms of winning margins) the turnout rate is higher when parties nominate 
ex-incumbents. It further implies that voters may turn out more to reward them for their 
positive contribution in the development of the constituency in the immediate or remote 
past.    
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Table 5.6 Model 5.2: Comparison of determinants of voter turnout under different specification: 1991-
2008 
Explanatory 
variables 
Model 5.2 Model 5.2 Model 5.2 Model 5.2 
  
 With 1991 power-
match 
Without 1991 power-
match 
One-long-period 
lagged voter turnout 
-0.22*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.21*** 
 (-4.79) (-4.51) (-4.79) (-4.51) 
Night-time satellite 
imagery (NSI) 
0.29*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 
 (4.53) (5.02) (4.53) (5.02) 
Hard core poverty -0.07** -0.07** -0.07** -0.07** 
 (-1.99) (-2.00) (-1.99) (-2.00) 
Hindu population 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.84 
 (1.16) (1.19) (1.16) (1.19) 
Adult literacy -0.86*** -0.85*** -0.86*** -0.85*** 
 (-4.14) (-4.14) (-4.14) (-4.14) 
Urban population 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 
 (2.79) (2.66) (2.79) (2.66) 
Political competition -0.19 - -0.19 - 
 (-0.42) - (-0.42) - 
Winning - -0.01 - -0.01 
margin - (-0.90) - (-0.90) 
Power match 0.81** 0.69** 0.81** 0.69** 
 (2.51) (2.16) (2.51) (2.16) 
Registered voters 
per polling station 
-0.24a*** -0.24a*** -0.24a*** -0.24a*** 
 (-3.60) (-3.68) (-3.60) (-3.68) 
Road length per 
polling station 
-2.90** -2.82** -2.90** -2.82** 
 (-2.55) (-2.45) (-2.55) (-2.45) 
Ex-incumbency 0.59 0.65* 0.59 0.65* 
 (1.62) (1.78) (1.62) (1.78) 
Observations 885 885 885 885 
Adjusted R-squared 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 
Number of 
constituencies 
299 299 299 299 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the voter turnout rate at the level; all 
the continuous explanatory variables are at the level except the voter turnout rate which is one-long period lagged; a, the 
coefficient*100; time and constituency fixed effects and constant are included but not reported; standard errors are clustered 
by constituencies. Reproduced from the Table 5.5, Appendix5J-Appendix 5L. 
 
5.10.6 Estimates and analysis of the model 5.3 
In the model 5.3 we regress long-first differences (5 years gap) of voter turnout rates on 
long-first differences of explanatory variables (Table 5.7). Our objective is to explore how 
changes in explanatory variables between two adjacent electoral cycles affect changes in  
DETERMINANTS OF VOTER TURNOUT 
 
268 
 
Table 5.7 Fixed effect estimation of the long-first difference model 5.3 
(With 1991 power-match values, night-time satellite imagery and political competition):1991-2008 
Explanatory 
variables 
Model  
5.3 
Model 
5.3a 
Model 
5.3b 
Model 
5.3c 
Model 
5.3d 
Model 
5.3e 
Model 
5.3f 
Night-time satellite 
imagery 
16.21*** 16.56*** 16.21*** 16.57*** 15.15*** 16.23*** 16.08*** 
 (3.21) (3.30) (3.20) (3.27) (3.00) (3.20) (3.18) 
Hard core poverty 0.06* 0.05 0.06* 0.06* 0.05 0.06 0.06 
 (1.66) (1.51) (1.65) (1.75) (1.40) (1.64) (1.61) 
Hindu population -0.46 -0.41 -0.46 -0.46 -0.45 -0.46 -0.45 
 (-0.93) (-0.82) (-0.93) (-0.93) (-0.90) (-0.92) (-0.89) 
Adult literacy -0.12 -0.18 -0.12 -0.12 -0.17 -0.12 -0.14 
 (-0.55) (-0.81) (-0.54) (-0.54) (-0.77) (-0.55) (-0.60) 
Urban population -0.10 0.07 -0.10 -0.10 -0.03 -0.10 -0.10 
 (-0.82) (0.52) (-0.78) (-0.82) (-0.24) (-0.81) (-0.85) 
Political 
competition 
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.28 
 (0.61) (0.60) (0.61) (0.68) (0.64) (0.60) (0.66) 
Power match 0.51 0.43 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.48 
 (0.87) (0.74) (0.87) (0.85) (0.89) (0.87) (0.81) 
Registered voters  -
0.29a*** 
-
0.29a*** 
-
0.29a*** 
-
0.29a*** 
-
0.22a*** 
-
0.30a*** 
-
0.30a*** 
per polling station (-8.97) (-8.86) (-8.96) (-8.91) (-5.00) (-8.87) (-8.94) 
Road length per -2.53*** -2.92*** -2.53*** -2.45** -2.58*** -2.55** -2.57*** 
polling station (-2.61) (-2.99) (-2.60) (-2.52) (-2.67) (-2.57) (-2.63) 
Ex-incumbency 0.07 -0.00 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.09 
 (0.14) (-0.00) (0.14) (0.18) (0.19) (0.14) (0.17) 
Population density  0.01***      
  (2.75)      
Gender ratio   0.00     
   (0.00)     
Contestant    0.07    
    (1.04)    
Total registered 
voters 
    -0.13b**   
     (-2.56)   
Land size per 
polling station 
     0.04  
      (0.08)  
Murder       -0.00 
       (-0.24) 
Strike       -0.01 
       (-0.63) 
Observations 883 883 883 883 883 883 883 
Adjusted R-squared 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 
Number of 
constituencies 
299 299 299 299 299 299 299 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the percentage point change in voter 
turnout rates between the election t and the election t-1; all continuous explanatory variables are the percentage point change 
between the election t and the election t-1; a, the coefficient*100; b, the coefficient*10000; time fixed effects and constant are 
included but not reported.  
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voter turnout rates. Another objective is to find out the pattern of relationships between 
voter turnout rates and explanatory variables over the period of interest when heterogeneity 
across constituencies is eliminated by the first difference. 
The base line model 5.3 (1st column) in Table 5.7 shows that the percentage point 
change in the night-time satellite imagery variable is significant at a 1 percent level of 
significance and the sign is positive. This implies that when economic activities are higher 
in the current election year in comparison to the previous election year, they are more likely 
to turnout in the current election than in the previous election. When economic activities in 
a constituency in the current election year in comparison to the previous election year by 1 
percentage point, their turnout rates are likely to be 16.21 percentage points higher in the 
current election than in the previous one. The estimate seems much higher than expected. 
As far as we are concerned no prior studies have used night time satellite imagery as a 
determinant of economic activity level of the people and a potential determinant of voter 
turnout rates. So, we are unable to compare our results with any other studies. However, 
this is expected that as economic activity increases over time, they are more likely to 
turnout for voting. This is because, they are like to have more leisure which they may invest 
in political activities.  
The percentage point change in the hard core poverty variable is significant at a 10 
percent level of significance and the sign is positive. It may or may not be expected. The 
reasons are explained earlier.  
The first difference of the number of registered voters per polling station is 
significant at a 1 percent level of significance and the sign is negative. The sign is expected. 
This is because, when the number of registered voters per polling station is higher in the 
current election year with respect to the previous election year, voters’ opportunity costs 
of voting (in terms of time for queuing for casting votes) is higher in the current election 
year than the previous election year and hence the voter turnout rate is likely to be lower in 
the current year. When registered voters per polling station is higher in the current election 
year by 1 percentage point with respect to the previous election year, the voter turnout rate 
is lower by 0.0029 percentage points in the current election year. 
 
 
 
DETERMINANTS OF VOTER TURNOUT 
 
270 
 
The first difference of the road length per polling station is significant at 1 percent 
level of significance and the sign is negative, which may or may not be expected. The 
reasons are explained earlier.      
5.10.7 Comparison between estimates of the model 5.3 under different specifications  
Table 5.8 shows that the night-time satellite imagery is significant at a 1 percent 
level of significance across all models whether we include or exclude the 1991 power-
match values, whether we use the winning margin or the political competition variable as 
a measure of electoral competition. The signs are positive, which is expected. It implies 
that irrespective of levels of competition constituencies, where people enjoy higher levels 
of well-being in the current election year than in the previous election year, have higher 
turnout rates in the current election. It may be noted that size of coefficients are same 
whether we include or exclude the 1991 power-match values or not. It may be due to small 
number of winners (15.51 percent of the total) elected from the incumbent party (JP) in the 
1991 election. However, the large size of the coefficient seems unusual.  
The hard core poverty variable is significant at a 10 percent level of significance when we 
use the 1991 power-match values. The signs are positive, which is unexpected under 
normal condition. However, the positive sign is expected in unusual condition such as in 
developing countries like Bangladesh which are usually plagued with patronage politics 
and where each election is critical.   
The political competition variable is not significant, but the winning margin variable 
(another measure of political competition) is significant at a 1 percent level of significance 
and the signs are negative, which is expected.  This may imply that when the winning 
margin in the current election is expected to be greater than that in the previous election, 
the turnout rate in the current election is lower. It may be because, the constituency 
becomes safer for a prospective winner. So, voters have less incentive to turnout for casting 
votes (Tideman, 1985).   
The registered voter per polling station variable is significant at 1 percent level of 
significance and the signs are negative, which is expected.  It implies that voters take into 
account the opportunity cost of turning out for voting. When the opportunity cost of turning 
out is higher in the current year in comparison to the previous year, voters turnout less in 
the current year.  
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Table 5.8 Model 5.3: Comparison of determinants of voter turnout under different specification: 1991-
2008 
Explanatory 
variables 
Model 5.3 Model 5.3 Model 5.3 Model 5.3 
 With 1991 power-
match (includes less 
competitive elections) 
Without 1991 power-
match (excludes less 
competitive elections) 
Night-time satellite 
imagery 
16.21*** 16.38*** 16.21*** 16.38*** 
 (3.21) (3.28) (3.21) (3.28) 
Hard core poverty 0.06* 0.05 0.06* 0.05 
 (1.66) (1.46) (1.66) (1.46) 
Hindu population -0.46 -0.53 -0.46 -0.53 
 (-0.93) (-1.09) (-0.93) (-1.09) 
Adult literacy -0.12 -0.04 -0.12 -0.04 
 (-0.55) (-0.19) (-0.55) (-0.19) 
Urban population -0.10 -0.15 -0.10 -0.15 
 (-0.82) (-1.24) (-0.82) (-1.24) 
Political 
competition 
0.25 - 0.25  
 (0.61) - (0.61)  
Winning margin - -0.06***  -0.06*** 
 - (-3.66)  (-3.66) 
Power match 0.51 0.02 0.51 0.02 
 (0.87) (0.03) (0.87) (0.03) 
Registered voters  -0.29a*** -0.29a*** -0.29a*** -0.29a*** 
per polling station (-8.97) (-9.11) (-8.97) (-9.11) 
Road length per -2.53*** -2.14** -2.53*** -2.14** 
polling station (-2.61) (-2.22) (-2.61) (-2.22) 
Ex-incumbency 0.07 0.24 0.07 0.24 
 (0.14) (0.48) (0.14) (0.48) 
Observations 883 883 883 883 
Adjusted R-squared 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 
Number of 
constituencies 
299 299 299 299 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the percentage point change in voter 
turnout rates between the election t and the election t-1; all continuous explanatory variables are the percentage point change 
between the election t and the election t-1; a, the coefficient*100; b, the coefficient*10000; time fixed effects and constant are 
included but not reported. Reproduced from the Table 5.7, Appendix 5M-Appendix 5O. 
 
  The road length per polling station variable is significant at a 1 percent level of 
significance and signs are negative, which is unexpected. This is because, when road length 
per polling station is higher in the current election year with respect to the previous election 
year, the transportation cost of turning out for voting is likely to be lower in the current 
election year and as such the turnout rate in the current year is expected to be higher. 
However, the unexpected negative sign may result from composite nature of the road 
network. While it provides the basic fabric of the economy and social interactions, its 
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uneven distribution across a constituency may be an important source of grievance of some 
people, who are likely to refrain out of grievance. Moreover, it is also a vehicle of 
transferring public fund for private consumption. So, more road network is an indicator of 
more corruption by political elites and their cronies. When voters use their conscience, they 
tend to refrain from voting for any one and as such they do not turnout for voting. 
Moreover, road network may be unevenly distributed. There may be more roads around 
the civic centres and less in the peripheral areas. So, voters in peripheral areas do not turn 
out to protest against it.  
In essence, we may infer that relatively higher levels of economic activity in the 
current election year with respect to the previous one motivate more people to turn out for 
voting. While direct benefit from turning out for voting plays an insignificant role in 
motivating people to turn out for voting, the direct cost of turning out for voting plays more 
significant role in dissuading them from turning out for voting.  
5.11 Conclusion 
From the estimations of base line and extended models we may infer some idea 
about the factors that influence the voter turnout rate in Bangladesh. The current turnout 
rate is not only related with current socioeconomic, political and electoral conditions 
(model 5.1), but also with the previous turnout rate (model 5.2). The change in the turnout 
rate between two adjacent elections is related with relative changes in some of those factors 
between two subsequent elections (model 5.3). 
The registered voters per polling station is a Condorcet winner. It is significant 
across all models. The signs are negative, which are expected. This implies that cost of 
turning out has significant negative relationship with voter turning out rates. Moreover, 
voters remember this cost in the previous election while deciding to turn out in the current 
election.  
Like the registered voters per polling station the road length per polling station is 
also a Condorcet winner. The signs are negative, which are unexpected. It implies that it 
does not capture one dimension. It captures several conflicting dimensions.  
The hard core poverty is a near-Condorcet winner. It is significant in all models 
except one in which the relative hard core poverty and relative political competition are 
considered. Its sign is negative in our baseline model 5.1 and model 5.2, which may be 
expected in the context of Bangladesh. This is because, the opportunity cost of turning out 
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for voting is usually higher for the hard core poor than non-hard core poo in Bangladesh.  
The relative change in the hard core poverty in the baseline model 5.3 is significant when 
political competition is considered. The sign is also positive, which may be unexpected. 
This is because, as relative hard core poverty becomes higher, the relative turnout rate is 
likely to be lower. However, the positive relationship may be expected in the context of 
patronage politics in developing countries like Bangladesh. So, the hard core poverty is 
confounding. However, the results of the model 5.1-model 5.3 reveal an important 
information that poverty matters in the case of voter turnout and political elites can 
strategically use it for their electoral benefits.  
The night-time satellite imagery is insignificant in the model 5.1, but significant in 
the model 5.2 and the model 5.3. This may imply that present socioeconomic and political 
conditions may outweigh the effect of economic activity being captured by the night-time 
satellite imagery, which may be a composite index of all those variables. In the model 5.2 
and the model 5.3 we find it significant and the signs are positive which are expected. This 
may imply that voter turnout rates are higher when their current socioeconomic condition 
is better than the previous one. .  
The adult literacy rate is significant in the model 5.1 and the model 5.2, but 
insignificant in the model 5.3. The signs are negative across all models. This implies that 
higher literacy rate leads to lower voter turnout rates.  The sign may be unexpected, because 
the opposite is expected to be the likely effect. However, like the hard core poverty it may 
be confounding. This is because, adult literacy may be a composite index of political 
consciousness as well as political apathy, which tend to move in different directions. While 
political consciousness resulting from a higher literacy rate is likely to increase voter 
turnout rates, political apathy is likely to depress the same. It seems that as adult literacy 
rates increase political apathy overpowers political consciousness.  
The urban population as a percentage of the total population (i.e., urbanization) is 
significant in the model 5.1 and the model 5.2, but insignificant in the model 5.3. The signs 
are positive, which are expected. This implies that voter turnout rates have positive 
relationship with present urbanization rates. The relationship between their relative 
changes is likely to insignificant, because urbanization rate is slow in Bangladesh. 
Moreover, in Bangladesh urbanization is more a political issue rather than a socioeconomic 
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process. By just declaring or making a promise to declare a rural area urban political elites 
may reap electoral benefits.  
The power-match variable is significant in the model 5.1 and the model 5.2, but 
insignificant in the model 5.3. The signs are positive across all models, which are expected. 
This may imply that the incumbent party tends to use its economic and political clout to 
mobilize voters for turning out for voting.  
The winning margin variable is significant in the model 5.3 but insignificant in the 
model 5.1 and the model 5.2. It is expected. The signs are negative, which are expected 
too. The political competition variable is insignificant. This implies that degree of electoral 
competition between the winner and the runner-up in the previous election determines the 
voter turnout rates in the present election. Moreover, only the winner and the runner-up are 
significant players in the two-party dominant political system in Bangladesh.  
The model 5.1 and the model 5.2 and are constructed following Kramer (1971) who 
assumes that voters have a short memory. Estimates of these two models show that the hard 
core poverty, the urban population, the registered voters and road length per polling station 
variables are significant and their signs are expected. These may imply that Bangladeshi 
voters have short-term memory and they behave rationally. The model 5.3 is constructed 
following Stigler (1973) who assumes that voters have a long memory. The estimates of 
the model 5.3 show that the winning margin, the hard core poverty and the registered voters 
per polling station variables are significant and their signs are expected. These may imply 
that Bangladeshi voters have long-term memory too and they behave rationally. So, the 
estimates of our models under three structural forms together reveals that voters’ turnout 
rates are influenced by their short- and long-term memory and they behave rational in many 
cases.     
Once voters decide that they are going to turn out to vote, they subsequently need 
to decide which party or candidate they will vote for or against. As such, the following 
chapter attempts to identify factors that influence vote shares of winners in general as well 
as re-elected winners (incumbents) in particular.   
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Determinants of Winner Vote Share in Bangladesh: 1991-2008 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented an econometric analysis of determinants of voter 
turnout in the four parliamentary elections held in Bangladesh over the 1991-2008 period. 
This chapter extends the analysis to an investigation of the determinants of winners’ vote 
shares in the same parliamentary elections. As re-elected winners (incumbents) in general 
and re-elected winners in marginal constituencies in particular play an important role in 
winning majority seats in the parliament, this chapter also investigates determinants of their 
vote shares. This analysis is important for multiple reasons. Winners constitute the 
parliament, the highest body entrusted to enact laws and formulate policies. The more the 
voters vote for them, the more they tend to take into consideration the concerns of more 
people while making laws and policies. Consequently, laws and policies being made by 
them harm fewer people. Moreover, when a party or a coalition of parties form a 
government by polling a substantial share of total votes cast, the government becomes 
representative of a greater percentage of the population (Campbell et al., 1960:96-115). 
The electoral support base of the government becomes very strong. By using its dominance 
in the parliament it is able to implement its promises made before elections and further 
consolidate its support base. Overall, it suffers from less uncertainty and may concentrate 
more on improving the quality of governance. With the support of its voters the government 
may be able to resist any attempt to pull it down by any unconstitutional means. On the 
other hand, when a party or a coalition of parties forms a minority government, by 
definition the government does not represent a vast majority of the population. So, laws 
and policies of the country may serve interests of a small percentage of the population 
belonging to upper socioeconomic classes (Campbell et al., 1960:96-115). As a result, the 
electoral support base of the government becomes very precarious. It may not be able to 
implement its promises made before the election. This may disillusion its core supporters 
and hence weaken its core support base further. The government may not be certain about 
its future. Hence, it may concentrate more on clinging to the power by hook or by crook 
rather than improving the quality of governance.   It may be a victim of ‘tyranny of 
minority’ parties if it is a minority coalition government. With time, the legitimacy of the 
minority government may come under attack from opposition parties when it wants to 
introduce some path-breaking laws and policies.   
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The implication of the total vote share of a winning party or a number of parties 
forming a coalition government is different from that of a winner’s vote share. However, a 
party’s and a partisan candidate’s vote shares are highly intertwined. When a candidate 
wins with a substantial vote share, this implies that she has a high level of popularity. The 
constituency may be safe for her and possibly for her party. Her or her party’s re-election 
chance from the same constituency in coming elections may be high too. However, it 
depends whether she tries to retain her popularity at that level or not. If she maintains a 
hand-off policy, her popularity is likely to wane as a capital machinery wears off over time 
in absence of proper maintenance.  So, she must take a hands-on policy to retain her 
popularity level if she wants to be re-elected in following elections with comfortable 
margins. Her substantial vote share is likely to increase her party’s total vote share 
indicating a high level of political legitimacy of the government. On the other hand, when 
a candidate wins with a low vote share, this may imply that her popularity level may be as 
good as her principal competitor. The constituency may be unsafe for herself as well as for 
her party. It would be relatively easier for the dominant opposition candidate to defeat her 
in coming elections. So, her chance of re-election is slim in following elections in her 
constituency. If she wants to make it a safe constituency for herself as well as for her party, 
her popularity level must be increased by taking hands-on policies.  
Among the winners, re-elected winners (incumbents) are particularly important. 
They may be re-elected with substantial or low vote shares. Whether they are re-elected 
with substantial or low vote shares, they become assets for themselves as well as for their 
parties. This is because, they accumulate experiences regarding parliamentary affairs, 
running successful election campaigns, dealing with opposition parties and debating public 
policy and so on. The more times they are re-elected, the more seasoned they become and 
the more experience and human capital they accumulates. They are likely to be more skilful 
in steering the party, their constituencies or the country through critical time. Some of these 
political elites may become expert crisis-managers. This skill is especially necessary to 
managing violent politics in developing countries like Bangladesh.  
Winning in marginal constituencies is important for a party when a good number 
of constituencies are marginal. Marginal seats can determine the balance in parliament and 
the chance of forming the government by the incumbent or the dominant opposition party. 
Winners in marginal seats need to demonstrate ‘something’ special to the voters to outbid 
their dominant challengers. The traditional electioneering strategies, such as displaying 
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posters in public areas, organizing processions of supporters, mammoth public gatherings 
being addressed by national-level party leaders and conducting of the door-to-door 
campaigns by activists and so on are unlikely to be effective in marginal constituencies. 
This is because, the dominant opposition party and candidate may easily clone them. 
Partisan candidates and their parties need to pursue some ‘innovative’ strategies to win. 
Following introduction of a new electoral law the Labour Party in New Zealand took some 
pre-emptive and innovative strategies to win in marginal seats in the 1993 election, while 
the National Party relied on traditional strategies to ensure winning in its safe seats. The 
Labour Party identified marginal seats two years ahead of the scheduled election and took 
professional approach under the leadership of the centre. Among others, the party devised 
some voter-focused customized campaign strategies and used digital technologies to 
communicate with potential voters in marginal constituencies regularly (Denemark, 1996). 
The seat share of the Labour Party increased from 29.89 percent in 1990 to 46.39 percent 
in 1993, whereas the seat share of the National Party decreased from 69 percent in 1990 to 
51.54 percent in 1993. The vote share of the Labour Party decreased from 35.1 percent in 
1990 to 34.7 percent in 1993, whereas the vote share of the National Party decreased from 
47.8 percent in 1990 to 35.1 percent in 1993 (New Zealand Election Commission)1. A 
16.49 percentage point increase in the seat share of the Labour Party came at a cost of 
reduction of its vote share by only 0.4 percentage points. This implies that it won in more 
marginal seats in the 1993 election and as such its innovative strategies yielded a high 
electoral dividend.     
The percentage of votes being polled by a partisan candidate reflects several factors, 
including the personal popularity of the candidate and popularity of the party she belongs 
to. Before seeking nomination of the party in a constituency an expectant candidate needs 
to demonstrate her competency to constituents as well as to the stalwarts of the party. This 
competency may come from multiple sources. She may be associated with socioeconomic 
and political activities in the constituency she belongs to. She may be highly successful in 
her profession. She may have good relationship with national-level leaders of the party. 
She may become remarkably reputed for making an outstanding contribution in some 
nationally or locally important movements. However, she may ‘buy’ nomination by 
donating a substantial amount of money to the party’s fund or by bribing some powerful 
                                                            
1 Source: http://www.elections.org.nz/events/past-events/general-elections-1890-1993, accessed on 13 
March 2018.  
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leaders of the party. For example, Majumdar (2008) reports that the practice of selling 
nominations for money is widespread in Bangladesh. The amount varies between Taka 5 
crore (US$ 0.85 million) and Taka 20 crore (US$3.2). The buyers of nominations are 
criminals and black-money holders (Majumdar, 2008).  
When a candidate belongs to a party she becomes a cog in the vast political 
infrastructure of the party. In return, she derives enormous amount of benefits from the 
organizational infrastructure of the party. As a party advocates for certain ideologies and 
platforms and some voters vote in support of for it for these ideologies, the candidate also 
receives some of the associated votes. She polls these votes, because she represents the 
party in her constituency. When national leaders of her party campaign for her, she derives 
some ‘coat-tail’ benefits from them. However, a partisan candidate may gain some negative 
votes from voters disillusioned with their most preferred parties. Weak partisan voters are 
also motivated to vote for or against a candidate for her stance on some local issues or a 
party for its stance on some nationally important issues. In addition to the policy- and issue-
based voting, some voters vote for a candidate for her personal contribution in the 
socioeconomic development in the constituency in the immediate or remote past period.  
She may make some personal contribution at the national or international level too. 
Similarly, some voters vote for a candidate for the past socioeconomic and political 
contribution made by her party or some party leaders at the national or constituency level. 
Voters may also vote for a partisan candidate for her anticipated prospective performance. 
A partisan voter may gain some votes for good reputation of some fellow partisan 
candidates in neighbouring constituencies.  
While a partisan candidate may gain votes from several sources, she may also lose 
votes for many reasons too. For example, a party may enjoy a good reputation for its 
substantial contribution in the socioeconomic development of a constituency or the 
country, but a partisan candidate may have a bad reputation for some reasons, such as 
involvement with some sort of corruption or degraded morality and so on. Similarly, bad 
reputation of fellow partisan candidates in neighbouring constituencies may cause a 
reduction in the vote share of a partisan candidate. As a result, the vote share of the party 
at the national level may fall leading to its defeat in the election. In the same way a 
candidate may have good reputation but the performance of the party at the constituency 
or national level may be poor. It would also reduce the candidate’s vote share leading to 
 DETERMINANTS OF WINNER VOTE SHARE  
279 
 
fall of the party’s vote share at the national level. This would reduce its chance of forming 
the government.  
Paradoxes in winners’ vote shares in Bangladesh 
In Bangladesh there are more than one hundred political parties with an ideological 
orientation that spans from the far-left to the far-right. On the basis of their outlook about 
religion, economic programme, globalization, nationalism, political system and form of the 
government Khan et al. (2008:8-9) arrange main parties in Bangladesh along the left-right 
ideological spectrum like Figure 6.1. We add their vote shares from Riaz (2016: Appendix 
4 and 5). 
Figure 6.1: Location of parties in Bangladesh in the left-right ideological space and their vote shares 
during the 1991-2008 period 
 
Source: Khan et al. (2008:8-9) and Riaz (2016 Appendix 4 and 5). Note: NA means the party did not 
win any seat or disappeared.  
Figure 6.1 shows that the AL is the centre-left and the BNP is the centre-right party. 
There are some moderate centre-left as well as centre-right parties. In the same vein there 
are some extreme right and left parties in Bangladesh. As voter turnout rates increase, the 
AL’s vote shares increase consistently across elections and the BNP’s vote shares increase 
consistently until 2001 and then dip. The vote shares of two medium2 parties –the Jatiya 
                                                            
2 By medium we mean they do not have a uniform support in all constituencies like the AL or the BNP. 
Their support is limited in a few constituencies. Similarly, they are bigger than small parties which use the 
residence of the leader as the parties’ offices.    
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Party (JP) and the Jamaat-i-Islami Bangladesh (JIB) – are not consistent across elections. 
By 2001 some parties have disappeared or merged or made ‘jumbo’ and ‘rainbow’ alliances 
with the AL or the BNP.  
When we investigate the relationship between the voter turnout rate and the vote 
share of the centre-left AL and of the centre-right BNP (Figure 6.1 and Appendix 6A Panel 
1 and Panel 2) from the perspective of the Columbia model, we find some paradoxes. 
According to the Columbia model, when the voter turnout rate is low, it increases vote 
shares of parties belonging to right-leaning ideologies. This is because middle and upper 
socioeconomic classes are regular voters and only they turn out for voting. As the voter 
turnout rate increases, casual and apathetic voters start to turn out. Usually, they belong to 
lower socioeconomic classes. They prefer redistributive policy and left-leaning parties 
advocate for this policy. So, a higher voter turnout rate increases vote shares of parties 
having left-leaning ideologies and the winning chance of their candidates.  
In the 1991 election the voter turnout rate was 55.45. The vote share of the AL was 
30.1 percent and that of the BNP was 30.8 percent. In the 1996 election the voter turnout 
rate increased to 75.55 percent and AL’s vote share increased to 37.4 percent. So, a higher 
voter turnout rate increased the vote share of a centre-left party. This is consistent with the 
proposition of the model. However, it also increased the BNP’s vote share to 33.6 percent. 
This is inconsistent with the proposition of the model. We may examine it from another 
perspective. While the AL’s vote share increased by 7.3 percentage points, the BNP’s vote 
share increased by 2.8 percentage points. So, a higher turnout increased vote share of a 
centre-left party more than that of a centre-right party.  This is consistent with the 
proposition of the model.  
In the 2001 election the voter turnout rate increased marginally to 76.06 percent. 
The BNP’s vote share increased to 41.4 percent and the AL’s vote share increased to 40.02 
percent. A rise in the AL’s vote share is consistent, while a rise in the BNP’s vote share is 
inconsistent with the proposition of the model. While the AL’s vote share increased by 2.62 
percentage points, the BNP’s vote share increased by 7.8 percentage points. So, a higher 
turnout increased vote share of a centre-right party more than that of a centre-left party. 
Again, this is inconsistent with the proposition of the model.  
In the 2008 election the voter turnout rate increased substantially to 87.05 percent. 
The BNP’s vote share declined to 33.2 percent and the AL’s vote share increased to 49 
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percent. A rise in the AL’s vote share and a fall in the BNP’s vote share is consistent with 
the proposition of the model. While the AL’s vote share increased by 8.98 percentage 
points, the BNP’s vote share declined by 8.2 percentage points. So, a higher turnout 
increased vote share of a centre-left party and reduced vote share of a centre-right party. 
This is consistent with the proposition of the model. This may imply that sometimes voters 
may have voted along their socioeconomic line and sometimes they crossed it.   
It is noteworthy that voter turnout rates and vote shares of the AL and the BNP are 
found to differ for a variety of reasons (Figure 6.1 and Appendix 6A, panel 1 and panel 2). 
The discrepancy in voter turnout rates may arise from rounding up of turnout rates of 
constituencies, while discrepancies in vote shares of the AL and the BNP may arise from 
identification of partisanship of some winners. For example, when an AL’s or a BNP’s 
popular candidate fails to obtain the party’s nomination, she sometimes contests as an 
independent candidate. Upon winning the party usually takes her back. So, we consider her 
as a de facto candidate of the party she originally belonged to. Another problem is that 
candidates of some minor parties contest election with the symbol of a dominant party. 
This strategy helps them to win in most cases. Without this strategy they can never dream 
of winning in elections. As they get votes of many supporters of the party whose election 
symbol they use, we consider them as candidates of that party.  However, they are 
consistent in the sense that above inferences remain unaltered when we investigate 
consistency or inconsistency from the perspective of the voter turnout elasticity of partisan 
vote shares (Appendix 6A, panel 1 and panel 2).  
       We find more paradoxes when we investigate vote shares of winners and re-elected 
winners ( Table 6.1) from the perspective of Key’s (1966) reward-punishment model, 
which makes a proposition that voters reward an incumbent (party/candidate) when its 
performance is better than expected. 
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Table 6.1: Vote shares of winners and re-elected winners (incumbents) belonging to the AL and the 
BNP 
 
Source: Calculated by the author from the Statistical Reports of Bangladesh Election Commission 
        The BNP lost in the 1996 and the 2008 elections. The AL lost in the 2001 election. 
Since all successive incumbents performed poorly (Jahan, 2005:291), vote shares of their 
winners were likely to fall in elections when they were immediate past incumbents, but 
they did not. On the contrary, vote shares of their winners kept increasing consistently 
over time. This is in sharp contrast with Key’s (1966) reward-punishment model. In the 
1996 election voters rewarded winners belonging to the incumbent BNP more than the 
opposition AL, because the average vote share of winners belonging to the BNP was 
higher than that of the AL. This is inconsistent with the proposition of the model. In 
contrast, in the 2001 election voters punished winners belonging to the incumbent AL by 
casting fewer votes in favour of them than in favour of the opposition BNP.  This is 
consistent with the proposition of the model. Similarly, in the 2008 election voters 
punished winners belonging to the incumbent BNP by casting fewer votes in favour of 
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them than in favour of the opposition AL.  This is consistent with the proposition of the 
model. 
           As the incumbent BNP lost in the 1996 election, we may presume that voters 
perceived its performance to be worse than expected. So, they punished it for its poor 
performance. However, voters rewarded its re-elected incumbents by casting more votes 
in favour of them. It may be that performance of individual incumbents in their respective 
constituencies was perceived better than expected. As the performance of the party is the 
collective performance of all incumbents belonging to the party, re-elected winners are 
also responsible for poor performance of the party and as such they deserved punishment. 
In contrast, they were rewarded. Moreover, the average vote share of re-elected 
incumbents belonging to the incumbent BNP was higher than that belonging to the 
opposition AL.  
        As the incumbent AL lost in the 2001 election, we may presume that voters perceived 
its performance to be worse than expected. So, they punished it for its poor performance. 
However, voters rewarded its incumbents by re-electing them with higher vote shares. 
However, the average vote share of re-elected incumbents belonging to the incumbent AL 
was lower than that belonging to the opposition BNP. So, voters punished the re-elected 
incumbents belonging to the incumbent AL by rewarding them with fewer votes. 
Consequently, voters punished them along with the party. Voters held them accountable 
at least partially for poor performance of the party. Voters acted rationally, because re-
elected incumbents are also a part of the party machinery. The same happened in the 2008 
election in the case of the incumbent BNP and its re-elected winners.  
             Some studies (e.g., Nannestad and Paldam, 1994; Lewis-Beck and Stegmeir, 
2000; Wilkin et al., 1997; Benton, 2005) attempt to identify factors that influence vote 
shares of the incumbent party or incumbent candidates in Western mature democracies as 
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well as in developing countries where free and fair elections are held regularly. The case 
in Bangladesh is an exception. This is because since gaining independence in 1971, 
elections held between 1973 and 1988 were massively rigged by incumbents. As such 
voters lost their trust in the electoral system. It is the 1991 election that restored voters’ 
faith in the electoral system. The historic 1991 election was followed by three more free 
and fair elections. These elections were likely to have consolidated democratic practices 
in Bangladesh, but they did not. Before each election some events took place which 
endangered democratic practices in Bangladesh. So, each election became critically 
important. This is not typical in many emerging democracies, let alone Western mature 
democracies. So, it is interesting to investigate factors influencing vote shares of winners 
in free and fair elections held in Bangladesh over the 1991-2008 period.             
       The identification of factors affecting vote shares of re-elected winners is especially 
important. This is because, it helps us to test some electoral behavioural models, such as 
Key’s (1966) reward-punishment model and Downs’ (1957) economic vote model. With 
this end in view some studies (e.g., Mayhew, 1974; Abramowitz, 1975; Fiorina, 1977; 
Cain, et al., 1984, Cox and Katz, 1996; Studler and McAllister, 1996) attempt to identify 
factors influencing vote shares of re-elected incumbents. In the context of Bangladesh it 
is more important, because 39.67 percent, 44.33 percent and 19.03 percent incumbents 
were re-elected in the 1996, the 2001 and the 2008 elections. As re-elected winners are 
popular in their constituencies, they win not only in their own constituencies but they  also 
act as catalysts in increasing vote shares of co-partisan candidates in neighbouring 
constituencies due to spatial spillover effect of vote. As a result, they play an important 
role in winning more partisan candidates and increase the chance of forming a government 
of their party.  This also increases legitimacy of the government.  
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         Among re-elected winners, re-elected winners from marginal constituencies are 
especially important. This is because, they must possess some atypical personal attributes 
to be able to stand out in the crowd of contestants. Moreover, their own atypical attributes 
are not enough to withstand onslaught of dominant opposition candidates. The strength of 
this onslaught is more deadly when a dominant opposition candidate is an immediate past 
ex-incumbent and she belongs to the incumbent party. In that case she needs to adopt 
some innovative strategies as well as support of the party (Denemark, 1996). If the number 
of marginal seats is proportionately more, winning in those constituencies is crucial to 
form the upcoming government. For example, in the 1996 election the AL won 146 seats 
and could not form the government on its own for lack of 5 seats, while it lost in 41 out 
of 49 marginal seats. It had to take support of the Jatiya Party which has a bad reputation 
for being authoritarian and which was ousted by a joint movement led by opposition 
parties including the AL over the 1982-1990 period. As a result, the AL government had 
to form a coalition government and deviate from its ideologies as well as policies. So, 
winning in marginal seats is also important for maintaining independency in policy 
orientation.        
           Some prior studies (e.g., Sobhan, 1968; Jahan, 1976/2005; Blair, 1979; Baxter and 
Rahman, 1981; Karim, 2007 and so on) concerned with the electoral behaviour in 
Bangladesh attempt to focus on factors affecting vote shares of winners belonging to the 
incumbent party or opposition parties or some specific parties. No prior studies investigate 
determinants of winners’ vote shares in general. This is important because different 
winners have different levels of personal political capital. Different constituencies have 
different socioeconomic and political make-up. Each election has some uniqueness. It is 
important to identify the common factors that are instrumental in winning or losing in 
elections. Moreover, very few prior studies focus on determinants of vote shares of re-
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elected winners in general and re-elected winners in marginal constituencies in particular. 
It is also important to identify those factors, because in highly competitive elections they 
may be game-changers. Re-winning in those constituencies by incumbent candidates may 
help their party to form the upcoming government again and continue to pursue its policy.  
On the contrary, it may help the dominant opposition party to oust the incumbent party 
too and form a new partisan government.     
           Except Karim (2007), all other prior studies use data sets which are old by several 
decades. So, their findings may be less relevant in the current context. Secondly, besides 
Karim (2007) and Blair (1979) all other studies use summary statistics as analytical tools. 
As a result, they do not control variables that may potentially affect winners’ vote shares. 
So, their findings are less reliable. Thirdly, though Karim (2007) and Blair (1979) use 
econometric models, their models are not based on any electoral behavioural models. So, 
they do not test any hypothesis regarding determinants of winners’ vote shares. Fourthly, 
while Blair (1979) uses a few socioeconomic variables as determinants of winners’ vote 
shares, Karim (2007) uses all political variables except one as explanatory variables. So, 
their analyses are likely to suffer from omitted variable bias. Fifthly, no studies control 
heterogeneity among constituencies. So, their results are less robust. Sixthly, none of the 
earlier studies use panel data. As a result, they do not identify factors affecting voters’ 
behaviour across elections. Last but not least, no studies use data set consisting of all four 
free and fair elections held between 1991 and 2008. 
             In this context this study attempts to address some limitations of prior studies in 
identifying determinants of vote shares of winners in general and re-elected winners in 
particular. It uses a panel data set consisting of electoral results of all elections held 
between 1991 and 2008 and a good number of socioeconomic and political variables 
capturing heterogeneous characteristics of 300 constituencies of Bangladesh. Moreover, 
it includes stock of personal political capital of winners from 300 constituencies in all four 
elections. It uses fixed effect models to control heterogeneity among constituencies. It 
also extends the basic model to test robustness of results. Hence, results of this study are 
likely to be more reliable than those of existing studies.          
The next section discusses the rationale behind identification of factors affecting 
winners’ vote shares in Bangladesh over the 1991-2008 period. The third section explains 
the data and their sources. It also describes the methodology used to estimate econometric 
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models. The fourth, the fifth and the sixth sections present and analyse results from various 
estimated models. The fifth section summarizes the findings and draws conclusions.         
6.2 Historical trends in winners’ vote shares and turnout rates in Bangladesh: 1937-
2008 
Figure 6.2 (details in Appendix 6C) shows that the franchise was restricted during 
the British colonial rule. The turnout rate was low in the 1937 election. The vote shares of 
both the winning and losing party were low. The gap between their vote shares was low 
too. The turnout rate increased in the 1946 election. The vote share of the winning party 
increased a lot and that of the runner-up party declined a lot too. The winning margin was 
much larger in the 1946 election than in the 1937 election. Both the 1937 and the 1946 
elections were free and fair.    
Figure 6.2 further shows that the 1954 and the 1970 elections were held under the 
Pakistan’s neo-colonial rule. While the 1954 election was held under the restricted 
franchise, the restricted franchise system was abolished in 1956. So, the 1970 election was 
held under the universal adult franchise. In the 1954 election the incumbent party 
intimidated and persecuted the activists of the United Front, an alliance of the dominant 
opposition parties in East Pakistan (present Bangladesh). However, there were little vote 
rigging. The voter turnout rate was much lower in the 1954 election in comparison to the 
1946 election. However, the gap between vote shares of the winning party and the runner-
up party also declined in the 1954 election. While the vote share of the winning party 
declined, the same for the runner-up party increased with respect to the 1946 election. The 
voter turnout rate was much higher in the 1970 election in comparison to the 1954 election. 
However, the gap between vote shares of the winning party and the runner-up party also 
increased in the 1970 election. While the vote share of the winning party increased, the 
same for the runner-up party declined with respect to the 1954 election. The 1970 election 
was free and fair. 
Figure 6.2 further shows that the gap between vote shares of the winning party and 
the runner-up party declined between 1973 and 1979 despite the fact that vote rigging was 
more widespread in the 1979 election than in the 1973 election. While both the AL and the 
BNP were spearheading the anti-government movement the BNP boycotted and the AL 
participated in the 1986 election. The 1986 election was as much rigged as the 1979 and 
the winning margin remained similar. Both the AL and the BNP boycotted the 1988 
election and the incumbent Jatiya Party (JP) won the election by massive vote rigging. As 
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a result, the winning margin increased several times with respect to the 1979 and the 1986 
elections. The winning margins were slim in the 1991, the 1996 and the 2001 elections, but 
increased in the 2008 election. However, voter turnout rates kept increasing consistently 
over time.        
Figure 6.2: Historical vote shares of the winning party and the runner-up party and turnout rates in 
elections in Bangladesh: 1937-2008 
 
Source: Constructed by the author from various sources (details in the Appendix 6C) 
6.3 Determinants of winners’ vote shares 
  
Figure 6.3 (Panel A) shows that winners may belong to the incumbent party(s) or 
opposition party(s) or they may be independent. Again, they may be freshmen or re-elected. 
Figure 6.3 (Panel B) further shows that re-elected winners may be remote or immediate 
past incumbents. However, some re-elected winners may be both immediate as well as 
remote past incumbents. They may be re-elected in the parliament one time or more than 
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one time. When a winner is an independent candidate, her vote share is determined by her 
relative personal popularity only. Figure 6.4 shows that her personal popularity may arise 
from multiple sources.  
Figure 6.3: Types of winners 
 
Source: Constructed by the author  
 
All the factors shown in Figure 6.4 also influence popularity and hence vote shares 
of partisan candidates alike. In addition to these factors, the popularity of a party also 
influences vote shares of partisan candidates. However, depending on their status in the 
parliament parties derive their popularity from some common as well as from some 
uncommon sources.  
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Figure 6.4: Sources of personal popularity of independent and partisan winners
 
Source: Constructed by the author based on existing literature 
Figure 6.5 shows that both the incumbent and the opposition party(s) derive their 
popularity from some common sources, such as their retrospective and prospective 
socioeconomic and political performance (hence performance) at the national as well as 
constituency level. The international condition and their electioneering strategies also 
influence their vote shares. However, their ideologies are different. Some voters may vote 
for a party for its ideological stance. The incumbent party(s) has some upper hand over the 
opposition party(s) in this sense that it has some recent contribution in the socioeconomic 
and political development (hence development) of constituencies as well as the nation. It 
makes this contribution by strategic use of public resources. Since voters may have short-
run memory (Kramer, 1971), recent contribution in the development of the country may 
influence vote share of the incumbent party(s). While the incumbent party(s) has absolute 
command on public resources, the opposition party(s) does not have so. As a result, for 
lack of recent performance the opposition party(s) is to rely on its retrospective 
performance and weaknesses of the incumbent party. If voters have long-run memory 
(Stigler, 1973), retrospective performance of both the incumbent party(s) and the 
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opposition party(s) may influence their popularity and hence vote shares. However, 
differences in their contribution may have differential effects on their vote shares.     
Figure 6.5: Sources of popularity of political parties
 
Source: Constructed by the author based on existing literature 
The popularity (in terms of the vote share) of a candidate is also influenced by that 
of the party she belongs to. When a candidate belongs to a party which has a good 
performance, her vote share is likely to increase. Similarly, when a partisan candidate 
having a good performance contest in an election her vote share is likely to increase and 
hence the vote share of the party she belongs to also increases at the national level given 
the vote shares of other partisan candidates remain same. Figure 6.6 shows the 
interdependency between the popularity of a partisan candidate and that of her party. The 
total vote being polled by a candidate is the sum of personal votes and partisan votes. They 
are enmeshed so much that it is hard to decompose them into constituents.   
The re-elected winners (incumbents) may be classified into two types– immediate 
past incumbents and remote past incumbents. The vote shares of immediate past 
incumbents who are re-elected may be influenced by their personal popularity as 
individuals as well as by their recent contribution in the development of the constituency 
given that voters have short-run memories. The vote shares of remote past incumbents who 
are re-elected may be influenced by their personal popularity as individuals and their 
remote retrospective contribution in the development of the constituency given that voters 
have long-run memories. The re-elected winners may have a comparative advantage or 
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disadvantage over freshmen, because the former has some track records dealing with 
parliamentary affairs as well as public works.  
Figure 6.6: Interaction between personal and party popularity and effect on total vote 
  
Source: Constructed by the author based on existing literature 
Among the re-elected winners, winners from marginal constituencies are especially 
important. This is because a few percentage of less vote may turn them from winners to 
losers. In marginal constituencies parties usually nominate ‘serious’ candidates (Gaines, 
1998). While Gaines (1998) does not outline defining characteristics of ‘serious’ 
candidates, they may be those who have high level of accumulated personal political capital 
earned as incumbents of public offices including the parliament and as cabinet ministers. 
They may be business magnates who may lavishly spend money in election campaigns. 
They may be high-level reputed and retired civil or military bureaucrats. The party may 
also nominate people who are successful in their professions, such as lawyers, doctors, 
academics, athletes, film actors and actresses and so on. When the number of marginal 
constituencies in an election is proportionately large, winning in those constituencies 
decides the electoral fate of dominant parties. So, parties pay special attention in those 
constituencies.           
6.3.1 Theoretical and empirical literature review on winners’ vote shares: the case of 
Western mature democracies  
The Columbia model lays down the foundation for models concerning determinants 
of vote shares of contesting candidates belonging to certain parties. It hypothesizes that 
core voters usually belong to higher socioeconomic classes and hence they always turnout 
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out for voting for the Right-leaning parties. In the US they tend to vote for the Republican 
Party. So, when voter turnout rates are low vote shares of the Republican Party candidates 
are higher and as such they have a higher chance to win. As voter turnout rates gradually 
increase, the vote shares of candidates of the right-leaning parties declines and as such 
those of the left-leaning parties increases. It is because, higher voter turnout rates come 
from occasional voters and non-voters, who usually belong to lower socioeconomic classes 
and who support the redistributive policy. They tend to turnout for voting for left-leaning 
parties, which also support the redistributive policy. In the US they tend to vote for 
Democratic Party candidates. As a result, levels of voters’ turnout benefit different parties 
differently. The nexus between voter turnout rates and vote shares of partisan winners as 
predicted by the Columbia model may break down when voters do not vote on the basis of 
their socioeconomic statuses (Pacek and Radcliff, 1995).  
DeNardo (1980) partially agrees with the suggestions of the Columbia model. 
However, he argues that it is incomplete. So, he develops the ‘defection model’ in the light 
of the Michigan model. Dividing voters into three categories and elections into two 
categories he explains effects of turnout on the chance of winning of Democrat and 
Republican candidates. According to him, there are three types of voters: hard core partisan 
voters, weak partisan voters and swing voters. Similarly, there are two types of elections: 
high-interest and low-interest elections. In high-interest elections swing voters are 
motivated to vote for or against incumbent candidates by short-term issues and candidate 
factors. In those elections weak partisan voters come under cross-pressure. Under intense 
cross-pressure they cross their partisan lines and vote against their own parties. Overall, 
more voters defect dominant parties and vote for minor parties. In Democrat-dominant 
constituencies the Republican Party is a minor party and vice versa. So, high-interest 
elections benefit the Democratic Party in Republican-dominant constituencies and vice 
versa. He assumes that vote shares of the Democratic Party in Republican-dominant 
constituencies increase proportionately more than those of the Republican Party in 
Democrat-dominant constituencies. So, the Democratic Party wins in high-interest 
elections. In low-interest elections voters having weak partisanship do not tend to vote. So, 
the Republican Party wins in low-interest elections. One important drawback of DeNardo’s 
(1980) analysis is that he builds his model on the basis of the distribution of long-term 
partisanship of voters, the kernel of the Michigan model. He assumes that both parties are 
equally popular or unpopular. Voters with weak partisanship defect dominant parties at 
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comparable rates. Only in that case Democrats are benefited in Republican-dominant areas 
and vice versa.  
Grofman et al. (1999) argue that both dominant and minor parties can be benefitted 
from higher turnout rates. It depends on the proclivity of weak partisan voters. If they have 
more proclivity to the dominant party, it is benefitted more than the minor party. Moreover, 
DeNardo (1980) does not consider the context. Short-term forces may vary from election 
to election and benefit either the major or the minor party. When a popular Democratic 
incumbent controls salient issues and the efficacy of the Republican challenger is 
questionable, few weak partisan supporters of the Democratic Party are likely to defect 
their party. On the other hand, when the economy has been booming under a Republican 
incumbent weak partisan supporters of the Democratic Party are likely to defect their party 
(Converse et al., 1965).  As a result, defection rates of weak partisan supporters of any 
party are contextual.  
Martinez and Gill (2005) find partial support for the Columbia model as well as for 
the defection model in the US during the 1960-2000 period. They find that the support for 
the Democratic Party is more among the lower socioeconomic status people, but the 
relationship is changing over time. From the above discussion it is evident that higher 
turnout rates increase vote shares of contestants in differential degrees depending on the 
context and partisan proclivity of weak partisan voters. However, Tucker and Vedlitz 
(1986) find evidence of the Columbia as well as the defection model for some states and 
no evidence for some states in the US. Moreover, they find that high national-level turnout 
does not result in high state-level turnout. So, they conclude that empirical relationship 
between the voter turnout rate and the partisan advantage in US presidential elections is a 
complex issue.   
While the Columbia model and the Michigan Model attempt to determine vote 
shares of left- and right-leaning parties solely by turnout rates, the vote-popularity (VP) 
model attempts to explain vote shares of the incumbent party across elections by three types 
of factors – economic, political and institutional (Nannestad and Paldam, 1994; Paldam, 
1991). Thus, the voter turnout rate is embedded in the VP model. The VP model is an 
approximation of the social welfare function (Nannestad and Paldam, 1994; Lewis-Beck 
and Stegmeir, 2013). Some researchers (e.g., Nannestad and Paldam, 1994 and Lewis-Beck 
and Stegmeir, 2000) identify defining characteristics of both early and later studies. The 
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early studies of the VP model use aggregate economic variables, such as unemployment, 
inflation, income, economic growth, and gross national product, and so on. They use a few 
variables. They also control political factors, such as wars, political scandals, and 
international crises, and term cycles, and so on. They are mostly in binary forms. The 
economic and political variables being used by these studies are objective and retrospective 
in nature. The institutional factors are country size, number of parties, left-right rule, years 
in power, majority-minority government and so on. As they include different economic 
variables and their lags, the results are sometimes conflicting. Some studies (e.g., Frey and 
Schneider, 1979) of this class develop closed politico-economic model by endogenizing 
almost all variables. Since their economic variables are national-level aggregate data and 
results of studies using aggregate economic data may suffer from ecological fallacy, the 
later studies on the VP model use individual-level evaluation of personal as well as national 
economic condition, which are subjective. Most studies use data being collected by the 
Michigan Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behaviour. The individual and cross-country 
analysis show that vote shares of the incumbent party(s) increase during economic 
recoveries and fall during economic recessions (Nannestad and Paldam, 1994; Lewis-Beck 
and Stegmeir, 2000). However, voters punish the government proportionately more when 
the economy turns from ‘good’ to ‘bad’ and reward proportionately less when the economy 
turns from ‘bad’ to ‘good’ (Lewis-Beck and Stegmeir, 2013). While about one-third of the 
change in the vote for the government is attributable to the economic condition, 
unemployment and inflation are two ‘big’ contributors in this case. By reducing 
unemployment or inflation by one percentage point the government may be able to increase 
its vote share by two-third of a percentage point (Nannestad and Paldam, 1994). Economic 
growth is also another ‘big’ contributor to the vote share of the government. By increasing 
the economic growth rate by one percentage point the government may be able to increase 
its vote share between 1.4 percentage points ( Wilkin et al., 1997) and 1.7 percentage points 
(Benton, 2005). Eventually, unemployment and economic growth are two ‘big’ 
contributors to the government’s vote share. However, the relationship between economic 
variables and the government’s vote share is unstable over time and across countries 
(Nannestad and Paldam, 1994).   
A survey of studies concerning the VP model reveals that voters attach more 
importance to economic factors than political ones. However, factors other than economic 
and political also affect the vote share of the government (Nannestad and Paldam, 1994). 
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Lewis-Beck and Stegmeir (2013) point out that a greater contribution of economic 
variables to the vote share of the government may arise from weak measurement of political 
variables. As the studies surveyed by Nannestad and Paldam (1994) incorporate political 
variables as dummy variables, much information regarding those variables is lost.   
The VP model does not explicitly focus on determinants of vote shares of 
candidates belonging to opposition parties. However, factors affecting the vote share of the 
government positively are likely to affect that of the opposition party negatively. So, the 
VP model implicitly incorporates determinants of the vote share of the opposition party 
too.   Moreover, irrespective of performance of the government it loses popularity over 
time for being the incumbent. As the incumbent, it makes rules and regulations and 
business agreements which might displease some weakly partisan supporters who are likely 
to withdraw their supports. Using 12 parliamentary electoral data over the 1955-97 period 
Lewis-Beck et al. (2004) find that for each additional term in the office the government 
loses 3 percent of the vote. It implies that it goes to opposition parties.    
When the factors encapsulated in the Columbia model, the Michigan model and the 
VP model are put together in another, it becomes an eclectic model. It is because, they 
include a wide range of factors emanating from different domains, such as social, psycho-
sociological, economic, political and institutional factors.  
Having been winners in elections, any rational winner would like to be re-elected 
again. In order to retain their popularity at winnable levels in their constituencies they 
perform some sorts of constituency services and develop projects, such as infrastructural 
and educational development and so on.  They need to sacrifice their personal wellbeing 
for rendering such constituency services. However, these personal level constituency 
services are not visible to the common voters. So, they are interested to develop projects 
that are spectacularly visible (e.g., roads and highways, educational buildings, community 
centres and so on) and they try their best to mobilize public resources for implementation 
of those socioeconomic development projects. So, they lobby with ministers and 
bureaucrats for this purpose. The objective of all these works is to increase personal votes 
as well as votes for the party in own constituencies. Sometimes they would like to increase 
their personal popularity even at the expense of the party popularity so that they are re-
elected repeatedly from their constituencies in the face of failure of their party to be re-
elected at the centre (Cain et al. 1984). Thus, they tend to follow ‘self-safety-first’ strategy.  
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Incumbents wishing to be re-elected try their best to make their names familiar with 
their constituents by religiously following three strategies (Abramowitz, 1975). In various 
public meetings, social gatherings and social media they ‘advertise’ their names in such a 
manner that their names stand out over and above their stances on current or proposed 
policy issues (Norton and Wood, 1993:70-1). Secondly, when some public projects or 
activities benefitting constituents are implemented in their constituencies, they claim 
personal ‘credit’ for them, as if, it would not have happened without their personal 
initiatives. Thirdly, they tend to take ‘position’ on contemporary public policies that please 
a majority of their constituents. In these ways they attempt to garner ‘personal votes’ by 
building up their personal images and get re-elected. On the other hand, the challengers are 
not involved with implementation of any public projects and hence they cannot ‘claim’ 
credit for them. They can take ‘position’ on contemporary public issues that are favourable 
to the majority constituents, but very few people pay attention to public issues. 
Hypothetically, if both take ‘position’ that please the majority, their positions converge to 
a single points. Since incumbents’ names are more familiar to constituents than 
challengers’, majority voters are likely to trust incumbents despite no differences among 
their policy stances. By familiarising their names with constituents through a variety of 
strategies, they are able to restore not only the electoral support of the voters who voted for 
them in previous elections, but also sway voters towards them from opposition parties 
(Stokes and Miller, 1966:260). Gelman and King (1990) estimate that in the US the 
incumbency advantage per see was about 12 extra percentage points in the last quarter of 
the 19th century against 2 percentage points in the 1950s. On the other hand, Jacobson and 
Carson (2016:40) find that the incumbency advantage (in terms of vote shares) of the US 
incumbents increased sharply during the 1960s and fell to the pre-1960s level in the recent 
elections.     
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To Abramowitz (1975) the incumbency advantage results from the strategic usage 
of incumbency status itself. Mayhew (1974) explains it from the perspective of amount of 
resources under incumbents’ control. The government endows incumbents with public 
resources to perform project works in their constituencies and they have knock-on effects 
on welfare of constituents and thus they are likely to yield more votes for them. They also 
use those resources strategically for electoral benefits. Fiorina (1977) adds that incumbents 
use public resources to perform project works as well as constituency services. In the UK 
constituency service contributes to swing personal vote in favour of the Labour Party’s 
incumbents by 1.5-2.0 percent and the Conservative Party’s incumbents by 3-3.5 percent 
(Cain et al. (1984). So, both Mayhew (1974) and Fiorina (1977) identify project works and 
constituency services as major sources of incumbency advantages. However, the 1986 
British Social Attitude Survey reveals that only one out of ten constituents contact 
incumbents at some stage of their lives (Jewell et al. 1987). So, constituency services are 
unlikely to be main vote-gaining instrument. However, Cain et al. (1984:54) counter-argues 
that it is not the actual number or amount of constituency services constituents avail 
themselves of, it is rather the existence of opportunity that constituents may available in 
emergency. Moreover, Norton and Wood (1993) argue that it is not the volume of project 
works and constituency services that matter. It is rather the influence of members of the 
parliament in the government circle that voters appreciate and reward them for it. For 
example, the Australian voters would like to see their incumbents on national media 
debating on national issues and dealing with national leaders. So, these activities are likely 
to yield more electoral benefits than project works and constituency services. Studler and 
McAllister (1996) estimate that when an Australian member of parliament renders one hour 
more constituency service per month, she loses the first preference vote by 0.09 percent. 
However, King (1991) points out that those studies that find negative relationship between 
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constituency service and vote shares of incumbents may suffer from some methodological 
problems.  
The increasing troubleshooting skills of experienced incumbents may be another 
source of incumbency advantage (Fiorina, 1977). As the size of the bureaucracy has been 
increasing over time, citizens need to deal with the bureaucracy more and more for availing 
themselves of a variety of public services. When all possible ways of solving problems are 
exhausted, citizens approach to incumbents as the last resort for solving personal or group 
problems. When incumbents deal with the bureaucracy, they deal with it on behalf of the 
concerned citizens in benevolent and non-partisan ways. This produce favourable ‘ripple 
effects’ on their friends, family members and other acquaintance who are more likely to 
reward incumbents in following elections. Carson and Roberts (2013) argue that the 
Leviathan bureaucratic tangle that Congressmen help to untangle on behalf of grieved 
citizens is created by the Congressmen themselves. 
 Trouble-shooting is one of several key skills of incumbents. Overall, their quality 
in terms of political experience, educational qualification, and trouble-shooting has been 
increasing over time (Cox and Katz, 1996). The challengers may match incumbents in 
terms of educational and professional qualifications, but not in terms of resources and 
recent political experience. The incumbents have effective control over a higher amount of 
public and private resources and are equipped with recent political experiences, which may 
increase the opportunity cost of challengers (e.g., permanent loss of political career 
following defeat in elections) and as such competent challengers may be ‘scared off’. An 
overwhelming majority of British members of the parliament are university educated and 
nearly a quarter of them are educated in two prestigious universities of the world – Oxford 
and Cambridge. About 25 percent are professional politicians and the rest were involved 
with ‘metropolitan professions’ before taking politics as profession (Hunter and Holden, 
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2015).  On the other hand, a significant portion of voters are becoming cynical about the 
performance, intentions and efficiency of the government and consequently they are 
becoming more and more non-partisan (Miller, 1974).  As a result, voters are more likely 
to trust the person who they know and who is readily approachable than the partisan 
government which they do not know much and which is far off. Consequently, they tend 
to attach more weight on the individual incumbent than on the partisan government (Cox 
and Katz, 1996). Cox and Katz (1996) estimate the total incumbency effect in the US over 
the 1946-90 period and decompose it into three components – direct effect resulting from 
project works and constituency services, scare-off effect arising from dropping off of 
competent challengers in elections and quality effect emanating from improvement of 
quality of incumbents. They observe that there have been increasing trends in all three 
components over time, but improvement in the quality of incumbents makes substantial 
contribution to the increased incumbency advantage. So, both quantity of resources under 
the disposal of incumbents and their personal qualities contribute to increase vote shares of 
incumbents in the US. 
Using the UK electoral data covering the 1950-92 period Gaines (1998) finds little 
(1 percent in the 1950s and 2 percent in the late 1980s) or no evidence of incumbency 
advantage for major parties but significant incumbency advantage (6 percent to 16 percent) 
for a minor party (Liberal Democratic Party). The reason of not finding substantial 
incumbency effect for major parties is attributed to existence of multiple ‘serious’ 
candidates in constituencies where incumbents compete. However, Gaines (1998) does not 
outline the attributes of ‘serious’ candidates. Smith (2013) finds that in the UK the re-
elected incumbents belonging to the Conservative Party, the Labour Party and the Liberal 
Democratic Party receive about 1.75 percent, 2.2 percent and 6.7 percent more vote 
respectively with respect to the situation when incumbents do not compete.  
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The abovementioned researchers use the aggregate electoral data to measure 
incumbency advantage. They define the incumbency advantage as the difference in vote 
shares when incumbents re-contest and when they do not. Their unit of analysis is the 
electoral district. So, their analysis may suffer from ecological fallacy. They do not control 
some factors that might potentially over-estimate incumbency advantage, such as 
partisanship, personal vote, and presence of weaker challengers. Moreover, they do not 
control short-term economic fluctuations that might affect recruitment of election 
campaigners and fund-raising and so on.  So, their incumbency advantage is likely to be 
over-estimated. In this context, Petrocik and Desposato (2004) estimates incumbency 
advantage in the US by using US National Election Surveys from 1980 through 2000. They 
find that on average voters are 15 percentage points more likely to vote for incumbents that 
they are expected to vote for open-seat successors. When partisanship of voters is 
considered, Democratic supporters are 17 percentage points more likely to vote for 
Democratic incumbents than they are expected to vote for Democratic candidates running 
in Democratic open constituencies. On the contrary, it is 14 percentage points for 
Republican supporters. In the bad election environment vote shares of Democratic 
incumbents fall by 0.009 percentage points whereas they fall by 0.02 percentage points for 
Republican incumbents. In contrast, in the good election environment vote shares of 
Democratic incumbents increase by 0.009 percentage points whereas it increase by 0.02 
percentage points for Republican incumbents.  So, economic trends benefit or harm 
different parties differently.  
While there is a controversy over the magnitude of incumbency advantage in 
developed countries, its existence is a fact in those countries. This is evident from high 
rates of re-election of incumbents in the developed countries especially in the US (e.g., 
Krashinsky and Milne, 1993) and the UK (e.g., Hunter and Holden, 2015). It may be 
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mentioned that except Petrocik and Desposato (2004) very few studies have addressed the 
socioeconomic causes of incumbency advantage or disadvantage in developed countries.  
It is clear from above discussion that incumbents enjoy an electoral advantage over 
challengers due to the long-term familiarity with constituents, strategic use of public 
resources under their disposal, accumulated experience in dealing with local problems and 
proven trouble-shooting skills and so on. In order to win in marginal seats where 
incumbents are competing opposition parties also nominate ‘Gaines’ (1998) ‘serious’ 
candidates who are capable of overshadowing incumbents’ incumbency advantage in some 
ways. So, competition is too tough in marginal seats. The parties give special attention to 
marginal seats when they are proportionately more in number and hence winning in 
marginal seats may decide the likelihood of forming the government.  
6.3.2 Empirical literature review: the case of India  
Using the electoral and socioeconomic data of Indian states for the 1975-2003 
period Uppal (2009) shows that Indian state-level legislators in marginal constituencies 
(vote share difference between winners and runners-up ≤ 5 percent) are 15 percentage 
points less likely to be re-elected before 1991 and 22 percentage points after 1991. The 
sources of disadvantage is the discontent of voters. Incumbents in marginal constituencies 
receive less votes where quality of infrastructure is poor, per capita income is low, and 
poverty and unemployment are high. While Uppal (2009) estimates incumbency 
disadvantage of state legislators in Indian marginal constituencies, Ravisankar (2009) 
estimates direct and cross incumbency advantage and disadvantage of incumbents in the 
state and national elections during the 1977-2005 period. She finds that the chance of re-
election of incumbents belonging to the state ruling party is 14.5 percentage points lower 
in relation to incumbents belonging to opposition parties. Additionally, the chance of re-
election of incumbents belonging to the national ruling party is 9 percentage points lower 
in relation to incumbents belonging to opposition parties. So, whether incumbents belong 
to the national or state ruling party they are more likely to lose in relation to their 
counterparts belonging to opposition parties. So, Indian incumbents belonging to ruling 
and opposition parties are punished asymmetrically. However, Indian incumbents are not 
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always in disadvantaged position. If state elections takes place within 2 years of national 
elections, state-level incumbents belonging to the national ruling party enjoy some 
incumbency advantage, but as time passes it wanes. It may be mentioned that Indian 
incumbents perform more constituency services and case works than their counterparts in 
the developed countries, yet they are in general disadvantaged. For example, Indian voters 
approach their incumbents to lend or donate them money in times of emergency (Mezey, 
1985). Neither incumbents nor voters in developed countries can dream of it.             
6.3.3 Empirical literature review: the case of Bangladesh  
  
           Like the incumbents in developed and other developing countries, incumbents in 
Bangladesh perform project works, constituency service and caseworks (Jahan, 1976). 
They would like to be busier with these activities than parliamentary affairs. They are 
concerned with general social, economic and political problems as well as specific 
problems, such as food shortages, inflation, unemployment, education, law and order, 
corruption and so on. All incumbents play a vital role in setting up new educational 
institutions and getting government affiliation and grants for them. They supervise 
programs and projects being funded by the government and international donor agencies. 
Though Jahan’s (1976) findings are derived from a survey conducted long ago on the eve 
of the 1973 parliamentary election, its findings may be still valid.  Ahmed (2002:171-184 
remarks that some incumbents in the fifth parliament (1991 election) are more active than 
others in promoting constituency-related and other issues. The constituency-related issues 
include construction of roads and bridges, setting up of educational institutions, supply of 
agricultural inputs to farmers, rehabilitation of people affected by natural disasters, rural 
electrification and nationalization of educational institutions especially primary schools. 
A major general issue is the demand to reduce prices of agricultural inputs and necessary 
consumer goods in times of higher inflation. However, constituency issues are 
predominant. Out of all issues raised in the 5th parliament, 62.3 percent are local, 14.2 
percent are regional and only 23.5 percent are national related issues. All are more 
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concerned with constituency issues than parliamentary activities, which is consistent with 
Jahan’s (1976) findings. However, the activities of incumbents are different depending on 
their political life in the parliament as well as their party affiliation. While junior 
incumbents are more involved with constituency activities, senior incumbents are more 
involved with parliamentary affairs.  
               Before 1991 there were not many regular elections in Bangladesh. So, studies 
on the electoral behaviour in Bangladesh are mostly absent. The first pioneering work on 
the electoral behaviour in present Bangladesh (the then East Pakistan) is conducted by 
Sobhan (1968). Among other issues he investigates into the causes of re-election and 
defeat of incumbents in local government elections. The Government of East Pakistan’s 
(1964) Basic Democracies and Local Government Department (BDLGD) collected data 
on the 1959 and 1964 elections of Basic Democrats and Union Councils (Sobhan, 
1968:245-249). Though electoral behavior at the lowest rung of the local government is 
likely to be different from that in parliamentary elections in some way (Sobhan, 
1968:252), it may be logically assumed that had there been free and fair general elections, 
electoral results of the lowest local government level would most probably be resonated 
in the parliamentary elections too. Re-examining the district level aggregate electoral data 
collated by the BDLGD, Sobhan (1968:245-9) shows that only 47.65 percent of the 
incumbents Basic Democrats were re-elected. Among the Chairmen (Head of a Union 
Council elected by its members) only 58.7 percent out of 76.39 percent contesting 
incumbent Chairmen were re-elected. About 22.50 percent Chairmen refrained from 
contesting for fear of losing in the elections following allegations of corruption, nepotism 
and idleness against them. The reason of rejecting the rest incumbent Chairmen (40.3 
percent) is voters’ resentment resulting from abuse of power delegated to them under the 
‘authoritarian’ Basic Democracy System. Another reason of defeat is jealousy of fellow 
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members arising from incumbency position as direct ‘contact-man’ between local 
bureaucracy and voters. Voters cast negative votes against incumbents to express 
dissatisfaction with their performance. There is no reason to believe that challengers were 
more effective than incumbents. Even by delivering benefits to the general public and 
dispensing patronage to cronies through the Public Works Programmes many incumbents 
failed to keep voters permanently loyal to them. It can be deduced from this fact that the 
traditional patron-client relationship breaks down when incumbents promote personal 
interests proportionately more than public interests. So, corruption and mismanagement 
of public fund are most instrumental in rejecting incumbents.  
          Analysing his own survey data Sobhan (1968:249-255) shows that 85 percent of 
incumbent Basic Democrats (BD) sought re-election and of them 35 percent were 
defeated. One of the important causes of re-election of Basic Democrats is that the local 
bureaucrats pressured voters to vote in favour of incumbents who were supporters of the 
incumbent government. Despite pressure from the top bureaucratic level, many Basic 
Democrats used their conscience in taking voting decisions. They emphasized honesty 
and sincerity (82.0 percent), ability (73.5 percent), and party affiliation (33.0 percent) 
rather than class-consciousness as defining forces for taking voting decisions. As to causes 
of victory of incumbent Basic Democrats, they ranked hereditary influence (87.5 percent), 
hardworking (73.5 percent), and honesty and sincerity (72.0 percent) as the most 
important personal attributes of contestants. They ranked dishonesty (82.0 percent), 
insincerity (66.0 percent), misappropriation charge (58.3 percent), and support for corrupt 
regime (58.3 percent), corruption (51.0 percent), and favouritism (35.0 percent) as the 
most important factors for their defeat. It should be noted that in the Union Council and 
Basic democrat elections local issues and personal characteristics of candidates were more 
important than national issues. In terms of coverage of factors that led to victory and defeat 
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of incumbents Sobhan’s (1968) study was more comprehensive than the Government of 
East Pakistan’s (1964) Basic Democracies and the Local Government Department. Yet 
none of them included a host of socioeconomic, political, demographic and institutional 
factors that were likely to have contributed to cast votes against Basic Democrats who 
were tutelage of the authoritarian rule.  
       Since elections were few and far between and most of them were rigged in favour of 
the candidates belonging to the ruling party, researchers were not interested to carry out 
researches on any aspect of the electoral behaviour in Bangladesh.  Moreover, electoral 
studies were considered “sensitive and dangerous” in Bangladesh during the pre- and post-
independent periods (Jahan, 1976). Though there are some studies (e.g., Jahan, 1976, 
2005; Blair, 1979; Baxter and Rashiduzzaman, 1981 and Karim, 2007) that focus on some 
important aspects of electoral behaviour in Bangladesh, they address the determinants of 
winners’ vote shares marginally.  
           Some studies focus on factors that help to win in elections in Bangladesh. Jahan 
(1976/2005) finds that voters tend to cast vote against candidates of the incumbent party 
(the AL) if they fail to realise hopes and aspirations of the people and for effective 
candidates of opposition parties. Blair (1979) finds that voters tend to vote for candidates 
of the incumbent party (the AL) if they could develop local infrastructure as per their 
expectation. Baxter and Rashiduzzaman (1981) concentrate on the electoral behaviour of 
the Hindus, the largest religious minority in Bangladesh. They tend to vote for candidates 
of the AL for its firm commitment to secularism as one of the state’s basic principles. 
They do not take into consideration of the AL’s retrospective and/or prospective 
socioeconomic performance.  
           Karim (2007) investigates electoral behaviour in three elections (1991, 1996 and 
2001) in the post-1990 period with special focus on the 2001 election. His main concern 
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is to identify factors that increased or decreased AL’s and the BNP’s vote shares in the 
2001 election. It may be mentioned that the AL ruled the country over the 1996-2001 
period and the BNP was the opposition during that period. Karim (2007:441) finds that in 
the 2001 election the AL’s vote shares were higher in constituencies where the AL’s 
popular vote shares were higher in the 1996 election and voter turnout rates were higher 
in the 2001 election. On the other hand, in the 2001 election the AL’s vote shares were 
lower in constituencies where terrorist activities were carried out mostly by the AL’s 
activists, the AL’s officially nominated candidates were challenged by its rebel 
candidates, strong opposition or independent candidates. It may be mentioned that the AL 
was defeated in the 2001 election. Karim (2007:443) points out that terrorism was the 
most important factor contributing to the AL’s defeat in the 2001 election. The AL’s 
alliance with some other parties in the 2001 election failed to counter the negative effect 
of terrorism on its vote share.  
        The BNP was the dominant opposition party in the 2001 election and it formed the 
4-party alliance under its leadership. Karim (2007:444) finds that the BNP-led 4-party 
alliance and vote shares of the alliance candidates in the 1996 election positively 
contributed to increase the BNP-led alliance candidates’ vote shares in the 2001 election. 
In terrorist-prone constituencies their vote shares increased marginally, because most 
terrorist activities were conducted by the AL’s activists during its incumbency period. 
Alternatively, the BNP was the beneficiary of the AL’s terrorist activities. Overall, vote 
shares of candidates of both the AL and the BNP in the 2001 election increased in those 
constituencies where their vote shares were higher in the previous 1996 election. While 
political alliance increased vote shares of the AL’s candidates and helped it to win more 
seats in the 1996 parliamentary election, it decreased the same and caused defeat in the 
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2001 election. The turnout rate in the 2001 election had positive contribution to the vote 
shares of the AL’s candidates, but no contribution to those of the BNP.    
6.3.4 Shortcomings of prior studies related to determinants of winners’ vote shares in 
Bangladesh   
 
            A good number of researchers (Baxter and Rahman, 1991; Rahman, 1997; 
Hossain, 2000; Rashiduzzaman, 2001, 2002; Ahmed, 2002; Mannan, 2005; Manik, 2008; 
Sobhan, 2008; Hagerty, 2008; Alamgir, 2009; Momen, 2009; Zaman, 2009; Ahmed, 2011 
and Ahmed, 2014) investigate causes of success and defeat of the dominant parties in each 
election held between 1991 and 2008 (details in the Chapter 4). None of them investigates 
down to the constituency level as Karim (2007) does. So, they do not shed light on the 
causes of higher or lower vote shares of contestants at the constituency level. Moreover, 
most researchers focus on a single election. While only one study (e.g., Khan, 1997) 
compares and contrasts between the 1991 and 1996 elections, another study (e.g., 
Mannan, 2005) sequentially discusses contexts, results and factors affecting the AL or the 
BNP to win or lose in three subsequent elections – 1991, 1996 and 2001. They are mostly 
in-depth contextual studies of one or at best two elections. Though they identify factors 
affecting vote and seat shares of parties at the national level, they do not shed light on 
factors affecting vote shares of candidates at the constituency level. No studies attempt to 
identify factors affecting levels of vote shares of winners from the perspective of any 
electoral behavioural models. So, they do not test any models too.   
         The studies (e.g., Sobhan, 1968; Jahan, 1976/2005; Blair, 1979; Baxter and 
Rashiduzzaman, 1981 and Karim, 2007), that use constituency-level or sub-national level 
electoral results and survey data, have some methodological and data related limitations. 
Jahan’s (1976/2005) study is based on survey data collected from two constituencies in 
Bangladesh (one in suburban area and one in the metropolitan Dhaka city). They are poor 
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representatives of the whole of Bangladesh. The survey was conducted long ago in 1973. 
Its utility is likely to have diminished over time. She uses summary statistics to analyse 
the data. So, she does not control a variety of factors that may influence vote shares of 
winners. Blair (1979) collects socioeconomic data of two suburban constituencies in 
Bangladesh from secondary sources. He uses the electoral data of the 1973 election. It is 
not reliable, because the election was rigged in favour of the candidates of the ruling party. 
It is Karim (2007) who uses reliable electoral data of 300 constituencies in Bangladesh 
over the 1991-2001 period. His key focus is to determine factors influencing winners’ as 
well as losers’ vote shares across all constituencies in general as well as in marginal 
constituencies in particular.   However, the basis of his study is purely personal intuition 
rather than any electoral behavioural models. In most cases he uses summary statistics to 
explain winners’ as well as losers’ vote shares in general as well as in marginal 
constituencies linking them with a variety of political factors and only one social factor. 
In some cases he uses multiple regressions. However, his estimates are inefficient and 
biased, because there are a lot of endogeneity and multicollinearity problems in his 
analysis. He does not address those issues at all. Except one all his explanatory variables 
are related with electoral results. They are likely to have high correlations with dependent 
variables. It is because, except one variable (i.e., terrorism) all other explanatory variables 
are subsets of dependent variables. He does not include any economic and personal 
political capital variables in his analysis. So, his estimations are likely to suffer from 
omitted variable bias. However, he uses the variable ‘terrorism’ in his analysis and 
investigates its effect on vote shares of winners and losers and discusses their implications 
thoroughly. Except Karim (2007) no other studies deals with determination of winners’ 
vote shares across constituencies and re-elected winners’ vote shares in particular. Karim 
(2007) deals with them patchily, because he omits important socioeconomic and political 
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variables being used by empirical researchers that might potentially affect them. No 
studies focus on determinants of re-elected winners’ vote shares in marginal 
constituencies, whereas it is important. It is because, in competitive elections they are the 
game-changers. Each constituency has different socioeconomic and political 
characteristics. Similarly, each contestant has different levels of personal political capital 
stock. They need to be controlled for getting robust results. This can be done by using the 
fixed effect model. None has used it. So, their results are less reliable.    
6.4 Data and methodology   
 
While compiling the data set the author faces some problems resulting from 
mismatches of electoral and socioeconomic data. So, he follows a strategy recommended 
by Richter (1975) which aims to minimise mismatches (details discussed in the previous 
chapter 5).        
6.4.1 The response variable 
 
Our response variable is winners’ vote shares. More specifically, it is measured in 
four alternative ways: vote shares of winners; vote shares of re-elected winners; vote shares 
of re-elected winners in marginal constituencies; and vote shares of re-elected winners in 
non-marginal constituencies.  
6.4.2 The explanatory variables 
 
In the 5th chapter we identify potential determinants of voter turnout by reviewing 
theoretical and empirical literature and we classify them into some distinct categories. In 
this chapter we do the same and they are as follows: (a) economic variables, such as per 
capita gross domestic product, night time satellite imageries, hard core poverty and 
inflation), (b) social variables, such as adult literacy rate, gender ratio, Hindu population 
and levels of development in terms of road density per square kilometre), (c) politico-
electoral variables, such as voter turnout rates, politically motivated murders, politically 
salient strikes, political alliance, political competition and demeaned voter turnout rates) 
 DETERMINANTS OF WINNER VOTE SHARE  
311 
 
and (d) personal political capital stock variables, such as ex-incumbency and ex-ministerial 
position). It may be mentioned that some determinants of voter turnout and vote shares of 
winners are common, but underlying reasons of their inclusion are different. We explain 
them in relevant sub-sections.  
ECONOMIC VARIABLES  
Per capita real income 
In the section 5.7 of the immediate previous chapter (the 5th chapter) we identify it 
as a potential determinant of the voter turnout rate. We also identify it as a potential 
determinant of vote shares of winners in this chapter.  It has differential effects on them.   
Per capita real income is an indicator of human well-being. When it rises during the 
incumbency of a winner, voters are more likely to reward her by casting more votes in her 
favour. Thus, her chance of re-election increases (Erikson, 1989). However, there are some 
strategic incumbents who tend to contest when the economic condition is better and refrain 
from contesting when the same is worse (Jacobson, 1989).  
In Bangladesh the per capita district nominal gross domestic product (GDP) is 
available for the old twenty districts (districts that existed before 1985) for the 1991-1995 
period, but it is not available for the new 64 districts (all 64 sub-divisions under old 20 
districts were renamed as districts in 1985) for the 1996-2000 period. New districts are 
partitioned old ones. Since we are dealing with per capita GDP, old district level GDPs are 
substituted for the new ones for the 1991-1995 period. They are unavailable for the 2001-
2005 period for new districts. Using Holt’s linear exponential smoothing method we 
forecast them for the 2001-2005 period using historical data for the 1991-2000 period. This 
is because, historical GDP series contain a trend and Holt’s linear exponential smoothing 
method captures the underlying trend. Per capita GDP is expressed in real terms. Some 
researchers (e.g., Anand and Harris, 1994) argue that in developing countries per capita 
food consumption is a more reliable indicator of human well-being than the per capita gross 
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domestic product. In Bangladesh a substantial amount of produced food grains is consumed 
by producing households. So, per capita food grains being marketed may under-estimate 
the actual amount consumed.  However, it remains a common practice to use per capita 
real GDP rather than consumption to capture well-being of the people.  
Unemployment is a key economic variable that might influence winners’ vote 
shares, but in Bangladesh it is not available year-wise and district-wise even with irregular 
intervals. To a great extent the per capita real GDP would most likely capture it and is 
likely to be negatively related with the unemployment rate. 
Night-time satellite imagery (NSI) 
In the section 5.7 of the immediate previous chapter (the 5th chapter) we discuss 
limitations of the district per capita GDP as a robust indicator of the volume of economic 
activities or the welfare level of the people of a district and its probable relationship with 
the voter turnout rate.  We also discuss in details potential costs and benefits of using NSI 
as a determinant of the voter turnout rate in general and in the particular context of 
Bangladesh. The same is applicable when NSI is used as a potential determinant of vote 
shares of winners in general and re-elected winners in particular. We are unsure about the 
overall relationship between winners’ vote shares and radiance of NSI. However, using 
NSI of 98,000 villages of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh over the 1992-2010 period Min 
(2015:12-14) finds that the higher the radiance of NSI the higher are the vote shares of re-
elected incumbents. These extra votes in favour of re-elected incumbents are most probably 
cast by the rural poor voters. This is because, as argued by Min (2015:12-14), the poor have 
no ideological alignment or firm partisanship. They are most likely to vote for candidates 
who deliver or promise to deliver them more public goods, such as electricity, which is the 
life-blood of their economic prosperity. We are unsure about the probable relationship 
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between NSI and winners’ vote shares, because winners may be fresh or re-elected. 
Moreover, as far as the author of this study is concerned, no studies have investigated into 
this relationship in general. However, we expect this relationship to be positive for re-
elected winners belonging to the incumbent party irrespective of the socioeconomic 
characteristics of voters. This is because, the Bangladesh government directly or indirectly 
controls production and distribution of electricity. Voters tend to reward incumbents when 
supply of electricity is stable and price of electricity is within the reach of the common 
people. They tend to punish incumbents (e.g., by casting votes against them in elections or 
forcing them to resign by organizing prolonged mass protests) for their failure to supply 
electricity regularly at reasonable prices (Min, 2015:8-10).  
Hard core poverty  
In the immediate previous chapter (the section 5.7 of the 5th chapter) we use the 
hard core poverty as one of the potential economic determinants of the voter turnout rate.. 
Our objective is to capture the possibility of ‘turnout buying’ and ‘turnout selling’ practices 
between power-monger political elites and severely poverty-stricken voters in Bangladesh. 
In this chapter we also use the same variable to capture the effect of poverty on winners’ 
vote shares in general and re-elected winners’ vote shares in particular. As per capita real 
GDP increases, the relative poverty level is likely to fall provided that the distribution of 
the national income is biased towards the hard core poor. We are not sure about the 
relationship between the hard core poverty and winners’ vote shares, but we expect a 
negative relationship between them for re-elected winners in absence of ‘vote buying and 
selling’ practices. This is because, as relative poverty increases the hard core poor are 
expected to turnout more and cast votes against incumbents to express their grievance 
against them. Its effect is expected to be positive in the presence of ‘vote buying and 
selling’ practices. This is because, the poorer the voters the higher is the likelihood of 
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‘exchange’ votes for ‘cash’. So, it may have ambiguous effect on vote shares of re-elected 
incumbents.  
Inflation 
While the model includes real per capita GDP, it also includes the inflation rate. 
This is because, they measure different aspects of economic performance of the 
government.  
Inflation reduces real income and thus the well-being of the people. It has 
distributional effects. It reduces the real income of lower socioeconomic classes more than 
that of upper socioeconomic classes. So, some researchers (e.g., Palmer and Whitten, 1999) 
find that when voters believe that the government has an important responsibility to control 
the inflation rate, an unexpected hyper-inflation is likely to reduce vote shares of winners 
belonging to the incumbent party. We are unsure about the relationship between the 
inflation rate and winners’ vote shares, but we expect a negative relationship between vote 
shares of re-elected winners belonging to the incumbent party and the inflation rate. 
Alternatively, it is likely to increase vote shares of winners belonging to the dominant 
opposition parties.  
In Bangladesh inflation rates are not available at the district level. The consumer 
price indices (CPI) are available at the divisional level for the rural and urban people. We 
calculate inflation rates by using CPIs. The CPIs are available for industrial workers of 
some metropolitan cities, such as Narayanganj (very close to the Dhaka city, the capital of 
Bangladesh), Chittagong and Khulna, and their base year is 1969/70. Similarly, CPIs for 
rural families under Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna, and Rajshahi divisions are available and 
their base year is 1973/74. We convert them into 1969/70 base year. From those data we 
calculate inflation rates at the divisional level, and substitute them for rural and urban 
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constituencies under those divisions. Rangpur and Sylhet are new divisions created by 
partitioning Rajshahi and Chittagong divisions respectively. CPIs are not available for 
them. The data for Rajshahi and Chittagong divisions are substituted for them.  
SOCIAL VARIABLES 
Adult literacy rate 
In the section 5.7 of the immediate previous chapter (the 5th chapter) we identify 
adult literacy as a potential determinant of the voter turnout rate. It is also a potential 
determinant of vote shares of winners belonging to the incumbent party as well as the 
dominant opposition parties.  This is because, literate people are likely to be intellectually 
better equipped to compare retrospective and/or prospective performance of the 
government and opposition candidates/parties than illiterate people. Moreover, literate 
people are more financially independent than illiterate people, and thus they may vote more 
rationally and independently than their illiterate counterparts (Stromquist, 2005).  
In Bangladesh each government is found to establish new educational institutions. 
It also nationalises many private institutions and thus takes the responsibility of running 
them. The educational expenditure as percentage of the gross national income increased by 
0.11, 0.09 and 0.33 percentage points over 1991-95, 1996-2001, 2002-2005 periods (World 
Bank, undated). The initiative of establishing new educational institutions and transforming 
them into public ones are either taken by local political elites mainly for reaping electoral 
benefits for themselves or for their cronies. Sometimes it is the demand of electors and 
political elites just respond to it. In Bangladesh 35 percent members of the 9th parliament 
(2001-2006) are found involved with provision of educational facilities and nationalising 
educational institutions (Akram, 2012). Jahan (1976) finds that 23 percent members of the 
1st parliament (election held in 1973) believe that education is the key factor in solving all 
socioeconomic problems in Bangladesh. Thus, voters may reward incumbents for higher 
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adult literacy. However, they may punish under-performing incumbents too as they become 
politically more conscious with the increase in literacy. Thus, adult literacy may have bi-
directional effects on winners’ vote shares and hence its effect on winners’ vote shares is 
likely to be ambiguous.  
Development level 
Road networks facilitate transportation of people and goods, and thus contribute to 
the GDP and eventually overall human well-being. The wider and denser the road network, 
the lower is the cost of transportation of goods and commutation of people. However, they 
reduce cultivable land and thus cause reduction in GDP too. Whatever costs and benefits 
are, benefits are likely to outweigh costs (BIDS, 2003 and 2004). Roads are an integral part 
of the basic structure of the economy. In the developing countries the government may 
build roads for altruistic motives as well as for some ulterior partisan benefits (Kenny, 2006 
and Benitez et al., 2010).  
In rural areas in Bangladesh roads are built (i) to create short-term employment 
opportunities for the poor people during lean seasons (Mujeri, 2002) and hence the 
government tries to garner support for it in upcoming elections, (b) to distribute political 
patronage to partisan supporters (Rashid, 2005) and thus allure swing voters, and (c) to 
provide opportunities to rural elites to divert a large part of the public fund for private 
consumption (Westergaard and Alam, 1995). Moreover, through building roads the 
government may like to create opportunities for local political elites and activists to help 
them realize their political investment. A higher road density also helps contestants to 
mobilize apathetic voters to turn out for voting in elections. If candidates are allegedly 
involved with any corruption including road-related one, voters in general are likely to 
punish them (Peters and Welch, 1980). However, voters may reward them too if they are 
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able to sustain economic prosperity (Choi and Woo, 2010). Thus, road length may have 
ambiguous impacts on electoral support for incumbents.  
Bangladesh is one of the most corrupt countries in the world as per the corruption 
perception index being estimated by the Transparency International and Governance index 
being estimated by the World Bank (McDevitt, 2015). Corruption is endemic across 
sectors. In Bangladesh 31.3 percent members of the 9th parliament (2008-2013) is involved 
with local infrastructural development, a major part of which is road construction (Akram, 
2012). It is hard to decompose expenditures for road construction into components showing 
the part going to cater genuine needs of the economy, the part meeting demands of electors 
and the part being misappropriated for partisan and personal benefits. So, road length per 
square kilometre land area may give mixed signals to voters.  
The road length for new districts are available for 2001 and 2005, but not for 1991 and 
1996. The road length for old districts are available for 1992 and 1994. We apportion them 
among new districts on the basis of their land size and calculate road density per square 
kilometre. They are taken as proxies for 1991 and 1995 respectively. We include road 
length per square kilometre to capture contribution of incumbents to local infrastructural 
development as well as dimension of misappropriation of public funds by them. We treat 
length of road per square kilometre as an indicator of resource allocation in constituency. 
We regard those constituencies as high developed ones where percentage increase in road 
length is 50 percent greater than mean percentage change of road length. Similarly, we 
consider those constituencies as low developed where percentage increase in road length 
is 50 percent less than mean percentage change of road length. We treat those 
constituencies as medium developed where percentage increase in road length is in between 
the low and high developed constituencies. 
 
 CHAPTER 6 
318 
 
Gender ratio 
Electoral behaviour of women is to some extent different from that of men across 
countries (Lovenduski, 1992). Women constitute about half of the population in 
Bangladesh. Being a a Muslim-dominant developing society woman used to enjoy 
restricted freedom in the society several decades ago. In the case of electoral participation 
either they did not turn out for voting and treated voting as a masculine political affair, or 
they used to vote as per directions of their male guardians. However, with spread of female 
education this situation is changing over time. Now-a-days more women are participating 
in political decisions at different levels of public life (Ahmed, 2008). For lack of data 
regarding gender of voters, we include gender ratio (women per 100 men population) to 
estimate effect of women’s vote on vote shares of winners in general and re-elected winners 
in particular. We are not sure about the relationship between gender ratio and winners’ vote 
shares. This is because, in the European countries women support left-leaning parties which 
promise to give financial security to vulnerable groups. In the US they support the 
conservative party, as women have conservative attitudes. In Bangladesh rhetorically AL 
is left-leaning and the BNP is right-leaning, but in reality it is hard to distinguish between 
them along ideological dimensions (Hossain, 2000). Literally, women voters are more 
likely to support the AL if they prefer financial security to religious conservatism, 
otherwise they support the BNP. So, the higher the percentage of women voters in a 
constituency the higher is the likelihood of vote shares of winners belonging to the AL. So, 
the effect of the gender ratio on winners’ vote shares is ambiguous. It depends on the 
composition of women preferring financial security to conservative attitude and vice versa.   
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Hindus population 
Historically religion has been playing an important role not only in the South Asian 
immature democratic countries (Riaz, 2010), but also in Western traditional mature 
democracies (Swift, 1998). Religion is also playing an important role in the present day as 
ever, but in different forms (Layman, 1994). In South Asia British India was partitioned 
into India and United Pakistan (the then East and West Pakistan) in 1947 based on the 
concentration of her two major religious groups – Hindus and Muslims. In Bangladesh the 
major minority religious group is the Hindus. Using doctored aggregate electoral data of 
1970, 1973, 1978 and 1979 and naïve analytical techniques, Baxter and Rashiduzzaman 
(1981) find that the Hindus have been traditionally supporting the AL, a dominant secular 
party in Bangladesh.  
The average Hindu population in Bangladesh is 9.88 percent over the 1991-2008 
period with maximum 35.13 percent and minimum 1.15 percent. So, in marginal 
constituencies Hindu voters may play an important role in turning electoral outcomes in 
favour of the AL. For lack of religious identification of voters, we use Hindu population as 
a percentage of total population as a proxy for religious affiliations of voters. The district-
wise percentage distribution of Bangladesh population by religious communities are 
available in 1991, 2001 and 2011 population censuses. So, the 1996 and the 2008 district-
wise percentage distribution of Bangladesh population by religious communities are 
calculated by averaging their adjacent census years. We include percentage of Hindu 
population in our models to test Baxter and Rashiduzzaman’s (1981) findings and validate 
whether or not the ethno-cultural or ethno-religious voting model is operative in 
Bangladesh.  
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POLITICAL VARIABLES 
Political alliance 
Downs (1957:55-56) laid the theoretical foundation of coalition government in a multi-
party system. Coalition governments are prevalent in some West European mature 
democracies, but alliances among political parties in South Asian countries are of different 
nature. Forming and maintaining ‘rainbow’3 and ‘jumbo’4 type political alliances is a 
newly emerging trend in most South Asian countries in recent decades. Keeping aside 
historical animosity and ideological confrontation, parties tend to form pre-election 
alliances mainly to reap some electoral gains. In some South Asian countries ideologically 
heterogeneous opposition parties make pre-election alliances to depose authoritarian rulers 
and play an important role in the upcoming government. The incumbent party or parties 
also form alliances to be re-elected. The ‘rainbow’ and ‘jumbo’ alliances consist of many 
small parties which have little political clout, but they are welcomed by alliances of both 
the incumbent and the dominant opposition parties to keep them away from contending 
alliances (Riaz, 2016:7).  
In India the Indian National Congress (INC), which did not form any alliance with any 
party over 120 years until 2003, realized that the only way to challenge the BJP-led 
incumbent coalition government (the National Democratic Alliance) in the 2004 national 
election was to form pre-election alliance with like-minded parties. Consequently, it 
formed the United Progressive Alliance and won a landslide victory in the 2004 national 
election.  Following the victory some INC leaders openly acknowledged that the alliance 
was the single most important factor in winning in the 2004 national election. In contrast, 
in the same election the BJP-led incumbent coalition government met unexpected electoral 
                                                            
3 Parties having different and sometimes conflicting ideologies. 
4 Many small and medium sized parties thronging around a dominant party. 
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debacle despite higher than expected economic development during its tenure and well-
orchestrated election campaigns. It held the election much earlier than the scheduled date 
with a view to reaping electoral benefits from much-recognized economic growth. This is 
because, some of its key allies of the 1999 election left the alliance before the 2004 election 
(Rana, 2006:55-56,110). While ‘right’ pre-election political alliance is likely to increase 
vote shares of co-party alliance candidates and subsequently their probability of winning, 
‘wrong’ alliance or defection of key co-allies may reverse it. Candidates of smaller parties 
who are marginalized in the political landscape and hence have little chance to win may 
get elected following formation of alliances. Similarly, candidates of dominant parties who 
may be disliked by supporters of minor parties might narrowly win by pooling support of 
multiple smaller co-alliance parties.  
In Bangladesh there are two dominant alliances led by two dominant political parties – 
the AL and the BNP. Sometimes these alliances are publicly declared and sometimes they 
are implicitly agreed upon for strategic reasons. Some alliances are local and some are 
national. Local alliances are likely to be more effective than national ones, because parties 
may benefit from one popular party in one area and another popular party from another 
area (Hussain, 2008:ix). We treat candidates as alliance candidates of a dominant party 
when we do not find its own candidate in a constituency in an election. This is because, 
both the AL and the BNP have capacity to field candidates in all 300 constituencies in 
Bangladesh. We expect that a political alliance is likely to increase vote shares of 
candidates belonging to the alliance. So, an alliance candidate has a higher chance to win 
than a non-alliance one.  
Political competition 
Like product markets, higher competition in the political markets accrues some benefits 
to voters. The higher the competition for votes in constituencies, the higher the response of 
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incumbents to the needs of majority constituents. Moreover, since they need to poll the 
highest percentage of votes to win under the first-past-the-post system, they need to get 
votes of median voters. So, their stance in the policy space is more moderate 
(Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Steward, 2001). Secondly, since opposition parties monitor the 
activities of incumbents constantly, incumbents try their best to increase their probability 
of re-election in following elections (Wittman, 1995:22). Thirdly, in order to poll more 
votes, contestants mobilize apathetic voters. It is found that while voting, apathetic voters 
vote for the party which activists mobilize them for voting. Thus, the competition for votes 
motivates more voters to be politically engaged leading to healthy democratic environment 
(Nichter, 2008). However, it is sometimes argued that more political competition leads to 
an increase in expenditure for election campaigns, which raises barriers to entry for new 
contestants leading to low political competition (Wittman, 1995:24). It is imperative to take 
into consideration the level of political competition, because it may be the level of political 
competition itself rather than socioeconomic factors that determines the vote shares of 
contestants in elections. Political competition and subsequently mobilization of voters is 
likely to increase voter turnout rates in elections and hence vote shares of all dominant 
political parties leading to reduction in margins of win.  
There are several ways to measure political competition: (a) inverse of Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI), (b) margin of difference between winners’ and runners-up’ vote 
share, and (c) contestants per voter. Number of contestants per voter is a good indicator of 
political competition where each party has more or less equal support base. In Bangladesh 
there are two dominant political alliances led by two dominant political parties. So, the first 
two criteria may be applicable in the case of Bangladesh. Since the margin difference 
between the winner and the runner-up does not take into account vote shares of other 
contestants who might reduce vote shares of candidates of dominant parties ideologically 
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close to them, it may not be an ideal index. Voters voting for minor parties do not 
necessarily support them. In contrast, it may rather mean that they vote in favour of minor 
parties to show their antipathy to major parties (Salka, 2012). Since HHI takes into 
consideration vote shares of all contestants, following Uppal (2009) we use its inverse to 
capture effects of all contestants on vote shares of winners. We test its robustness by the 
margin difference between the winner and the runner-up.    
Voter turnout rate 
In the section 5.7 of the previous chapter (the 5th chapter) we attempt to identify 
potential determinants of the voter turnout rate in Bangladesh.  In this chapter we use it as 
a potential determinant of vote shares of winners in general and re-elected winners in 
particular. 
The levels of voter turnout rates have differential effects on vote shares of parties 
depending on their ideological stances.  According to Campbell et al. (1960:96-115), the 
socioeconomically upper classes are habitual voters and they are usually supporters of 
right-leaning parties which advocate for lower taxes for the higher income classes. When 
voter turnout rates are low, vote shares of candidates of right-leaning parties increase and 
they are more likely to win. Conversely, the socioeconomically lower classes are 
occasional voters and non-voters. So, their political preferences are likely to be different 
from their counterparts in upper socioeconomic classes. They are usually supporters of left-
leaning parties which advocate for redistribution of income in favour of lower 
socioeconomic classes. When voter turnout rates are high, vote shares of candidates of left-
leaning parties increase and they are more likely to win.  
The political parties in Bangladesh can be divided into left- and right-leaning groups. 
Khan et al. (2008:8-9) have arranged them from left to right on the basis of their ideological 
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stances regarding religion, economic management, global political outlook, nationalism, 
party system and system of government. While they place the AL at the centre-left location, 
they place the BNP at the centre-right location. Their left-to-right arrangement is as 
follows: Communist Party of Bangladesh, Bangladesh Workers’ Party, National Socialist 
Party (Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal), Bangladesh Krisak Sramik Awami League, National 
Awami Party, Bangladesh Awami League, Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Jatiya Party, 
Bangladesh Muslim League, Islamic United Alliance (Islami Oikyo Jote) and Jammat-i-
Islami Bangladesh. All of these parties contested in elections held between 1991 and 2008 
and their candidates won. It is expected that lower voter turnout rates might increase vote 
shares of winners belonging to the right-leaning ideologies and higher voter turnout rates 
are likely to increase vote shares of winners belonging to the left-leaning ones.    
Demeaned voter turnout rates 
The voter turnout has multiple implications in electoral outcomes. A higher voter 
turnout is likely to indicate voters’ interest in public choices, whereas a lower voter turnout 
is likely to indicate voters’ apathy to the political system. On one hand, a higher turnout 
rate may indicate voters’ attempt to vent the grievance against the incumbent (Powell Jr., 
1986). On the other hand, it may also indicate the magnitude of vote buying by contestants 
(Nichter, 2008). When the voter turnout rate is higher, vote shares of candidates belonging 
to dominant parties are likely to increase following their intensive and extensive 
mobilization efforts. However, it may benefit candidates of left-leaning parties more than 
right-leaning ones (Campbell et al., 1960:96-115). For some reasons some voters do not 
like to cast votes in normal elections, whereas they like to vote enthusiastically in some 
critical elections. Turning up of these apathetic voters in critical elections may be a game-
changer in the political landscape of the country.  
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In Bangladesh voter turnout rates have been high in every election compared to many 
Western mature democracies. However, it is relatively low in the 1991 election. They also 
differ in magnitude across constituencies in an election. While differences in voter turnout 
rates may indicate contextual differences across-elections and across-constituencies, they 
do not capture the expressive aspect of voting. Following Drinkwater and Jennings (2007) 
we use the demeaned voter turnout rate to capture expressiveness in voting.  
Since demeaned voter turnout rates are derived from voter turnout rates, their 
simultaneous use gives birth to multicollinearity problems. So, we convert the former series 
into a series consisting of ordered discrete numbers to reduce the said problem. We do not 
take the historical mean or median as a benchmark, because it differs considerably from 
the election-specific means and medians Appendix 6D). Moreover, their distributions are 
skewed (Appendix 6E). So, for each election we regard middle 50 percent of demeaned 
voter turnout rates as normal, others as super-abnormal. We denote middle 50 percent by 
0, 1st quartile by (-) 1 and 3rd quartile by (+) 1.   
Power-match 
 In the section 5.7 of the previous chapter (the 5th chapter) we identify power-
matching as a potential determinant of the voter turnout rate. In this chapter we also identify 
it as a potential determinant of vote shares of winners in general and re-elected winners in 
particular. Power-matching winners are likely to poll more votes than non-power-matching 
ones. This is because, the government may allocate more resources in their constituencies 
with a view to manipulate the electoral outcome in its favour. Voters respond positively to 
more resource allocation in their constituencies (Drazen and Eslava, 2010; Ansolabehere 
and Snyder, 2006). Cox and McCubbins (1986) argue that while allocating public resources 
within a constituency a risk-averse incumbent first allocates resources to benefit her core 
voters and thereafter she allocates leftover resources to benefit swing voters. They do not 
allocate any resources for voters who vote for opposition candidates. On the other hand, 
Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1996) argue that an incumbent 
allocates more public resources to benefit swing voters and low socioeconomic status 
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voters, because they tend to respond positively to a higher level of resource allocation. 
Swing voters do not care about ideologies of parties and it is cheaper to ‘buy’ votes of the 
poor. However, belonging to the ruling party is advantageous in developed countries 
(Erikson, 1971), whereas it is disadvantageous in developing counties under some 
situations (Ravisankar, 2009). In Bangladesh Blair (1979) finds mixed results depending 
on the nature of public resources being spent in constituencies. We expect positive 
relationship in the case of power-matching winners. Moreover, we expect stronger 
relationship for re-elected power-matching winners than newly elected ones.  
Ex-incumbency 
In the section 5.7 of the previous chapter (the 5th chapter) we identify ex-
incumbency as a potential determinant of the voter turnout. In this chapter we also identify 
it as a potential determinant of vote shares of winners in general and re-elected winners 
(incumbents) in particular.   
Incumbent members of the parliament perform a lot of activities in their 
constituencies in their capacity as local ombudsmen, spokesmen for local interests, 
constituency welfare officers and educators and explainers of government policy (Norton 
and Wood, 1993:24). While personal services being rendered by incumbents are not easily 
visible, project works are spectacularly visible. So, like incumbents in many other 
countries, incumbents in Bangladesh spend more time outside the parliament to procure 
benefits for their constituencies in the form of grants for local educational institutions, 
getting government affiliation for them, setting up new educational institutions, developing 
irrigational infrastructures and distributing relief goods in times of food shortage and so 
on. Whatever functions they perform at the constituency level, their prime motive is to be 
re-elected and strengthen the support base of the party. Incumbents who perform more 
constituency services are more likely to be rewarded through re-election than those who do 
not. While junior incumbents are more involved with constituency services, senior 
incumbents are more involved with parliamentary activities. However, senior incumbents 
bank on their accumulated constituency services, project works and case works. Since 
junior incumbents lack executive power, they raise their concerns about local issues either 
privately to senior incumbents or ministers or in the parliament (Jahan, 1976).   
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While constituency services and project works are likely to increase the partisan 
support base, they may also erode it if they are alleged to be involved with misuse of power 
and public funds. So, ex-incumbency may have positive as well as negative relationship 
with vote shares of incumbents and their party. There is no easy way to estimate these 
constituency services. The project works such as construction of roads can be measured by 
road length. However, there are many other project works which are not recorded in 
publicly available documents. Similarly, there is no simple method to measure personal 
constituency services of incumbents. In order to capture relationship of constituency 
services of winners (either re-elected or newly elected) with their vote shares we include a 
binary variable - whether they are ex-incumbents or not. However, it may be noted that it 
partially captures constituency services of winners.  
Past cabinet minister 
Ministerial status can be of two type: immediate past and remote past. Immediate 
past minister may be a potentially important determinant of vote shares of winners in 
general and re-elected winners in particular.  This is because, during their tenure they tend 
to allocate proportionately more public resources not only in their own constituencies but 
also in neighbouring constituencies where incumbents are from their own parties. As voters 
may have short term memories (Kramer, 1971) and they respond positively to allocation 
of more public resources (Blair, 1979), we expect that an incumbent who is an immediate 
past minister is likely to poll more votes than an incumbent who is not a minister. If people 
have long term memory (Stigler, 1973), they tend to reward remote past ministers for 
allocating a higher amount of public resources in their constituencies in the remote past 
and hence their vote shares are likely to increase.  
Murder and strike  
As electoral cycles come closer to the end during the incumbency of the party in 
power, social crimes as well as disorders in public life rise exponentially in Bangladesh. 
These social crimes include robbery, murder, torture on women, and children kidnapped, 
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and so on. The social disorders include fight with police force, fight between groups of the 
public and resulting injuries, strikes being called for putting pressure upon the government 
to accept demands of the opposition parties and so on. Prior to the 1996 election some 
lower-tier regional-level AL leaders were killed and some leaders of the ruling BNP of 
respective regions were implicated for those murders. Rahman (1997) opines that these 
politically motivated murders may be instrumental in casting sympathy votes in favour of 
the victims’ party the opposition AL and its eventual victory in the 1996 election. This is a 
fact that some politically motivated murders of opposition parties’ leaders and activists are 
allegedly perpetrated by political elites and activists of the ruling party, but 20 percent of 
all politically motivated murders are result of intra-party factional rivalry aimed to cleanse 
challengers within the party (Moniruzzaman, 2009). So, murders may cause sympathy vote 
as well as negative votes for concerned parties. Thus, it may have ambiguous effect on 
winners’ as well as incumbents’ vote shares. However, there is no systematic records (year-
wise as well as district-wise) of politically motivated murders. So, we include all murders 
as a proxy for it. We collect number of murders in districts for 6 months before the NCG 
takes power. In some cases no murders are reported, which is unusual. So, we fill them up 
with average of the long-run murders of that district and neighbouring districts. We convert 
them into yearly figures and then calculate number of murders per million population.  
In Bangladesh, strikes (total shutdowns) seem to have become the most effective 
weapon in the hand of the opposition to realize their political demands since 1920s when 
Gandhi started anti-British movement in British India. The use of this political instrument 
rose exponentially between 1990 and 2015 during the populist authoritarian regimes 
(Shonchoy and Tsubola, 2015). While opposition parties employ all tactics to paralyse the 
country in all respects with a view to realize their demands, the government also uses all 
possible means to suppress the opposition parties. So, violent politics has become a norm 
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in Bangladesh. In course of suppressing opposition parties the government rhetorically  
terms itself as the ‘sole patriotic force’ of the country and opposition parties as ‘national 
enemies’ and ‘agents of foreign powers’ leading to serious head-on collision between them 
(Siddiqi, 2011). While the activists of political parties fight in streets to establish their 
partisan supremacy, the common people suffer most in all respects. The greatest brunt of 
strikes is borne by lower and lower-middle classes (Roy and Borsha, 2013). An UNDP 
(2005) report estimates that the financial costs of strikes is between 3 percent and 4 percent 
of the GDP during the 1990s.  There are various types of strikes. While some are local and 
national, some are industry-wise, such as garment industry, transport industry and 
educational institutions and so on. In general any kind of strikes is disruptive and hence 
voters hate all kinds of strikes. However, voters are divided in opinions about justification 
of calling strikes by opposition parties off and on, and the government’s use of brutal 
measures to resist them. As we do not have a systematic record of strikes in Bangladesh, 
we collect them from a daily national vernacular newspaper (The Ittefaq) for 6 months 
before the NCG takes power and convert them into yearly number per million. 
Strikes have impacts on a wide range of factors which include social, political, 
economic and personal dimensions across regions. While its effects are felt personally by 
everyone across regions, the effect of politically motivated murders of lower-tier political 
leaders or activists is confined within the area where they take place and its effect is limited 
within the politically conscious people. They mostly take place in divisional cities 
(Moniruzzaman, 2009).          
6.4.3 Sources of data 
 
The electoral and personal political capital stock data are compiled from Reports of 
the Bangladesh Election Commission. The socioeconomic data is collected from 
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Bangladesh Censuses, Bangladesh Statistical Yearbooks and Household Income and 
Expenditure Surveys. For lack of systematic (year-wise and district-wise) data on murders 
and strikes, we follow Karim’s (2007) and Ahsan and Iqbal’s (2014) methodology. We 
collect them from a highly circulated national vernacular daily newspaper (the Ittefaq). 
Since the socioeconomic data are prone to measurement errors, we collect night-time 
satellite imagery to capture overall economic activities of constituencies.   
6.4.4 Econometric model 
 
A review of the existing literature shows that vote shares of a candidate or a party 
may be determined by (i) socioeconomic and demographic conditions prevailed in the year 
just before the election year (e.g., Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995), or (ii) socioeconomic and 
demographic conditions prevailed during the election year (e.g., Kramer, 1971), or (iii) 
changes in socioeconomic and demographic conditions between two consecutive election 
years (e.g., Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995 and Kramer, 1971), or (iv) socioeconomic and 
demographic conditions prevailed in an election unit with respect to the national ones in 
the election year (e.g., Stigler, 1973), or (v) a combination of all or some of them (e.g., 
Kramer, 1971; Levernier, 1992). Some researchers (e.g., Rosa, 1980) take averages of 
explanatory variables for some previous years to determine factors affecting vote shares of 
parties in elections. So, we take an exploratory approach in determining factors affecting 
vote shares of winners. Our econometric models are as follows: 
Fixed effect model: 
(6.1)     0
1
it j ijt i t it
i
VS Xβ β α γ ε
=
= + + + +∑  
              Where, VSit denotes alternative measures of vote shares of winners in the 
constituency і in the election t; 
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             VSREit = the vote share of re-elected winners in the constituency і in the election 
t; 
VSREMit = the vote shares of re-elected winners in the marginal constituency і in 
the            election t; 
VSRENMit = the vote shares of re-elected winners in the non-marginal constituency 
і in the election t; 
            Xijt  is a vector of explanatory variable Xj in the constituency і in election t, 
  αi   are constituency fixed effects, 
            δt  are time fixed effect, 
   and εit =error term.  
6.5 Analysis of summary statistics: all winners 
Table 6.2 shows that the average vote share of winners is 49.48 percent, but they 
fluctuate a lot across elections. The average real per capita income is taka 1430.58. 
However, they vary substantially. The average inflation rate is 5.50 percent. The adult 
literacy rate is 38.53. Some constituencies have very high literacy rate, while some have 
less literacy rate.  
The high literacy rates are usually found in urban centres. On average there are 106 
women for 100 men. Some constituencies have higher rates than others. They are rural 
constituencies, because men members of the family migrate to urban centres for 
employment. The Hindu population is unevenly distributed across Bangladesh.  The 
average voter turnout rate is 73.43. Some constituencies have lower voter turnout rate, such 
as Chittagong Hill Tracts. Voters cannot turnout mainly for long distance from polling 
booths. Some constituencies are more competitive than others. The average of white pixels 
as percentage of black ones is 0.11. On average 30.50 percent of the population live on US 
$1 per day. In some constituencies in the northern part in Bangladesh incidence of poverty 
is very high. The average winning margin is 15.10 percent. In some constituencies it is as 
narrow as 0.02 percentage points. The average number of contestants per one million voters 
is 18.22. Urban constituencies have more contestants than their rural counterparts. Per 
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million population experience 32.78 murders and 112 strikes during each inter-election 
period. Urban constituencies experience higher murder rates than rural ones.  
Table 6.2: Summary statistics of the response variable and explanatory (continuous) 
variables:1991-2008 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from different sources. 
6.6 Model 6.1: Determinants of vote shares of all winners (1991-2008) 
The base line model in Table 6.3 is presented in Column (1) and other columns are 
extensions of the baseline model. The two main economic variables – night-time satellite 
imagery (NSI) and inflation – are not statistically significant. Some researchers (e.g., 
Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000) find that per capita real 
GDP is likely to be an important determinant of vote shares of winners belonging to the 
incumbent party. As winners are not only from the incumbent party but also from 
opposition parties, it is hard to speculate about the expected relationship between the NSI 
and vote shares of winners. When income is included and the NSI is excluded, it is 
statistically insignificant with a negative sign (these results are presented in Appendix 6H). 
According to Bonoli and Häusermann (2009) it is expected.  Instead of income, the baseline  
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Table 6.3 Fixed effect estimations of the model 6.1: Determinants of winners’ vote 
shares (1991-2008) (with 1991 power-match and political competition) 
Variables Model 6.1 Model 6.1b Model 6.1c Model 6.1d 
     
Night-time satellite 
imagery (NSI) 
3.31 3.56 3.47 3.77 
 (0.72) (0.76) (0.76) (0.82) 
Inflation 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
 (0.90) (0.85) (0.87) (0.90) 
Adult literacy -0.27* -0.28* -0.27* -0.28* 
 (-1.92) (-1.95) (-1.93) (-1.96) 
Gender ratio 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.20 
 (1.41) (1.51) (1.39) (1.41) 
Hindu population -0.03 -0.00 -0.03 -0.02 
 (-0.08) (-0.00) (-0.09) (-0.06) 
Medium developed -0.03 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 
 (-0.08) (-0.20) (-0.10) (-0.03) 
High developed 0.55 0.57 0.54 0.57 
 (1.36) (1.35) (1.33) (1.40) 
Voter turnout -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 
 (-1.24) (-1.36) (-1.26) (-1.26) 
Political alliance 1.55*** 1.55*** 1.57*** 1.49*** 
 (3.14) (3.14) (3.16) (3.02) 
Political competition -14.33*** -14.28*** -14.31*** -14.36*** 
 (-28.36) (-28.32) (-28.28) (-28.49) 
Power-match -1.13*** -1.15*** -1.13*** -1.11*** 
 (-3.38) (-3.40) (-3.38) (-3.36) 
Ex-incumbency 1.34*** 1.33*** 1.34*** 1.27*** 
 (4.52) (4.57) (4.52) (3.97) 
Hard core poverty -0.07** -0.07** -0.07** -0.07** 
 (-2.28) (-2.28) (-2.32) (-2.19) 
Number of contestant   0.03   
  (0.55)   
Murder  0.00   
  (1.21)   
Strike  -0.01   
  (-1.48)   
Expressiveness   0.26  
   (0.57)  
Remote past minister    0.74 
    (1.07) 
Immediate past minister    -0.41 
    (-0.47) 
Observations 1,181 1,181 1,181 1,181 
R-squared 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 
Number of constituency 300 300 300 300 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the 
winners’ vote shares at the level; all continuous variables are at the level; constituency and time fixed 
effects are included but not reported; standard errors are clustered by constituencies. 
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model includes the NSI as a proxy for economic activity. Table 6.3 shows that it has a 
positive coefficient, but it is statistically insignificant. A positive sign of the coefficient is 
expected, because it is claimed to reflect the level of economic activity or level of well-
being of people in a constituency (e.g., Ghosh et al., 2013 and Sutton and Costanza, 2002).  
The voters are likely to reward incumbents when levels of economic activities or 
well-being are higher. In contrast, they are likely to punish incumbents when levels of 
economic activities are lower. This is because, they probably have more leisure time when 
they have higher levels of income and hence they may incline to invest time to turn out for 
voting for incumbents. In contrast, when their levels of income are low, they may turn out 
more and vote against incumbents to express their grievance against them or abstain from 
voting for their antipathy to the existing political system. So, their turnout for voting or 
abstention from voting may increase or decrease vote shares of incumbents and hence 
challengers. While we are certain about the probable relationship between vote shares of 
incumbents and the NSI, we are uncertain in the case when all winners are pooled together. 
Though it is statistically insignificant, it is retained in the model. This is because, it is 
argued that it is a better indicator of economic activity than the real per capita income which 
is prone to some measurement errors and manipulation by incumbents.  
Table 6.3 further shows that inflation is statistically insignificant and the sign is 
positive, which is unexpected. However, like the NSI we are uncertain about significance 
of this variable. This is because, winners may be incumbents as well as challengers. They 
may belong to the incumbent party as well as opposition parties. Parties may hold pro-
inflation or anti-inflation economic policy. The positive sign may be expected in the case 
of winners belonging to the incumbent party. Additionally, when the incumbent party is a 
left-leaning party and it attempts to reduce unemployment at the expense of rising inflation. 
In that case, lower unemployment rates benefit voters belonging to lower socioeconomic 
classes and hence they tend to vote for winners belonging to the left-leaning incumbent 
party (Hibbs, 1986).  
We find that adult literacy, political alliance, political competition, power-match, 
ex-incumbency and hard core poverty are significant at various levels of significance. As 
winners may be freshmen or re-elected, we are not sure about signs of their coefficients. 
The result is affected by the percentage composition of freshmen and re-elected winners in 
the winners’ pool. For example, adult literacy has a negative relationship with winners’ 
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vote shares. We do not know why more literate people tend to vote against winners. Same 
is true in the case of hard core poverty. However, when we examine them from theoretical 
perspectives, we are confident that political alliance is likely to have a positive, political 
competition a negative, power-match a positive and ex-incumbency a positive relationship 
with winners’ vote shares. So, results of the model 6.1 are not very much meaningful.   
We compare estimates of base line models using two overlapping data sets. We 
present the results in Table 6.4, which shows estimates of the model 6.1 when we include 
the 1991 power-match and when we exclude it. It also shows estimates of the model 6.1 
when we substitute political competition for winning margin. We observe some substantial 
differences. 
With the 1991 power-match values and winning margin, one more variable (voter 
turnout) becomes significant along with those that are significant when we use the 1991 
power-match and political competition. When we exclude 1991 power-match values and 
use political competition the NSI, gender ratio, high developed level and voter turnout 
become significant along with those that are significant when political competition and 
1991 power-match values are used. Similarly, when we exclude 1991 power-match values 
and use winning margin, gender ratio, high developed level and voter turnout become 
insignificant, but inflation and medium developed level become significant. As a result, 
measurements of electoral competition and partial alteration in data sets make some 
difference in estimates. 
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6.6.1 Comparison of estimates of the base line model 6.1 with and without the 1991 
power-match 
 
Table 6.4 Model 6.1: Determinants of winners’ vote shares: 1991-2008 under different specifications 
Variables       With the 1991 power-
match 
Without the 1991 power-
match 
    Political              Winning  
  Competition         margin 
Political              Winning  
Competition         margin 
     
Night-time satellite 
imagery 
3.31 2.29 21.03*** 22.26*** 
 (0.72) (0.39) (2.80) (2.83) 
Inflation 0.07 -0.08 0.45 -0.66** 
 (0.90) (-0.94) (1.55) (-2.02) 
Adult literacy -0.27* 0.05 -0.12 -0.15 
 (-1.92) (0.30) (-0.57) (-0.55) 
Gender ratio 0.20 -0.03 0.28** -0.03 
 (1.41) (-0.21) (2.10) (-0.19) 
Hindu population -0.03 0.39 0.16 0.23 
 (-0.08) (1.05) (0.37) (0.36) 
Medium developed -0.03 -0.22 -0.02 -0.76* 
 (-0.08) (-0.57) (-0.06) (-1.90) 
High developed 0.55 -0.71 0.89** -0.63 
 (1.36) (-1.49) (2.16) (-1.33) 
Voter turnout -0.04 0.08** -0.07** 0.04 
 (-1.24) (2.00) (-2.08) (0.87) 
Political alliance 1.55*** 2.70*** 3.86*** 2.86*** 
 (3.14) (4.53) (5.14) (3.94) 
Political competition -14.33*** - -14.96*** - 
 (-28.36) - (-20.56) - 
Winning margin - 0.53*** - 0.53*** 
 - (29.46) - (28.00) 
Power-match -1.13*** 0.43 -0.65 -0.30 
 (-3.38) (1.05) (-1.37) (-0.66) 
Ex-incumbency 1.34*** 0.14 1.14*** 0.32 
 (4.52) (0.40) (3.11) (0.86) 
Hard core poverty -0.07** 0.03 -0.12*** 0.00 
 (-2.28) (0.73) (-3.18) (0.07) 
Observations 1,181 1,181 884 884 
Adjusted R-squared 0.83 0.77 0.84 0.81 
Number of constituency 300 300 300 300 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the winners’ vote shares at the 
level; all continuous variables are at the level; constituency and time fixed effects are included but not reported; standard errors 
are clustered by constituencies. All values are reproduced from the Table 6.4, Appendix 6I, Appendix 6M and Appendix 6N. 
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6.7 Model 6.2: Determinants of vote shares of re-elected (incumbents) winners (1991-
2008) 
The model 6.1 deals with determinants of vote shares of winners in general. As 
winners have heterogeneous political backgrounds (Figure 6.7), results of the model are 
more general. We know the basis of increase or decrease of vote shares of winners. We 
also know that the vote share of an incumbent may be determined by her retrospective or 
prospective performance. We do not know what factors increase or decrease a winner’s 
vote share when she is a freshman. She has possibly little contribution in the socioeconomic 
development of her constituency and voters have little information about her competence 
level. When an incumbent competes in elections, voters may assess her prospective 
performance on the basis of her retrospective performance. What are the basis of measuring 
prospective performance of a freshman in absence of any retrospective performance? How 
do voters make a choice between two freshmen? In the case of freshmen, voters grapple 
with the choice of a party or a candidate. 
Figure 6.7 shows that winners may belong to political parties or they may be 
independent. Again, partisan winners may belong to the incumbent party(s) or opposition 
parties. The winners belonging to incumbent party(s) usually have some advantages over 
those belonging to opposition parties. Whether they are partisan winners or independent 
winners, some winners may be re-elected and some are freshmen. The re-elected winners 
may be re- elected once or several times. The winners may win by defeating new 
challengers or ex- incumbents. Some winners may be remote past winner or runner-up. 
Some winners may be incumbents. Some winners may be immediate past or remote past 
ministers. Some winners may win from marginal seats and some from safe seats. As 
winners are heterogeneous, the results of the Table 6.4 are likely to be biased towards the 
group which is proportionately more in the whole population of winners.  
Among all these winners, the re-elected (incumbents) winners have special 
importance to the party, candidates themselves and voters. If the winners belonging to the 
ruling party are able to re-win in their constituencies, it increases the chance of re-election 
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of the current government. This is because, most winners belong to the ruling party during 
the tenure of the incumbent party. Similarly, if the winners belonging to the dominant 
opposition party(s) are able to re-win in their constituencies, it increases the probability of 
forming a new government by the dominant opposition party.  
The re-election of incumbents in their respective constituencies may not be as hard 
as those who are not incumbents. This is because, they usually carry out many development 
projects in their constituencies and they have direct contact with voters. Due to their 
frequent public appearance in constituencies and media, they are better known to voters 
than their challengers. This is an intangible but powerful political capital which they may 
Figure 6.7: Classification of winners 
 
Source: Constructed by the author 
use strategically during election campaigns. This political capital may turn marginal 
constituencies into safe ones for the party. So, they have higher probability of winning than 
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any new candidate of the party. If they are able to retain their constituencies, this is likely 
to give the party a lead in winning. Secondly, the party needs to spend less time and 
resources for electioneering in those constituencies where they have incumbents. 
Consequently, party leaders can concentrate in other constituencies where they have no 
incumbents or in marginal constituencies where their candidates have a probability of win 
or loss at very narrow margins. This reduces campaign costs of the party. Thirdly, the re-
elected winners themselves gain political experience by participating in parliamentary 
debates, dealing with bureaucrats and general public during their tenure in public offices. 
Their initial incumbency period is usually spent for learning. When they are re-elected they 
may translate their learning into actions. Fourthly, during their first term in the parliament 
they are junior members of the parliament. In order to procure public fund for any local 
project, they need to approach concerned ministers, who are senior members of the 
parliament and the party. They need time to develop strong relationship with ministers. So, 
during the first term they may not be able to implement projects that are likely to yield 
universal long term benefits for constituents and thus make constituencies strongholds for 
themselves as well as for their parties. They need more time to implement such projects. 
That is why many US presidents (e.g., George Bush Junior and Barak Obama) sought re-
election to finish their “unfinished businesses” home and abroad (Anderson, 2004; Wilson, 
2013). Not only incumbent presidents, but also nearly 90 percent US incumbent House 
representatives sought re-elections in recent decades (Abramowitz, 1975). Fifthly, winners 
may seek re-election for egocentric motive. Incumbents are connecting points between the 
government and voters. So, they are politically powerful. Most political elites are already 
financially well-off. Their regular salary and other bonuses as members of the parliament 
or senate are approximately as much as earnings of top quality professionals in the country.  
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In addition to aforementioned temptations, they have ample opportunities to make 
themselves further better-off by using their existing financial and political clout. They can 
gain these objectives without ‘naked corruption’. For example, some Indian politicians, 
who were not charged with blatant corruption, have been able to multiply their assets 
several times within 5 years in the last decade (Ravisankar, 2009).  When they are 
incumbents, they are involved with many social organisations and thus they may become 
social development entrepreneurs too. In this way, they can crown themselves with three 
overlapping and mutually reinforcing identities – political, business and social 
development entrepreneur. All these are likely to yield invaluable personal satisfaction to 
them. So, seeking re-election is a worthy venture for incumbents. Last but not least, they 
have special appeal to voters too. This is because, voters know their backgrounds, expertise 
and performance over a few past years and thus they can carry out their SWOT (strength-
weakness-opportunities-threat) analysis. Even one in three people (in Australia) believe 
that politicians abuse power, indulge in financial and other corruptions (McAllister, 2000), 
and their percentage may have been increasing or decreasing over time (Besley, 2005), 
voters may prefer them to new ones. This is because, known ‘devils’ are preferable to 
unknown ‘angels’. In this context the model 6.2 attempts to identify factors that influence 
vote shares of re-elected winners.  
Identification of some re-elected winners is problematic in Bangladesh. This is 
because some top leaders of dominant parties compete and get elected in more than one 
constituency. Their objective is to test the level of popularity of parties as well as candidates 
in those constituencies and secure them later through bye-elections. For example, in the 
1991 election Sheikh Hasina and Tofael Ahmed of the AL, Khaleda Zia and M.K. Anwar 
of the BNP and Ershad of the JP were elected from more than one constituency. The same 
happened in subsequent elections. On being elected, they are required to keep only one. 
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Bye-elections are held in those vacated constituencies. The vote shares in bye-elections do 
not reflect the competitive political condition in those constituencies. Between the time of 
original elections and that of bye-elections the government is formed if and only if a party 
or a coalition of parties win in majority constituencies. The newly elected ruling party does 
not show any interest in those bye-elections, because it (or its allies) has already won in 
majority constituencies and it cannot be ousted even if its candidates are defeated in bye-
elections. Similarly, the dominant opposition party does not have any incentives to 
nominate competent candidates and as such launch vigorous election campaigns. This is 
because, even if its candidates win, this cannot help it to form the government. Moreover, 
the candidates themselves do not have any interest to mobilize voters in their favour. This 
is because, outcomes of bye-elections are pre-determined. Usually candidates of recently 
elected incumbent party win. So, we treat original winners as winners, and if they compete 
and re-win from the same constituencies, we treat them re-elected.   
All bye-elections in Bangladesh are not uncompetitive. For example, Magura-2 has 
been a safe constituency for the AL, the then dominant opposition party. This is because, 
its candidates won in that constituency in several consecutive elections. It is alleged that 
through massive vote rigging, the ruling BNP managed to get its candidate elected in that 
constituency in a bye-election held in 1994. Through winning in that election the BNP 
wanted to restore its image lost by deadly defeat in elections in two important city 
corporations (Dhaka and Chittagong). On the other hand, the opposition AL mobilized all 
kinds of resources to win. Its objective was to take advantage from the contemporary 
volatile political condition in Bangladesh (Hossain, 1995). So, if the objective is different, 
bye-elections can be more competitive than normal elections. This bye-election raised the 
demand for institutionalization of the NCG to hold fair elections in Bangladesh.       
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Table 6.5: Summary statistics of vote shares of winners and re-elected winners: 1991-2008 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.5 shows that the average vote shares of re-elected winners are higher than 
those of winners in general, with the exception of the 1991 election. It implies that re-
elected winners poll more votes probably and largely due to their incumbency advantages. 
Moreover, the average vote share is higher without re-elected winners of the 1991 election 
than with re-elected ones of the 1991 election. It implies that re-elected winners of the 1991 
election were re-elected with less vote. As the 1988 election was uncompetitive, we analyse 
the data set with and without re-elected winners of the 1991 election.  
Table 6.6 (details in Appendix 6P Panel 1-3)    shows that whether we include re-
elected winners of the 1991 election or not, real per capita GDP, adult literacy and voter 
turnout are higher in constituencies where incumbents are re-elected. On the other hand, 
inflation is lower in those constituencies. Competition is lower and margin of win is higher 
in those constituencies too. Murder rate is lower there. All these are expected. However, 
hard core poverty is higher and the brightness of night-time satellite imagery is lower in 
those constituencies, which is unexpected.  
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Table 6.6: Summary statistics of continuous variables of winners and re-elected winners 
(1991-2008) 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from different sources.  
6.7.1 Model 6.2: Determinants of vote shares of all re-elected (incumbent) winners 
(1991-2008) 
 
Table 6.7 shows that the NSI is significant at a 5 percent level of significance and 
the sign is positive, which is expected. This is because, voters are likely to reward 
incumbents for making a contribution in increasing economic activities in constituencies. 
For a 1 percentage point higher brightness of night-time satellite imageries, vote shares of 
re-elected incumbents are higher by over 35.00 percentage points. The size of the 
coefficient seems inordinately large. Since no prior studies use it as a determinant of vote 
shares of re-elected winners, we are unable to compare our finding with that of any prior 
study. However, national income is generated by economic activities and the relationship 
is expected to be positive. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) find that national income is a 
significant determinant of incumbents’ vote shares and their relationship is positive. As 
national income is generated by economic activities, the night-time satellite imagery is 
likely to be a significant determinant of vote shares of re-elected incumbents and a positive 
relationship is expected.  
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The adult literacy rate is significant in all models except one (model 6.2b) where 
number of contestants, murder and strike are controlled. The sign is positive, which is 
expected. This is because, voters are likely to reward incumbents for making a contribution 
in increasing literacy rate. For a 1 percentage point higher literacy rate, vote shares of re-
elected winners are more than 0.57 percentage points higher. It is expected that as more 
people become literate, more voters can measure performance of incumbents better.  
Kaplan and Venezky (1994) observe that a higher literacy rate induces people to collect 
more local, national and international news which in turn motivate them to participate in 
elections more. Consequently, a higher participation rate is likely to increase vote shares 
of either winners or losers or both. On the contrary, a higher literacy rate may make people 
aware of deficiencies in current democratic practices and motivate them to demand reforms 
of political institutions. If the current system is in favour of incumbents, but against 
developing a ‘true’ democratic system demanded by literate voters and incumbents are 
reluctant to reform it in the line being demanded by literate voters, they are more likely to 
vote against incumbents leading to reduction in their vote shares (Johnston et al., 2006).  
The higher development is significant at a 5 percent level of significance and the 
sign is positive, which is expected. This implies that incumbents in higher developed 
constituencies are likely to poll 2.18 percentage points higher votes than their counterparts 
in lower developed constituencies. Our finding is consistent with Drazen and Eslava (2010) 
who find that selective infrastructural expenditure before the election year has a significant 
(at a 5 percent level) and a positive relationship with vote shares of the incumbent party in 
Columbian municipal elections.  
Political alliance is significant at a 1 percent level of significance and the sign is positive, 
which is expected.   This implies that re-elected incumbents of a party belonging to a pre-
election alliance are likely to poll 4.21 percentage points more votes than incumbents who 
do not belong to such an alliance. This result is consistent with anecdotal evidence in India 
where the BJP-led alliance (the National Democratic Alliance) won landslide victory in the 
1999 general election by forming pre-election alliance of 13 parties and lost in the 2004 
election following defection of some (5 parties) parties which were its coalition partners in 
the 1999 election. In the same way the Congress-led Alliance (the United Progressive 
Alliance) won landslide victory in the 2004 election by forming a pre- election alliance of  
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Table 6.7 Fixed effect estimations of the model 6.2: Determinants of re-elected winners’ vote shares 
(1991-2008) (with 1991 power-match and political competition)  
Variables Model 6.2 Model 6.2a Model 6.2b Model 6.2c Model 6.2d 
      
Night-time satellite 
imagery (NSI) 
35.77** 35.65** 36.63** 41.25*** 37.84** 
 (2.54) (2.51) (2.57) (3.11) (2.52) 
Inflation 0.43 0.37 0.44 0.44 0.44 
 (1.61) (1.48) (1.63) (1.59) (1.64) 
Adult literacy 0.57* 0.48 0.59* 0.51* 0.57* 
 (1.83) (1.52) (1.94) (1.75) (1.83) 
Gender ratio 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.06 
 (0.24) (0.42) (0.22) (0.27) (0.28) 
Hindu population -0.23 -0.23 -0.01 -0.58 -0.13 
 (-0.21) (-0.21) (-0.01) (-0.56) (-0.12) 
Medium developed -0.11 -0.08 -0.11 -0.30 -0.09 
 (-0.17) (-0.12) (-0.16) (-0.47) (-0.14) 
High developed 2.18** 2.40*** 2.22** 2.08** 2.28*** 
 (2.54) (2.89) (2.59) (2.52) (2.64) 
Voter turnout -0.08 -0.10 -0.09 -0.03 -0.10 
 (-1.29) (-1.52) (-1.30) (-0.51) (-1.51) 
Political alliance 4.21*** 4.26*** 4.20*** 3.72*** 4.03*** 
 (3.02) (3.27) (2.99) (2.79) (2.83) 
Political competition -13.11*** -12.79*** -13.07*** -13.32*** -13.29*** 
 (-13.18) (-12.81) (-13.37) (-13.69) (-13.21) 
Power-match 0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.18 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.05) (-0.05) (-0.29) (-0.01) 
Ex-incumbency 0.52 0.57 0.66 0.56 0.24 
 (0.40) (0.43) (0.47) (0.43) (0.17) 
Hard core poverty -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.08 
 (-1.26) (-1.29) (-1.29) (-1.36) (-0.93) 
Number of contestant  0.16*    
  (1.66)    
Murder   -0.00   
   (-0.31)   
Strike   0.00   
   (0.21)   
Expressiveness    -2.35**  
    (-2.16)  
Remote past minister     1.28 
     (1.07) 
Immediate past minister     0.21 
     (0.17) 
Observations 330 330 330 330 330 
Adjusted R-squared 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.88 
Number of constituencies 210 210 210 210 210 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the 
re-elected winners’ vote shares at the level; all continuous variables are at the level; constituency and 
time fixed effects are included but not reported; standard errors are clustered by constituencies. 
 
 
 CHAPTER 6 
346 
 
10 parties on a common platform– resist the rise of Hindutva under the BJP-led coalition 
government. Following the victory, leaders of the Indian National Congress openly 
acknowledged that the Alliance was the single most important factor in winning in the 2004 
national election (Rana, 2006:55-56,110). However, as far as the author is concerned, no 
prior empirical studies use alliance as a determinant of vote shares of incumbents. So, we 
are unable to compare our finding with any prior empirical studies that use econometric 
models.  
Political competition is significant at a 1 percent level of significance and the sign 
is negative, which is expected. For a 1 percentage point higher competition level, vote 
shares of re-elected incumbents is lower by 13.11 percentage points. In the product market 
as competition increases, each firm’s market share reduces. The same is applicable in the 
political market. The finding is consistent with the national electoral results in India during 
the transformation phase of the Indian political landscape when it transformed from a 
monolithic to a two-party dominant system during the 1989-99 period. During this period 
vote shares of the dominant Indian National Congress (INC) declined gradually from 39.5 
percent in 1989 to 25.9 percent in 1998, while those of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
increased from 11.5 percent in 1989 to 25.5 percent in 1998 (Yadav, 1999). So, in general 
political competition reduces vote shares of winners and increases those of losers.  
Number of contestant is significant at a 10 percent level in the extended model 6.2a 
and the sign is positive, which may or may not be expected. For an additional candidate 
per million voters, vote shares of incumbents is lower by 0.16 percentage points. Usually, 
when number of contestant is higher, vote share of each candidate including the incumbent 
is likely to be lower. It may be higher if incumbents try to mobilize casual and apathetic 
voters to turn out and induce them to vote for them. By using social network they ensure 
that voters vote for them. Thus, voters respond to higher levels of mobilization efforts by 
incumbents. It conforms to Wolfinger’s (1965) mobilization model. However, the success 
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rate of the voter mobilization depends on the social make-up (Franklin, 2004:25). 
Moreover, incumbents have some advantages over non-non-incumbents, such as more 
voters are more familiar with incumbents than non-incumbents due to their active presence 
in public affairs and media. So, positive relationship may exist between number of 
contestant and vote shares of incumbents. However, it may be unexpected, because as 
number of contestant increases total votes are divided among more contestants. So, per 
capita votes are likely to be lower. Our finding is inconsistent with Karp (2009) who finds 
negative relationship with incumbents’ vote shares and number of opponents of 
incumbents.  
Expressiveness is significant at a 5 percent level of significance and the sign is 
negative. It may or may not be expected. This implies that voters vote against incumbents 
to express their grievance against them. This is expected when incumbents are implicated 
with any sort of corruption charges. Our finding is consistent with Peters and Welch (1980) 
who find a significant negative relationship between vote shares of incumbents who are 
charged with some kind of corruption. However, our finding is inconsistent with Choi and 
Woo (2013) who find a significant positive relationship between vote shares of re-elected 
incumbents and some kind of corruption charges against them. This is because, those re-
elected incumbents sustained higher economic growth.     
 
The estimates in Table 6.7 are obtained by using the political competition variable 
measured by the inverse of the sum of vote shares of all contestants. The winning margin 
is another measure of competition. We use it to estimate the model 6.2.  The results 
(Appendix 6Q) show that medium development is significant. The sign is negative, which 
may or may not be expected. It may be expected when voters of medium developed 
constituencies would like to compare their condition with respect to high developed 
constituencies and blame incumbents for relative under-development. Conversely, it may 
be unexpected when voters of medium developed constituencies would like to compare 
their condition with respect to normal developed constituencies and credit incumbents for 
relative over-development.  The political alliance and winning margin variables are 
significant at a 1 percent level of significance and the signs are positive, which are 
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expected. The number of contestant variable is significant at a 1 percent level of 
significance and the sign is positive, which may or may not be expected. We have explained 
reasons earlier. Murder and strike are significant at a 1 percent level of significance and 
signs are negative, which is expected. This is because, voters may blame incumbents for 
their failure to maintain social cohesiveness. Remote past minister is significant at a 5 
percent level of significance and the sign is negative, which may be expected. This is 
because, voters may punish them for their corruption during their period of ministership.  
The results in the Appendix 6Q are obtained by using the margin of win as a series 
of continuous values. It is observed that winning margin elasticity of vote shares of re-
elected winners are different at different winning margin slabs being lower at lower 
winning margin slabs and higher at higher winning margin slabs (Appendix 6R). So, we 
estimate the model 6.2 by using slabs of the winning margin.  The results (Appendix 6S) 
shows that they are similar to those of the Appendix 6Q with a few exceptions. The NSI 
becomes significant across all models. Medium development is significant in two extended 
models only. The coefficient of the second lowest winning margin slab is insignificant, but 
others are significant at 1 percent level of significance. The coefficients of higher winning 
margin slabs are higher than those of lower ones. They increase in a step-like manner 
(Appendix 6T).    
The results of the Table 6.7 are obtained by using the data set that includes values 
of the 1991 power-match variable. We also estimate it by omitting them. The results 
(Appendix 6U) show that the NSI is significant at 5 percent level of significance in all 
models except one. The signs are positive which is expected. High developed is significant 
at a 1 percent level of significance and the signs are positive, which is expected.  The 
political alliance and political competition variables are significant at a 1 percent level of 
significance and the signs are as expected. The power-match variable is significant at a 10 
percent level of significance except in one model (sub-model 6.2c) when expressiveness is 
controlled. The expressiveness is significant at a 10 percent level of significance and the 
sign is negative, which may be expected. We have explained reasons earlier.  
The results of the Appendix 6U are obtained by using the political competition 
variable. As the winning margin is also used to measure the level of competition, we use it 
instead of the political competition variable. Results (Appendix 6V) show that medium 
developed is significant at a 5 percent level of significance in the model 6.2b when murder 
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and strike are controlled. Murder and strike are significant at a 5 percent level of 
significance and the signs are negative as expected. The political alliance and the winning 
margin variables are significant at a 1 percent level of significance and the signs are as  
Table 6.8 Comparison of fixed effect estimations of the model 6.2: Determinants of re-elected winners’ 
vote shares (1991-2008) (with political competition and winning margin) 
Variables       With the 1991 power-
match 
Without the 1991 power-
match 
    Political              Winning  
  Competition         margin 
Political              Winning  
Competition         margin 
     
Night-time satellite 
imagery (NSI) 
35.77** 35.58* 34.31** 34.98 
 (2.54) (1.65) (2.39) (1.65) 
Inflation 0.43 -0.35 0.28 0.05 
 (1.61) (-1.14) (0.50) (0.07) 
Adult literacy 0.57* 0.29 0.76* 0.64 
 (1.83) (0.51) (1.91) (1.16) 
Gender ratio 0.05 -0.06 0.01 -0.18 
 (0.24) (-0.24) (0.06) (-0.77) 
Hindu population -0.23 1.71 -0.29 -0.43 
 (-0.21) (1.17) (-0.25) (-0.28) 
Medium developed -0.11 -1.91* 0.03 -1.59 
 (-0.17) (-1.84) (0.05) (-1.42) 
High developed 2.18** 0.20 2.63*** 0.50 
 (2.54) (0.18) (3.12) (0.45) 
Voter turnout -0.08 0.05 -0.02 0.13 
 (-1.29) (0.62) (-0.33) (1.64) 
Political alliance 4.21*** 6.16*** 7.43*** 7.25*** 
 (3.02) (3.32) (4.92) (3.02) 
Political competition -13.11*** - -13.24*** - 
 (-13.18) - (-12.57) - 
Winning margin - 0.44*** - 0.44*** 
 - (8.04) - (8.27) 
Power-match 0.01 0.77 1.36* 1.31 
 (0.02) (0.94) (1.75) (1.23) 
Ex-incumbency 0.52 0.44 -0.93 -1.25 
 (0.40) (0.34) (-0.77) (-0.94) 
Hard core poverty -0.10 -0.08 -0.12 -0.13 
 (-1.26) (-0.78) (-1.39) (-1.12) 
Observations 330 330 303 303 
Adjusted R-squared 0.88 0.80 0.89 0.80 
Number of constituency 210 210 197 197 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the re-elected winners’ vote 
shares at the level; all continuous variables are at the level; constituency and time fixed effects are included but not reported; 
standard errors are clustered by constituencies. The columns are reproduced from Table 6.9, Appendix 6Q, Appendix 6U and 
Appendix 6V.  
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expected. The number of contestant variable is significant at 1 percent level of significance 
and the sign is positive, which may be unexpected. The reason is explained before. The 
remote past minister variable is significant at 10 percent level of significance and the sign 
is negative, which may be expected. We estimate the model 6.2 using discrete winning 
margin values. The results (Appendix 6W) are as good as those of the Appendix 6S which 
are obtained by using the data set with values of the 1991 power-match.   
6.7.2 Comparison of estimates of the base line model 6.2 with and without the 1991 
power-match 
We summarize estimates of base line models of the model 6.2 under different 
specifications in Table 6.8. It shows that whether we include or exclude the 1991 power-
match values political alliance, political competition and winning margin variables are 
significant at a 1 percent level of significance. Given the level of political competition, 
NSI, adult literacy, high developed, power-match and political alliance increase vote shares 
of re-elected winners. Given the winning margin, political alliance and night-time satellite 
imagery increase and medium development reduces their vote shares.    
6.7.3 Consistency of behaviour of Bangladeshi voters with electoral behaviour models 
 
From Table 6.8 it appears that more economic activities and higher development 
levels (in terms of road density) in constituencies increase vote shares of re-elected 
incumbents. This implies that voters credit incumbents for higher levels of economic 
activities and road density in their constituencies and reward them by voting for them more. 
So, voters’ behaviour is consistent with Key’s (1966) reward-punishment model and 
Downs’ (1957) economic vote model. Secondly, incumbents may manipulate economic 
activities of their constituencies before elections with a view to be re-elected. This can be 
performed better by incumbents belonging to the immediate past incumbent party.  As 
power-match is significant and its sign is positive, this may imply that the immediate past 
incumbent party may try to influence the economic activities as well as development levels 
of constituencies under the control of its own partisan incumbents. Thus, incumbents 
belonging to the immediate past ruling party may be able to give voters a ‘false’ positive 
signal that they are more competent than candidates belonging to the dominant opposition 
party. So, voters may be impressed by short-term competency of those incumbents. This 
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sort of reaction of voters is predicted by the political budget cycle model (Buchanan, 1960. 
1967 and Rogoff, 1990).  
6.8 Model 3 and Model 4: Determinants of vote shares of re-elected incumbents from 
marginal and non-marginal constituencies respectively (1991-2008) 
 
Winners may be divided into two broad types depending on the degree of 
competition they face (Figure 6.7). They may be elected from marginal constituencies 
where winning margin is less than or equal to 5 percent (Uppal, 2009). They may be elected 
from non-marginal constituencies where winning margin is more than 5 percent. Similarly, 
re-elected winners may win from marginal or non-marginal constituencies. When marginal 
seats are proportionately more in the parliament, winning in those seats is crucial for both 
the incumbent party and the dominant opposition party. The tough competition in a 
constituency is likely to spillover to neighbouring constituencies too. Since incumbents 
enjoy some advantages over non-incumbents, incumbents in marginal constituencies are 
more likely to be re-elected than non-incumbents. They may be instrumental in forming 
the government by the incumbent party for another term, because there are more 
incumbents in the parliament from the incumbent party than the dominant opposition party. 
If they are not re-elected, the dominant opposition party is more likely to form the next 
government.  
Table 6.9: Vote shares of elected and re-elected winners in marginal and non-marginal constituencies
  
Table 6.9 shows that the re-elected winners polled more votes in marginal 
constituencies in the 1996 and 2001 elections and less in the 2008 election than those of 
elected winners. However, the average vote share of re-elected winners is more than that 
of elected ones. It also shows that the re-elected winners polled more votes in non-marginal 
constituencies in each election than those of elected ones. The average vote share of re-
elected winners is more than that of elected ones in non-marginal constituencies as they are 
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in marginal constituencies. Moreover, the re-elected winners in non-marginal 
constituencies poll more votes than their counterparts in marginal constituencies. It implies 
that political competition reduces vote shares.  In order to find out the importance of re-
election of incumbents from marginal and non-marginal constituencies, we need to look at 
their partisanship.   
Table 6.10 (details in the Appendix 6X) reveals that rates of re-election are more 
from non-marginal constituencies than marginal ones. Moreover, rates of re-election are 
higher for the candidates belonging to the incumbent party than to the dominant opposition 
party.    
In order to ascertain whether the relationships are expected according to electoral 
behaviour models we need to find out their relationship with vote shares of re-elected 
winners from marginal and non-marginal constituencies. It helps us to identify whether 
voters have rewarded or punished incumbents for their performance during their tenure. 
We expect positive relationship in the case of the night-time satellite imagery and the 
medium developed variables. As our panel data set becomes unbalanced for re-elected 
winners from marginal constituencies it is hard to estimate the fixed effect model 
(Appendix 6Z-B). So, we do not do so. Instead, we use the ordinary least squared model 
for them under various situations (from Appendix 6Z-C to Appendix 6Z-F).  Though the 
estimates are not as reliable as those of the fixed effect model, they give us a general idea 
about the factors affecting re-elected winners’ vote shares in marginal constituencies. In 
marginal constituencies competition (in terms of winning margin or effective number of 
parties) is pivotal in determining vote shares of re-elected incumbents.        
Table 6.10 Re-election rates of candidates belonging to incumbent and the dominant opposition party 
in marginal and non-marginal constituencies: 1991-2008 
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We estimate the model 6.4 to identify factors that influence vote shares of re-elected 
winners in non-marginal constituencies under different conditions (from Appendix 6Z-G 
to Appendix 6Z-I).  The results are summarized in Table 6.11 which shows that whether 
we use the 1991 values of the power-match variable or not, results are same. When we 
control the political competition, the NSI, high developed, political alliance and hard core 
poverty are significant at various levels of significance. While signs of the night-time 
satellite image, the high developed and the political alliance variables are positive, that of 
the hard core poverty is negative. So, their signs are as per expectation. When we use 
winning margin as a proxy variable for the political competition, no other variable except 
itself is significant. It is significant at a 1 percent level of significance and the sign is 
positive, which is expected. It implies that winning margin alone explains more variation 
in vote shares of re-elected winners in non-marginal constituencies.   
It is expected that the differential magnitude of winning margins is likely to have 
differential relationship. So, we categorize the values of the winning margin variable into 
several classes from low values to high ones and identify them by increasing and ordered 
numbers. The results (Appendix 6Z-K) show that each category of winning margins is 
significant at various levels of significance and the signs are negative across categories.  
However, coefficients are different. This implies that the relationship between vote 
shares of re-elected winners in non-marginal seats is not uniform. This also shows that the 
relationship is inverse and the trend is declining (Appendix 6Z-L). The results are expected, 
because if incumbents win in the previous election at higher margins, voters are confident 
that they are likely to win with higher margins in the current election and as such they are 
less likely to turn out for voting for them. So, vote shares of re-elected incumbents increase 
at a decreasing rate.  
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Table 6.11 Comparison of fixed effect estimations of the model 6.4: Determinants of re-elected 
winners’ vote shares in non-marginal constituencies (1991-2008) (with and without the 1991 power-
match) 
Variables Model 6.4 Model 6.4 Model 6.4 Model 6.4 
 With 1991 power match Without 1991 power 
match 
Night-time satellite 
imagery 
39.87*** 37.44 39.87*** 37.44 
 (3.47) (1.38) (3.47) (1.38) 
Inflation 0.40 -0.43 0.40 -0.43 
 (0.63) (-0.51) (0.63) (-0.51) 
Adult literacy 0.57 -0.07 0.57 -0.07 
 (1.63) (-0.11) (1.63) (-0.11) 
Gender ratio 0.12 -0.26 0.12 -0.26 
 (0.60) (-0.95) (0.60) (-0.95) 
Hindu population -1.49 -0.27 -1.49 -0.27 
 (-1.34) (-0.16) (-1.34) (-0.16) 
Medium developed -0.39 -2.08 -0.39 -2.08 
 (-0.61) (-1.49) (-0.61) (-1.49) 
High developed 2.99*** -1.42 2.99*** -1.42 
 (3.48) (-1.17) (3.48) (-1.17) 
Voter turnout -0.02 0.14 -0.02 0.14 
 (-0.29) (1.54) (-0.29) (1.54) 
Political alliance 9.05*** 3.99 9.05*** 3.99 
 (2.69) (0.66) (2.69) (0.66) 
Political competition -13.90*** - -13.90*** - 
 (-14.76) - (-14.76) - 
Winning margin - 0.51*** - 0.51*** 
 - (7.00) - (7.00) 
Power-match 2.23 0.27 2.23 0.27 
 (1.32) (0.10) (1.32) (0.10) 
Ex-incumbency -1.08 -0.81 -1.08 -0.81 
 (-0.80) (-0.69) (-0.80) (-0.69) 
Hard core poverty -0.22* -0.05 -0.22* -0.05 
 (-1.96) (-0.35) (-1.96) (-0.35) 
Observations 238 238 238 238 
Adjusted R-squared 0.92 0.78 0.92 0.78 
Number of 
constituencies 
164 164 164 164 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable 
is the re-elected winners’ vote shares at the level in non-marginal constituencies; all continuous 
variables are at the level; estimation method is fixed effect; constant and time effect included 
but not reported; standard errors are clustered by constituencies. 
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6.8.1 Consistency of behaviour of Bangladeshi voters with electoral behaviour models 
 
We may infer from the results of Table 6.11 that electoral behaviour of voters in 
non-marginal constituencies in Bangladesh is consistent with Key’s (1966) reward-
punishment model and Downs’ (1957) economic vote model. They credit incumbents when 
the economic activities in their constituencies is higher and as such reward them by voting 
for them. They also vote for incumbents when their constituencies have higher 
development levels than average developed constituencies. The voters blame incumbents 
for higher poverty level in their constituencies and as such they punish them for it. In some 
extended models (e.g. model 6.4b) we find that strike and murder are significant at various 
levels and their signs are negative which is expected. This is because, higher murder and 
strike rates disrupt economic and social life of the people. Voters blame incumbents for 
their failure to reduce strikes and murders and as such they punish them by voting against 
them.  
6.9 Conclusion 
The key objective of this chapter is to identify determinants of vote shares of 
winners in general and re-elected winners in particular in elections held in Bangladesh over 
the 1991-2008 period.  
  The results of the model 6.1 show that vote shares of winners are positively related 
with the magnitude of economic activities of constituencies, the level of development in 
constituencies, political alliance at the national or local level, magnitude of winning margin 
and whether a winner is an ex-incumbent or not. They are negatively related with the level 
of competition and hard core poverty. These results are more general, because winners may 
be freshmen or re-elected. So, our model 6.2 sheds light on the factors influencing vote 
shares of re-elected incumbents. The results of the model 6.2 suggest that Bangladeshi 
voters hold incumbents accountable for the level of economic activities and development 
in constituencies during their tenure. They tend to appreciate incumbents for higher levels 
of economic activities and consequently reward them by voting for them more. Similarly, 
they vote for them more when the level of development of their constituencies is higher 
than the level of development of average developed constituencies. The results of the model 
6.2 also suggest that Bangladeshi voters expect that their incumbents take specific measures 
to improve social cohesiveness by reducing number of strikes that disrupt economic 
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activities and politically motivated murders that trigger spirally upward socio-political 
unrest. So, they punish their incumbents for higher levels of murders and strikes. It appears 
from the results that Bangladeshi voters take into account both economic and political 
condition in their constituencies while taking decision to vote for or against their 
incumbents. These results are in conformity with predictions of Key’s (1966) reward-
punishment model and Downs’ (1957) economic vote model.   
 Though the results of the model 6.2 help us to identify factors that affect vote shares 
of re-elected incumbents, they are still a bit more general. It is because, re-elected winners 
may be from marginal constituencies or non-marginal constituencies. The factors 
determining vote shares of re-elected incumbents in marginal constituencies are likely to 
be different from those that determine the same in non-marginal constituencies. The results 
of the model 6.3 show that that in marginal constituencies only political competition and 
pre-election political alliance are significant in determining vote shares of re-elected 
incumbents. While the political alliance increases their vote shares in marginal 
constituencies, the political competition reduces the same. On the other hand, the results of 
the model 6.4 shows that in non-marginal constituencies along with political competition 
and political alliance, levels of economic activities and development also affect the vote 
shares of re-elected incumbents. As a result, in marginal constituencies political 
competition and alliance nullify impact of the contribution incumbents make in the 
socioeconomic development of constituencies. The results of the model 6.4 further show 
that when winning margins are wider in the previous election vote shares of re-elected 
incumbents in the current election increase at decreasing rates.   
In the next and final chapter we summarize the background and rationale behind 
empirically analysing voter turnout and winners’ vote shares in Bangladesh. In the case of 
winners’ vote shares we specially focus on re-elected incumbents in marginal and non-
marginal constituencies. We also highlight key findings of our econometric estimations, as 
well as identify some limitations of our estimations. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
Historical background of pre-independent elections in Bangladesh.  
In 1858, against the backdrop of the utterly oppressive colonial rule of the British 
East India Company, the Great Sepoy Mutiny took place which prompted the British 
government to take over the ruling power from the company in 1861. It is the British 
Government which introduced elections in British India to involve Indians with legislative 
and administration activities. All national elections held before the 1937 election were 
lacklustre, as the British Indian Government gave voting rights to only a small percentage 
of the total population. Moreover, the elected Indian legislators did not have any real power. 
The 1937 election was remarkable, because elected legislators were given some legislative 
as well as administrative power. Using this limited power, legislators belonging to 
dominant parties (the Hindu-dominant Indian National Congress and the Muslim-only All-
India Muslim League) vied to increase their respective political clout by communalizing 
Hindus and Muslims respectively. While the communal feeling of Hindus and Muslims 
was unable to make little inroad into the political landscape of British India in the 1937 
election, it did so significantly in the 1946 election, leading to the partition of British India 
into India (present India) and United Pakistan (present Pakistan and Bangladesh). 
However, it may be mentioned that all elections held under the British colonial rule were 
free and fair.  
The ruling power in United Pakistan was vested in the hands of the people who 
migrated from present India to West Pakistan (present Pakistan) after the partition of British 
India and the West Punjabi civil and military bureaucrats. From the very beginning, they 
followed severely discriminatory policies which led to the rapid development of West 
Pakistan at the expense of East Pakistan. The first general election was held in 1954 in East 
Pakistan under the supervision of the incumbent government. Though the incumbent 
Muslim League at the Centre and the province attempted to influence the electoral outcome 
in many ways, they failed to do so due to overwhelming support from the people of East 
Pakistan in favour of the United Front, the combined nationalist force of East Pakistan. The 
people of East Pakistan expressed their grievance by casting votes overwhelmingly against 
the incumbent Muslim League. However, the winner, United Front, could not rule East 
Pakistan for the full period because the Muslim League-dominant Central Government 
dismissed United Front government illegitimately just after two and a half months of its 
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formation. Due to internal conflicts among constituent parties of the United Front, it could 
not stand up against this unfair action of the Centre. The West Punjabi-dominant Pakistan 
military took this opportunity to capture ruling power in 1958. The exploitation of East 
Pakistan gained new momentum under the Ayub-led military regime. It attempted to 
legitimize its rule by rigging all types of elections repeatedly.  
The 1965 India-Pakistan War unmasked the ulterior motive of the regime, revealing 
that it did not have any intention to protect East Pakistan against India’s military onslaught. 
As a result, the Awami League and other nationalist parties demanded full autonomy for 
East Pakistan. As a result, East Pakistan came to a head-on collision with the West Punjabi-
dominant Pakistani military regime. Following a prolonged mass upsurge in East Pakistan 
against the West Pakistan-based ruling regime, the military regime was forced to hold an 
election to facilitate the peaceful transfer of power to a democratically elected government. 
So, an election was held in 1970. In this election the people of East Pakistan 
overwhelmingly voted for the Awami League which pioneered the demand for full 
autonomy of East Pakistan. Instead of transferring power to the democratically elected 
Awami League government, the military regime wanted to crush the legitimate demand of 
the people of East Pakistan by using military forces ruthlessly. This led to the breakout of 
a civil war in East Pakistan. Following a nine-month long bloody civil war, East Pakistan 
emerged as an independent state re-named as Bangladesh in 1971. It may be mentioned 
that although the 1970 election was held under the supervision of the incumbent military 
regime, it was free and fair due to the incumbent’s hands-off attitude towards the electoral 
outcome.               
Historical background of post-independent elections in Bangladesh 
 The elections held in Bangladesh in the post-independent period right from 1973 
down to 1988 were held under the supervision of incumbent parties which managed to be 
re-elected by massive electoral corruption. As such, they did not reflect political 
preferences of Bangladeshi voters and consequently the electorate lost faith in the electoral 
system. The historic 1991 election was expected to restore faith in the electoral system. 
The key reason behind this expectation was that this election was held under the 
supervision of a non-partisan caretaker government (NCG). The NCG made all possible 
arrangements for ensuring free and fair election. Since that election was free and fair, it 
was likely to reflect political preferences of voters in Bangladesh. The 1991 election was 
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followed by three more consecutive elections (1996, 2001 and 2008) which were held 
under NCGs and they were free and fair by any international standard. In each election 
millions of voters turned out to vote. The winners of participating parties polled high vote 
shares as a percentage of the total vote cast. One important characteristic of voter turnout 
rates and winners’ vote shares is that they were increasing over time. The voter turnout rate 
increased from 55.43 per cent in 1991 to 75.55 per cent in 1996 to 76.06 per cent in 2001 
and to 87.02 per cent in 2008. Similarly, winners’ vote shares increased from 43. 56 percent 
in 1991 to 44.54 per cent in 1996 to 52.53 per cent in 2001 and to 57.60 per cent in 2008. 
Moreover, both dominant parties (the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist 
Party) ruled the country alternatively and failed to be re-elected in the following election 
for failing to translate their promises into reality. Vote shares of both parties increased 
consistently over time except in 2008 when the vote share of the Bangladesh Nationalist 
Party (BNP) declined.   
The 1991 election was held following the collapse of an authoritarian ruler who 
ruled the country for over nine years and got re-elected repeatedly by massive vote rigging. 
Millions of people participated in the mass movement which was led by two dominant 
opposition parties and their allies, and which caused demise of the authoritarian ruler. The 
1991 election provided these people with an opportunity to express their political 
preferences. So, it was expected that the voter turnout rate would be higher in the 1991 
election, but it was low. When each consecutive government failed to deliver what they 
promised earlier, voters were likely to be disillusioned and as such they were less likely to 
turn out to vote in subsequent elections. In contrast, they turned out more in elections 
following the 1991 one. Due to higher voter turnout rates, vote shares of winners belonging 
to the incumbent party as well as the dominant opposition party increased over time. So, 
did their total vote shares except in 2008 for the BNP. This is in sharp contrast with 
propositions of some electoral behaviour models, such as  Downs’ (1957) economic vote 
model, Mueller’s (1970) asymmetric vote model and Nannestad and Paldam’s (1997) 
revised asymmetric vote model. This is also contrary to the electoral behaviour of voters in 
East European emerging democracies, where voter turnout rates declined over successive 
elections following the first elections held shortly after the fall of authoritarian communist 
rulers. As a result, regarding the voter turnout rate and winners’ vote shares, there are some 
paradoxes in the electoral behaviour in Bangladesh in elections held between 1991 and 
2008.      
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Paradox in the electoral behaviour of Bangladeshi voters  
Kostadinova (2003) finds that in the East European emerging democracies the 
average turnout rate continued to decline in elections held over the 1990-2000 period. In 
those countries voter turnout rates declined from 86.28 percent in the first election to 74.88 
percent in the second election and from 68.43 percent in the third election to 66.36 percent 
in the fourth election. His econometric estimations show that each election is significant 
and the sign of the coefficient of each election is negative. The average voter turnout rate 
declines by 5 percent between the first and the second elections, by 6 percent between the 
second and the third elections and by 5 percent between the third and the fourth elections. 
This relationship holds when socioeconomic and institutional variables are controlled. The 
first-past-the-post electoral system reduces voter turnout rates, while the proportional 
representative system increases the same. When number of party increases, the voter 
turnout rate declines. It is because, voters are confused when there are too many parties 
competing for a seat. For each additional party added, the voter turnout rate falls by 1.5 
percent. The effect of competition on the voter turnout rate is inconclusive. Kostadinova 
(2003) does not investigate determinants of vote shares of winners. From the decreasing 
trend in turnout rate we may infer that winners’ vote shares are most likely to fall in 
successive elections.  
Some similarities exist between contexts of elections in East European countries 
and those in Bangladesh. In the East European countries, the first democratic elections were 
held after the collapse of authoritarian communist rulers following prolonged mass 
upsurges. In Bangladesh the 1991 election was held following collapse of an authoritarian 
ruler who reigned over Bangladesh for nine years. The two dominant opposition parties 
(the Awami league and the Bangladesh nationalist party) and their allies carried out the 
anti-government movement over nine years and mass people participated in the movement. 
Consistently increasing mass participation in the movement caused the demise of the 
authoritarian ruler in Bangladesh in late 1990.  
There are also disparities between contexts of elections in East European countries 
and those in Bangladesh. In East European emerging democracies, voter turnout rates in 
early elections following the collapse of authoritarian rulers were high. It is most likely that 
people participated in early elections with the hope that democratically elected 
 CHAPTER 7 
361 
 
governments would ensure peace, stability and prosperity. When subsequent governments 
failed to deliver what they promised formerly during their election campaigns, voters 
became increasingly disillusioned. This resulted in lower voter turnout rates in subsequent 
elections (Solijonov, 2016). We observe an opposite trend in Bangladesh. More voters 
turned out in later elections than earlier ones to express their grievance against the 
incumbent party. While grievance made voters in East European emerging democracies 
more apathetic to the political participation, the same made voters in Bangladesh more 
interested in political participation.   
Pacek et al. (2008) find that in East European emerging democracies, the voter 
turnout rate is higher in more important elections than in less important ones. In Bangladesh 
voter turnout rates were higher in all elections except the 1991, but each election was very 
important. While the first election restored peoples’ trust in democracy, successive ones 
were likely to consolidate democracy. Mason (2003/2004) finds that when people of the 
East European countries find that economic hardship resulting from transition from 
socialism to capitalism inflicts lower socioeconomic classes more than upper ones, the 
turnout rate of the former group declines. We do not know the socioeconomic backgrounds 
of voters in Bangladesh, but according to the Columbia model higher turnout is possible 
when voters of lower socioeconomic classes turn out. It may imply that while economic 
hardship pushed voters in East European emerging democracies away from political 
participation, it pulled voters in Bangladesh towards it.  
It is most probable that in East European emerging democracies, both the incumbent 
and opposition parties agreed on the mechanism of peaceful transfer of power, but in 
Bangladesh they did not. While the incumbent party wanted to cling to power by hook or 
by crook, the dominant opposition party wanted to pull down the incumbent party from the 
power even before expiry of its tenure through prolonged shutdown of the country. So, 
before each election the incumbent party did something to ensure its re-election and 
opposition parties foiled those plans by prolonged strikes. As a result, the protracted 
hostility between the incumbent and opposition parties was likely to make each election 
critical.  
In Bangladesh, the failure of each successive incumbent party to meet the 
expectations of the people, was likely to make voters apathetic towards the political system 
and thus cause voter turnout rates and winners’ vote shares to fall over time. However, we 
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observe that they were rising over time except in 2008 when the BNP’s vote share declined 
in comparison to 2001. Another important effect of these high voter turnout rates in 
Bangladesh is that though both the AL and the BNP ruled the country alternatively and 
failed to be re-elected in the following election due to poor performance on many fronts, 
their vote shares increased over time except in 2008. This may imply that voters became 
more polarized and partisan over time despite poor performance of their parties in many 
fronts. This is also an unexpected outcome. So, upward trending voter turnout rates and 
winners’ vote shares in successive elections in Bangladesh held between 1991 and 2008 
are in sharp contrast with propositions of some electoral behaviour models. The findings 
of some empirical studies focusing on the voter turnout rates in the East European emerging 
democracies are also inconsistent with their trends.  
Rationale of the study 
There is a paucity of systematic study of voting behaviour in Bangladesh due to 
irregular and rigged elections in post-independent periods. In recent times there have been 
studies on electoral behaviour in Bangladesh, but very few have focussed on this 
paradoxical behaviour of voters in recent elections. Bangladesh was never under 
communist rule like East European emerging democracies. She has a long history of 
colonial rule in the previous millennium and relentless freedom movement against her 
colonial masters. Bangladesh has achieved independence through a nine-month long armed 
struggle with a view to establish democracy, but until 1991 no incumbent governments 
could organize any free and fair election under their supervision. The contexts of concerned 
elections in Bangladesh are partly different from East European emerging democracies and 
many post-colonial nascent democracies. In this context this study is interesting, because 
it presents a more comprehensive analysis of determinants of voter turnout rates and vote 
shares of re-elected winners in Bangladesh which is left unexplored hitherto. It also tests 
how much the electoral behaviour of Bangladeshi voters is consistent with propositions of 
electoral behaviour models. 
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Determinants of voter turnout 
Literature review: electoral behaviour models 
Electoral behaviour models suggest that turning out of voters in elections is influenced by 
many factors: 
1) Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of voters (Columbia/sociological 
model); 
2) Partisanship of voters developed over time following association with family 
members, relatives, friends, neighbours and other members of the society 
(Michigan model/psycho-sociological model); 
3) Ethnocultural values of voters (ethnocultural vote model); 
4) Ethnic identity of voters and candidates (ethnic vote model); 
5) Right quantity of information about candidates (information-based vote model); 
6)  Personal as well as national economic condition (economic vote model); 
7)  Minimization of regret (minimax regret vote model); 
8) Gains/losses from electoral outcomes and authority over them (ethical voting 
model);  
9) Peer pressures (Group-based vote model); 
10)  Past experiences (learning-based vote model); and  
11)  Degree of eagerness to express one or more predominant identities (expressive 
voting).  
Literature review: empirical studies 
Determinants of the voter turnout rate in the Western mature democracies and 
emerging democracies differ in some respects.  The post-secondary level educational 
achievement (Powell, 1982), degree of competitiveness in elections and partisanship of 
voters (Powell, 1986 and Jackman, 1987), and turnout of voters in previous elections 
(Jackman, 1987) are important determinants of voter turnout rates in the Western mature 
democracies. On the other hand, grievance against incumbents and voter turnout in the 
previous election (Aguilar and Pacek, 2000), percentage of female voters, number of 
eligible voters and degree of competition (Legoucq and Wall, 2004), per capita income, 
number of registered voters and whether voting is optional or compulsory (Taskin, 2015), 
degree of urbanization, and literacy rate (Diwakar, 2008), door-to-door campaign (Gine 
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and Mansuri, 2011) and anticipation of vote rigging (Wilder, 1999:228-229) are important 
determinants of voter turnout rates in emerging democracies.   
A few studies (Baldersheim et al., 2001; Karim, 2007) attempt to identify factors 
affecting voter turnout rates in Bangladesh. Some of these factors are educational 
institutions being run by non-governmental organizations, degree of urbanization, 
household’s access to electricity, percentage of young and middle aged population and rural 
development programmes (Baldersheim et al., 2001), terrorist activities in constituencies 
and pre-election political alliance (Karim, 2007:403-5). However, their results are less 
reliable. This is because, their data sets are incomprehensive. Moreover, their 
methodologies suffer from some problems and they do not control heterogeneity among 
constituencies. Using a more comprehensive panel data set and the fixed effect model this 
study attempts to identify factors affecting voter turnout rates in Bangladesh in elections 
held in Bangladesh over the 1991-2008 period.    
Key findings: determinants of voter turnout in Bangladesh 
Our key findings are as follows: 
1) The one period long-lagged voter turnout is significant at a1 percent level of 
significance and the sign is negative. When the turnout rate in the previous election is 
1 percentage point higher, the turnout rate in the current election is 0.22 percentage 
points lower. This is inconsistent with Aguilar and Pacek (2000) and Diwakar (2008), 
who find a significant positive relationship between them.  
2) The economic activity level (in terms of night-time brightness) is significant at 1 
percent level of significance and the sign is positive. For 1 percentage point higher 
economic activity in a constituency the voter turnout rate in that constituency is 0.29 
percentage points higher. This is inconsistent with Kim et al. (1975) who find the 
opposite relationship.  However, this measure masks the income distribution among 
different socioeconomic classes. So, when we measure hardship of the people, we get 
an opposite result. For 1 percentage point higher hard core poverty level (person not 
receiving 1805 kilocalorie per day) in a constituency during the current electoral cycle 
the voter turnout rate in that constituency is 0.06 percentage points lower. Again, this 
is inconsistent with Aguilar and Pacek (2000), who find that lower income has 
significant positive effect on voter turnout rates. The poor voters tend to turn out to 
express their grievance.  
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3) The registered voter per polling station is significant at a 1 percent level of significance 
and the sign is negative. It implies that when the cost of voting (in terms of queuing) is 
higher, the turnout rate is lower but not substantial. When there are 10,000 more 
registered voters in a polling station, 24 more voters do not turnout for voting. So, the 
direct cost of turning out for voting arising from long queuing does not discourage 
many people from turning out. As a result, in Bangladesh we observe people queuing 
for voting for a number of hours. This finding is inconsistent with Taskin (2015) and 
consistent with Diwakar (2008).  
4) The power-match is significant at various levels of significance and the sign is positive. 
It implies that when a winner in a constituency belongs to the immediate past incumbent 
party, the voter turnout rate is 0.81 percentage points higher in that constituency. This 
may be expected, because the very identity that a candidate belongs to the immediate 
past incumbent party may be a political capital fir a candidate. This provides them with 
an opportunity to co-share achievements of that party in its recent tenure. This is an 
example of positive externality in the political market. This is why we observe in 
Bangladesh that before the election some political elites heading small parties and 
independents tend to join the immediate past incumbent party. As a result, independents 
and smaller parties have virtually disappeared from the political landscape in 
Bangladesh. We do not find any study that uses such a variable and as we cannot 
compare our finding with those of other studies.   
5) Ex-incumbency is significant at 10 percent level of significance and the sign is positive. 
It signifies that when a winner is an ex-incumbent the turnout rate is 0.65 percentage 
points higher than when she is not. This result is expected, because ex-incumbency is 
a highly productive political capital of a candidate. Voters are likely to turnout more to 
reward a winner for possessing a highly productive capital necessary for a country 
plagued with toxic politics.  We do not find any study that uses such a variable and as 
such we are unable to compare our finding with other studies.  
6) The adult literacy rate has significant and negative relationship with voter turnout rates. 
This is inconsistent with Diwakar (2008).   
We find some paradoxical results too. For example, road length per polling station 
is significant but the sign is negative, which is unexpected. It is because, higher road length 
per polling station lowers cost for turning out for voting. The unexpected sign may result 
from the fact that it encapsulates multiple dimensions. While some dimensions are likely 
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to motivate voters, some are likely to de-motivate them to turn out for voting. As a result, 
its resultant effect on the voter turnout rate is perplexing. However, we may infer from their 
negative signs that de-motivating forces are more powerful than motivating ones.  
Determinants of winners’ and re-elected winners’ vote shares 
Literature review: electoral behaviour models 
Electoral behaviour models suggests that winners’ vote shares in elections are influenced 
by many factors: 
1) Lower voter turnout increases vote shares of candidates of right-leaning parties and 
as such, their chance of winning. In contrast, higher voter turnout increases vote 
shares of candidates of left-leaning parties and as such their chance of winning 
(Columbia model). The nexus between voter turnout rates and vote shares of 
partisan winners as predicted by the Columbia model may break down when voters 
do not vote on the basis of their socioeconomic class (Pacek and Radcliff, 1995).  
2) Swing voters come under peer pressure in high-interest elections. They are 
motivated to vote for or against incumbents. The short-term issues and candidate 
factors decide their choice of parties. Under intense peer pressure weak partisan 
voters cross their partisan line and vote against dominant parties (extension of 
Columbia model by  DeNardo, 1980)  
3) Both dominant and minor parties can reap benefit from higher turnout rates. It 
depends on the proclivity of weak partisan voters. If they have more proclivity to 
the dominant party, it is benefitted more than the minor party (further extension of 
Columbia model by Grofman et al., 1999). 
4) Key’s (1966) reward-punishment model and Fiorina’s (1981) retrospective vote 
model suggest that voters reward incumbents when their retrospective performance 
is better than expected and punish them when their retrospective performance falls 
short of (their) expected level. Downs’ (1957) economic vote model argues that 
voters extrapolate future performance of incumbents on the basis of their 
retrospective performance. Therefore, incumbents’ retrospective performance 
influence their vote shares.   
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Literature review: empirical studies 
Different factors affect vote shares of winners in Western mature democracies and 
emerging democracies. National economic conditions encapsulated in the unemployment, 
inflation, economic growth, gross national product and their impact on the personal 
economic condition, personal political capital (e.g., incumbency) and some other 
institutional factors (e.g., whether turning out for voting is compulsory or optional, whether 
the political system is unicameral or bi-cameral and so on) affect vote shares of incumbents 
in the mature democracies. However, voters tend to attach more importance to economic 
than political factors (e.g., Nannestad and Paldam, 1994; Lewis-Beck and Stegmeir, 2000; 
Gelman and King (1990). Moreover, voters punish incumbents more for economic 
downturns than for economic upturns (e.g., Nannestad and Paldam, 1994; Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmeir, 2000).  Some personal political capital such as incumbency status of candidates 
also affect vote shares of incumbents in mature democracies (e.g., Gelman and King, 1990; 
Jacobson and Carson, 2016:40; Cox and Katz, 1996; Gainers, 1998 and Smith, 2013). In 
developing countries (e.g., India) incumbents in general and non-incumbents particularly 
those belonging to the incumbent party are in a more disadvantageous position than their 
challengers in general and non-incumbents especially those belonging to dominant 
opposition parties. However, incumbents belonging to the incumbent party enjoy some sort 
of honeymoon period at early stage of incumbency of the party and over time it fades off 
(Ravisankar, 2009).   
A few studies (Sobhan, 1968; Jahan, 1976/2005; Blair, 1979 and Karim, 2007) 
attempt to identify factors affecting voter shares of dominant parties and their candidates 
in Bangladesh. Those factors are personal character (e.g., honesty, sincerity and integrity 
of character, abuse of power and so on), personal political capital (e.g., ex-incumbency, 
descendants of past political leaders, belonging to locally influential family and so on) as 
well as economic conditions (e.g., hyperinflation, recession and high unemployment rate 
and so on). However, their results are less reliable. This is because, their data sets are 
incomprehensive and their methodologies suffer from some problems. They do not control 
heterogeneity among constituencies. Using a more comprehensive panel data set and the 
fixed effect model, this study attempts to identify factors affecting vote shares of winners 
in general. It focuses more on identifying vote shares of re-elected incumbents in marginal 
and non-marginal constituencies in elections held over the 1991-2008 period in 
Bangladesh.    
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Key findings: determinants of re-elected winners’ vote shares in Bangladesh  
Our key findings are as follows:  
1) Political competition (effective number of parties) is significant at a 1 percent level of 
significance in both marginal and non-marginal constituencies and the sign is negative.  
This result is expected. Uppal (2009) finds the coefficient insignificant but the sign is 
negative. So, our finding is partially consistent with Uppal (2009). When we measure 
political competition by winning margins, we get expected results too. For 1 percentage 
point higher winning margin in non-marginal constituencies, vote shares of re-elected 
winners are 0.51 percentage points higher. This result is also expected. For lack of 
sufficient observations we are unable to estimate the fixed effect model for re-elected 
winners in marginal constituencies. The ordinary least squared (OLS) estimates show 
that only the political competition (whether measured by inverse of square of vote 
shares of candidates or the winning margin) variable is significant. It implies that voters 
do not consider contribution of incumbents in the immediate past socioeconomic 
development of constituencies. Though our results of the OLS method are not as 
reliable as those of the fixed effect method, we gain an insight into factors affecting re-
elected winners’ vote shares in marginal constituencies.  
2) In non-marginal constituencies, the economic activity level (in terms of night-time 
brightness and infrastructural development) is significant at 1 percent level of 
significance and the sign is positive. This finding is consistent with Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmeir (2013). Moreover, we find that the hard core poverty is significant at a 10 
percent level and the sign is negative in non-marginal constituencies. For 1 percentage 
point higher hard core poverty the vote shares of re-elected winners is 0.22 percentage 
points lower. Uppal (2009) finds poverty level significant at a 1 percent level of 
significance and the sign negative in marginal constituencies. So, our finding is 
partially consistent with Uppal (2009).    
3) Political alliance is significant at 1 percent level of significance and the sign is positive 
in non-marginal constituencies. This is expected. As far we are concerned, no prior 
studies have used this variable as a determinant of re-elected winners’ vote shares in 
non-marginal constituencies. So, we are unable to compare our results with any other 
study. However, both incumbents and dominant opposition parties in South Asia are 
seen to have formed pre-election ‘rainbow’ and ‘jumbo’ alliances and won elections 
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(Rana, 2006:55-56,110). It implies that alliances make a positive contribution to 
winners’ vote shares. 
4) In non-marginal constituencies hard core poverty is significant at 10 percent level of 
significance and the sign is negative.  As far we are concerned, no prior studies have 
used this variable as a determinant of re-elected winners’ vote shares in non-marginal 
constituencies. So, we are unable to compare our results with any other study. However, 
it is partially consistent with Uppal (2009) who find that poverty reduces probability of 
winning of incumbents in Indian state legislative assemblies.    
Contribution of the study 
This thesis has made several contributions in the literature concerning electoral 
behaviour in Bangladesh: 
1. The existing literature on determinants of voter turnout and vote shares of re-elected 
winners use the real per capita GDP as a measure of wellbeing of the population. As 
the real per capita GDP suffers from a number of measurement errors in developed 
countries let alone in developing countries like Bangladesh, we use night-time satellite 
imagery to measure economic activity. This measure is less prone to measurement 
errors. We find that its behaviour is consistent with the proposition of the economic 
vote model, which is being tested by using the real per capita GDP as a measurement 
of welfare of the people. As far as we are concerned no previous studies have used it in 
the case of identifying determinants of voter turnout and vote shares of winners in 
general and re-elected winners in particular. So, we introduce a new measure in the 
literature of electoral behaviour. 
2. Three variables are used to measure electoral competition: (a) inverse of the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) called Laasko-Taagepara index, (b) margin of 
difference between the winner’s and the runner-up’s vote shares, and (c) contestants 
per voter. Since each measure has some merits and some demerits, they are likely to 
give different estimates on the basis of contexts. As far as we are concerned no studies 
tested their effectiveness in explaining vote turn out and vote shares of re-elected 
winners. Given the number of contestant per million we use them alternatively and find 
that the winning margin variable explains variations in voter turnout and vote shares of 
re-elected winners more than the Laasko-Taagepara index. The result is expected in the 
context of Bangladesh where a two-party dominant political system has evolved over 
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time under popular authoritarian rule. Thus, we add a new approach in the literature of 
electoral behaviour.    
3. It is well-documented that the incumbent party allocates scarce public resources 
strategically in order to get its candidates elected or re-elected. While this is rampant in 
mature Western democracies (e.g., Leigh, 2008), it is more rampant in developing 
countries like Bangladesh (see Besley et al., 2014 for Indian local governments and 
Khemani, 2003 for Indian inter-governmental transfer). This political consideration in 
public fund allocation leads to misallocation of scarce public resources which 
developing countries like Bangladesh cannot afford. It is hard to distinguish which 
resources are distributed with political motive and which are distributed on the basis of 
genuine needs in constituencies. As far as we know some studies in developed countries 
(e.g., Leigh, 2008) and developing countries (e.g., Besley et al., 2014 and Khemani, 
2003) use the quantity of fund allocated among constituencies to determine partisan 
biasedness in the allocation of public fund.  It is hard to collect such information in a 
country like Bangladesh. So, we follow a short-cut but more effective method. We try 
to capture this element by introducing a new variable called power-match. The 
constituency where the incumbent belongs to the incumbent party is regarded as a 
power-matching constituency. As far we know no prior studies have used this measure. 
Our variable is more comprehensive than any other continuous numbers. While 
continuous numbers capture one aspect of partisan biasedness, our binary variable 
captures the phenomenon in entirety. The variable is well-behaved in this sense that its 
sign is expected. Thus, we introduce a new variable in the literature to capture partisan 
biasedness in resource allocation in absence of publicly available proper and systematic 
record of public fund allocation in developing countries like Bangladesh.      
4. The existing literature on determinants of voter turnout and vote shares of re-elected 
winners identifies a good number of factors as their determinants. It does not help in 
formulation of public policy. In our analysis we find that a few factors explain a large 
part of the variation in vote turn out and vote shares of re-elected winners. Among them, 
one or two become politically salient and sway independent voters from the incumbent 
to the dominant challenger or vice versa. Thus, our study gives an effective signal to 
political elites what to do and what to abstain from to increase turnout rates and thus 
their vote shares. 
5. The existing literature on determinants of voter turnout and vote shares of re-elected 
winners in Bangladesh push economic factors to the back and place political factors to 
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the front. Our study shows that economic factors are as powerful as political factors in 
this regard. So, our study brings back economic factors to the front too. It implies that 
anti-incumbency behaviour of voters is politically as well as economically rational. No 
emotional bandwagon effect motivate them to turnout in huge numbers and vote against 
the incumbent party.  
Shortcomings of the study 
This study has at least following shortcomings: 
1. As this study uses aggregate data to explain factors affecting voter turnout and vote 
shares of re-elected winners in Bangladesh, there are ecological fallacy problems in the 
estimates. 
2. As socioeconomic and political variables are overlapping and interactive, explanatory 
variables are correlated to some degrees. Hence, the size of coefficients and their t-
statistics may be ambiguous to some extent.   
3. As district-level (in most cases) socioeconomic values are substituted for constituencies 
under a district, there is less variations in these data. So, our estimates may be biased.    
4. Our estimates suffer from omitted variable bias. There are spatial (geographical) 
spillover effects among neighbouring constituencies, but we do not include this in our 
models.  
5. We use the Laasko-Taagepara index and the winning margin as a measure of political 
competition. They constitute a large part of the winner’s vote share, which is our 
dependent variable. So, there is a specific endogeneity problem in this case. We do not 
address endogeneity problem at all in our study. However, we check robustness of our 
results by a number of alternative specifications of models.   
In essence, given the limitations regarding data and methodology, we have carried 
out a more comprehensive study to identify factors influencing voter turnout rates and 
re-elected winners’ vote shares in Bangladesh. Though our estimates are biased to some 
extent, they may guide us in formulating policies that would increase voters’ turnout 
rates and thus make the government more representative of the population. For 
example, the incumbent party misallocates resources for reaping political dividends in 
elections especially in the following election. The social planners may make some 
binding arrangements for the incumbent party to redistribute public resources in a 
particular constituency as well as among constituencies that are rule-based as well as 
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need-based. This is likely to increase voter turnout rates in under-developed areas 
leading to higher voter turnout rates at the constituency as well as national level. In a 
highly politicized society like Bangladesh the problem is: who will bell the cat?    
We find that a higher hard core poverty level leads to a lower turnout rate. 
According to the Columbia model, this may help to increase vote shares of candidates 
belonging to right-leaning parties and the likelihood of their winning. So, our finding 
gives a signal to social planners that if the hard core poor are kept away from turning 
out for voting, more right-leaning candidates would win and they would adopt the 
policy which is most likely to upper socioeconomic classes of the population. This 
would increase income inequality further. So, social planners may make it mandatory 
to allocate a certain percentage of the total public expense for alleviating hard core 
poverty. In some developing countries where politics is becoming more and more 
militarized and commercialized like Bangladesh, the problem is: who will be the 
firewood for cooking meals for the poor?   
In the course of carrying out this research, we have identified a good number of 
areas where further research can be carried out and thus enrich the literature on electoral 
behaviour in Bangladesh.  
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Appendix 3A: Results of the 1937 election in all British Indian provinces  
Name of the 
party 
Seats won in the 
provincial 
legislative 
councils (% ) 
Seats won in the 
provincial 
legislative 
assemblies (% ) 
Total Muslim 
seats won (% ) 
Total Muslim seats  
won (% ) 
Muslim-
majority 
provinces 
Muslim-
minority 
provinces 
Indian National 
Congress (INC) 
24.90a 44.60a 42.37a     
Muslim League 
(ML) 
4.66a 6.68a 21.57a 35.57b 64.42b 
Other parties 27.23a 25.04a       
Independent 43.19a 24.29a       
Total 100 100       
Uncontested 10.89a,c 12.99a,c       
Source: a, calculated by the author from the Election Report, Government of India (1937:1-19); b, Harun 
(2003:80); c is included in constituencies won by parties and independents. 
Appendix 3B: Results of the 1937 election in Bengal province 
Name of the 
party 
 Total Muslim constituencies won (%) 
 Total 
seats won 
(%) 
Total 
Muslim 
seats won 
(%) 
East 
Bengal 
Muslim 
seats 
(%) 
West 
Bengal 
Muslim 
seats 
(%) 
Rural Muslim 
constituencies  
Urban Muslim 
constituencies  
Seat (%) Vote 
(%) 
Seat (%) Vote 
(%) 
BINC 20.80        
BPML 15.60 29.91 27.55 42.10 27.27 26.52 100 61.67 
KPPa 16.40 35.04 38.77 15.79 34.71 35.61 0 15.39 
Independent 
Muslim 
16.8 35.04 33.67 42.10 38.02 37.87 0 23.14 
Independent 
Hindu 
16.00        
Other 
parties 
14.40        
Total 100 100 100 100 100  100  
Uncontested 18.80b        
Source: Nugent (1977:145) and Harun (2003:75, 77-78, 80). Note: a, Tippera Krishak Samity is included 
with the KPP; b, uncontested constituencies are included in political parties and independents; percentages 
of total constituency won were calculated by the author from Nugent (1977:145) and others were taken 
from Harun (2003:,75, 77-78, 80). 
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Appendix 3C: Comparison of performance of the BPML in Muslim seats in the 1946 and the 1954 
election and the UF in the 1954 election 
 Percentage of total Muslim seats  
Party 1946 1954 
ML 94.02  4.21  
UF - 94.09 
Alliance partners of the UF: 
East Pakistan Awami 
League 
Krishak Sramik Party 
Nizam-i-Islam Party  
Ganatantri Dal 
   
60.39  
20.25  
8.01    
5.48    
 
Source: Compiled and calculated by the author from Chaudhuri (1968:50) and Chiriyankandath (1992).  
 
Appendix 5A: Franchise and voter turnout rates in Bangladesh: 1920-2008  
Year                             1920 1923 1926 1930 1937 1946 1954  
Franchise (%)                    2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 5.6 13.4 46.45  
General turnout (%)      33.4 39 39.3 26.1 40.5 51.1 37.19  
Muslim turnout (%)      28.3 48.1 48.6 52.9 55.5 59.24 37.6  
Year                             1970 1973 1979 1986 1988 1991 1996  
Franchise (%)                45.82 47.34 44.77 48.26 47.7 55.7 47.27  
General turnout (%)      56.9 54.9 50.94 60.31 54.93 55.45 75.55  
Muslim turnout (%)        -                  -            -           -          -           -           - 
Year                             2001 2008       
Franchise (%)                57.42 52.77       
General turnout (%)    76.06 87.05       
Muslim turnout (%)      -                    -        
Source: Chiriyankandath (1992) for 1920-1930 and 1946; Indian Election Report (1937:5 and 8) for 1937; 
The Economic Weekly, 15 April, 1961 for 1954; Rizivi (2013) Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development 
and Transparency, 2013 for 1970; Percentage franchise for 1970 calculated by the author from Rizivi (2013) 
and Statistical Yearbook Bangladesh 1979 pp.50 Table 2.6; For 1973,1979,1986,1988,1991,1996, 2001, 2008 
CIA World Fact Book, Statistical Yearbook Bangladesh 1979 pp. 50 and Arefin (2011); For 1954 Muslim 
turnout Report on the General Elections in the East Bengal Legislative Assembly held in 1954. Government 
of East Bengal, Home Department, Constitution and Election 25 February 1956, Dhaka, Statement IV; For 
1946 Muslim turnout was in the provincial central assembly of Muslim dominant provinces (Ahmed, 2001); 
For 1920-1937 Muslim provincial central legislative assemblies Rashiduzzaman (1964), 1937 is actually for 
1934 election, 1946 is actually for 1945.  
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Note: There is some discrepancy between the author’s means over the 1991-2008 period and means for the 
same period calculated by some other authors, such as Mannan (2005:180). The magnitude of discrepancy 
is very small. The possible reason might be rounding up of decimals.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5D: Comparison of normal and kernel distribution of voter turnout rates in each election 
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Appendix 5E: Boxplot of voter turnout rates in Bangladesh: 1991-2008
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Appendix 5F: Model 5.1: Determinants of voter turnout (with 1991 power-match values and political 
competition and real per capita GDP):1991-2008 
Variables Model 5.1 Model 
5.1a 
Model 
5.1b 
Model 
5.1c 
Model 
5.1d 
Model 
5.1e 
Model 
5.1f 
Real per capita GDP -0.90b** -0.50b -1.20b*** -0.70b* -0.80b** -0.80b* -1.00b** 
 (-2.36) (-1.19) (-2.90) (-1.67) (-1.99) (-1.96) (-2.45) 
Hard core poverty -0.06** -0.07** -0.07** -0.08** -0.07** -0.06* -0.06** 
 (-2.00) (-2.28) (-2.22) (-2.40) (-2.15) (-1.92) (-2.03) 
Hindu population 0.92* 0.94* 0.94* 1.01** 0.91* 0.96* 0.96** 
 (1.88) (1.90) (1.90) (1.97) (1.90) (1.93) (2.07) 
Adult  literacy -0.57*** -0.58*** -0.57*** -0.58*** -0.55*** -0.57*** -0.55*** 
 (-4.11) (-4.19) (-4.06) (-4.27) (-4.10) (-4.08) (-3.92) 
Urban population 0.22** 0.16 0.23** 0.21** 0.24** 0.23** 0.20** 
 (2.19) (1.54) (2.37) (2.01) (2.55) (2.28) (2.07) 
Political competition -0.55 -0.44 -0.53 -0.51 -0.52 -0.53 -0.52 
 (-1.62) (-1.28) (-1.56) (-1.54) (-1.57) (-1.59) (-1.54) 
Power match 0.52* 0.52* 0.52* 0.51* 0.52* 0.47* 0.43 
 (1.87) (1.85) (1.86) (1.81) (1.88) (1.65) (1.50) 
Registered voters -0.37a*** -0.37a*** -0.37a*** -0.37a*** -0.29a*** -0.37a*** -0.38a*** 
per polling station (-6.12) (-6.10) (-6.08) (-6.13) (-4.51) (-5.82) (-6.20) 
Road length per -2.20** -2.28** -2.25** -2.14* -2.50** -1.72* -2.25** 
polling station (-1.97) (-2.05) (-2.00) (-1.90) (-2.23) (-1.66) (-2.05) 
Ex-incumbency 0.11 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.11 0.10 
 (0.36) (0.51) (0.40) (0.53) (0.48) (0.36) (0.32) 
Population density  -0.14a*      
  (-1.86)      
Gender ratio   0.22**     
   (2.16)     
Number of     0.15**    
contestants    (2.53)    
Total voters     -0.15c***   
     (-2.82)   
Land size per      -0.40  
polling station      (-1.49)  
Murder       -0.00 
       (-0.18) 
Strike       -0.03** 
       (-2.53) 
Observations 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,183 
Adjusted R-squared 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 
Number of 
constituency 
299 299 299 299 299 299 299 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the voter turnout rates at the level; the 
explanatory variables are at the level; the real per capita GDP included and the night-time satellite imagery variable is excluded; a, 
the coefficient*100; b, the coefficient*1000; ; c, the coefficient*10000; time and constituency fixed effects and constant are included 
but not reported; standard errors are clustered by constituencies. 
 
Appendix 5G: Model 5.1: Determinants of voter turnout (with 1991 power-match values and winning 
margin):1991-2008 
Variables Model 5.1 Model 
5.1a 
Model 
5.1b 
Model 
5.1c 
Model 
5.1d 
Model 
5.1e 
Model 
5.1f 
Night-time satellite -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
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imagery (-0.38) (0.41) (-0.63) (-0.07) (-0.04) (-0.34) (-0.07) 
Hard core poverty -0.06* -0.07** -0.06** -0.07** -0.06* -0.05* -0.06* 
 (-1.79) (-2.16) (-1.97) (-2.24) (-1.95) (-1.73) (-1.78) 
Hindu population 0.94* 0.96* 0.95* 1.04** 0.92* 0.98** 0.97** 
 (1.94) (1.94) (1.95) (2.04) (1.95) (1.99) (2.13) 
Adult literacy -0.61*** -0.61*** -0.62*** -0.61*** -0.59*** -0.60*** -0.60*** 
 (-4.51) (-4.45) (-4.52) (-4.63) (-4.45) (-4.35) (-4.36) 
Urban population 0.30*** 0.18* 0.32*** 0.26*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.28*** 
 (3.32) (1.76) (3.55) (2.81) (3.54) (3.33) (3.22) 
Winning margin 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.34) (0.07) (0.18) (0.35) (0.01) (0.28) (0.22) 
Power-match 0.51* 0.48* 0.50* 0.49* 0.47* 0.44 0.41 
 (1.77) (1.66) (1.76) (1.69) (1.67) (1.51) (1.39) 
Registered voters -0.38a*** -0.38a*** -0.38a*** -0.38a*** -0.29a*** -0.37a*** -0.38a*** 
per polling station (-6.26) (-6.18) (-6.25) (-6.25) (-4.52) (-5.90) (-6.35) 
Road length per -2.18* -2.25** -2.20* -2.11* -2.46** -1.57 -2.19* 
polling station (-1.87) (-1.97) (-1.88) (-1.81) (-2.12) (-1.48) (-1.91) 
Ex-incumbency 0.03 0.14 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.02 
 (0.11) (0.45) (0.12) (0.36) (0.31) (0.15) (0.06) 
Population density  -0.19a**      
  (-2.88)      
Gender ratio   0.15     
   (1.47)     
Number of     0.17***    
contestants    (2.94)    
Total voters     -0.16b***   
     (-2.98)   
Land size per      -0.51*  
polling station      (-1.96)  
Murder       0.00 
       (0.04) 
Strike       -0.03** 
       (-2.51) 
Observations 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,183 
Adjusted R-squared 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91 
Number of 
constituency 
299 299 299 299 299 299 299 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the voter turnout rates at the level; the 
explanatory variables are at the level; a, the coefficient*100; b, the coefficient*10000; time and constituency fixed effects and 
constant are included but not reported; standard errors are clustered by constituencies. 
 
 Appendix 5H: Model 5.1: Determinants of voter turnout (without 1991   power-match values and with 
political competition):1991-2008 
Variables Model 5.1 Model 
5.1a 
Model 
5.1b 
Model 
5.1c 
Model 
5.1d 
Model 
5.1e 
Model 
5.1f 
Night-time satellite -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
imagery (-0.45) (0.28) (-0.65) (-0.15) (-0.15) (-0.41) (-0.15) 
Hard core poverty -0.07** -0.08** -0.07** -0.08** -0.08** -0.07** -0.07** 
 (-2.05) (-2.37) (-2.19) (-2.47) (-2.22) (-2.00) (-2.05) 
Hindu population 0.85* 0.88* 0.86* 0.94* 0.84* 0.89* 0.87* 
 (1.75) (1.77) (1.76) (1.85) (1.76) (1.81) (1.91) 
Adult literacy -0.59*** -0.59*** -0.60*** -0.60*** -0.58*** -0.59*** -0.58*** 
 (-4.24) (-4.19) (-4.25) (-4.38) (-4.19) (-4.05) (-4.11) 
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Urban population 0.28*** 0.17* 0.30*** 0.25*** 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 
 (3.15) (1.71) (3.33) (2.68) (3.41) (3.17) (3.06) 
Political  -0.44 -0.26 -0.44 -0.39 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 
competition (-1.23) (-0.72) (-1.21) (-1.11) (-1.17) (-1.16) (-1.15) 
Power-match 0.85*** 0.78** 0.85*** 0.82*** 0.80*** 0.79** 0.78** 
 (2.74) (2.53) (2.74) (2.62) (2.61) (2.50) (2.50) 
Registered voters -0.37a*** -0.36a*** -0.37a*** -0.36a*** -0.28a*** -0.35a*** -0.37a*** 
per polling station (-5.86) (-5.79) (-5.85) (-5.85) (-4.24) (-5.56) (-5.94) 
Road length per -2.25* -2.36** -2.28* -2.16* -2.54** -1.66 -2.26** 
polling station (-1.96) (-2.09) (-1.97) (-1.87) (-2.21) (-1.58) (-1.99) 
Ex-incumbency 0.15 0.24 0.15 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.14 
 (0.47) (0.75) (0.47) (0.69) (0.61) (0.52) (0.43) 
Population density  -0.18a***      
  (-2.73)      
Gender ratio   0.11     
   (1.10)     
Number of     0.17***    
contestants    (2.77)    
Total voters     -0.15b***   
     (-2.78)   
Land size per      -0.51*  
polling station      (-1.96)  
Murder       0.00 
       (0.05) 
Strike       -0.02** 
       (-2.37) 
Observations 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 
Adjusted R-squared 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 
Number of 
constituency 
299 299 299 299 299 299 299 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the voter turnout rates at the level; the 
explanatory variables are at the level; a, the coefficient*100; b, the coefficient*10000; time and constituency fixed effects and 
constant are included but not reported; standard errors are clustered by constituencies. 
 
Appendix 5I: Model 5.1: Determinants of voter turnout (without 1991   power-match values and with 
winning margin):1991-2008 
Variables Model 5.1 Model 
5.1a 
Model 
5.1b 
Model 
5.1c 
Model 
5.1d 
Model 
5.1e 
Model 
5.1f 
Night-time satellite -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
imagery (-0.44) (0.33) (-0.63) (-0.14) (-0.12) (-0.40) (-0.13) 
Hard core poverty -0.07** -0.08** -0.07** -0.08** -0.07** -0.07* -0.07** 
 (-2.01) (-2.37) (-2.16) (-2.44) (-2.19) (-1.96) (-2.02) 
Hindu population 0.86* 0.88* 0.87* 0.96* 0.85* 0.91* 0.88* 
 (1.79) (1.79) (1.79) (1.88) (1.80) (1.85) (1.95) 
Adult literacy -0.59*** -0.59*** -0.60*** -0.59*** -0.57*** -0.58*** -0.58*** 
 (-4.20) (-4.17) (-4.22) (-4.34) (-4.18) (-4.02) (-4.07) 
Urban population 0.29*** 0.17* 0.31*** 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 
 (3.24) (1.70) (3.42) (2.75) (3.49) (3.25) (3.15) 
Winning margin 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.30) (0.02) (0.17) (0.30) (-0.01) (0.25) (0.18) 
Power-match 0.81** 0.74** 0.80** 0.79** 0.75** 0.75** 0.74** 
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 (2.59) (2.39) (2.57) (2.50) (2.40) (2.37) (2.35) 
Registered voters -0.37a*** -0.36a*** -0.37a*** -0.36a*** -0.28a*** -0.36a*** -0.37a*** 
per polling station (-5.90) (-5.82) (-5.89) (-5.89) (-4.30) (-5.59) (-5.98) 
Road length per -2.28* -2.37** -2.30* -2.19* -2.54** -1.67 -2.28** 
polling station (-1.95) (-2.06) (-1.96) (-1.87) (-2.18) (-1.56) (-1.97) 
Ex-incumbency 0.14 0.25 0.14 0.22 0.20 0.16 0.13 
 (0.43) (0.75) (0.44) (0.65) (0.61) (0.49) (0.40) 
Population density  -0.19a***      
  (-2.86)      
Gender ratio   0.11     
   (1.07)     
Number of     0.17***    
contestants    (2.81)    
Total voters     -0.15b***   
     (-2.81)   
Land size per      -0.52**  
polling station      (-2.05)  
Murder       0.00 
       (0.10) 
Strike       -0.03** 
       (-2.41) 
Observations 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,145 
Adjusted R-squared 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 
Number of 
constituency 
299 299 299 299 299 299 299 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the voter turnout rates at the level; the 
explanatory variables are at the level; a, the coefficient*100; b, the coefficient*10000; time and constituency fixed effects and 
constant are included but not reported; standard errors are clustered by constituencies. 
 
Appendix 5J: Model 5.2: Determinants of voter turnout (with 1991 power-match values and winning 
margin):1991-2008 
Variables Model 5.2 Model 
5.2a 
Model 
5.2b 
Model 
5.2c 
Model 
5.2d 
Model 
5.2e 
Model 
5.2f 
One-long-period  -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** 
lagged voter turnout (-4.51) (-4.36) (-4.50) (-4.50) (-4.51) (-4.57) (-4.66) 
Night-time satellite 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 
imagery (5.02) (3.65) (4.73) (4.53) (5.09) (4.66) (4.74) 
Hard core poverty -0.07** -0.07** -0.07* -0.07** -0.07** -0.07** -0.08** 
 (-2.00) (-2.03) (-1.96) (-2.08) (-2.09) (-1.99) (-2.23) 
Hindu population 0.84 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.88 
 (1.19) (1.16) (1.19) (1.22) (1.22) (1.21) (1.31) 
Adult literacy -0.85*** -0.86*** -0.86*** -0.84*** -0.84*** -0.84*** -0.86*** 
 (-4.14) (-4.14) (-4.15) (-4.17) (-4.09) (-4.00) (-4.15) 
Urban population 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.24*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 
 (2.66) (2.86) (2.95) (2.60) (2.93) (2.66) (2.69) 
Winning margin -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 (-0.90) (-0.95) (-0.99) (-0.85) (-1.06) (-0.88) (-0.96) 
Power-match 0.69** 0.68** 0.68** 0.71** 0.67** 0.68** 0.62* 
 (2.16) (2.12) (2.11) (2.20) (2.10) (2.12) (1.91) 
Registered voters -0.24a*** -0.24a*** -0.24a*** -0.24a*** -0.24a*** -0.24a*** -0.24a*** 
per polling station (-3.68) (-3.65) (-3.68) (-3.71) (-2.99) (-3.62) (-3.75) 
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Road length per -2.82** -2.84** -2.86** -2.73** -2.92** -2.63** -2.90** 
polling station (-2.45) (-2.46) (-2.47) (-2.30) (-2.53) (-2.31) (-2.55) 
Ex-incumbency 0.65* 0.65* 0.65* 0.66* 0.68* 0.65* 0.64* 
 (1.78) (1.76) (1.79) (1.79) (1.85) (1.78) (1.76) 
Population density  0.00      
  (0.43)      
Gender ratio   0.15     
   (0.98)     
Number of     0.05    
contestants    (0.79)    
Total voters     -0.00   
     (-1.63)   
Land size per      -0.16  
polling station      (-0.52)  
Murder       -0.00 
       (-0.37) 
Strike       -0.02* 
       (-1.77) 
Observations 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 
Adjusted R-squared 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 
Number of 
constituency 
299 299 299 299 299 299 299 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the voter turnout rates at the level; the 
explanatory variables are at the level; a, the coefficient*100; time and constituency fixed effects and constant are included but not 
reported; standard errors are clustered by constituencies. 
 
 
 
Appendix 5k: Model 5.2: Determinants of voter turnout (without 1991 power-match values and with 
political competition):1991-2008 
Variables Model 5.2 Model 
5.2a 
Model 
5.2b 
Model 
5.2c 
Model 
5.2d 
Model 
5.2e 
Model 
5.2f 
One-long-period  -0.22*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** 
lagged voter turnout (-4.79) (-4.66) (-4.79) (-4.78) (-4.80) (-4.85) (-4.93) 
Night-time satellite 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 
imagery (4.53) (3.40) (4.31) (4.15) (4.54) (4.24) (4.28) 
Hard core poverty -0.07** -0.07** -0.07* -0.07** -0.07** -0.07* -0.08** 
 (-1.99) (-2.00) (-1.94) (-2.07) (-2.07) (-1.97) (-2.21) 
Hindu population 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.83 0.83 0.86 
 (1.16) (1.13) (1.17) (1.19) (1.18) (1.18) (1.28) 
Adult literacy -0.86*** -0.87*** -0.86*** -0.85*** -0.85*** -0.85*** -0.86*** 
 (-4.14) (-4.12) (-4.14) (-4.16) (-4.09) (-3.99) (-4.16) 
Urban population 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 
 (2.79) (2.95) (3.06) (2.72) (3.08) (2.79) (2.83) 
Political competition -0.19 -0.20 -0.16 -0.17 -0.20 -0.19 -0.18 
 (-0.42) (-0.45) (-0.35) (-0.38) (-0.46) (-0.44) (-0.41) 
Power-match 0.81** 0.81** 0.80** 0.82** 0.81** 0.80** 0.75** 
 (2.51) (2.49) (2.48) (2.52) (2.50) (2.46) (2.26) 
Registered voters -0.24a*** -0.24a*** -0.24a*** -0.24a*** -0.19a*** -0.24a*** -0.24a*** 
per polling station (-3.60) (-3.56) (-3.60) (-3.63) (-2.92) (-3.54) (-3.66) 
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Road length per -2.90** -2.91** -2.94** -2.79** -3.00*** -2.69** -2.97*** 
polling station (-2.55) (-2.55) (-2.58) (-2.38) (-2.64) (-2.40) (-2.65) 
Ex-incumbency 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.61 0.61* 0.59 0.58 
 (1.62) (1.59) (1.62) (1.64) (1.67) (1.63) (1.59) 
Population density  0.00      
  (0.38)      
Gender ratio   0.13     
   (0.85)     
Number of     0.05    
contestants    (0.80)    
Total voters     -0.00   
     (-1.56)   
Land size per      -0.17  
polling station      (-0.56)  
Murder       -0.00 
       (-0.36) 
Strike       -0.02* 
       (-1.74) 
Observations 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 
Adjusted R-squared 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 
Number of 
constituency 
299 299 299 299 299 299 299 
    Notes: t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the voter turnout rates at the level; the 
explanatory variables are at the level; a, the coefficient*100; time and constituency fixed effects and constant are included but not 
reported; standard errors are clustered by constituencies. 
 
 
 
Appendix 5L: Model 5.2: Determinants of voter turnout (without 1991 power-match values and with 
winning margin):1991-2008 
        
Variables Model 5.2 Model 5.2a Model 5.2b Model 5.2c Model 5.2d Model 5.2e Model 5.2f 
One-long-period  -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** 
lagged voter turnout (-4.51) (-4.36) (-4.50) (-4.50) (-4.51) (-4.57) (-4.66) 
Night-time satellite 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 
imagery (5.02) (3.65) (4.73) (4.53) (5.09) (4.66) (4.74) 
Hard core poverty -0.07** -0.07** -0.07* -0.07** -0.07** -0.07** -0.08** 
 (-2.00) (-2.03) (-1.96) (-2.08) (-2.09) (-1.99) (-2.23) 
Hindu population 0.84 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.88 
 (1.19) (1.16) (1.19) (1.22) (1.22) (1.21) (1.31) 
Adult literacy -0.85*** -0.86*** -0.86*** -0.84*** -0.84*** -0.84*** -0.86*** 
 (-4.14) (-4.14) (-4.15) (-4.17) (-4.09) (-4.00) (-4.15) 
Urban population 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.24*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 
 (2.66) (2.86) (2.95) (2.60) (2.93) (2.66) (2.69) 
Winning margin -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 (-0.90) (-0.95) (-0.99) (-0.85) (-1.06) (-0.88) (-0.96) 
Power-match 0.69** 0.68** 0.68** 0.71** 0.67** 0.68** 0.62* 
 (2.16) (2.12) (2.11) (2.20) (2.10) (2.12) (1.91) 
Registered voters -0.24a*** -0.24a*** -0.24a*** -0.24a*** -0.19a*** -0.24a*** -0.24a*** 
per polling station (-3.68) (-3.65) (-3.68) (-3.71) (-2.99) (-3.62) (-3.75) 
Road length per -2.82** -2.84** -2.86** -2.73** -2.92** -2.63** -2.90** 
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polling station (-2.45) (-2.46) (-2.47) (-2.30) (-2.53) (-2.31) (-2.55) 
Ex-incumbency 0.65* 0.65* 0.65* 0.66* 0.68* 0.65* 0.64* 
 (1.78) (1.76) (1.79) (1.79) (1.85) (1.78) (1.76) 
Population density  0.00      
  (0.43)      
Gender ratio   0.15     
   (0.98)     
Number of     0.05    
contestants    (0.79)    
Total voters     -0.00   
     (-1.63)   
Land size per      -0.16  
polling station      (-0.52)  
Murder       -0.00 
       (-0.37) 
Strike       -0.02* 
       (-1.77) 
Observations 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 
Adjusted R-squared 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 
Number of constituency 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the voter turnout rates at the level; the 
explanatory variables are at the level; a, the coefficient*100; time and constituency fixed effects and constant are included but not 
reported; standard errors are clustered by constituencies. 
 
Appendix 5M: Model 5.3: Determinants of voter turnout (with 1991 power-match values and with winning 
margin):1991-2008 
Explanatory variables Model 5.3 Model 
5.3a 
Model 
5.3b 
Model 
5.3c 
Model 
5.3d 
Model 
5.3e 
Model 
5.3f 
        
Night-time satellite 16.38*** 16.75*** 16.36*** 16.64*** 15.23*** 16.39*** 16.24*** 
imagery (3.28) (3.38) (3.27) (3.32) (3.06) (3.27) (3.25) 
Hard core poverty 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 
 (1.46) (1.30) (1.46) (1.53) (1.16) (1.45) (1.41) 
Hindu population -0.53 -0.48 -0.54 -0.53 -0.52 -0.53 -0.51 
 (-1.09) (-0.98) (-1.09) (-1.08) (-1.06) (-1.08) (-1.03) 
Adult literacy -0.04 -0.10 -0.05 -0.04 -0.09 -0.04 -0.05 
 (-0.19) (-0.45) (-0.23) (-0.18) (-0.41) (-0.19) (-0.23) 
Urban population -0.15 0.03 -0.14 -0.15 -0.07 -0.15 -0.15 
 (-1.24) (0.19) (-1.11) (-1.23) (-0.62) (-1.23) (-1.27) 
Winning margin -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
 (-3.66) (-3.77) (-3.67) (-3.61) (-3.85) (-3.66) (-3.69) 
Power-match 0.02 -0.08 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.03) (-0.13) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (-0.02) 
Registered voters -0.29a*** -0.29a*** -0.29a*** -0.29a*** -0.21a*** -0.30a*** -0.30a*** 
per polling station (-9.11) (-9.00) (-9.08) (-9.05) (-4.92) (-8.99) (-9.09) 
Road length per -2.14** -2.54*** -2.16** -2.08** -2.17** -2.15** -2.18** 
polling station (-2.22) (-2.62) (-2.23) (-2.15) (-2.27) (-2.19) (-2.25) 
Ex-incumbency 0.24 0.17 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.26 
 (0.48) (0.33) (0.46) (0.50) (0.54) (0.47) (0.50) 
Population density  0.02***      
  (2.89)      
Gender ratio   0.06     
   (0.27)     
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Number of     0.05    
contestants    (0.80)    
Total voters     -0.14b***   
     (-2.82)   
Land size per      0.03  
polling station      (0.05)  
Murder       -0.00 
       (-0.19) 
Strike       -0.01 
       (-0.76) 
Observations 883 883 883 883 883 883 883 
Adjusted R-squared 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.76 
Number of constituency 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the percentage point change in voter 
turnout rates; the explanatory variables are percentage point change between election t and election t-1; a, the coefficient*100; b, 
the coefficient*10000; time fixed effects and constant are included but not reported. 
 
Appendix 5N: Model 5.3: Determinants of voter turnout (without 1991 power-match values and with 
political competition):1991-2008 
Explanatory variables Model 
5.3 
Model 
5.3a 
Model 
5.3b 
Model 
5.3c 
Model 
5.3d 
Model 
5.3e 
Model 
5.3f 
Night-time satellite 16.21*** 16.56*** 16.21*** 16.57*** 15.15*** 16.23*** 16.08*** 
imagery (3.21) (3.30) (3.20) (3.27) (3.00) (3.20) (3.18) 
Hard core poverty 0.06* 0.05 0.06* 0.06* 0.05 0.06 0.06 
 (1.66) (1.51) (1.65) (1.75) (1.40) (1.64) (1.61) 
Hindu population -0.46 -0.41 -0.46 -0.46 -0.45 -0.46 -0.45 
 (-0.93) (-0.82) (-0.93) (-0.93) (-0.90) (-0.92) (-0.89) 
Adult literacy -0.12 -0.18 -0.12 -0.12 -0.17 -0.12 -0.14 
 (-0.55) (-0.81) (-0.54) (-0.54) (-0.77) (-0.55) (-0.60) 
Urban population -0.10 0.07 -0.10 -0.10 -0.03 -0.10 -0.10 
 (-0.82) (0.52) (-0.78) (-0.82) (-0.24) (-0.81) (-0.85) 
Political competition 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.28 
 (0.61) (0.60) (0.61) (0.68) (0.64) (0.60) (0.66) 
Power-match 0.51 0.43 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.48 
 (0.87) (0.74) (0.87) (0.85) (0.89) (0.87) (0.81) 
Registered voters -0.29a*** -0.29a*** -0.29a*** -0.29a*** -0.21a*** -0.30a*** -0.30a*** 
per polling station (-8.97) (-8.86) (-8.96) (-8.91) (-5.00) (-8.87) (-8.94) 
Road length per -2.53*** -2.92*** -2.53*** -2.45** -2.58*** -2.55** -2.57*** 
polling station (-2.61) (-2.99) (-2.60) (-2.52) (-2.67) (-2.57) (-2.63) 
Ex-incumbency 0.07 -0.00 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.09 
 (0.14) (-0.00) (0.14) (0.18) (0.19) (0.14) (0.17) 
Population density  0.01***      
  (2.75)      
Gender ratio   0.00     
   (0.00)     
Number of     0.07    
contestants    (1.04)    
Total voters     -0.13**   
     (-2.56)   
Land size per      0.04  
polling station      (0.08)  
Murder       -0.00 
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       (-0.24) 
Strike       -0.01 
       (-0.63) 
Observations 883 883 883 883 883 883 883 
Adjusted R-squared 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 
Number of 
constituency 
299 299 299 299 299 299 299 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the percentage point change in voter 
turnout rates; the explanatory variables are percentage point change between election t and election t-1;a, the coefficient*100; time 
fixed effects and constant are included but not reported. 
 
Appendix 5O: Model 5.3: Determinants of voter turnout (without 1991 power-match values and with 
winning margin):1991-2008 
Explanatory variables Model 5.3 Model 
5.3a 
Model 
5.3b 
Model 
5.3c 
Model 
5.3d 
Model 
5.3e 
Model 
5.3f 
        
Night-time satellite 16.38*** 16.75*** 16.36*** 16.64*** 15.23*** 16.39*** 16.24*** 
imagery (3.28) (3.38) (3.27) (3.32) (3.06) (3.27) (3.25) 
Hard core poverty 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 
 (1.46) (1.30) (1.46) (1.53) (1.16) (1.45) (1.41) 
Hindu population -0.53 -0.48 -0.54 -0.53 -0.52 -0.53 -0.51 
 (-1.09) (-0.98) (-1.09) (-1.08) (-1.06) (-1.08) (-1.03) 
Adult literacy -0.04 -0.10 -0.05 -0.04 -0.09 -0.04 -0.05 
 (-0.19) (-0.45) (-0.23) (-0.18) (-0.41) (-0.19) (-0.23) 
Urban population -0.15 0.03 -0.14 -0.15 -0.07 -0.15 -0.15 
 (-1.24) (0.19) (-1.11) (-1.23) (-0.62) (-1.23) (-1.27) 
Winning margin -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
 (-3.66) (-3.77) (-3.67) (-3.61) (-3.85) (-3.66) (-3.69) 
Power-match 0.02 -0.08 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.03) (-0.13) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (-0.02) 
Registered voters -0.29a*** -0.29a*** -0.29a*** -0.29a*** -0.21a*** -0.30a*** -0.30a*** 
per polling station (-9.11) (-9.00) (-9.08) (-9.05) (-4.92) (-8.99) (-9.09) 
Road length per -2.14** -2.54*** -2.16** -2.08** -2.17** -2.15** -2.18** 
polling station (-2.22) (-2.62) (-2.23) (-2.15) (-2.27) (-2.19) (-2.25) 
Ex-incumbency 0.24 0.17 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.26 
 (0.48) (0.33) (0.46) (0.50) (0.54) (0.47) (0.50) 
Population density  0.02***      
  (2.89)      
Gender ratio   0.06     
   (0.27)     
Number of     0.05    
contestants    (0.80)    
Total voters     -0.00***   
     (-2.82)   
Land size per      0.03  
polling station      (0.05)  
Murder       -0.00 
       (-0.19) 
Strike       -0.01 
       (-0.76) 
Observations 883 883 883 883 883 883 883 
Adjusted R-squared 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.76 
Number of constituency 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 
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Notes: t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the percentage point change in voter turnout 
rates; the explanatory variables are percentage point change between election t and election t-1; a, the coefficient*100; time fixed 
effects and constant are included but not reported. 
Appendix 6A: Voter turnout elasticity of AL and BNP and their vote shares 
Panel 1 
 
Panel 2 
Table 6.1: Voter turnout elasticity of AL’s and BNP’s vote share 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Bangladesh Election Commission’s Reports (1991, 1996, 2001, 
2008)  
Appendix 6B: Voter turnout elasticity of AL and BNP: 1991-2008 
 
 
Appendix 6C: Vote shares of the winning party and the runner-up party and turnout rates in 
Bangladesh: 1937-2008 
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Source: Arefin (2011:13-45); Mannan (2005:180); Afzal (1976:97); Harun (2003:35,215); Ahmed 
(2004:140) 
 
Appendix 6D: Summary statistics of demeaned voter turnout rates:1991-2008  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 6E: Distribution of demeaned voter turnout rates:1991-2008 
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Appendix 6F: Summary statistics of winners’ vote shares of the AL, the BNP and minor parties 
 
 
 
Appendix 6G: Vote shares of winners of the incumbent and the dominant opposition party  
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Appendix 6H: Fixed effect estimations of the model 6.1: Determinants of winners’ vote shares (with 
1991 power match and political competition): 1991-2008  
 
Variables Model 6.1 Model 6.1a Model 6.1b Model 6.1c Model 6.1d 
Per capita real GDP  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-1.38) (-1.38) (-1.27) (-1.36) (-1.39) 
Inflation 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
 (1.01) (1.01) (0.93) (0.97) (0.99) 
Adult literacy -0.24* -0.24* -0.25* -0.24* -0.24* 
 (-1.66) (-1.66) (-1.69) (-1.66) (-1.68) 
Gender ratio 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.26 
 (1.60) (1.60) (1.64) (1.59) (1.61) 
Hindu population -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 
 (-0.15) (-0.15) (-0.09) (-0.16) (-0.13) 
Medium developed -0.07 -0.07 -0.10 -0.08 -0.05 
 (-0.20) (-0.20) (-0.28) (-0.21) (-0.14) 
High developed 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.63 
 (1.52) (1.52) (1.44) (1.49) (1.57) 
Voter turnout -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
 (-1.50) (-1.50) (-1.53) (-1.45) (-1.52) 
Political alliance 1.54*** 1.54*** 1.54*** 1.56*** 1.48*** 
 (3.17) (3.17) (3.16) (3.18) (3.05) 
Political competition -14.31*** -14.31*** -14.27*** -14.29*** -14.34*** 
 (-28.55) (-28.55) (-28.48) (-28.48) (-28.68) 
Power-match -1.12*** -1.12*** -1.14*** -1.12*** -1.10*** 
 (-3.35) (-3.35) (-3.38) (-3.36) (-3.31) 
Ex-incumbency 1.39*** 1.39*** 1.37*** 1.39*** 1.32*** 
 (4.61) (4.61) (4.65) (4.61) (4.06) 
Hard core poverty -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** -0.08*** -0.08** 
 (-2.58) (-2.58) (-2.53) (-2.62) (-2.51) 
Number of contestant    0.01   
   (0.21)   
Murder   0.00   
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   (1.06)   
Strike   -0.01   
   (-1.45)   
Expressiveness    0.21  
    (0.46)  
Remote past minister     0.73 
     (1.07) 
Immediate past minister     -0.47 
     (-0.54) 
Observations 1,181 1,181 1,181 1,181 1,181 
R-squared 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 
Number of constituency 300 300 300 300 300 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the winners’ vote shares at the 
level; all continuous variables are at the level; constituency and time fixed effects are included but not reported; standard errors 
are clustered by constituencies.  
 
Appendix 6I: Fixed effect estimations of the model 6.1: Determinants of winners’ vote shares (with 
1991 power match and continuous winning margin): 1991-2008  
 
Variables Model 6.1 Model 6.1a Model .1b Model 6.1c Model .1d 
Night time satellite imagery 2.29 2.29 2.85 3.01 1.02 
 (0.39) (0.39) (0.48) (0.52) (0.17) 
Inflation -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 
 (-0.94) (-0.94) (-0.99) (-1.06) (-0.96) 
Adult literacy 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.06 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.13) (0.27) (0.39) 
Gender ratio -0.03 -0.03 -0.00 -0.04 -0.03 
 (-0.21) (-0.21) (-0.00) (-0.31) (-0.26) 
Hindu population 0.39 0.39 0.47 0.37 0.39 
 (1.05) (1.05) (1.22) (1.00) (1.07) 
Medium developed -0.22 -0.22 -0.28 -0.25 -0.28 
 (-0.57) (-0.57) (-0.70) (-0.65) (-0.71) 
High developed -0.71 -0.71 -0.55 -0.74 -0.71 
 (-1.49) (-1.49) (-1.13) (-1.55) (-1.52) 
Voter turnout 0.08** 0.08** 0.07 0.04 0.08** 
 (2.00) (2.00) (1.65) (0.93) (2.07) 
Political alliance 2.70*** 2.70*** 2.70*** 2.77*** 2.82*** 
 (4.53) (4.53) (4.57) (4.67) (4.71) 
Winning margin 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 
 (29.46) (29.46) (29.57) (29.39) (30.16) 
Power match 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.31 
 (1.05) (1.05) (1.05) (1.04) (0.75) 
Ex-incumbency 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.19 
 (0.40) (0.40) (0.48) (0.44) (0.50) 
Hard core poverty 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.73) (0.73) (0.49) (0.49) (0.61) 
Number of contestant   0.11*   
   (1.88)   
Murder   0.01*   
   (1.70)   
Strike    -0.01   
   (-1.06)   
Expressiveness    1.19**  
    (2.05)  
Remote past minister     -1.47* 
     (-1.74) 
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Immediate past minister     2.07* 
     (1.75) 
Observations 1,181 1,181 1,181 1,181 1,181 
Adjusted R-squared 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 
Number of constituencies 300 300 300 300 300 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the winners’ vote shares at the 
level; all continuous variables are at the level; constituency and time fixed effects are included but not reported; standard errors 
are clustered by constituencies.  
 
Appendix 6J: Winning margin elasticity of winners’ vote shares 
 
 
Appendix 6K: Fixed effect estimations of the model 6.1: Determinants of winners’ vote shares (with 
1991 power match and discrete winning margin): 1991-2008  
Variables Model 6.1 Model 6.1a Model 6.1b Model 6.1c Model 6.1d 
Night-time satellite imagery 0.31 0.31 1.89 1.25 -0.33 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.34) (0.22) (-0.06) 
Inflation -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.13 
 (-1.34) (-1.34) (-1.38) (-1.46) (-1.33) 
Adult literacy -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 
 (-0.23) (-0.23) (-0.38) (-0.27) (-0.19) 
Gender ratio 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.00 0.01 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.32) (-0.03) (0.08) 
Hindu population 0.32 0.32 0.44 0.29 0.31 
 (0.73) (0.73) (1.00) (0.66) (0.72) 
Medium developed -0.13 -0.13 -0.28 -0.17 -0.15 
 (-0.33) (-0.33) (-0.66) (-0.43) (-0.38) 
High developed -1.12** -1.12** -0.95* -1.16** -1.13** 
 (-2.19) (-2.19) (-1.81) (-2.26) (-2.24) 
Voter turnout 0.10** 0.10** 0.08* 0.05 0.10** 
 (2.41) (2.41) (1.90) (1.10) (2.45) 
Political alliance 3.05*** 3.05*** 3.08*** 3.13*** 3.12*** 
 (4.87) (4.87) (4.99) (5.00) (4.97) 
1.Winning margin >5 but ≤10 2.79*** 2.79*** 2.80*** 2.73*** 2.76*** 
 (5.13) (5.13) (5.25) (5.05) (5.14) 
2. Winning margin >10 but ≤15 5.29*** 5.29*** 5.22*** 5.24*** 5.24*** 
 (10.74) (10.74) (10.68) (10.59) (10.43) 
3. Winning margin >15 but ≤20 7.90*** 7.90*** 7.90*** 7.88*** 7.88*** 
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 (14.60) (14.60) (14.66) (14.68) (14.42) 
4. Winning margin >20 but ≤25 10.46*** 10.46*** 10.47*** 10.35*** 10.43*** 
 (16.89) (16.89) (16.70) (16.57) (16.82) 
5. Winning margin >25 but ≤30 13.16*** 13.16*** 13.07*** 13.14*** 13.12*** 
 (16.31) (16.31) (16.24) (16.43) (15.96) 
6. Winning margin >30 19.44*** 19.44*** 19.41*** 19.34*** 19.44*** 
 (22.27) (22.27) (22.52) (22.44) (22.47) 
Power-match 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.22 0.19 
 (0.54) (0.54) (0.47) (0.52) (0.44) 
Ex-incumbency 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.28 0.34 
 (0.76) (0.76) (0.86) (0.79) (0.85) 
Hard core poverty 0.06* 0.06* 0.05 0.05 0.06 
 (1.74) (1.74) (1.40) (1.45) (1.64) 
Number of contestant    0.14**   
   (2.24)   
Murder   0.00   
   (1.21)   
Strike   -0.02*   
   (-1.81)   
Expressiveness    1.48**  
    (2.53)  
Remote past minister     -0.87 
     (-0.99) 
Immediate past minister     0.75 
     (0.62) 
Observations 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182 
Adjusted R-squared 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Number of constituency 300 300 300 300 300 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the winners’ vote shares at the 
level; all continuous variables are at the level; constituency and time fixed effects are included but not reported; standard errors 
are clustered by constituencies.  
 
 
Appendix 6L: Value of coefficient of the winning margins  
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Appendix 6M: Fixed effect estimations of the model 6.1: Determinants of winners’ vote shares (without 
1991 power match and with political competition): 1991-2008  
Variables Model 6.1  Model 6.1a  Model 6.1b  Model 6.1c  Model 6.1d  
Night-time satellite 
imagery 
21.03*** 22.19*** 21.09*** 20.98*** 21.09*** 
 (2.80) (2.97) (2.65) (2.80) (2.77) 
Inflation 0.45 0.39 0.45 0.47 0.45 
 (1.55) (1.33) (1.53) (1.57) (1.53) 
Adult literacy -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 
 (-0.57) (-0.59) (-0.57) (-0.53) (-0.62) 
Gender ratio 0.28** 0.28** 0.28** 0.28** 0.28** 
 (2.10) (2.03) (2.13) (2.10) (2.08) 
Hindu population 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.16 0.17 
 (0.37) (0.27) (0.38) (0.36) (0.38) 
Medium developed -0.02 -0.00 -0.05 -0.02 -0.00 
 (-0.06) (-0.01) (-0.12) (-0.04) (-0.01) 
High Developed 0.89** 0.78* 0.88** 0.89** 0.94** 
 (2.16) (1.89) (2.12) (2.13) (2.28) 
Voter turnout -0.07** -0.07* -0.07** -0.08** -0.07** 
 (-2.08) (-1.96) (-2.07) (-1.97) (-2.07) 
Political alliance 3.86*** 3.83*** 3.87*** 3.89*** 3.81*** 
 (5.14) (5.10) (5.10) (5.06) (5.10) 
Political competition -14.96*** -14.99*** -14.96*** -14.94*** -15.02*** 
 (-20.56) (-20.53) (-20.60) (-20.32) (-20.78) 
Power-match -0.65 -0.66 -0.66 -0.65 -0.63 
 (-1.37) (-1.39) (-1.38) (-1.35) (-1.33) 
Ex-incumbency 1.14*** 1.13*** 1.14*** 1.14*** 1.04*** 
 (3.11) (3.06) (3.11) (3.09) (2.63) 
Hard core poverty -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 
 (-3.18) (-3.04) (-3.24) (-3.21) (-3.10) 
Murder   -0.00   
   (-0.08)   
Strike   -0.00   
   (-0.37)   
Number of contestant  -0.07    
  (-1.37)    
Expressiveness    0.28  
    (0.46)  
Remote past minister     0.82 
     (1.07) 
Immediate past minister     0.06 
     (0.06) 
Observations 884 884 884 884 884 
Adjusted R-squared 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 
Number of constituencies 300 300 300 300 300 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the winners’ vote shares at the level; 
all continuous variables are at the level; constituency and time fixed effects are included but not reported; standard errors are clustered by 
constituencies.  
 
Appendix 6N: Fixed effect estimations of the model 6.1: Determinants of winners’ vote shares (without 
1991 power match and with continuous winning margin): 1991-2008  
 
Variables Model 6.1 Model 6.1a Model 
6.1b 
Model 6.1c Model 
6.1d 
Night-time satellite imagery 22.26*** 20.53*** 19.08** 22.13*** 21.05** 
 (2.83) (2.61) (2.33) (2.84) (2.58) 
Inflation -0.66** -0.58* -0.69** -0.62* -0.63** 
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 (-2.02) (-1.77) (-2.06) (-1.84) (-2.03) 
Adult literacy -0.15 -0.14 -0.16 -0.13 -0.11 
 (-0.55) (-0.54) (-0.60) (-0.48) (-0.46) 
Gender ratio -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 
 (-0.19) (-0.15) (-0.08) (-0.24) (-0.18) 
Hindu population 0.23 0.28 0.27 0.22 0.18 
 (0.36) (0.44) (0.43) (0.34) (0.29) 
Medium developed -0.76* -0.79* -0.70* -0.74* -0.83** 
 (-1.90) (-1.94) (-1.71) (-1.84) (-2.06) 
High developed -0.63 -0.48 -0.61 -0.65 -0.78* 
 (-1.33) (-1.03) (-1.28) (-1.36) (-1.65) 
Voter turnout 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 
 (0.87) (0.77) (0.93) (0.43) (0.92) 
Political alliance 2.86*** 2.87*** 2.79*** 2.93*** 2.98*** 
 (3.94) (3.96) (3.83) (3.99) (4.13) 
Winning margin 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 
 (28.00) (28.23) (27.99) (28.11) (28.90) 
Power-match -0.30 -0.28 -0.25 -0.29 -0.37 
 (-0.66) (-0.62) (-0.55) (-0.64) (-0.78) 
Ex-incumbency 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.64 
 (0.86) (0.91) (0.85) (0.83) (1.47) 
Hard core poverty 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.07) (-0.12) (0.16) (0.03) (-0.10) 
Murder   0.00   
   (1.16)   
Strike   -0.00   
   (-0.20)   
Number of contestant  0.10*    
  (1.72)    
Expressiveness    0.64  
    (1.05)  
Remote past minister     -2.86*** 
     (-2.94) 
Immediate past minister     0.38 
     (0.43) 
Observations 884 884 884 884 884 
Adjusted R-squared 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.82 
Number of constituencies 300 300 300 300 300 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the winners’ vote shares at the 
level; all continuous variables are at the level; constituency and time fixed effects are included but not reported; standard errors 
are clustered by constituencies. 
Appendix 6O: Fixed effect estimations of the model 6.1: Determinants of winners’ vote shares (without 
1991 power match and with discrete winning margin): 1991-2008  
Variables Model 6.1 Model 6.1a Model 6.1b Model 6.1c Model 6.1d 
Night-time satellite imagery 24.12*** 22.09*** 21.64*** 23.82*** 23.64*** 
 (3.19) (2.90) (2.79) (3.21) (3.05) 
Inflation -0.61* -0.52 -0.63* -0.54 -0.59* 
 (-1.70) (-1.45) (-1.74) (-1.45) (-1.71) 
Adult literacy -0.18 -0.17 -0.20 -0.15 -0.16 
 (-0.62) (-0.59) (-0.68) (-0.50) (-0.57) 
Gender ratio 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.10 
 (0.50) (0.54) (0.54) (0.42) (0.53) 
Hindu population 0.64 0.70 0.69 0.61 0.61 
 (1.17) (1.25) (1.22) (1.11) (1.11) 
Medium developed -0.62 -0.64 -0.65 -0.57 -0.64 
 (-1.48) (-1.53) (-1.55) (-1.37) (-1.56) 
High developed -0.98* -0.81 -1.00* -1.00** -1.07** 
 (-1.94) (-1.61) (-1.97) (-1.99) (-2.15) 
Voter turnout 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.00 0.03 
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 (0.64) (0.56) (0.63) (-0.03) (0.66) 
Political alliance 3.95*** 3.96*** 3.91*** 4.07*** 4.03*** 
 (5.16) (5.19) (5.04) (5.25) (5.24) 
1.Winning margin >5 but ≤10 2.92*** 2.92*** 2.91*** 2.81*** 2.89*** 
 (5.35) (5.41) (5.36) (5.16) (5.20) 
2. Winning margin >10 but ≤15 5.30*** 5.27*** 5.30*** 5.24*** 5.22*** 
 (9.10) (9.13) (9.07) (8.93) (8.82) 
3. Winning margin >15 but ≤20 7.74*** 7.75*** 7.75*** 7.68*** 7.75*** 
 (12.66) (12.64) (12.74) (12.79) (12.64) 
4. Winning margin >20 but ≤25 10.38*** 10.47*** 10.40*** 10.27*** 10.40*** 
 (14.38) (14.39) (14.32) (14.34) (14.35) 
5. Winning margin >25 but ≤30 12.10*** 12.14*** 12.07*** 12.05*** 12.00*** 
 (14.23) (14.26) (14.19) (14.44) (13.94) 
6. Winning margin >30 19.40*** 19.44*** 19.41*** 19.30*** 19.40*** 
 (20.54) (20.87) (20.61) (20.63) (20.57) 
Power match -0.42 -0.40 -0.42 -0.41 -0.45 
 (-0.81) (-0.77) (-0.81) (-0.78) (-0.85) 
Ex-incumbency 0.54 0.56 0.53 0.52 0.77* 
 (1.36) (1.41) (1.33) (1.30) (1.67) 
Hard core poverty 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 (1.07) (0.88) (1.02) (1.02) (0.94) 
Murder   0.00   
   (0.71)   
Strike   -0.02   
   (-1.23)   
Number of contestant  0.11*    
  (1.78)    
Expressiveness    1.20**  
    (1.98)  
Remote past minister     -1.82* 
     (-1.68) 
Immediate past minister     -0.25 
     (-0.26) 
Observations 884 884 884 884 884 
Adjusted R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 
Number of constituencies 300 300 300 300 300 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the winners’ vote shares at the 
level; all continuous variables are at the level; constituency and time fixed effects are included but not reported; standard errors 
are clustered by constituencies.  
Appendix 6P: Summary statistics of continuous variables associated with re-elected winners (with 1991 
election) 
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  Panel 1: Summary statistics of continuous variables associated with all winners (1991-2008) 
 
Panel 2: Summary statistics of continuous variables associated with all re-elected winners (with 1991 
election) 
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Panel 3: Summary statistics of continuous variables associated with all re-elected winners (without 
1991 election) 
 
Appendix 6Q: Fixed effect estimations of the model 6.2: Determinants of re-elected winners’ vote 
shares (with 1991 power-match and winning margin): 1991-2008  
Variables Model 6.2 Model 6.2a Model 6.2b Model 6.2c Model 6.2d 
      
Night-time satellite imagery 35.58* 34.30 34.48 32.36 29.01 
 (1.65) (1.62) (1.57) (1.59) (1.22) 
Inflation -0.35 -0.45 -0.38 -0.35 -0.42 
 (-1.14) (-1.44) (-1.33) (-1.12) (-1.45) 
Adult literacy 0.29 0.06 0.18 0.31 0.22 
 (0.51) (0.12) (0.34) (0.55) (0.41) 
Gender ratio -0.06 0.02 -0.14 -0.07 -0.07 
 (-0.24) (0.08) (-0.57) (-0.28) (-0.30) 
Hindu population 1.71 2.08 1.27 1.88 1.26 
 (1.17) (1.49) (0.89) (1.28) (0.94) 
Medium developed -1.91* -1.74* -2.82*** -1.81* -2.01* 
 (-1.84) (-1.70) (-2.86) (-1.72) (-1.97) 
High developed 0.20 0.81 0.11 0.22 0.05 
 (0.18) (0.76) (0.10) (0.20) (0.04) 
Voter turnout 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.06 
 (0.62) (0.11) (0.73) (0.29) (0.64) 
Political alliance 6.16*** 6.06*** 6.21*** 6.31*** 6.44*** 
 (3.32) (3.63) (3.46) (3.29) (3.48) 
Winning margin 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 
 (8.04) (8.26) (8.64) (8.24) (8.87) 
Power-match 0.77 0.79 0.49 0.86 0.63 
 (0.94) (1.01) (0.58) (1.01) (0.75) 
Ex-incumbency 0.44 0.57 -0.01 0.43 0.91 
 (0.34) (0.43) (-0.01) (0.34) (0.69) 
Hard core poverty -0.08 -0.07 -0.12 -0.07 -0.12 
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 (-0.78) (-0.73) (-1.23) (-0.72) (-1.23) 
Number of contestant  0.40***    
  (3.27)    
Murder   -0.01***   
   (-2.64)   
Strike   -0.09***   
   (-3.11)   
Expressiveness    1.10  
    (0.85)  
Remote past minister     -2.64** 
     (-1.98) 
Immediate past minister     1.88 
     (1.34) 
Observations 330 330 330 330 330 
Adjusted R-squared 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.80 0.81 
Number of constituencies 210 210 210 210 210 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the re-elected winners’ vote 
shares at the level; all continuous variables are at the level; constituency and time fixed effects are included but not reported; 
standard errors are clustered by constituencies.  
 
 
Appendix 6R: Winning margin elasticity of vote shares of re-elected winners 
 
Appendix 6S: Fixed effect estimations of the model 6.2: Determinants of re-elected winners’ vote shares 
(with 1991 power-match and discrete winning margin slabs): 1991-2008  
Variables Model 6.2 Model 6.2a Model 6.2b Model 6.2c Model 6.2d 
Night-time satellite imagery 41.15** 38.70* 39.59* 38.74** 35.91* 
 (2.18) (1.96) (1.97) (2.10) (1.75) 
Inflation -0.36 -0.45 -0.36 -0.36 -0.40 
 (-1.14) (-1.32) (-1.16) (-1.11) (-1.26) 
Adult literacy 0.21 -0.03 0.14 0.22 0.21 
 APPENDIX 
  
439 
 
 (0.36) (-0.06) (0.25) (0.38) (0.37) 
Gender ratio -0.05 0.03 -0.15 -0.05 -0.07 
 (-0.18) (0.14) (-0.55) (-0.19) (-0.27) 
Hindu population 1.60 2.05 1.23 1.70 1.32 
 (1.04) (1.44) (0.87) (1.10) (0.92) 
Medium developed -1.66 -1.49 -2.57*** -1.58 -1.69* 
 (-1.64) (-1.49) (-2.62) (-1.53) (-1.68) 
High developed -0.41 0.17 -0.56 -0.40 -0.48 
 (-0.36) (0.17) (-0.53) (-0.36) (-0.43) 
Voter turnout 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.06 
 (0.56) (0.16) (0.72) (0.33) (0.58) 
Political alliance 6.82*** 6.53*** 6.69*** 6.90*** 7.10*** 
 (3.44) (3.70) (3.45) (3.40) (3.50) 
1.Winning margin >5 but ≤10 1.71 1.30 1.00 1.76 1.64 
 (0.93) (0.76) (0.56) (0.95) (0.87) 
2. Winning margin >10 but ≤15 5.15*** 4.75*** 4.56*** 5.25*** 4.80*** 
 (3.58) (3.33) (3.13) (3.50) (3.27) 
3. Winning margin >15 but ≤20 4.58** 5.01*** 5.03*** 4.82** 4.50** 
 (2.53) (2.96) (2.81) (2.55) (2.49) 
4. Winning margin >20 but ≤25 8.91*** 9.43*** 9.41*** 9.02*** 8.57*** 
 (3.99) (4.32) (4.39) (4.02) (3.85) 
5. Winning margin >25 but ≤30 8.99*** 8.88*** 8.85*** 9.18*** 8.76*** 
 (4.75) (4.74) (4.81) (4.93) (4.45) 
6. Winning margin >30 14.67*** 14.06*** 14.35*** 14.78*** 14.76*** 
 (7.41) (7.48) (7.71) (7.51) (7.98) 
Power-match 0.50 0.55 0.24 0.55 0.50 
 (0.60) (0.70) (0.27) (0.64) (0.57) 
Ex-incumbency 1.22 1.28 0.75 1.19 1.72 
 (0.81) (0.83) (0.50) (0.80) (1.06) 
Hard core poverty -0.06 -0.08 -0.13 -0.06 -0.09 
 (-0.50) (-0.67) (-1.06) (-0.50) (-0.79) 
Number of contestants   0.44***    
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  (3.52)    
Murder   -0.01**   
   (-2.40)   
Strike   -0.09***   
   (-2.77)   
Expressiveness    0.81  
    (0.59)  
Remote past minister     -2.40* 
     (-1.66) 
Immediate past minister     0.50 
     (0.34) 
Observations 330 330 330 330 330 
Adjusted R-squared 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.80 0.81 
Number of constituencies 210 210 210 210 210 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the re-elected winners’ vote 
shares at the level; all continuous variables are at the level; constituency and time fixed effects are included but not reported; 
standard errors are clustered by constituencies.  
 
Appendix 6T: Value of coefficient of the winning margins of re-elected winners  
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Appendix 6U: Fixed effect estimations of the model 6.2: Determinants of re-elected winners’ vote 
shares (without 1991 power-match and with political competition): 1991-2008  
Variables Model 6.2 Model 6.2a Model 6.2b Model 6.2c Model 6.2d 
      
Night-time satellite 
imagery 
34.31** 34.35** 34.81** 38.69*** 35.72** 
 (2.39) (2.38) (2.41) (2.85) (2.35) 
Inflation 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.10 0.19 
 (0.50) (0.54) (0.56) (0.19) (0.32) 
Adult literacy 0.76* 0.71* 0.78** 0.65* 0.72* 
 (1.91) (1.75) (2.07) (1.66) (1.84) 
Gender ratio 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.14) (0.05) (0.23) (0.06) 
Hindu population -0.29 -0.16 -0.26 -0.59 -0.29 
 (-0.25) (-0.14) (-0.23) (-0.52) (-0.25) 
Medium developed 0.03 0.04 0.05 -0.28 -0.02 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (-0.41) (-0.03) 
High developed 2.63*** 2.78*** 2.65*** 2.49*** 2.78*** 
 (3.12) (3.24) (3.15) (3.06) (3.22) 
Voter turnout -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 
 (-0.33) (-0.48) (-0.34) (0.24) (-0.57) 
Political alliance 7.43*** 7.47*** 7.43*** 6.60*** 7.31*** 
 (4.92) (4.89) (4.88) (4.26) (4.83) 
Political competition -13.24*** -12.99*** -13.23*** -13.48*** -13.34*** 
 (-12.57) (-12.08) (-12.83) (-13.39) (-12.74) 
Power-match 1.36* 1.38* 1.34* 1.03 1.34* 
 (1.75) (1.73) (1.73) (1.28) (1.76) 
Ex-incumbency -0.93 -0.87 -0.83 -0.95 -1.20 
 (-0.77) (-0.75) (-0.65) (-0.79) (-0.95) 
Hard core poverty -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.10 
 (-1.39) (-1.56) (-1.41) (-1.37) (-1.12) 
Number of contestants  0.11    
  (1.21)    
Murder   -0.00   
   (-0.14)   
Strike   0.00   
   (0.19)   
Expressiveness    -2.15*  
    (-1.84)  
Remote past minister     1.19 
     (0.81) 
Immediate past minister     0.69 
     (0.51) 
Observations 303 303 303 303 303 
Adjusted R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 
Number of constituencies 197 197 197 197 197 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the re-elected winners’ vote 
shares at the level; all continuous variables are at the level; constituency and time fixed effects are included but not reported; 
standard errors are clustered by constituencies.  
 
 
 
 
 APPENDIX 
  
442 
 
Appendix 6V: Fixed effect estimations of the model 6.2: Determinants of re-elected winners’ vote 
shares (without 1991 power-match and with winning margin): 1991-2008  
 
Variables Model 6.2 Model 6.2a Model 6.2b Model 6.2c Model 6.2d 
      
Night-time satellite imagery 34.98 33.90 35.42 30.43 28.46 
 (1.65) (1.62) (1.64) (1.54) (1.21) 
Inflation 0.05 0.12 0.17 0.20 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.17) (0.25) (0.28) (0.02) 
Adult literacy 0.64 0.44 0.57 0.71 0.69 
 (1.16) (0.89) (1.14) (1.32) (1.31) 
Gender ratio -0.18 -0.12 -0.26 -0.20 -0.14 
 (-0.77) (-0.57) (-1.08) (-0.93) (-0.64) 
Hindu population -0.43 0.04 -0.59 -0.19 -0.67 
 (-0.28) (0.02) (-0.33) (-0.12) (-0.50) 
Medium developed -1.59 -1.47 -2.43** -1.33 -1.70 
 (-1.42) (-1.33) (-2.31) (-1.14) (-1.52) 
High developed 0.50 1.11 0.37 0.57 0.33 
 (0.45) (1.05) (0.36) (0.52) (0.30) 
Voter turnout 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.12 
 (1.64) (0.94) (1.60) (1.15) (1.34) 
Political alliance 7.25*** 7.19*** 6.77*** 7.73*** 8.00*** 
 (3.02) (3.21) (2.80) (2.99) (3.42) 
Winning margin 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 
 (8.27) (8.33) (8.75) (8.56) (9.00) 
Power-match 1.31 1.37 0.73 1.57 1.36 
 (1.23) (1.38) (0.65) (1.36) (1.32) 
Ex-incumbency -1.25 -1.00 -1.36 -1.21 -0.78 
 (-0.94) (-0.74) (-0.92) (-0.91) (-0.54) 
Hard core poverty -0.13 -0.15 -0.18 -0.12 -0.17 
 (-1.12) (-1.41) (-1.49) (-1.06) (-1.65) 
Number of contestants  0.40***    
  (3.26)    
Murder   -0.01**   
   (-2.42)   
Strike   -0.08**   
   (-2.56)   
Expressiveness    1.72  
    (1.16)  
Remote past minister     -2.72* 
     (-1.77) 
Immediate past minister     1.93 
     (1.03) 
Observations 303 303 303 303 303 
Adjusted R-squared 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.80 0.81 
Number of constituencies 197 197 197 197 197 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the re-elected winners’ vote 
shares at the level; all continuous variables are at the level; constituency and time fixed effects are included but not reported; 
standard errors are clustered by constituencies.  
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Appendix 6W: Fixed effect estimations of the model 6.2: Determinants of re-elected winners’ vote 
shares (without 1991 power-match and with discrete winning margin): 1991-2008  
Variables Model 6.2 Model 6.2a Model 6.2b Model 6.2c Model 6.2d 
      
Night-time satellite imagery 40.28** 37.62** 40.44** 35.73** 35.07* 
 (2.22) (1.98) (2.13) (2.05) (1.75) 
Inflation 0.33 0.42 0.51 0.46 0.40 
 (0.45) (0.57) (0.71) (0.61) (0.51) 
Adult literacy 0.80 0.53 0.75 0.86 0.88 
 (1.39) (0.99) (1.36) (1.53) (1.61) 
Gender ratio -0.24 -0.16 -0.34 -0.26 -0.23 
 (-1.00) (-0.69) (-1.29) (-1.06) (-0.93) 
Hindu population -0.46 0.10 -0.52 -0.28 -0.60 
 (-0.30) (0.07) (-0.32) (-0.19) (-0.44) 
Medium developed -1.17 -1.11 -2.01* -0.90 -1.15 
 (-1.06) (-1.01) (-1.88) (-0.79) (-1.03) 
High developed 0.02 0.55 -0.21 0.05 -0.15 
 (0.02) (0.56) (-0.20) (0.04) (-0.13) 
Voter turnout 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.14 
 (1.55) (1.07) (1.59) (1.13) (1.34) 
Political alliance 8.57*** 8.20*** 7.82*** 8.90*** 9.13*** 
 (3.84) (3.84) (3.51) (3.72) (4.12) 
1.Winning margin >5 but ≤10 0.90 0.66 0.25 0.92 0.76 
 (0.50) (0.40) (0.15) (0.51) (0.42) 
2. Winning margin >10 but ≤15 4.41*** 4.05*** 3.89*** 4.58*** 4.21*** 
 (3.21) (2.95) (2.74) (3.19) (3.08) 
3. Winning margin >15 but ≤20 3.72** 4.38** 4.02** 4.19** 3.65* 
 (2.00) (2.45) (2.18) (2.18) (1.96) 
4. Winning margin >20 but ≤25 7.75*** 8.75*** 8.18*** 7.93*** 7.48*** 
 (3.60) (3.95) (3.95) (3.71) (3.52) 
5. Winning margin >25 but ≤30 8.92*** 9.00*** 8.77*** 9.29*** 8.68*** 
 (4.87) (4.92) (4.96) (5.20) (4.48) 
6. Winning margin >30 14.45*** 13.99*** 14.08*** 14.71*** 14.54*** 
 (7.44) (7.67) (7.60) (7.67) (8.06) 
Power-match 1.48 1.55* 0.89 1.69 1.54 
 (1.52) (1.66) (0.85) (1.62) (1.60) 
Ex-incumbency -0.71 -0.43 -0.76 -0.72 -0.15 
 (-0.50) (-0.30) (-0.52) (-0.51) (-0.10) 
Hard core poverty -0.11 -0.17 -0.19 -0.11 -0.15 
 (-0.89) (-1.40) (-1.31) (-0.87) (-1.22) 
contestant  0.47***    
  (3.45)    
Murder   -0.01**   
   (-2.22)   
Strike   -0.08**   
   (-2.28)   
Expressiveness (1.88) (1.29) (-0.81) (1.82) (2.29) 
    1.58  
Remote past minister    (1.07)  
     -2.70* 
Immediate past minister     (-1.75) 
     0.58 
     (0.30) 
Observations 303 303 303 303 303 
Adjusted R-squared 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.81 
Number of constituencies 197 197 197 197 197 
 APPENDIX 
  
444 
 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the re-elected winners’ vote 
shares at the level; all continuous variables are at the level; constituency and time fixed effects are included but not reported; 
standard errors are clustered by constituencies.  
Appendix 6X: Re-election rates of candidates belonging to the incumbent and the dominant opposition 
party in marginal and non-marginal constituencies: 1991-2008 
 
 
Appendix 6Y: Fixed effect estimations of the model 6.3: Determinants of elected winners’ vote shares in 
marginal constituencies (without 1991 power-match and with winning margin): 1991-2008  
Variables Model 6.3 Model 6.3a Model 6.3b Model 6.3c Model 6.3d 
      
Night-time satellite imagery 186.32* 209.77* 191.17* 178.13* 159.67* 
 (1.81) (1.87) (1.67) (1.85) (1.97) 
Inflation -3.51 -4.04 -3.55 -3.66 -2.73 
 (-1.30) (-1.38) (-1.31) (-1.31) (-1.37) 
Adult literacy -2.80* -3.13* -2.91* -2.81* -2.43** 
 (-1.72) (-1.73) (-1.74) (-1.75) (-2.09) 
Gender ratio -3.07* -3.22* -3.26 -3.00* -2.66* 
 (-1.67) (-1.73) (-1.64) (-1.71) (-1.87) 
Hindu population -4.56** -4.27* -3.97 -4.13* -6.24*** 
 (-2.10) (-1.89) (-1.63) (-1.87) (-3.14) 
Medium developed -0.65 -0.30 -0.59 -0.36 -0.41 
 (-0.38) (-0.18) (-0.32) (-0.21) (-0.28) 
High developed 1.51 0.88 1.08 1.76 3.01 
 (0.68) (0.40) (0.47) (0.76) (1.42) 
Voter turnout 0.56** 0.63** 0.60* 0.70* 0.57** 
 (2.05) (2.37) (1.89) (1.90) (2.55) 
Political alliance 7.32** 8.55** 7.57** 7.31** 6.89** 
 (2.17) (2.39) (2.11) (2.25) (2.13) 
Winning margin 0.63*** 0.59*** 0.62*** 0.64*** 0.61*** 
 (8.53) (6.43) (7.77) (8.30) (7.76) 
Power-match 1.14 0.17 1.78 0.61 0.86 
 (0.69) (0.08) (0.84) (0.34) (0.51) 
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Ex-incumbency 0.23 -0.34 0.23 0.10 2.30 
 (0.17) (-0.23) (0.16) (0.07) (1.26) 
Hard core poverty 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.03 
 (0.53) (0.51) (0.33) (0.66) (0.19) 
Murder   0.01   
   (0.74)   
Strike   -0.07   
   (-0.55)   
Number of contestants  -0.50    
  (-1.07)    
Expressiveness    -2.26  
    (-0.78)  
Remote past minister     -11.60** 
     (-2.32) 
Immediate past minister     -21.76*** 
     (-4.41) 
Observations 230 230 230 230 230 
Adjusted R-squared 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.86 
Number of constituencies 170 170 170 170 170 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the elected winners’ vote shares 
at the level; all continuous variables are at the level; constituency and time fixed effects are included but not reported; standard 
errors are clustered by constituencies.  
 
Appendix 6Z: Fixed effect estimations of the model 6.3: Determinants of elected winners’ vote shares in 
non-marginal constituencies (without 1991 power-match and with political competition): 1991-2008  
Variables Model 6.3 Model 6.3a Model 6.3b Model 6.3c Model 6.3d 
Night-time satellite 
imagery 
20.63** 22.11** 23.61*** 19.63** 20.91** 
 (2.17) (2.34) (2.61) (2.03) (2.20) 
Inflation 0.36 0.32 0.41 0.42 0.38 
 (0.93) (0.83) (1.08) (1.09) (0.99) 
Adult literacy -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 -0.07 -0.12 
 (-0.43) (-0.44) (-0.43) (-0.24) (-0.43) 
Gender ratio 0.40** 0.39** 0.39** 0.37** 0.39** 
 (2.54) (2.45) (2.51) (2.37) (2.45) 
Hindu population -0.15 -0.20 -0.22 -0.15 -0.15 
 (-0.33) (-0.44) (-0.49) (-0.35) (-0.32) 
Medium developed -0.78 -0.77 -0.95* -0.68 -0.80 
 (-1.51) (-1.48) (-1.81) (-1.31) (-1.53) 
High developed 0.62 0.51 0.54 0.64 0.66 
 (1.18) (0.94) (1.04) (1.19) (1.25) 
Voter turnout -0.06 -0.06 -0.07* -0.10** -0.06 
 (-1.55) (-1.45) (-1.69) (-2.29) (-1.47) 
Political alliance 3.85*** 3.79*** 3.99*** 4.01*** 3.93*** 
 (4.05) (3.99) (4.12) (4.19) (4.05) 
Political competition -14.94*** -14.96*** -14.94*** -14.85*** -14.94*** 
 (-18.58) (-18.51) (-18.49) (-18.55) (-18.44) 
Power-match -0.56 -0.58 -0.66 -0.57 -0.59 
 (-0.93) (-0.98) (-1.09) (-0.97) (-0.98) 
Ex-incumbency 0.82* 0.82* 0.81* 0.79* 0.70 
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 (1.78) (1.79) (1.77) (1.72) (1.42) 
Hard core poverty -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 
 (-1.18) (-1.07) (-1.42) (-1.14) (-1.18) 
Murder   -0.01   
   (-1.41)   
Strike   -0.01   
   (-1.01)   
Number of contestants  -0.07    
  (-1.02)    
Expressiveness    1.40**  
    (2.03)  
Remote past minister     0.49 
     (0.57) 
Immediate past minister     1.11 
     (0.84) 
Observations 654 654 654 654 654 
Adjusted R-squared 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 
Number of constituencies 295 295 295 295 295 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the elected winners’ vote shares 
at the level; all continuous variables are at the level; constituency and time fixed effects are included but not reported; standard 
errors are clustered by constituencies.  
 
Appendix 6Z-A: Fixed effect estimations of the model 6.3: Determinants of elected winners’ vote shares 
in non-marginal constituencies(without 1991 power-match and with winning margin): 1991-2008  
Variables Model 6.3 Model 6.3a Model 6.3b Model 6.3c Model 6.3d 
Night-time satellite imagery 24.47** 22.41** 19.51* 23.91** 23.50** 
 (2.48) (2.26) (1.88) (2.48) (2.31) 
Inflation -0.52 -0.47 -0.57 -0.48 -0.49 
 (-1.43) (-1.30) (-1.55) (-1.31) (-1.38) 
Adult literacy 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.11 
 (0.46) (0.49) (0.40) (0.57) (0.45) 
Gender ratio 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03 
 (0.13) (0.20) (0.15) (0.04) (0.16) 
Hindu population 1.16** 1.22** 1.27** 1.15** 1.10** 
 (2.26) (2.37) (2.50) (2.21) (2.12) 
Medium developed -0.63 -0.64 -0.55 -0.57 -0.68 
 (-1.29) (-1.29) (-1.05) (-1.17) (-1.39) 
High developed -0.59 -0.45 -0.58 -0.57 -0.72 
 (-1.02) (-0.78) (-1.01) (-1.00) (-1.26) 
Voter turnout -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 
 (-0.32) (-0.41) (-0.26) (-0.78) (-0.38) 
Political alliance 2.76*** 2.82*** 2.61** 2.88*** 2.87*** 
 (2.72) (2.78) (2.55) (2.80) (2.80) 
Winning margin 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.53*** 0.54*** 
 (23.22) (23.40) (22.81) (23.13) (23.32) 
Power-match -0.17 -0.13 -0.10 -0.18 -0.25 
 (-0.31) (-0.25) (-0.18) (-0.34) (-0.46) 
Ex-incumbency -0.18 -0.18 -0.20 -0.19 -0.01 
 (-0.45) (-0.47) (-0.52) (-0.48) (-0.03) 
Hard core poverty 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.40) (0.25) (0.47) (0.43) (0.39) 
Murder   0.01*   
   (1.65)   
Strike   -0.01   
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   (-0.50)   
Number of contestants  0.09    
  (1.29)    
Expressiveness    0.85  
    (1.21)  
Remote past minister     -1.60** 
     (-1.99) 
Immediate past minister     0.85 
     (0.82) 
Observations 654 654 654 654 654 
Adjusted R-squared 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 
Number of constituencies 295 295 295 295 295 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the elected winners’ vote shares 
at the level; all continuous variables are at the level; constituency and time fixed effects are included but not reported; standard 
errors are clustered by constituencies.  
 
Appendix 6Z-B: Fixed effect estimations of the model 6.3: Determinants of re-elected winners’ vote 
shares in marginal constituencies(without 1991 power-match and with political competition): 1991-
2008  
Variables Model 6.3 Model 6.3a Model 6.3b Model 6.3c Model 6.3d 
      
Night-time satellite 
imagery 
-1,676.97*** -1,676.97*** -1,676.97*** -1,676.97*** -1,676.97*** 
 (-1.90e+13) (-1.90e+13) (-1.90e+13) (-1.90e+13) (-1.90e+13) 
Inflation 17.26*** 17.26*** 17.26*** 17.26*** 17.26*** 
 (3.68e+13) (3.68e+13) (3.68e+13) (3.68e+13) (3.68e+13) 
Adult literacy 2.77*** 2.77*** 2.77*** 2.77*** 2.77*** 
 (4.04e+13) (4.04e+13) (4.04e+13) (4.04e+13) (4.04e+13) 
Gender ratio 4.66*** 4.66*** 4.66*** 4.66*** 4.66*** 
 (1.97e+13) (1.97e+13) (1.97e+13) (1.97e+13) (1.97e+13) 
Hindu population - - - - - 
      
Medium developed - - - - - 
      
High developed - - - - - 
      
Voter turnout - - - - - 
      
Political alliance - - - - - 
      
Political competition - - - - - 
      
Power-match - - - - - 
      
Ex-incumbency - - - - - 
      
Hard core poverty - - - - - 
      
Murder   -   
      
Strike   -   
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Number of contestants  -    
      
Expressiveness    -  
      
Remote past minister     - 
      
Immediate past minister     - 
      
Observations 65 65 65 65 65 
Adjusted R-squared 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Number of 
constituencies 
61 61 61 61 61 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the re-elected winners’ vote 
shares at the level in marginal constituencies; all continuous variables are at the level; constituency and time fixed effects are 
included but not reported; standard errors are clustered by constituencies.  
 
 
Appendix 6Z-C: OLS estimations of the model 6.3: Determinants of re-elected winners’ vote shares in 
marginal constituencies(without 1991 power-match and with political competition): 1991-2008  
Variables Model 6.3 Model 6.3a Model 6.3b Model 6.3c Model 6.3d 
      
Night-time satellite 
imagery 
2.70 2.98 2.46 2.93 3.71 
 (0.52) (0.57) (0.43) (0.55) (0.71) 
Inflation 0.05 0.15 0.08 0.07 -0.12 
 (0.06) (0.17) (0.09) (0.08) (-0.14) 
Adult literacy -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 
 (-0.57) (-0.72) (-0.49) (-0.54) (-0.77) 
Gender ratio -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 -0.13 -0.10 
 (-1.51) (-1.29) (-0.89) (-1.30) (-1.26) 
Hindu population 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 
 (0.63) (0.68) (0.68) (0.58) (0.62) 
Medium developed 1.27 1.27 1.10 1.32 1.51 
 (1.01) (1.01) (0.85) (1.02) (1.20) 
High developed 1.07 1.07 0.92 1.05 0.86 
 (0.82) (0.82) (0.67) (0.80) (0.66) 
Voter turnout -0.05 -0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.02 
 (-0.59) (-0.44) (-0.85) (-0.47) (-0.20) 
Political alliance 4.93** 4.75** 4.96** 4.94** 4.65** 
 (2.63) (2.48) (2.60) (2.61) (2.35) 
Political competition -16.96*** -16.79*** -17.26*** -16.98*** -17.07*** 
 (-10.85) (-10.49) (-10.45) (-10.73) (-10.68) 
Power-match 1.25 1.06 1.35 1.26 1.13 
 (0.94) (0.77) (0.96) (0.94) (0.83) 
Ex-incumbency -0.68 -0.65 -1.02 -0.60 -1.16 
 (-0.54) (-0.51) (-0.74) (-0.44) (-0.90) 
Hard core poverty -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 -0.07 
 (-1.15) (-1.04) (-0.68) (-1.15) (-1.03) 
Murder   -0.01   
   (-0.35)   
Strike   0.02   
   (0.55)   
Number of contestants  0.10    
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  (0.60)    
Expressiveness    0.34  
    (0.19)  
Remote past minister     2.87 
     (1.57) 
Immediate past 
minister 
    0.03 
     (0.01) 
Observations 65 65 65 65 65 
Adjusted R-squared 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the re-elected winners’ vote 
shares at the level in marginal constituencies; all continuous variables are at the level; estimation method is OLS; constant and 
time effect included but not reported.  
 
Appendix 6Z-D: OLS estimations of the model 6.3: Determinants of re-elected winners’ vote shares in 
marginal constituencies(with 1991 power-match and with political competition): 1991-2008  
Variables Model 6.3 Model 6.3a Model 6.3b Model 6.3c Model 6.3d 
      
Night-time satellite 
imagery 
2.70 2.98 2.46 2.93 3.71 
 (0.52) (0.57) (0.43) (0.55) (0.71) 
Inflation 0.05 0.15 0.08 0.07 -0.12 
 (0.06) (0.17) (0.09) (0.08) (-0.14) 
Adult literacy -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 
 (-0.57) (-0.72) (-0.49) (-0.54) (-0.77) 
Gender ratio -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 -0.13 -0.10 
 (-1.51) (-1.29) (-0.89) (-1.30) (-1.26) 
Hindu population 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 
 (0.63) (0.68) (0.68) (0.58) (0.62) 
Medium developed 1.27 1.27 1.10 1.32 1.51 
 (1.01) (1.01) (0.85) (1.02) (1.20) 
High developed 1.07 1.07 0.92 1.05 0.86 
 (0.82) (0.82) (0.67) (0.80) (0.66) 
Voter turnout -0.05 -0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.02 
 (-0.59) (-0.44) (-0.85) (-0.47) (-0.20) 
Political alliance 4.93** 4.75** 4.96** 4.94** 4.65** 
 (2.63) (2.48) (2.60) (2.61) (2.35) 
Political competition -16.96*** -16.79*** -17.26*** -16.98*** -17.07*** 
 (-10.85) (-10.49) (-10.45) (-10.73) (-10.68) 
Power-match 1.25 1.06 1.35 1.26 1.13 
 (0.94) (0.77) (0.96) (0.94) (0.83) 
Ex-incumbency -0.68 -0.65 -1.02 -0.60 -1.16 
 (-0.54) (-0.51) (-0.74) (-0.44) (-0.90) 
Hard core poverty -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 -0.07 
 (-1.15) (-1.04) (-0.68) (-1.15) (-1.03) 
Murder   -0.01   
   (-0.35)   
Strike   0.02   
   (0.55)   
Number of contestants  0.10    
  (0.60)    
Expressiveness    0.34  
    (0.19)  
Remote past minister     2.87 
     (1.57) 
Immediate past minister     0.03 
     (0.01) 
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Observations 65 65 65 65 65 
Adjusted R-squared 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the re-elected winners’ vote 
shares at the level in marginal constituencies; all continuous variables are at the level; estimation method is OLS; constant and 
time effect included but not reported.  
 
 
Appendix 6Z-E: OLS estimations of the model 6.3: Determinants of re-elected winners’ vote shares in 
marginal constituencies(with 1991 power-match and with winning margin): 1991-2008  
Variables Model 6.3 Model 6.3a Model 6.3b Model 6.3c Model 6.3d 
      
Night-time satellite imagery -0.96 -0.42 -1.02 -2.14 -0.96 
 (-0.15) (-0.06) (-0.14) (-0.32) (-0.14) 
Inflation 1.02 1.17 0.95 0.92 0.98 
 (0.94) (1.06) (0.85) (0.84) (0.87) 
Adult literacy 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.04 
 (0.46) (0.18) (0.31) (0.39) (0.32) 
Gender ratio -0.02 0.00 -0.10 0.04 -0.04 
 (-0.17) (0.03) (-0.75) (0.34) (-0.38) 
Hindu population -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 
 (-0.42) (-0.32) (-0.48) (-0.26) (-0.22) 
Medium developed -1.30 -1.25 -0.88 -1.60 -1.53 
 (-0.80) (-0.77) (-0.54) (-0.96) (-0.92) 
High developed 0.34 0.36 0.79 0.43 0.51 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.47) (0.26) (0.31) 
Voter turnout 0.08 0.10 0.17 0.20 0.05 
 (0.82) (0.95) (1.49) (1.09) (0.47) 
Political alliance -0.70 -0.90 -0.60 -0.74 -0.94 
 (-0.30) (-0.39) (-0.26) (-0.32) (-0.39) 
Winning margin 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.54*** 
 (7.48) (7.22) (7.45) (7.48) (7.25) 
Power-match -1.59 -1.85 -1.87 -1.67 -1.71 
 (-0.97) (-1.10) (-1.09) (-1.01) (-1.02) 
Ex-incumbency 1.74 1.76 2.51 1.28 2.15 
 (1.13) (1.14) (1.56) (0.77) (1.36) 
Hard core poverty -0.04 -0.03 -0.10 -0.02 -0.05 
 (-0.50) (-0.38) (-1.14) (-0.23) (-0.61) 
Murder   0.02   
   (0.97)   
Strike   -0.05   
   (-1.08)   
Number of contestants  0.17    
  (0.79)    
Expressiveness    -1.74  
    (-0.78)  
Remote past minister     -2.02 
     (-0.83) 
Immediate past minister     -2.84 
     (-0.73) 
Observations 65 65 65 65 65 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.77 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the re-elected winners’ vote 
shares at the level in marginal constituencies; all continuous variables are at the level; estimation method is OLS; constant and 
time effect included but not reported.  
 
 
Appendix 6Z-F: OLS estimations of the model 6.3: Determinants of re-elected winners’ vote shares in 
marginal constituencies(without 1991 power-match and with winning margin): 1991-2008  
Variables Model 6.3 Model 
6.3a 
Model 
6.3b 
Model 
6.3c 
Model 
6.3d 
      
Night-time satellite imagery -0.96 -0.42 -1.02 -2.14 -0.96 
 (-0.15) (-0.06) (-0.14) (-0.32) (-0.14) 
Inflation 1.02 1.17 0.95 0.92 0.98 
 (0.94) (1.06) (0.85) (0.84) (0.87) 
Adult literacy 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.04 
 (0.46) (0.18) (0.31) (0.39) (0.32) 
Gender ratio -0.02 0.00 -0.10 0.04 -0.04 
 (-0.17) (0.03) (-0.75) (0.34) (-0.38) 
Hindu population -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 
 (-0.42) (-0.32) (-0.48) (-0.26) (-0.22) 
Medium developed -1.30 -1.25 -0.88 -1.60 -1.53 
 (-0.80) (-0.77) (-0.54) (-0.96) (-0.92) 
High developed 0.34 0.36 0.79 0.43 0.51 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.47) (0.26) (0.31) 
Voter turnout 0.08 0.10 0.17 0.20 0.05 
 (0.82) (0.95) (1.49) (1.09) (0.47) 
Political alliance -0.70 -0.90 -0.60 -0.74 -0.94 
 (-0.30) (-0.39) (-0.26) (-0.32) (-0.39) 
Winning margin 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.54*** 
 (7.48) (7.22) (7.45) (7.48) (7.25) 
Power-match -1.59 -1.85 -1.87 -1.67 -1.71 
 (-0.97) (-1.10) (-1.09) (-1.01) (-1.02) 
Ex-incumbency 1.74 1.76 2.51 1.28 2.15 
 (1.13) (1.14) (1.56) (0.77) (1.36) 
Hard core poverty -0.04 -0.03 -0.10 -0.02 -0.05 
 (-0.50) (-0.38) (-1.14) (-0.23) (-0.61) 
Murder   0.02   
   (0.97)   
Strike   -0.05   
   (-1.08)   
Number of contestants  0.17    
  (0.79)    
Expressiveness    -1.74  
    (-0.78)  
Remote past minister     -2.02 
     (-0.83) 
Immediate past minister     -2.84 
     (-0.73) 
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Observations 65 65 65 65 65 
Adjusted R-squared 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.77 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the re-elected winners’ vote 
shares at the level in marginal constituencies; all continuous variables are at the level; estimation method is OLS; constant and 
time effect included but not reported.  
 
 
Appendix 6Z-G: Fixed effect estimations of the model 6.4: Determinants of re-elected winners’ vote 
shares in non-marginal constituencies(with 1991 power-match and political competition): 1991-2008  
Variables Model 6.4 Model 6.4a Model 6.4b Model 6.4c Model 6.4d 
Night-time satellite 
imagery 
39.87*** 39.67*** 41.78*** 41.36*** 41.06*** 
 (3.47) (3.37) (3.52) (3.71) (3.31) 
Inflation 0.40 0.26 0.58 0.34 0.26 
 (0.63) (0.40) (0.93) (0.53) (0.38) 
Adult literacy 0.57 0.42 0.76** 0.51 0.52 
 (1.63) (1.16) (2.39) (1.47) (1.50) 
Gender ratio 0.12 0.20 0.20 0.13 0.11 
 (0.60) (1.15) (0.83) (0.71) (0.57) 
Hindu population -1.49 -0.98 -1.67 -1.65 -1.50 
 (-1.34) (-0.89) (-1.63) (-1.49) (-1.37) 
Medium developed -0.39 -0.34 -0.69 -0.55 -0.51 
 (-0.61) (-0.55) (-1.01) (-0.79) (-0.76) 
High developed 2.99*** 3.53*** 3.38*** 2.95*** 3.07*** 
 (3.48) (4.07) (3.83) (3.47) (3.58) 
Voter turnout -0.02 -0.06 0.01 -0.00 -0.05 
 (-0.29) (-0.99) (0.11) (-0.03) (-0.66) 
Political alliance 9.05*** 9.54** 9.43*** 8.87*** 8.85*** 
 (2.69) (2.49) (3.06) (2.69) (2.66) 
Political competition -13.90*** -13.23*** -13.63*** -13.98*** -13.86*** 
 (-14.76) (-13.19) (-13.76) (-15.06) (-14.80) 
Power-match 2.23 2.61 2.13 2.15 2.07 
 (1.32) (1.35) (1.39) (1.31) (1.25) 
Ex-incumbency -1.08 -1.04 -0.23 -1.11 -1.27 
 (-0.80) (-0.83) (-0.17) (-0.82) (-0.92) 
Hard core poverty -0.22* -0.19* -0.30*** -0.23* -0.19 
 (-1.96) (-1.87) (-2.80) (-1.97) (-1.49) 
Murder   -0.02***   
   (-3.44)   
Strike   -0.00   
   (-0.27)   
Number of contestants  0.27***    
  (2.62)    
Expressiveness    -0.89  
    (-0.74)  
Remote past minister     0.73 
     (0.54) 
Immediate past minister     1.50 
     (1.10) 
Observations 238 238 238 238 238 
Adjusted R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 
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Number of constituencies 164 164 164 164 164 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the re-elected winners’ vote 
shares at the level in non-marginal constituencies; all continuous variables are at the level; estimation method is fixed effect; 
constant, constituency and time effect included but not reported; standard errors are clustered by constituencies. 
 
Appendix 6Z-H: Fixed effect estimations of the model 6.4: Determinants of re-elected winners’ vote 
shares in non-marginal constituencies(with 1991 power-match and winning margin): 1991-2008 
Variables Model 6.4 Model 
6.4a 
Model 
6.4b 
Model 
6.4c 
Model 
6.4d 
Night-time satellite imagery 37.44 39.45 36.31 33.16 32.45 
 (1.38) (1.47) (1.31) (1.34) (1.06) 
Inflation -0.43 -0.56 -0.47 -0.30 -0.55 
 (-0.51) (-0.66) (-0.54) (-0.36) (-0.61) 
Adult literacy -0.07 -0.22 -0.15 0.05 -0.10 
 (-0.11) (-0.38) (-0.24) (0.09) (-0.16) 
Gender ratio -0.26 -0.12 -0.33 -0.29 -0.22 
 (-0.95) (-0.51) (-1.16) (-1.03) (-0.80) 
Hindu population -0.27 0.34 -0.52 0.07 -0.61 
 (-0.16) (0.19) (-0.28) (0.04) (-0.38) 
Medium developed -2.08 -1.91 -2.94** -1.72 -2.20 
 (-1.49) (-1.38) (-1.98) (-1.16) (-1.56) 
High developed -1.42 -0.23 -1.68 -1.37 -1.63 
 (-1.17) (-0.17) (-1.30) (-1.12) (-1.39) 
Voter turnout 0.14 0.06 0.14 0.10 0.11 
 (1.54) (0.57) (1.53) (1.08) (0.96) 
Political alliance 3.99 5.42 2.79 4.21 4.43 
 (0.66) (0.83) (0.47) (0.68) (0.73) 
Winning margin 0.51*** 0.45*** 0.50*** 0.51*** 0.50*** 
 (7.00) (5.44) (5.71) (6.98) (7.23) 
Power-match 0.27 1.02 -0.68 0.41 0.27 
 (0.10) (0.34) (-0.24) (0.14) (0.10) 
Ex-incumbency -0.81 -0.81 -1.75 -0.72 -0.38 
 (-0.69) (-0.62) (-1.11) (-0.61) (-0.30) 
Hard core poverty -0.05 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 -0.05 
 (-0.35) (-0.25) (-0.36) (-0.19) (-0.34) 
Murder   0.00   
   (0.17)   
Strike   -0.07*   
   (-1.80)   
Number of contestants  0.37**    
  (2.16)    
Expressiveness    1.88  
    (1.20)  
Remote past minister     -1.66 
     (-0.79) 
Immediate past minister     2.13 
     (0.81) 
Observations 238 238 238 238 238 
Adjusted R-squared 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.78 
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Number of constituencies 164 164 164 164 164 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the re-elected winners’ vote 
shares at the level in non-marginal constituencies; all continuous variables are at the level; estimation method is fixed effect; 
constant, constituency and time effect included but not reported; standard errors are clustered by constituencies. 
 
 
Appendix 6Z-I: Fixed effect estimations of the model 6.4: Determinants of re-elected winners’ vote 
shares in non-marginal constituencies(without 1991 power-match and with political competition): 
1991-2008  
Variables Model 6.4 Model 6.4a Model 6.4b Model 6.4c Model 6.4d 
      
Night-time satellite 
imagery 
39.87*** 39.67*** 41.78*** 41.36*** 41.06*** 
 (3.47) (3.37) (3.52) (3.71) (3.31) 
Inflation 0.40 0.26 0.58 0.34 0.26 
 (0.63) (0.40) (0.93) (0.53) (0.38) 
Adult literacy 0.57 0.42 0.76** 0.51 0.52 
 (1.63) (1.16) (2.39) (1.47) (1.50) 
Gender ratio 0.12 0.20 0.20 0.13 0.11 
 (0.60) (1.15) (0.83) (0.71) (0.57) 
Hindu population -1.49 -0.98 -1.67 -1.65 -1.50 
 (-1.34) (-0.89) (-1.63) (-1.49) (-1.37) 
Medium developed -0.39 -0.34 -0.69 -0.55 -0.51 
 (-0.61) (-0.55) (-1.01) (-0.79) (-0.76) 
High developed 2.99*** 3.53*** 3.38*** 2.95*** 3.07*** 
 (3.48) (4.07) (3.83) (3.47) (3.58) 
Voter turnout -0.02 -0.06 0.01 -0.00 -0.05 
 (-0.29) (-0.99) (0.11) (-0.03) (-0.66) 
Political alliance 9.05*** 9.54** 9.43*** 8.87*** 8.85*** 
 (2.69) (2.49) (3.06) (2.69) (2.66) 
Political competition -13.90*** -13.23*** -13.63*** -13.98*** -13.86*** 
 (-14.76) (-13.19) (-13.76) (-15.06) (-14.80) 
Power-match 2.23 2.61 2.13 2.15 2.07 
 (1.32) (1.35) (1.39) (1.31) (1.25) 
Ex-incumbency -1.08 -1.04 -0.23 -1.11 -1.27 
 (-0.80) (-0.83) (-0.17) (-0.82) (-0.92) 
Hard core poverty -0.22* -0.19* -0.30*** -0.23* -0.19 
 (-1.96) (-1.87) (-2.80) (-1.97) (-1.49) 
Murder   -0.02***   
   (-3.44)   
Strike   -0.00   
   (-0.27)   
Number of contestants  0.27***    
  (2.62)    
Expressiveness    -0.89  
    (-0.74)  
Remote past minister     0.73 
     (0.54) 
Immediate past minister     1.50 
     (1.10) 
Observations 238 238 238 238 238 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 
Number of constituencies 164 164 164 164 164 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the re-elected winners’ vote 
shares at the level in non-marginal constituencies; all continuous variables are at the level; estimation method is fixed effect; 
constant, constituency and time effect included but not reported; standard errors are clustered by constituencies. 
 
Appendix 6Z-J: Fixed effect estimations of the model 6.4: Determinants of re-elected winners’ vote 
shares in non-marginal constituencies(without 1991 power-match and with winning margin): 1991-
2008  
Variables Model 6.4 Model 6.4a Model 6.4b Model 6.4c Model 6.4d 
      
Night-time satellite imagery 37.44 39.45 36.31 33.16 32.45 
 (1.38) (1.47) (1.31) (1.34) (1.06) 
Inflation -0.43 -0.56 -0.47 -0.30 -0.55 
 (-0.51) (-0.66) (-0.54) (-0.36) (-0.61) 
Adult literacy -0.07 -0.22 -0.15 0.05 -0.10 
 (-0.11) (-0.38) (-0.24) (0.09) (-0.16) 
Gender ratio -0.26 -0.12 -0.33 -0.29 -0.22 
 (-0.95) (-0.51) (-1.16) (-1.03) (-0.80) 
Hindu population -0.27 0.34 -0.52 0.07 -0.61 
 (-0.16) (0.19) (-0.28) (0.04) (-0.38) 
Medium developed -2.08 -1.91 -2.94** -1.72 -2.20 
 (-1.49) (-1.38) (-1.98) (-1.16) (-1.56) 
High developed -1.42 -0.23 -1.68 -1.37 -1.63 
 (-1.17) (-0.17) (-1.30) (-1.12) (-1.39) 
Voter turnout 0.14 0.06 0.14 0.10 0.11 
 (1.54) (0.57) (1.53) (1.08) (0.96) 
Political alliance 3.99 5.42 2.79 4.21 4.43 
 (0.66) (0.83) (0.47) (0.68) (0.73) 
Winning margin 0.51*** 0.45*** 0.50*** 0.51*** 0.50*** 
 (7.00) (5.44) (5.71) (6.98) (7.23) 
Power-match 0.27 1.02 -0.68 0.41 0.27 
 (0.10) (0.34) (-0.24) (0.14) (0.10) 
Ex-incumbency -0.81 -0.81 -1.75 -0.72 -0.38 
 (-0.69) (-0.62) (-1.11) (-0.61) (-0.30) 
Hard core poverty -0.05 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 -0.05 
 (-0.35) (-0.25) (-0.36) (-0.19) (-0.34) 
Murder   0.00   
   (0.17)   
Strike   -0.07*   
   (-1.80)   
Number of contestants  0.37**    
  (2.16)    
Expressiveness    1.88  
    (1.20)  
Remote past minister     -1.66 
     (-0.79) 
Immediate past minister     2.13 
     (0.81) 
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Observations 238 238 238 238 238 
Adjusted R-squared 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.78 
Number of constituencies 164 164 164 164 164 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the re-elected winners’ vote 
shares at the level in non-marginal constituencies; all continuous variables are at the level; estimation method is fixed effect; 
constant, constituency and time effect included but not reported; standard errors are clustered by constituencies. 
 
 
 
Appendix 6Z-K: Comparison of models determining factors affecting vote shares of re-elected winners 
in non-marginal constituencies: 1991-2008 
 
Variables Model 6.4 Model 6.4 Model 6.4 Model 6.4 
 With 1991 power match Without 1991 power match 
Night-time satellite 
imagery 
39.87*** 37.44 39.87*** 37.44 
 (3.47) (1.38) (3.47) (1.38) 
Inflation 0.40 -0.43 0.40 -0.43 
 (0.63) (-0.51) (0.63) (-0.51) 
Adult literacy 0.57 -0.07 0.57 -0.07 
 (1.63) (-0.11) (1.63) (-0.11) 
Gender ratio 0.12 -0.26 0.12 -0.26 
 (0.60) (-0.95) (0.60) (-0.95) 
Hindu population -1.49 -0.27 -1.49 -0.27 
 (-1.34) (-0.16) (-1.34) (-0.16) 
Medium developed -0.39 -2.08 -0.39 -2.08 
 (-0.61) (-1.49) (-0.61) (-1.49) 
High developed 2.99*** -1.42 2.99*** -1.42 
 (3.48) (-1.17) (3.48) (-1.17) 
Voter turnout -0.02 0.14 -0.02 0.14 
 (-0.29) (1.54) (-0.29) (1.54) 
Political alliance 9.05*** 3.99 9.05*** 3.99 
 (2.69) (0.66) (2.69) (0.66) 
Political competition -13.90*** - -13.90*** - 
 (-14.76) - (-14.76) - 
Winning margin - 0.51*** - 0.51*** 
 - (7.00) - (7.00) 
Power-match 2.23 0.27 2.23 0.27 
 (1.32) (0.10) (1.32) (0.10) 
Ex-incumbency -1.08 -0.81 -1.08 -0.81 
 (-0.80) (-0.69) (-0.80) (-0.69) 
Hard core poverty -0.22* -0.05 -0.22* -0.05 
 (-1.96) (-0.35) (-1.96) (-0.35) 
Murder     
     
Strike     
     
Number of contestants     
     
Expressiveness     
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Remote past minister     
     
Immediate past minister     
     
Observations 238 238 238 238 
Adjusted R-squared 0.92 0.78 0.92 0.78 
Number of constituencies 164 164 164 164 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the re-elected winners’ vote 
shares at the level in non-marginal constituencies; all continuous variables are at the level; estimation method is fixed effect; 
constant and time effect included but not reported; standard errors are clustered by constituencies. 
Appendix 6Z-L: Fixed effect estimations of the model 6.4: Determinants of re-elected winners’ vote 
shares in non-marginal constituencies(without 1991 power-match and with political competition and 
magnitude of winning margins in previous election): 1991-2008  
 
Variables Model 6.4 Model 6.4a Model 6.4b Model 6.4c Model 6.4d 
      
Night-time satellite 
imagery 
39.13*** 39.73*** 39.81*** 40.15*** 39.78*** 
 (3.67) (3.73) (3.48) (3.90) (3.32) 
Inflation 0.34 0.20 0.51 0.29 0.26 
 (0.59) (0.35) (0.90) (0.51) (0.42) 
Adult literacy 0.59* 0.49 0.74** 0.55 0.57* 
 (1.71) (1.37) (2.26) (1.59) (1.67) 
Gender ratio 0.18 0.28 0.26 0.19 0.18 
 (0.81) (1.46) (1.00) (0.88) (0.81) 
Hindu population -0.98 -0.41 -1.24 -1.12 -0.99 
 (-0.93) (-0.39) (-1.29) (-1.06) (-0.92) 
Medium developed -0.22 -0.14 -0.51 -0.33 -0.28 
 (-0.34) (-0.23) (-0.78) (-0.48) (-0.43) 
High developed 2.70*** 3.33*** 3.08*** 2.68*** 2.76*** 
 (3.56) (4.52) (4.01) (3.56) (3.62) 
Voter turnout -0.02 -0.07 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 
 (-0.36) (-1.24) (0.03) (-0.13) (-0.51) 
Political alliance 9.53*** 10.03*** 9.89*** 9.38*** 9.39*** 
 (3.67) (3.37) (4.06) (3.64) (3.54) 
Political competition -13.53*** -12.90*** -13.24*** -13.60*** -13.54*** 
 (-13.27) (-12.42) (-12.86) (-13.45) (-13.43) 
Power-match 2.57* 2.98* 2.49* 2.52* 2.47* 
 (1.91) (1.93) (1.92) (1.89) (1.77) 
Ex-incumbency -0.98 -1.04 -0.03 -1.02 -1.10 
 (-0.69) (-0.77) (-0.02) (-0.71) (-0.75) 
Hard core poverty -0.20* -0.18* -0.27** -0.21* -0.19 
 (-1.79) (-1.79) (-2.46) (-1.82) (-1.38) 
2.scaling_seats -2.84** -2.56** -2.75*** -2.73** -2.74** 
 (-2.60) (-2.46) (-2.62) (-2.39) (-2.54) 
3.scaling_seats -2.93*** -3.16*** -2.59** -2.91*** -2.89*** 
 (-2.88) (-2.91) (-2.57) (-2.76) (-2.88) 
4.scaling_seats -2.31** -2.17** -2.19** -2.28** -2.19** 
 (-2.31) (-2.27) (-2.15) (-2.24) (-2.13) 
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5.scaling_seats -2.78*** -2.90*** -2.86*** -2.83*** -2.72*** 
 (-2.96) (-2.98) (-3.10) (-2.97) (-2.83) 
6.scaling_seats -2.39* -1.99 -3.07** -2.43* -2.35* 
 (-1.70) (-1.48) (-2.43) (-1.66) (-1.65) 
Murder   -0.02***   
   (-3.17)   
Strike   -0.00   
   (-0.14)   
Number of contestants  0.28***    
  (2.80)    
Expressiveness    -0.65  
    (-0.55)  
Remote past minister     0.40 
     (0.29) 
Immediate past minister     0.80 
     (0.60) 
Observations 238 238 238 238 238 
Adjusted R-squared 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.93 
Number of constituencies 164 164 164 164 164 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the dependent variable is the re-elected winners’ vote 
shares at the level in non-marginal constituencies; all continuous variables are at the level; estimation method is fixed effect; 
constant and time effect included but not reported; standard errors are clustered by constituencies. 
Appendix 6Z-M: Values of coefficients and winning margin categories in the previous election  
 
 
 
 
